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MET Mes te) 
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PEED ON Se oem 1, 


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THE AUTHOR OF NATURE 
AND THE SUPERNATURAL 


(De Deo Creante et Elevante) 
A DOGMATIC TREATISE 


BY 


¥ 


THE REVEREND JOSEPH POHLE, PH.D., D.D. 


FORMERLY PROFESSOR OF FUNDAMENTAL THEOLOGY IN THE 
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA, NOW PROFESSOR 
OF DOGMA IN THE UNIVERSITY OF BRESLAU 


AUTHORIZED ENGLISH VERSION, BASED ON THE FIFTH 
GERMAN EDITION, WITH SOME ABRIDGEMENT 
AND MANY ADDITIONAL REFERENCES 


BY 


ARTHUR PREUSS 


ST. LOUIS, MO., 1912 
PuBLISHED BY B. HERDER © 
17 SOUTH BROADWAY 


FREIBURG (BADEN) LONDON W.C. 
GERMANY 68, GREAT RUSSELL STR. 


NIHIL OBSTAT. 


Sti. Ludovici, die 10. Junii, 1912 
JOSEPHUS WENTKER, 


Censor Librorum. 


IMPRIMATUR. 
Sti. Ludovici, die 12. Junii, 1912 
} JOANNES J. GLENNON, 
Archiepiscopus Sti. Ludovici. 


Copyright, 1912, 
by 
JOSEPH GUMMERSBACH. 


— BECKTOLD— 
PRINTING AND BOOK MFG. CO, 
ST. LOUIS, MO. 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 


PAGE 
INTRODUCTION I 
Part I. CREATION CONSIDERED AS A Divine Act 3 
Cu. I. The Beginning of the World, or Creation as a Pro- 
duction out of Nothing 4 
§ 1. The Dogma é 4 
Art. 1. Demonstration (as ichered Sere : 4 
Art. 2. The Heresies of Dualism and Pantheism . 20 
§ 2. Explanation of the Dogma . 82 
Art, 1. The Divine Idea of the Chines as he at 
emplary Cause of Creation , 32 
ArT. 2. Creation in its Relation to ine! ieee 35 
Art. 3. Creation as a Free Divine Act 40 
ArT. 4. Creation in Time . r 49 
Art. 5. The Incommunicability on God’s Greate 
Power 54 
Cu. II. The Continued Existence of the Created Universe, 
or Divine Preservation and Concurrence 61 
§ 1. Divine Preservation . ‘ 62 
§ 2. Divine Co-operation or Consitrenes i Se OF, 
Cu. III. The Final Cause or End of Creation, and Divine 
Providence : 79 
§ 1. The Final Cause or Obiect Me Creation : 80 
§ 2. Divine Providence OI 
Part II. CREATION PASSIVELY CONSIDERED, OR THE CREATED 
UNIVERSE 97 
Cu. I. Dogmatic Cosmology . 98 
§ 1. First and Second Creation . 98 
. § 2. The Hexaémeron in its Relation 18) Guienee and 
PEER ESTO CULE iar bie coma are enn oN ai tatin YUTO3 


ill 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Art. 1. The Mosaic Account of the Creation and 
Physical Science .:. on lies tO 
Art. 2. The Hexaémeron and foe MR Ay Seer ti 
CH. U1. Dogmatio: Anthropology 7.) ae ce ee 124 
§ 1. The Nature of Man. . 2° 2 te6 

Art. 1. The Origin of Man one a Waite ras the 
TiimatyRacercue - 126 

Art. 2. The Essential Comscimenes i Man an 
Their Mutual Relationship . . - ae O 
Art. 3. The Immortality of the ees Soul 2 OES 
Arr, 4, Origin of. the Setl-).. 9. *.0 au. eee 
§ 2. The Supernatural in Man. . . EM an Ta Soule 60) 
Art. I. Nature and the Sanernatiratl 3) te Le 
A. Definition of the Supernatural . . . 180 

B. The Prerogatives That Constitute the Super 
natural Order.) ohne - I90 

Art. 2. Man’s Srey Hai Eracweey, in Caen 
ine) coh, SRE . 196 


ArT. 3. Various Hercstoeh VS. the Domai Ronen 
ing of the Church in Regard to the State of Orig- 


inal’ Justice >. -.0)4 . 218 

Art. 4. The Different Sate Bs Maw id ane State 
of Pure Nature in Particular. . . Rea) 

§ 3. Man’s Defection from the Supernatural ‘Ofled or 
the Doctrine of Original Sin . . “232 

Art. 1. The Sin of Adam Considered as ane ee 
Sin, and its Effects on Our Proto-Parents . . 233 


Art. 2. The Sin of Adam Considered as Original 
Sin in the Technical Sense of the Term . . 2235 


Art. 3. The Nature of Original Sin. . . . 259 

Art. 4. How Original Sin is Transmitted. 8 ZAO 

Art. 5. The Penalties of Original Sin . . . . 26 

Cu. III. Christian Angelology . . . . 308 
§ 1. Existence, Nature, Number, and Hicecche af the 

Bavels a: feels oMeea rd 


ArT. I. Existence and Nene Bi the Mapels Meh 
Art. 2, Number and Hierarchy of the Angels 75.32% 
§ 2. The Angels and the Supernatural Order . . , 325 
AR? T; “The Supernatural Endowment of the Angels 325 

iv 


TABLE; OF CONTENTS 


PAGE 
Art. 2. The Angels in Their Relation to Men, or 
the Guardian Angels . . Jed B30 
§ 3. The Apostasy of a Number af he Wipelan ine AO 
Art. 1. The Fallen Angels or Demons. . Le a40 
Art. 2. The Demons in Their Relation to ‘ie tie 
Matis RaGCeni saat ace heey alam ual Man nen aitLM eI onl RAL 


ENDER, rata Vicente tis strc elt lees Yorn «cai nin b taut Womhaettite. tren Waly ell SEB 


Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2022 with funding from 
Princeton Theological Seminary Library 


https://archive.org/details/godauthorofnatur00pohl 


INTRODUCTION 


In two previous volumes * we considered God 
as He is in Himself. The remaining treatises 
of what is commonly called Special Dogmatic 
Theology treat of Him in relation to His various 
works, both of the natural and the supernatural 
order. 

God’s first and primal work is the Creation of 
the universe. Creation constitutes the funda- 
mental and essential postulate of all being and 
operation in the natural order as well as of all 
supernatural institutions, such as the Incarnation, 
Grace, the Sacraments, etc. Hence, the dog- 
matic treatise De Deo Creante et Elevante, which 
forms the subject matter of this volume, views 
God as the Author of Nature and the Super- 
natural. A true idea of Creation is indispensable 
to deepen and perfect the conception of God 
gained from the two preceding treatises. 


1God: His Knowability, Essence, Herder 1911.—The Divine Trin- 
and Attributes. A Dogmatic Trea- ity. A Dogmatic Treatise. By the 
tise. Prefaced by a Brief General Rev. Joseph Pohle, Ph.D., D.D. 
Introduction to the Study of Dog- -. . Authorized English Version, 
matic Theology. By the Rev. Jos. with Some Abridgement and Nu- 
Pohle, Ph.D., D.D. Authorized Eng- merous Additional References, by 
lish Version, with Some Abridge- Arthur Preuss. St. Louis, Mo.: B. 
ment and Added References, by Herder 1g11. i 
Arthur Preuss. St. Louis, Mo.: B. 


I 


2 INTRODUCTION 


Creation may be regarded from two distinct 
points of vantage: either (1) subjectively, as 
the creative act of God (actus creationis); or 
(2) objectively, as the result of this act, namely, 
the work of Creation (opus creationis). Hence 
the present volume embraces two main divisions: 
(I) Creation considered as a divine act, and ( TT} 
Creation considered as the result of that dct aor 
the created universe. 


PART I 


CREATION CONSIDERED AS A 
DIVINE ACT 


As the innermost Essence of God is self-existence,? 
so the cosmos (by which we mean everything not-God) 
is essentially dependent on God as its first and sole cause. 
The universe is no ens a se; it is entirely ab alio. This 
dependency is co-existent with the universe in all its 
phases. From the moment of its creation down to the 
hour of its consummation the universe is and remains 
essentially ens ab alio. It depends on God for its being 
and operation, and would sink back into nothingness 
without Him. Consequently God’s absolute causality 
must be our guiding principle in studying the doctrine 
of Creation. It is in the light of this principle that we 
must envisage the created universe, all things visible and 
invisible, the whole of nature and the supernatural order. 

Considered in His causal relation to the universe, God 
is its Creator; considered in relation to the continued 
existence of the universe, He is its Preserver and the 
Principle of all creatural action; considered in His rela- 
tion to the end of the universe (taking end in the sense 
of causa finals), He is the ultimate goal of Creation 
and its Governor by virtue of Divine Providence. We 
shall treat these three aspects of Creation in as many 
separate Chapters. 


2Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Aitributes, pp. 
133 Sdq. 


3 


CHARTER 


THE BEGINNING OF THE WORLD, OR CREATION AS 
A PRODUCTION OUT OF NOTHING 


SE GTILOIN er 


THE DOGMA 


That the universe was created out of nothing 
is one of the fundamental articles of the Catholic 
faith. Dogmatic theology demonstrates it from 
Holy Scripture, defends it against the opposing 
heresies of Dualism and Pantheism, clears up 
certain supplementary and explanatory notions 
that centre about the dogma, e. g., the liberty of 
the divine act of Creation, the simultaneous be- 
ginning of the world and of time, the incommuni- 
cability of creative power, etc. 


ARV IGICE Tt 


DEMONSTRATION FROM SACRED SCRIPTURE 


1. THE Concept or Creation ExPLAINED.— 
Catholic Philosophy, in accord with ecclesiastical 
Tradition, defines Creation as “the production of 

oS 


CREATION DEFINED 5 


a thing from, or out of, nothing.” * In this defi- 
nition, ‘‘production” expresses the proximate 
genus, while “out of nothing” * gives the specific 
difference by which Creation is marked off from 
all other modes of production as a singular oper- 
ation peculiar to God. 


a) There are two other well-known modes of pro- 
duction, which, however, have nothing in common with 
Creation except the genus. We mean generation and 
formation.° 

Generation differs from Creation in that Creation is 
a production out of nothing, while generation signifies 
the origin of one living being from another. This defi- 
nition applies to the divine Generation of the Son from 
the Father as well as to organic generation in the physical 
universe. In the Blessed Trinity, Generation is the 
Procession of the Logos “from the substance of the 
Father.”® The immanent production of the Holy 
Ghost by Spiration cannot be called Creation.’ 

As regards the so-called formative processes, both of 
nature and art, whether divine or creatural in their 
origin, all postulate a substratum, or raw material,’ from 
which the artificer evolves his product. Even second 

3“ Creatio simpliciter est pro- 


ductio ret ex nihilo.’ Cfr. J. T. 
Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: God, 


the nothingness of itself, as dis- 
tinguished from the nothingness of 
tts subject.” (W. Humphrey, S. J., 


pp. 202 sqq., 2nd ed., New York 
1904. 

4 Ex nihilo, in the sense of e*# 
nililo sui et subjectt. ‘‘ Since that 
which already is, is not being made, 
but that is being made which was 
not; so the nothingness, or the not 
being, of the thing which is being 
made, is presupposed to the effect- 
ing of it. This is what is called 


* His Divine Majesty,’ or The Liv- 
ing God, p. 206, London 1897.) 
5 Generatio — plasmatio s. forma- 
tio. f ; 

8éxk THs ovcias Tov marTpés, 
(Nicene Creed). Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, 
The Divine Trinity, pp. 162 sqq. 

7 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine 
Trinity, pp. 209 sqq. i 

8 Materia praeiacens Ss. ex qua. 


6 THE DOGMA 


creation, 7. ¢., the formation of the universe by God, was 
not creation in the strict sense, except in so far as in 


process thereof God actual] 


of nothing.® 


y produced new essences out 


b) The phrase er nihilo was misunderstood by Abbot 


Fredegis of Tours, 
real being, 


erroneous notion. 


who took nihilum in the sense of 
as some sort of invisible 
which the universe was formed.1! 


“protyle,” from 
This is an altogether 


The nothingness that preceded the 


Creation of the universe was no hyle, as conceived by 


Plato and Philo under the name of yi dv. 


The term 


ex nithilo is designed merely to negative the existence of 


any substratum or materia praeiacens, 


aliquo (é ovx dvTwy ) 1? 


It means non ex 


It would be equally erroneous to take Creation as 


signifying a conversion 
something, 


quo, 1. @., some sort of bein 


another kind.13 


(conversio) of nothing into 
Every conversion must have a terminus a 
§ convertible into being of 
Those of the Greek Fathers who de- 


fined Creation as & Tov py eivar eis TO evar Tapaywyn — 
(adductio ex non esse ad esse), merely wished to em- 
phasize that a thing which previously was merely possible 


had become rea] or actual. 


to actuality is no conversion, 
of the term, a mutation, b 


9 Hence the current distinction 
between creatio prima (ex nthilo) 
and creatio Secunda (ex materia 
praetacente), 

10 De Nihilo et Tenebris. Frede- 
gis flourished about the beginning 
of the ninth century, Cfr, Hurter, 
Nomenclator Literarius Theologiae 
Catholicae, Vol. I, col. 714 sro 
ed., Oeniponte 1903. 

11 Cfr. A.-M. Clerke, Modern 


A transition from potentiality 
nor even, in the proper sense 
ut merely succession, 4. e., 


Cosmogonies, Pp. 150 sqq., London 
1905. 

12 Cfr. St, Thom., 5S, Theol., 1a, 
qu. 45, art. 1, ad 3: “ Haec prae- 
bositio ‘ex? non designat causam 
materialem, sed ordinem tantum, 
Sicut cum dicitur: Ex mane fit 
meridies, i, e., post mane fit meri- 
dies.” 

13 We shall treat of this subject 
more in detail in a later volume, 
on the Blessed Eucharist, 


CREATION DEFINED 7 


there suddenly appears a thing which did not previously 
exist. 

Consequently, Creation is an act whereby God pro- 
duces a substance which ex parte termini was preceded 
by pure nothingness (76 oi« gv). Hence the periphrastic 
definition given by St. Thomas: “ Creatio est productio 
alicuius ret secundum totam suam substantiam, nullo 
praesupposito — Creation is the production of the whole 
substance of a thing, with nothing presupposed.” 14 
To mark off the concept of Creation still more clearly 
from all those other kinds of purely formative pro- 
duction, which merely effect accidental changes in an 
already existing substance,* the Angelic Doctor de- 
fines it as “the production of being, as being.” 28 
Being, as such, is opposed not only to this or that con- 
crete being, but to pure nothingness. Accident, on the 
other hand, is not properly being (ens), but ens entis, 
or ens in alio,—that is to say, it has its being only by 
inherence in a subject.17 Hence creation invariably re- 
sults in substances, while accidents, as such, are not, 
strictly speaking, created, but simply inhere in created 
substances (“accidentia non tam creantur, quam con- 
creantur ).”’ 18 


14S. Theol., 1a, qu. 65, art. 3.— 
*‘ The last three words [of this defi- 
nition] are merely declarative. The 
sense of them is contained in the 
words which precede’ them.... 
The formal object of creation is 
being. . . . Creation makes that to 
be, which was not. Hence, another 
definition — Creation is the produc- 
tion of being, as being.”’—(Hum- 
phrey, “ His Divine Majesty,’ p, 
207.) 

15 Such as a sculptor, e. g.,,. works 
in marble. 

16 “ Creatio est productio entis in 


quanium est ens.’ S. Theol., 12, 
qu. 44, art. 2. 

17 Cfr. John Rickaby, S. J., Gen- 
eral Metaphysics, p. 253 (Stony- 
hurst Series). 

18“ To be created is proper to 
substance. This is so, both be- 
cause, if substance is to be made, 
it can be made only by creation; 
and because other things, even if 
they are made at the same time, 
and along with substance, are 
nevertheless made of that substance, 
because it is through the reality of 
the substance that they consist.’”— 


8 OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE DOGMA 


c) Though the Scriptural and ecclesiastical concept 
of Creation was more or less unknown to the most 
enlightened pagan philosophers of antiquity, as Plato and 
Aristotle, it is not one at which it was impossible for 
human reason to arrive without supernatural aid. With 
the possible exception of the teleological, all the argu- 
ments by which we are able to demonstrate the exist- 
ence of God show that He is the absolute Creator 
of the universe, and they would be incomplete without 
this final conclusion. De facto, however, human rea- 
son is indebted to Divine Revelation for the true con- 
cept of Creation, which philosophy might have found, 
but in matter of fact did not find. This service which 
Revelation has rendered to reason is the more important 
because the concept of Creation clarifies our idea of 
God. For unless we know God as the Creator of all 
things, we do not know the true God.” 

d) The objections raised against the dogma of Cre- 
ation by infidel philosophers are futile. The axiom 
“Ex nihilo nihil fit” cannot be applied to Creation, be- 
cause Creation does not suppose a nihilum causae, but 
merely a nihilum sui et subiecti. God is the exemplary, 
the efficient, and the final cause of the universe, though, 
of course, the cosmos was not educed out of a divine sub- 
stratum, as the Pantheists allege. Consequently it cannot 
be asserted that the dogma of Creation involves “an 
overt and direct contradiction of right reason.” *° On 
the contrary, since the universe has its raison d’étre not 
in itself, but in a supra-mundane and intelligent Creator, 


Humphrey, “ His Divine Majesty,’ 
pp. 207 sq. 

19 Cfr. Kleutgen, Philosophie der 
Vorzeit, Vol. II, p. 839, 2nd ed. 
Innsbruck 1878; Suarez, Metaph., 
disp. 20, sect. 1, n. 24; K. Elser, 


Die Lehre des Aristoteles uber das 
Wirken Gottes, Minster 1890. 

20 A, Lange, Geschichte des Ma- 
terialismus, 4th ed., p. 131, Iser- 
lohn 1882. 


THE DOGMA, PROVED FROM SCRIPTURE 9 


Creation is not only a possible but a necessary conception. 
Herbert Spencer objects that to conceive a relation be- 
tween nothing and something, is as impossible as to con- 
ceive of a thing hovering midway betwixt nothingness 
and existence. But the author of the Synthetic Phi- 
losophy has overlooked the fact that in defining Creation 
we employ the term “nothing” to denote logical, not 
real opposition. The terminus of active Creation (which 
takes place in instanti), is Being not in fieri, but in facto 
esse. Hence it is ludicrous to compare the world to 
“metamorphosed nothingness ” and to treat it as a “ de- 
lusion.” 

Another, somewhat more serious objection is that the 
dogma of Creation postulates the pre-existence of an 
immeasurable void, and the creation of space by an ex- 
ternal agency,— which are impossible assumptions, since 
“the non-existence of space cannot by any mental effort 
be imagined.” 2+ But a man who allows his imagination 
to picture empty space as a creatable reality, has no 
right to hurl stones into the garden of Christian philos- 
ophy. If only actual or real space can be concreated 
with the corporeal universe, we have no more reason to 
speak of the “ existence” or “ non-existence ” of empty 
or imaginary space than of the “ existence” of a possible 
triangle or man. | 


‘ 66 


2. ProoF oF THE Docma.—All things are 
created out of nothing. This truth is clearly 
contained both in Scripture and Tradition. The 
Socinian and Arminian claim that it cannot be 
demonstrated from the Bible, is manifestly false. 

a) seb. 11S \-consider,,. i the, first. place, the 


21 Herbert Spencer, First Principles (Burt’s Library, p. 29). 


10 PROOF OF THE DOGMA 


deeper meaning of certain names applied to God 
by Sacred Scripture. 


a) God’s incommunicable proper name is 711, 6 oy, 
primus et novissimus. Inasmuch as this name denotes 
His proper Essence, it applies to God really and truly ; in 
fact, as a proper name, it applies to Him alone,” or, to put 
it otherwise, nothing outside of God is or can be called 
Yahweh. Now, if the things existing outside of God 
were, like Himself, necessary, increate, and self-existing 
(even though only after the manner of an eternal self- 
existing hyle), God could no longer claim as exclusively 
His own that self-existence which is denoted by the 
name Yahweh. For the things existing outside Him 
would then likewise be of the nature of ens a Se, 
and therefore mn’. But if God alone is Yahweh, or 


ens a se, then whatever else exists must be ab alio, that 
is, created. On this supposition alone is there any sense 
in calling, as Sacred Scripture does, the things of this 
world “nothing” in comparison with God. Only an 
uncreated, self-existent Being can be called Being in the 
full and perfect sense of the term. Is. XL, 17: “ Om- 
nes gentes, quasi non sint, sic sunt coram eo, et quasi 
nihilum et inane reputatae sunt et— All nations are 
before him as if they had no being at all, and are counted 
to him as nothing and vanity.” Wisd. XI, 23: “ Tam- 
quam momentum staterae, sic est ante te orbis terrarum, 
et tamquam gutta roris antelucani, quae descendit in 
terram — For the whole world before thee is as the 
least grain of the balance, and as a drop of the morning 
dew, that falleth down upon the earth.” Tertullian de- 
velops this idea briefly and beautifully as follows: 


22 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 
163 sqq. 


THE DOGMA PROVED FROM SCRIPTURE 11 


“Deus unicus est, nec aliter unicus, nisi quia solus; nec 
aliter solus, nist quia mhil cum illo. Sic et primus, quia 
omnia post illum; sic omnia post illum, quia omnia ab 
ilo; sic ab illo, quia ex mhilo— God is unique, and He 
is unique because He is sole, and He is sole for the 
reason that nothing co-exists with Him. Thus He is 
also the first, because all other beings come after Him; 
and the reason they come after Him is that they are of 
Him, and they are of Him, because they are created out 
St netnine er 

There is another divine name, viz.: FINA, 6 KUpLos, 
Dominus coeli et terrae, which describes God as the pro- 
prietor and ruler of the universe, precisely because He 
is its Creator. Cfr. John I, 3: “ All things were made 
by him: and without him was made nothing that was 
made.” Rom. X1) 26: For oft him and:by him, and in 
him are all things.’ ?* Accordingly, God is the absolute 
owner and master of “ heaven and earth,” that is, of the 
whole created universe.2> This could not be if He had 
not created but merely fashioned the world. For an 
increate, absolutely independent Being necessarily en- 
joys unlimited autonomy and the right to repel all ex- 
traneous interference and to resist attempts made to 
modify or shape it. As St. Justin Martyr profoundly 
observes: “ He who has not created, has no power over 
that which is increate and cannot force anything upon 
it.’ °* It follows as a necessary corollary that God could 
not even assume the role of a Demiurge ** if He were 

23 Contr. Hermog. thenticity of this work is, however, 


24 Cir. also Heb. I, 3; Deut. X, doubtful. Cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, 
Dis Vlog CONV sill TENOONOV Talal Patrology, p, 54, Freiburg and St. 


12; 1 Paral. XXIX, 11 sqq. Louis 1908. 

25 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 27 Cfr. J. P. Arendzen in the 
Knowability, Essence and Aittri- Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IV, pp. 
butes, pp. 286 sqq. 707 Sq. e 


26 Cohort. ad Gentiles. The au- 


12 PROOF OF THE DOGMA 


not the Creator of the universe. Nor would He be 
omnipotent, for, as Tertullian rightly says: “Jam non 
omnipotens, si non et hoc potens ex mihilo ommia proferre 
— He would not be almighty, had He not the power to 
create all things out of nothing.” 7° 

According to Holy Scripture, God is the Creator not 
only of the visible but also of the invisible world, 7. e., 
the Angels. Col. I, 16: “In ipso condita sunt universa 
in coelis et in terra, visibilia et invisibilia, sive throni sive 
dominationes sive principatus sive potestates— For in 
him were all things created in heaven and on earth, 
visible and invisible, whether thrones, or dominations, or 
principalities, or powers.” ‘The Angels were created 
either from some pre-existent substratum, or out of 
nothing. They can not have been created from a pre- 
existent substratum, because they are pure spirits. Con- 
sequently the Angels were created out of nothing. 
And since Scripture tells us that the visible things 
originated in precisely the same fashion as the Angels, 
“ Heaven and earth,” too, must have been created out of 
nothing. 


8B) Our thesis can also be demonstrated di- 
rectly from Scripture. Thus the formula “ex 
milo facere’ occurs literally in the exhortation 
which the mother of the Machabees addressed to 
her son: “Peto, nate, ut adspicias ad coelum et 
terram et ad omnia, quae in ets sunt, et intelligas, 
quia ex nililo*® fecit illa Deus —I beseech thee, 
my son, look upon heaven and earth, and all that 
is in them: and consider that God made them out 


28 Contr. Hermog., c 8 29 €& odk byTwD, 


THE DOGMA PROVED FROM SCRIPTURE © 13 


of nothing.” *° Estimating this passage at its 
lowest value, it is certainly a convincing testt- 
monial to the belief of the Jews that God created 
all things out of nothing. But we are justified 
in attaching to it the authority of an inspired 
dogmatic text, because the Sacred Writer ex- 
pressly says that the mother of the Machabees, 
when uttering the above quoted words, was “‘filled 
with wisdom.” ** 

The Jews no doubt derived their belief in 
Creation from Gen. I, 1: “In principio creavit 
Deus coelum et terram — In the beginning God 
created heaven and earth.” Jews and Christians 
alike regard this text asa direct enunciation 
ol ithe dogma’ of) Creationh| Aside tron )all 
other considerations, the circumstance that this 
account, which is clearly meant to be an ex 
professo explanation of the origin of the uni- 
verse, gives no hint of any pre-existing sub- 
stratum or materia ex qua, permits us to con- 
clude with a very high degree of probability that 
no such substratum existed, and that, therefore, 
the universe was literally created out of nothing. 
We are confirmed in this inference by compar- 
ing the sublimely simple Mosaic account with the 
various cosmogonies of pagan philosophers and 
poets, such as Plato’s in the Timeus and Ovid's 
in. the Metamorphoses. A careful analysis of 


302 Mach. VII, 28. 812 Mach. VII, 21. 


14 PROOF OF THE DOGMA 


Gen. I, 1 will render our conclusion absolutely 
certain, MYNI2 is employed without qualification 
and therefore can have no other meaning than: 
“In the beginning of all things,” that is, at a 
time when nothing yet existed, and from whence 
all things date their existence. By “heaven and 
earth” we may understand either the complete 
heaven and the complete earth,** or the as yet 
unformed, shapeless, and chaotic raw material 
from which God in the course of six days suc- 
cessively formed and fashioned the complete be- 
ings that constitute the universe. In view of 
Gent I; 2s) The: earth owas void and vempry. 
the last-mentioned assumption is decidedly the 
more probable. After the act of Creation proper, 
therefore, things were still in a chaotic state, 
waiting to be fashioned. “Jnformis illa mate- 
ria,’ says St. Augustine, “quam de nihilo Deus 
fecit, appellata est primo coelum et terra, non 
quia tam hoc erat, sed quia hoc esse poterat; nam 
et coelum scribitur postea factum— This un- 
formed matter, which God made out of nothing, 
was first called heaven and earth; not because 
it was already heaven and earth, but because it 
had the capacity of becoming heaven and earth; 
for we read of heaven that it was made later.” * 

It must also be remembered that Holy Scrip- 


32 Cfr. Petavius, De Mundi Opif., 83 De Gen. contr. Manich., I, 7, 
Ts 2s7r0, Lis 


THE DOGMA PROVED FROM SCRIPTURE 15 


ture often employs the terms “coelum et terra’ 
in a more general sense, as denoting the entire 
cosmos, or all things which exist outside of God. 
Had the original terminus of God’s creative act 
merely been matter in a chaotic, unformed state, 
it could not possibly have been produced from 
some other materia mformis. For to fashion 
unformed matter from unformed matter 1n- 
volves a contradiction in terms. Consequently, 
the original production was strictly a creation out 
of nothing. 

This interpretation is confirmed by the use of 
the verb creavit, éroiyce, 892, Unlike the verbs 
n’y (fecit) and "! (formavit), the Hebrew 833. 
in the forms Kal and Niphal (in which it oc- 
curs no less than forty-seven times), exclusively 
signifies a divine and supernatural activity. 
It is, moreover, never construed with a materia 
ey. qua. We cannot.) /therefores\ reasonably 
doubt that Moses, by employing the term ¥%73,*° 
intended to teach the Creation of the universe out 
of nothing.*® 


In further proof of this thesis we quote Rom. IV, 
17: “Vocat ea, quae non sunt, tamquam ea, quae sunt 
— God... calleth those things that are not, as those 
that are.” Or, as the Greek text puts it more pointedly: 

84 Cfr. Hummelauer, Comment. Genes., Malines 1883; V. Zapletal, 
in Gen., pp. 86 sq., Paris 1895. O.P., Der Schopfungsbericht der 


35 Gen. I, 1. Genesis, Freiburg 1902. _ 
36 Cir. Lamy, Comment. in Libr. 


16 PROOF OF THE DOGMA 


KaAdovytos (@eov) ra py bvta os dvta.— TS pn ovra here 
cannot mean an eternal /yle. It can only mean absolute 
nothingness, since the divine “ call” signifies an omnipo- 
tent fiat, in virtue of which Being (évra) emerges from 
the abyss of non-being. Cfr. Ps. CXLVIII, 5: “Ipse 
dixit et. facta sunt, ipse mandavit et creata sunt — 
He spoke, and they were made: he commanded, and 
they were created.” In the light of this passage St. 
Paul’s xadciv ra ph dvta ds dvra is merely a paraphrase 
of the expression employed by the mother of the Macha- 
bees: oueiv €€ otk 8vrwv — creare ex nihilo. 

y) No serious Scriptural difficulties can be urged 
against this interpretation. The seemingly contradictory 
text, Wisd. XI, 18: “Creavit orbem terrarum ex ma- 
teria mvisa —[Thy almighty hand] . . . made the world 
of matter without form,” *? is explained by Estius *° as 
referring to the creatio secunda, because the Sacred 
Writer points out that God had the power to send upon 
the Egyptians “a multitude of bears, or fierce lions,” in- 
stead of a swarm of comparatively harmless frogs. 

Heb. XI, 3, which some writers likewise urge against 
the construction we have adopted, is susceptible of vari- 
ous interpretations. The passage reads thus: “ A ptata 
esse saecula*® verbo Dei, ut ex invisibilibus visibilia . 
herent —[By faith we understand that].the world was 
framed by the word of God; that from invisible things 
visible things might be made.” Did St. Paul by “ in- 
visible things” perhaps mean a substratum from which 
the visible things were made?. If he did, we should 
have to understand the “ framing of the world(s)” to 


37 The English rendering of this und die Schépfung, p. 63, Ratisbon 


passage is more accurate than that 1910. j 
of the Latin Vulgate — éé auopou 38 Comment. in Heb., XI, 135 
irAns means ex materia informi. 39 aqi@ves = worlds. 


Cfr. on this text C. Gutberlet, Gott 


THE DOGMA PROVED FROM TRADITION 17 


‘ 


refer to the creatio secunda and the “ invisible things ” 
to mean the formless raw material from which the uni- 
verse was moulded, and which according to Gen. I, I 
was called into being by the “creatio prima.’ *° Other 
exegetes take this aptatio to mean creatio prima, and 
hold that Heb. XI, 3 formally enunciates the dogma 
of Creation. They translate 76 py é« dawopevov ta Bre- 
mopeva yeyovevat by: “ The visible things were made from 
what was not apparent.” A third, somewhat factitious 
interpretation of the text is that adopted by St. Thomas 
Aquinas,** who holds that by “invisible things” the 
Apostle meant creative archetypes in the Divine Intellect. 


b) The argument from Tradition is based 
partly on the polemical discussions and partly on 
the positive teaching of the Fathers. 


a) Beginning with the Ionians and Eleatians, up to 
Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoa, the pagan philosophers 
of antiquity, and in their train the heretics of the first 
centuries of the Christian era — especially the Gnostics 
—either ignored or declined to accept the Christian con- 
cept of Creation. In defending the faith against both 
these schools, the Fathers found themselves compelled to 
employ very strong arguments. In an apologetical trea- 
tise formerly attributed to St. Justin Martyr, but which 
is probably spurious, Plato is charged with ignoring the 
fact that the universe had a zourys as well as a Symoupyds. 
The writer thus explains the vast difference between the 
two notions: “ Without requiring anything else, the 
Creator creates by his own might and power that which 
comes into being. The Demiurge, on the other hand, 
needs some pre-existing raw material from which to 


40 Gen, I, 1. 41S. Th., 1a,-qu. 65, art. \4,.ad 1. 


18 PROOF OF THE DOGMA 


fashion his works.” ** Similar arguments are advanced 


by Theophilus of Antioch ** and Athanasius.** Irenzeus 
rightly insists against the Gnostics, that a so-called 
Demiurge would have been unable to do anything with 
an uncreated, and therefore immutable, hyle.*® Tertul- 
lian sharply criticizes Hermogenes in these words: 
“Totum, quod est Deus, aufert, nolens illum ex mhilo 
universa fecisse. A Christianis enim conversus ad phi- 
losophos, de ecclesia in Acadenuam et Porticum, inde 
sumpsit a Stoicis materiam cum Domino ponere, quae 
ipsa semper fuerit, neque nata, neque facta, nec mtium 
habens omnino nec finem, ex qua Dominus omnia postea 
fecit — He [Hermogenes] denies that God is God when 
he denies that He made all things out of nothing. Havy- 
ing left the Church for the sects of the philosophers, he 
has adopted the Stoic view, that matter co-exists with 
God, that it is eternal, neither generated nor made, having 
neither beginning nor end, and that from it God made 
all things that subsequently came into being.” *° 

8B) In their positive teaching, the Fathers declared the 
doctrine that the world was created out of nothing to 
be an article of faith, just as it has since been held by 
the Christians of all ages, and as it is laid down in the 
Apostles’ Creed. “ Above all things believe,’ says the 
Pastor Hermae,*" “that there is but one God, who 
created and perfected all things, by drawing them out 

42 Cohort ad Gent., 22. “ Very 
probably it [the Cohortatio ad 
Gentes] was composed at the end 


of the second or the beginning of 
the third century, though at present 


[increata], mundus ex eo non con- 
ditur, siquidem materia omnem mu- 
tationem respuit, eo quod est in- 
genita.” (Migne, P.G., VII, 1248.) 

46 Tertull., Contra Hermog., c. 1. 


opinions differ very widely as to 
its origin.” (Bardenhewer-Shahan, 
Patrology, p. 53.) 

43 Ad Autol., II, 4. 

44 Serm. de Incarn. Verbi, 2. 

45“ St immutabilis est 


materia 


How the Arians confounded the 
concept of Creation with that of 
Generation in regard to the Logos, 
is explained in Pohle-Preuss, The 
Divine Trinity, pp. 123, sqq. 

47 Mandat. I, 1. 


THE DOGMA PROVED FROM: TRADITION’ |. i9 


of non-being into being.” *® Tertullian 4° denounces the 
“materiaru,’ who advocated the theory of an uncreated 
hyle, as heretics and observes: “ Regula est autem fidei, 
qua creditur, unum omnino Deum esse, nec alium praeter 
mundi conditorem, qui universa de nihilo produxerit — 
It is a rule of faith, by which we believe that there is 
but one God, nor any other beside the Creator of the 
world, who produced all things out of nothing.” °° For 
the sources of their teaching the Fathers point to Apos- 
tolic Tradition and the Mosaic narrative. Thus St. 
Athanasius teaches: “God created all things, which 
previously did not exist, through the Logos out of noth- 
ing, so that they received being, as He speaks through 
the mouth of Moses: In the beginning God created 
heaven and earth.” °' The Scriptural text just quoted, 
according to St. Chrysostom, is a powerful bulwark 
against all heresies: “This man Moses eradicated all 
heresies which were later to grow up in the Church, 
when he laid down the proposition: In the beginning 
God created heaven and earth. If, therefore, some 
Manichzan approach thee saying that matter pre-existed, 
or some other heretic like Marcion or Valentius or any 
pagan,— reply to him: In the beginning God created 
heaven and earth.” *? 


48 roinoas éx Tov wn svTos els solution of certain Patristic difficul- 


7o elvat Ta TavTa, ties into which we cannot enter 
49 Contr. Hermog., c. 25. here, the student is referred to 
50 Praescript., c. 13. Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Ele- 
51 Serm. de Incarnat. Verbi, 2. vante, pp. 53 sqq., Rome 1878. 


52 Hom. in Genes., 2, 3. For the 


20 DUALISM AND PANTHEISM 


AX DICE 2 


THE HERESIES OF DUALISM AND PANTHEISM AND THEIR 
CONDEMNATION 


I, [THE ANTI-CREATIONIST HERESIES.—The 
dogma that God created the universe out of 
nothing has two heretical antitheses, to either 
one of which all unorthodox systems can be log- 
ically reduced: Dualism which holds that the 
universe (matter in particular) is uncreated and 
on the same plane with God, and Pantheism, 
which identifies the universe with God as an 
emanation from His essence. 


Materialism (which in our day prefers to call itself 
“mechanical Monism” or “ Positivism),”* though it 
really denies the existence of God, may nevertheless be 
regarded as a species of Dualism, because it adopts the 
chief tenet of that heresy, namely, the existence of an 
eternal uncreated hyle. Similarly the theory of Emana- 
tion and Theosophy may be treated as varieties of Pan- 
theism, because both claim that God is identical with the 
cosmos. Hylozoism, so-called, is a cross between Dual- 
ism and Pantheism, though for our present purpose we 
may regard it merely as an imperfect form of cosmo- 
logical Pantheism. 

We should have to write a complete history of dogmas 
and heresies, or rather of philosophy, were we to under- 
take to describe the various Dualistic and Pantheistic 
systems that have flourished in the course of centuries. 

1On the various Monistic sys- mus und seine  philosophischen 


tems cfr. the recent admirable work Grundlagen, Freiburg IQII. 
of Fr. Klimke, S. J., Der Monis- 


DUALISM 21 


Both errors in very deed deserve to be called protean. 
For our present purpose it will be sufficient to sketch 
the more important varieties of Dualism and Pantheism, 
against which the Church as been compelled to proceed 
in order to keep the dogma of Creation from being be- 
clouded and traduced, and to preserve the Christian (1. e., 
theistic) concept of God in its pristine purity. For 
every heresy that impugns the dogma of Creation neces- 
sarily entails grave errors against the Church’s teaching 
on the essence and attributes of God. 


a) Many of the ancient pagan philosophers, 
including Plato, held that God and the world 
co-existed eternally, though in opposition to 
each other and incapable of conciliation by mere 
Snmovpyia, which formed a peculiar feature of this 
system.” 


Dualism became more and more variegated, and closely 
approached Pantheism, in the complex and fantastic 
systems of the Gnostics, who held matter to be the seat 
of evil and separated the increate hyle from the centre of 
divinity by a long series of intermediate beings, which 
they called aeons. Marcion distinguished between the 
God of the New Testament and the God of the Jewish 
Covenant as between two essentially different principles. 
The God of the Old Testament he held responsible for 
the existence of the material world, which, however, 
according to him, was not created out of nothing, but 
fashioned from eternal and uncreated matter. Marcion 
was a forerunner of Mani,® who carried the system to 


2 See the article ‘‘ Demiurge ” in Arendzen’s article ‘‘ Manichaeism ”’ 
the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IV. in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 
8QOn Mani (the Greek form is IX, pp. 591 sqq 
Mdyns) and Manichzism, consult 


22 ANTI-CREATIONIST HERESIES 


its ultimate conclusions by distinguishing between the 
“good God” and His “evil Anti-God.” *  Priscillian- 
ism represents a mitigated revival of the Manichean 
heresy.° It had thousands of adherents as early as the 
fourth century, especially in Spain, and was not entirely 
extinct at the time of the so-called Protestant Reforma- 
tion. Since the publication: by G. Schepss, in 1889, of 
Priscillian’s genuine writings, theologians are inclined to 
judge his teaching less harshly than that of his later 
followers, though it is impossible to absolve him from 
the charge of propagating “ Gnostic-Dualistic specula- 
tions vividly reminiscent of Manicheism, and propped 
up, apparently, by a system or framework of mytholog- 
ical and astrological ideas.” ® 


4“ The preponderance of good or 
evil is explained by the temporary 
advantage gained by the one over 
the other. This teaching profoundly 
influenced early Christianity. St. 
Augustine fell under its sway for 
some years (Confess.). We find it 
coming out afresh in the doctrines 
of the Albigensians of the XII 
century. In our day it has been 
advanced by John Stuart Mill (Es- 
say on Rel. and Nature, p. 41).” 
— Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: 
God, p. 201. 

5 On the theological side of Dual- 
ism cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
Knowability, Essence and  Attri- 
butes, pp. 213, 221 sqq. For a 
brief general account see Michael 
Maher, S. J., in the Catholic En- 
cyclopedia, Vol. V, p. 169. To 
avoid misunderstandings the student 
should note that in modern phi- 
losophy the term Dualism is em- 
ployed in a different sense, signify- 
ing, in opposition to Monism, the 
ordinary common-sense view that 


the existing universe contains two 
radically distinct kinds of being or 
substance — matter and spirit, body 
and mind. 

6 Cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, Pa- 
trology, pp. 427 sqq.— Bardenhewer 
points out that while Priscillian’s 
writings, as edited by Schepss, 
“contradict in various ways the 
received accounts of the heresy, 
particularly those of Sulpicius Se- 
verus (Chron. ii, 46-51; Dial., ii 
[iii], 311 sq.), at the same time, 
by reason of their imperfect manu- 
script tradition and the obscurity 
of their diction, these newly found 
writings contain what are at pres- 
ent insurmountable difficulties.” 
Cfr. Schepss, Priscillian, ein neuauf- 
gefundener lateinischer Schriftstel- 
ler des gten Jahrhunderts, Wirzburg 
1886; also E. Michael, S. J., in the 
Innsbruck Zeitschrift fiir kath. The- 
ologie, 1892, pp. 692 sqq., and P, J. 
Healy in the Catholic Encyclopedia, 
article “ Priscillianism,’” Vol. XII, 
PP. 429 sq., with bibliography. 


PANTHEISM 23 


b) Pantheism at bottom is little less than 
veiled Atheism.’ Its teaching is tersely con- 
densed in the phrase: ‘God and the universe are 
one essence.’ * Pantheism is either cosmological 
or ontological. Cosmological Pantheism puts 
God first—‘“God is all,’”—while ontological Pan- 
theism assigns first place to the universe—‘“All 
things are God.” 


a) These two forms of Pantheism are related to each 
other as the two sides of a medal, or as relative and 
correlative. Cosmological Pantheism sinks God in the 
universe; ontological Pantheism merges the universe in 
God. This logical distinction forms the basis of impor- 
tant real differences. Ontological Pantheism, in devel- 
oping its axiom wav Oeds, finds itself constrained to as- 
cribe to the universe the reality and substantiality 
proper to God, together with all His quiescent attributes. 
Cosmological Pantheism, conversely, immerses the God- 
head in the restless process of cosmic motion and sub- 
jects it to all the various mutations characteristic of 
created being. It has rightly been observed that, while 
cosmological Pantheism gravitates toward Pancosmism, 
ontological Pantheism rather tends towards Acosmism. 

8B) Ontological Pantheism is characterized by its en- 
deavor to deify the cosmos. It was held by the Eleatic 
school of Greece,? and, in more recent times, by Baruch 


7On Atheism see Pohle-Preuss, 
God: His Knowability, Essence and 
Attributes, pp. 49 sqa. 

8éyp Kal may, That existing 
things are to be explained by an 
emanation out of the original one 
divine substance, is a doctrine 
found in all ancient mythologies. 
For a succinct historical sketch of 


the various systems see J. T. Dris- 
coll, Christian Philosophy: God, pp. 
180 sqq., New’ York 1904; W. 
Turner, History of Philosophy, pp. 
17 sqdq., 168 sqq., 306 sqq., 470 sq., 
Boston 1903. 

9 Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, 
Melissus, ; 


24 ANTI-CREATIONIST HERESIES 


Spinoza,*® a brilliant sophist, who sought by geometrical 
arguments to establish the proposition that there is but 
one infinite, indivisible substance, endowed with two at- 
tributes, thought and extension, which, as mere modi or 
“affections ” of the one Divine Substance, have no more 
a distinct reality and substantiality of their own than 
have the surging waves of the ocean in the great body 
of water which sustains them.14 

Cosmological Pantheism, as we have noted, aims 
rather at merging God in the universe. It may be di- 
vided into three species: Emanatism, Hylozoism, and 
Evolutionism. The most ancient and the crudest of 
these systems is Emanatism, which holds that the indi- 
vidual: creatures are particles detached from the Di- 
vine Substance, though not identical with it. One va- 
riety of Emanatism is called realistic, because it holds 
the world emanating from God to be material. There 
is another variety which may be described as idealistic, 
since it dissolves the whole cosmos into a series of in- 
telligible momenta, corresponding to the spirituality of 
God. Realistic Emanatism is held by the Brahmans, by 
many Gnostics, and by the Jewish Cabalists. The Ema- 
natism championed by the Neo-Platonists and John 
Scotus Eriugena is distinctly idealistic.12 


10 Born at Amsterdam, of Jewish 
parents, in 1632. Cfr. Turner, His- 
tory of Philosophy, pp. 466° sqq. 

11 Cfr. B. Boedder, S. J., Natural 
Theology, pp. 200 sqq., 2nd ed., 
London 1890. 

12 Cfr. Turner, History of Phi- 
losophy, pp. 246 sqq.; Driscoll, 
Christian Philosophy: God, pp. 183 
sqq. M. de Wulf calls attention to 
the curious fact that the philosophy 
of Eriugena “ contains the germ of 
subjectivism, since he endows the 


human mind with the power of at- 
taining, by the unaided effort of 
consciousness alone (gnosticus in- 
tuitus) to a knowledge of the di- 
vine evolution-process as an object 
of representation.” Of course, 
Eriugena himself did not go so far; 
nor did any medieval philosopher 
or theologian push the logic of his 
system to its legitimate conclusions. 
(Cfr. M. de Wulf, History of Me- 
dieval Philosophy, translated by P. 
Coffey, p. 173, London 1909.) 


PANTHEISM 25 


Hylozoism was taught by the Ionian philosophers of 
Asia Minor, who believed that God is the world-soul, 
controlling and vivifying matter as the human soul con- 
trols and animates the body, and thus completely iden- 
tified the life of the world with the Divine Life. 

Cosmological Pantheism achieved its highest form in 
Evolutionism, so-called, which holds that the Absolute 
was from the beginning immanent, and undergoes a 
constant process of development, in the universe.** 
According to this theory we cannot say God is, because 
He is constantly in fieri. Goethe refers to the God 
of the Pantheists as “ein ewig verschlingendes, ewig 
wiederkduendes Ungeheuer—an eternally devouring, 
eternally ruminating monster.” This evolutionary Pan- 
theism was first cast into the shape of a philosophical 
system by Heraclitus of Ephesus.** It was developed by 
Fichte #® and Schelling,’® and perfected by Hegel,’? who, 
like all other Pantheists before him, declared the visible 
universe to be a mere manifestation of the Absolute, 
whence it would follow that the Divine Substance is a 
purely abstract, vacuous, substance-less mental phenome- 
non. In Hegel’s hands this idealistic Pantheism became 


doctrine of determinism. Both Spi- 
noza and Spencer teach a pure 
Naturalism, with this difference 
only that the God of the former 
becomes to the latter the Unknown 
and Unknowable behind the phe- 
nomena.”— Driscoll, Christian Pli- 


13 The influence of Pantheism on 
modern thought has been, and con- 
tinues to be, very great. The Eng- 
lish Agnostic school teaches that 
God is unknowable and as_ such 
does not come within the purview 
of human thought and _ action; 


nevertheless, in all other points it 
is fashioned in the mould of 
Spinoza. ‘‘ Hence comes the charge 
—so strange at first sight — that 
Mr. Spencer is a Pantheist. In the 
criticism of his system we meet 
with the same difficulties that we 
find in Spinoza, i. e., the nature 
of mind and of matter, the char- 
acter of their interaction, and the 


3 


losophy: God, 189 sq. 

14 His was the famous dictum: 
Tldvra pel, “All things are flow- 
ing.” Cfr. Turner, History of Phi- 
losophy, pp. 53 sad. 

15 Cfr. Driscoll, Christian Philos- 
ophy: God, pp. 199 sq. 

16 Cfr. Turner, History of Phi- 
losophy, pp. 555 Sdd. { 

17 Turner, op. cit., pp. 560 sqq. 


26 ANTI-CREATIONIST HERESIES 


Panlogism, since he asserts the complete identity of our 
thought with being."® 


2. THEIR CONDEMNATION BY THE CHURCH. 
—Against these various forms of Dualistic and 
Pantheistic error the Church has rigorously up- 
held the dogma of Creation as essential to the 


purity and perfection of the Christian concept of 
God. 


a) In the early days she did not deem it necessary 
to utter a formal dogmatic definition against the Dualis- 
tic vagaries of the pagans and the Pantheistic heresies 
of the Gnostics and Neo-Platonists, but merely enforced 
the true doctrine through the Creed and in her ordinary 
catechetical instruction. The Nicene definition of the 
uncreatedness of the Logos ?® may be said to imply the 
dogma that all other things are created. In the sixth 
century the Council of Braga condemned Manicheism 
in the peculiar form in which it had been revamped by 
the Priscillianists.2° 


Bin the Middle Ages the Church found it 
necessary to condemn the resuscitated Manichz- 
ism of the Albigenses and the Pantheistic errors 


ee Se ee ——_*- ee 


: 
Se ee ee 


18 For a general refutation of 
Pantheism see B. Boedder, S. LY 
Natural Theology, pp. 112 sqq., 200 
sqq., and Driscoll, Christian Phi- 
losophy: God, pp. 204 sqq. Cfr. 
also P. Hake, Handbuch der allge- 
meinen Religionswissenschaft, Vol. 
I, pp. 71 sqq., Freiburg 187s, and 
Jos. Hontheim, S. J., Institutiones 
Theodicaeae, pp. 465 sqq., Friburgi 
1893. 


19 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine 
Trinity, pp. 125 sq. 

20 Cir. Denzinger-Bannwart, En- 
chiridion, nn, 231 sqq. In former 
editions of the LEnchiridion, this 
condemnation was attributed to St. 
Leo the Great. Karl Kiinstle has 
shown (Antipriscilliana, Freiburg 
1905, pp. 117 .sqq.) that it is a 
Spanish fabrication, made after the 
year 563. 


OT ah nn ca en ee a 


ANTI-CREATIONISM CONDEMNED 27 


of Amalric of Béne and David of Dinant.2* The 
Fourth Council of the Lateran, A.D. t21 5; 
defined: “Creator omnium visibilium et invisi- 
bilium, spiritualium et corporalium, . . . sua om- 
mpotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis utram- 
que de nthilo condidit naturam, spiritualem et 
corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, ac 
deinde humanam quasi communem ex spiritu et 
corpore constitutam. Diabolus enim et alii de- 
mones a Deo quidem natura creati sunt boni, 
sed ipst per se facti sunt mali; homo vero diaboli 
sug gestione peccavit — The Creator of all things 
visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal, by 
His omnipotent power, simultaneously with the 
beginning of time, created a twofold nature, 
spiritual and corporeal, viz.: the nature of the 
angels and that of material things, and then 
human nature, which partakes of both, in that it 
consists of soul and body. For the Devil and 
other demons were indeed good in their nature 
as created by God, but they made themselves 
bad by their own conduct; man sinned at the 
suggestion of the Devil.” 2 This definition em- 
braces four distinct heads of doctrine: (1) God 
created all things without exception, spiritual 


21 On the teaching of the school 220 sqq. See also Funk-Cappa- 
of Chartres, of which Amalric (or delta, A Manual of Church History, 
Amaur) and David were the lead- Vol. I, pp. 355 sq., London IQIO. 
ing exponents, cfr. De Wulf-Coffey, 22 Caput “ Firmiter.’ Denzinger- 
History of Medieval Philosophy, pp. Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 428, 


28 THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH 


and corporeal, including man, who is a synthesis 
of both. (2) God created all things out of 
nothing. (3) As originally created by God, all 
things were good. (4) Sin, both in angels and 
men, is not chargeable to God, but to an abuse 
of creatural liberty. 


The same truths were again defined by the Ecumenical 
Council of Florence,?? which formulated the teaching of 
the Church against Manichzan errors as follows: “| Ec- 
clesia] firmissime credit, ... unum verum Deum, Pa- 
trem et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, esse omnium 
visibilium et invisibilium creatorem: qui, quando voluit, 
bonitate sua universas tam spirituales quam corporales 
condidit creaturas: bonas quidem, quia a summo bono 
factae sunt, sed mutabiles, quia de nihilo factae sunt, 
nullamque mali asserit esse naturam, quia omnis na- 
tura, im quantum natura est, bona est... . Praeterca 
Manicheorum anathematizat insaniam, qui duo prima 
principia posuerunt, unum visibilium, aliud invisibilium; 
et alium Novi Testamenti Deum, alium Veteris esse 
Deum dixerunt —The Church believes most firmly that 
the one true God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is the 
Creator of all things visible and invisible, who, when 
it pleased Him, out of His goodness created all creatures, 
spiritual and corporeal. These creatures are indeed 
good, because made by Him who is the Supreme Good, 
but they are mutable, because made out of nothing. 
[The Church further] asserts that nothing is evil by na- 
ture, because every nature, as such, is good. ... And 
she anathematizes the folly of the Manichzeans who posit 
two first principles, one the principle of visible, the other 


23 A.D. 1439. 


THE VATICAN DECREE 29 


of invisible things; and who say that the God of the 
New Testament is different from the God of the Old 
Testament.” 24 From this time on Manichzism with its 
offshoots gradually disappears from history, and its 
place is taken by Materialism and Pantheism. 


c) Materialism and Pantheism may be called 
the prevailing heresies of modern times. Both 
were clearly and resolutely condemned as atheis- 
tic by the Council of the Vatican.” Caput I of 
the decrees of this Council, under the heading 
“De Deo Rerum Omnium Creatore,’ treats at 
some length of God’s relation to His creatures. 
The Vatican decree is substantially a restatement 
of the Caput “Firmiter”’ of the Fourth Lateran 
Council, from which it differs merely by laying 
special emphasis on the doctrine that, in creating 
the universe out of nothing, God acted “with abso- 
lute freedom of counsel.” 


Because of their great importance, the five canons 
which accompany Caput I of the Constitutions of the 
Vatican Council deserve to be reprinted here. 

The first is directed against Atheism and reads thus: 
“St quis unum verum Deum visibilium et invisibilium 
Creatorem et Dominum negaverit: anathema sit — lf any 
one shall deny the one true God, Creator and Lord of all 
things visible and invisible; let him be anathema.” 

The second specifically condemns Materialism: “Si 
quis practer materiam nihil esse affirmare non erubuerit: 

24 Decret. pro Iacobitis, cited in 25 A. D. 1870. 


Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, 
nn. 706 sq. 


30 THE TEACHING OF «DHE CHURCEH 


anathema sit—If any one shall not be ashamed to 
affirm that nothing exists except matter; let him be 
anathema.” 

Canon 3 anathematizes the fundamental principle of 
Pantheism: “Si quis dixerit, unam eandemque esse 
Dei et rerum omnium substantiam vel essentiam: ana- 
thema sit—If any one shall say that the substance or 
essence of God and of all things is one and the same; 
let him be anathema.” 

Canon 4 is aimed at certain particular forms or varie- 
ties of Pantheism: “Si quis diverit, res finitas tum 
corporeas tum spirituales aut saltem spirituales e divina 
substantia emanasse, aut divinam essentiam sui mani- 
festatione vel evolutione fieri omnia, aut denique Deum 
esse ens universale seu indefinitum, quod sese deter- 
minando constituat rerum universitatem in genera, 
Species et individua distinctam: anathema sit—If any 
one shall say that finite things, both corporeal and spir- 
itual, or at least spiritual, have emanated from the di- 
vine substance; or that the divine essence by the 
manifestation and evolution of itself becomes all things; 
or, lastly, that God. is universal or indefinite being, 
which by determining itself constitutes the universality 
of things, distinct according to genera, species, and in- 
dividuals; let him be anathema.” 

Canon 5 defines the dogma of Creation in its more 
important aspects: “ Si quis non confiteatur, mundum 
resque ones, quae in eo continentur, et spirituales et 
materiales secundum totam suam substantiam a Deo ex 
nihilo esse productas; aut Deum dixerit non voluntate 
ab omni necessitate libera, sed tam necessario creasse, 
quam necessario amat seipsum; aut mundum ad Dei 
gloriam conditum esse negaverit: anathema sit — If any 
one confess not that the world, and all things which 


DEE VET ICAN  DECR bE 31 


are contained in it, both spiritual and material, have 
been, in their whole substance, produced by God out of 
nothing; or shall say that God created, not by His will, 
free from all necessity, but by a necessity equal to the 
necessity whereby He loves Himself; or shall deny that 
the world was made for the glory of God; let him be 


anathema.” 26 


26 These canons can be found in 
Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, 
nn. 1801 sqq. Also, with an Eng- 
lish translation, in the Appendix to 
Cardinal Manning’s work, The Vat- 
ican Council, 4th ed., New York 


reprint, 1902, pp. 192 sqq. For ¢é 
detailed analysis of them see 
Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. I, pp. 496 
sqq. Cfr. also Granderath-Kirch, 
Geschichte des vatikanischen Kon- 
Zils, 3 vols., Freiburg 1903-06. 


SECTION 2 


EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 


The dogma of Creation presents two different 
aspects, according as we contemplate either the 
divine act or its creatural terminus. Viewing 
it in the first-mentioned or active sense, we 
shall enquire into (1) God’s conception of the 
universe as the exemplary cause of all things; 
(2) the relation of Creation to the Blessed 
Trinity; and (3) God’s freedom of will in 
creating the world. These points will be sever- 
ally treated in the first three Articles of the 
present section. Weshall adda fourth Article on 
creation as co-existent with time, and a fifth on 
the question whether or not God can communicate 
His creative power to creatures. 


ARTIC. Bit 


THE DIVINE IDEA OF THE COSMOS AS THE EXEMPLARY 
CAUSE OF CREATION 


I. THE Divine IDEA oF THE Cosmos.—Rea- 
son tells us that the Creator must have designed 
the created universe in accordance with some 

32 | 


THE DIVINE IDEA OF THE COSMOS 33 


pattern or archetype. As an artist cannot pro- 
duce a work of art unless he has previously 
formed some idea of it in his mind, so God must 
have had a definite conception of the cosmos be- 
fore He proceeded to mould it. 


Metaphysicians are agreed that the idea, or causa ex- 
emplaris, is a necessary condition for setting to work 
all those efficient causes which are endowed with under- 
standing and free will. No intelligent cause proceeds 
blindly or at random. 

God’s idea of the cosmos may be regarded either sub- 
jectively or objectively. Subjectively it is God’s creative 
Wisdom or practical Knowledge, and as such identical 
with the Divine Essence itself, Objectively, or with re- 
gard to content, it is the ideal representation of whatever 
is to become actual, or, in the words of St. Thomas, the 
outward imitability of the Divine Essence considered as 
purely conceptual.2 

This definition makes it quite clear that God’s idea of 
the cosmos is neither a creature, nor a metaphysical en- 
tity existing outside of, or side by side with God,? nor 
yet the Divine Essence itself. God’s idea of the cosmos 
must consequently be the possible essence of the created 
universe, in so far as that essence is rooted in the Di- 
vine Substance and conceived by the Divine Intellect 
from all eternity. If we are careful to guard against 
the Platonic mistake of conceiving the archetypes of 
things as individual existences extraneous to God, we 
may safely adopt Clement of Alexandria’s distinction 4 

1St. Thom., S. th, 1a, qu. 1s, Knowability, Essence and Attri- 
art. 2. butes, p. 117. 


2 Such was the opinion of Plato. 4 Cfr. Eusebius, Praeparatio Evan- 
3Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His gelica, XI, 2s, 


34 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 


between an ideal world (xécpos vonrés) and the really ex- 
isting world (xécpos aicOyrés). The former is necessary 
and eternal, the latter contingent and temporal. 

May we speak of divine ideas of created things in 
the plural number? We may, but only in regard to 
the multitude of created things. In the Divine Intellect 
itself there is but one absolutely simple idea,—as sim- 
ple and indivisible as the Divine Essence with which 
it coincides. This distinction furnishes the key for the 
correct interpretation of the plural phrase rationes 
rerum, Or Adyou ovovdrov1, Which occurs in the writings 
of the Fathers and theologians. 


2. THE TEACHING OF REVELATION.—While 
the Church has never formally defined her teach- 
ing with regard to the divine idea of the cosmos, 
Holy Scripture does not permit us to doubt the 
actual existence of such an idea. 


a) Of the various Scriptural texts which may be cited 
in this connection,® the most luminous perhaps is Gen. 
I, 26: “Let us make man to our image and likeness.” 
Here God appears in the role of a thoughtful artificer, 
who works out the concept of man in his own mind 
before he proceeds to create him. He is an intelligent 
Creator who follows a well-digested plan. 

This view is utterly incompatible with the theory of 
atheistic Darwinism, which attributes the creation of 
things to “chance.” It is developed in the Sapiential 
Books of the Old Testament and forms the necessary 
substratum of St. John’s Logos-doctrine. According to 
the punctuation of some manuscript codices of the Fourth 


5 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence and Attributes, pp. 
225 sqq. 


CREATION AND THE TRINITY 35 


Gospel, John I, 3 sq. reads as follows: “Et sine ipso 
factum est mhil. Quod factum est, in ipso vita erat,” 
1. €., that which was created sprang from a vital idea 
in the Godhead, namely, the Logos. St. Augustine 
beautifully develops this thought in his Homilies on the 
Gospel of St. John,® but the punctuation on which it is 
based has not stood the test of modern criticism. 

b) The Fathers developed the teaching thus adum- 
brated in Sacred Scripture, some of them explaining it 
in consonance with, others in opposition to, the Platonic 
philosophy.? It remained for the medieval Schoolmen 
to give it its final polish. The most brilliant exponent 
of the doctrine of the Divine Idea is St. Augustine.® 
From him the Schoolmen received it and unfolded it 
dialectically.® 


AR LCR rn2 
CREATION IN ITS RELATION TO THE TRINITY 
Though the Blessed Trinity creates per modum 


naturae, that is to say, qua Godhead, Creation 
is specially appropriated to the Father as the 


6 Tract. in Ioa., I, 17. 

7 Among those who opposed the 
Platonic view were Justin Martyr, 
Tertullian, and Gregory of Nazian- 
Zus. 

8 He writes: ‘“‘ Quis audeat dicere 
Deum irrationabiliter omnia condi- 
disse? Quodsi recte dici et credi 
non potest, restat, ut omnia ratione 
sint condita, nec eadem ratione 
homo qua equus; hoc enim ab- 
surdum est existimare. Singula igi- 
tur propriis sunt creata rationibus. 
Has autem rationes ubi arbitrandum 
est esse nist in mente Creatoris? 
Non enim quidquam extra se posi- 


tum intuetur, ut secundum id con- 
stitueret, quod constituebat; nam 
hoc opinari sacrilegum est. Quodsi 
hae rerum creandarum creatarumve 
rationes in divina mente continentur, 
neque in divina mente quidquam 
nist aeternum atque incommutabile 
potest ess@..., non solum sunt 
ideae, sed ipsae verae sunt et eius- 
modt atque incommutabiles manent, 
quarum participatione fit, ut sit, 
quidquid est, quoquo modo est.” 
In Libr. 83 Quaest., qu. 46, 2. 
9Cfr. Ruiz, De Scientia Dei, 
disp. 82. ¥ 


36 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 


First of the Three Divine Persons. The fact 
that the Trinity cannot be demonstrated by phil- 
osophical arguments, does not, rightly considered, 
disprove the teaching of Catholic theologians that 
all creatures contain some vestige of the Trinity, 
and that, in addition thereto, the pure spirits, and 
man who is endowed with reason, “represent the 
Trinity by way of image.” ? 


Thesis I: Father, Son, and Holy Ghost created the 
universe not as separate Persons, but per modum 
naturae, i. e., in virtue of the essential Knowledge 
and Volition common to the whole Trinity. 


Proof. This thesis, which embodies an article of 
faith, has been repeatedly defined by the Church.” 
The “Decretum pro Iacobitis,” adopted by the Council 
of Florence, in 1439, says: “ Firmissime credit, profite- 
tur et praedicat [Ecclesia], unum verum Deum, Patrem 
et Filium et Spiritum Sanctum, esse omnium visibilium 
et invisibilium creatorem— The Church most firmly be- 
lieves, professes, and teaches that the one true God, 
Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, is the Creator of all things 
visible and invisible”? And a few lines further up: 
“Sed Pater et Filius non duo principia Spiritus Sancti, 
sed unum principium, sicut Pater et Filius et Spiritus 
Sanctus non tria principia creaturae, sed unum princi- 
pum — But the Father and the Son [are] not two prin- 
ciples of the Holy Ghost, but one principle; just as the 


1 Bonjoannes, Compendium of the 2 Cfr. Conc. Lat. IV, Cap. “ Fir- 
Summa Theologica of St. Thomas miter.” 
Aquinas. ... Translated into Eng- 3 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridi- 


lish. Revised by Fr. Wilfrid Les- on, n. 706. 
cher, O. P., p. 116, London 1906. 


CREATION AND THE TRINITY 37 


Father and the Son and the Holy Ghost [constitute] not 
three principles of the creature, but one principle.” * 

We will merely outline the Biblical argument for our 
thesis. Holy Scripture attributes the Creation of the 
universe sometimes to the Father,> sometimes to the 
Son,® and sometimes to the Holy Ghost.?- The diacritical 
particles ex, per, and in (ék, dia, eis) in Rom. XI, 36: 
“Ex Patre per Filium in Spiritu Sancto— Of the 
Father, by the Son, in the Holy Ghost (are all things),” 
do not signify a difference of power, but simply the 
Trinitarian relation of origin. The meaning is that the 
Father has the creative power of Himself, the Son by 
Generation from the Father, and the Holy Ghost by 
Spiration from the Father and the Son.’ 

Certain Patristic writers say that if it were not for 
the Son, the Father could not create for lack of a cre- 
ative word. This remark must not be misunderstood. 
The Fathers who make it merely wish to intimate that, 
if God were not Tri-une, He would not be God at all, 
and therefore unable to exercise creative power.® St. 
Thomas explains this point as follows: “ Processiones 
personarum sunt rationes productionis creaturarum, in- 
quantum includunt essentialia attributa, quae sunt scientia 
et voluntas— The divine Processions are the cause of 
the production of creatures, inasmuch as they include 
the essential attributes of Understanding and Will.” 1° 


4 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridt- 
on, n. 704. Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The 
Divine Trinity, pp. 231 sq. 

5 Luke X, 21. 

Gr Ohta ts anol. cls 15 .Saq. 

TP Ss NON) 6s 

8 Cfr. St. Basil, De Spirttu Sanc- 
to, cap. 5; Humphrey, “ His Divine 
Majesty,” pp. 224 sq. 

9 “ The three Divine Persons are, 


all of them, required in order to 
the causality of creation; inasmuch 
as that God is required, to whom 
a trinity of persons is essential, so 
that without this trinity He would 
not be God.”—(Humphrey, “ His 
Divine Majesty,” p. 226.) — 

LON Tora du As art, OuusOn 
some very subtle problems involved 
iu this theory see Ruiz, De Trinit., 


38 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 


Thesis II: Creation is properly appropriated to 
God the Father. | ) 


This thesis may be technically qualified as “ doctrina 
catholica.” 

Proof. A glance at the so-called Apostles’ Creed #4 
shows that the Creation of the universe has always been 
appropriated to the Father. “Credo in unum Deum, 
Patrem omnipotentem, factorem coeli et terrae —I be- 
lieve in one God, the Father almighty, Creator of heaven 
and earth.” The intrinsic reason for this appropriation 
is the similarity existing between the creative act and the 
hypostatic character of the First Person of the Trinity. 
Creation is the beginning of divine operation, and as 
such related to the Father in His character of principium 
sine principio (épxy dvapyos). Asa sign of divine power, 
which culminates in the fiat “Ipse dixit et facta sunt,” 1? 
Creation is related to the notional Understanding by 
which the begetting Father utters His Word. “ Pater 
dicendo gignit Verbum.’ ‘Therefore Creation is rightly 
appropriated to the Father.?2 


Thesis III: Though the Divine Trinity is the 
Creator of the universe only per..modum naturae, 
nevertheless all creatures bear within themselves ves- 
tiges of the Trinity; the spiritual creatures, moreover, 
are real images of the same. 


disp. 3, sect. 1. On the whole sub- Apostles’ Creed has always been 


ject cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine 
Trinity, pp. 275 sqq. 

11 Though “ we cannot safely af- 
firm the Apostolic composition of 
[this] Creed, there is no doubt that 
in substance it goes back to Apos- 
tolic times. As a result of [its] 
intimate association with the liturgy 
and teaching of the Church, the 


held to have the authority of an 
ex cathedra utterance.”—Cfr. H. 
Thurston’s admirable article * Apos- 
tles’ Creed,’ with bibliography, in 
the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I, 

12 Ps. CXLYITI,. 5: 

13 On the divine Appropriations 
in general see Pohle-Preuss, The 
Divine Trinity, pp. 244 sqq. 


CREATION AND THE TRINITY 39 


This thesis forms part of the theological teaching com- 
mon to all schools. 

Proof. We do not assert that the created universe 
reflects the Trinity as such. If this were so, the 
mystery of the Trinity would be demonstrable from 
the cosmos. As a matter of fact the three Divine Per- 
sons do not create qua Triad, but gua Monad, and this 
is the fundamental reason why the mystery of the Most 
Holy Trinity is incapable of demonstration.1* The 
meaning of our thesis is that, as productions of the 
Triune God, creatures reflect the same essential attri- 
butes by virtue of which there are two Processions in 
the Godhead, viz.: understanding and will, knowledge and 
love. Thus interpreted the thesis offers no difficulties. 
For it stands to reason, and is further confirmed by the 
philosophical arguments by which we can prove the ex- 
istence of God, that the created universe postulates a 
wise Intellect and a creative Will, and these are precisely 
the attributes on which the two inner-divine Processions 
are based. Consequently all creatures contain within 
themselves certain vestiges *® of the Trinity. These ves- 
tiges are, however, blurred and obscure, so that, if it 
were not for Revelation, the human intellect could not 


14 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, op. cit., pp. 
196 sqq. 

15 “In every effect there is some- 
thing corresponding to the cause; 
something which may be said to 
represent that cause. This repres- 
entation may be such that the ex- 
istence of the effect merely indi- 
cates the existence of the cause, 
and such an effect is said to show 
a vestige of the cause; the proper 
meaning of the word ‘vestige’ is 
‘footprint’; and a footprint which 
shows that a man has passed, but 


does not tell what manner of man 
he is, affords an instance of a ves- 
tige. When the representation af- 
fords some distinct knowledge of 
the nature of the cause, even if 
this knowledge be imperfect, the 
representation is called an image, 
such is the work of a sculptor or 
painter.”— Sylvester Hunter, S. J., 
Outhnes of Dogmatic Theology, 
Vol. II, pp. 233 sq., London 1895. 
Cir. also Humphrey, “ His Divine 
Majesty,” pp. 227 sqq. 


40 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 


arrive at a knowledge of the mystery. It is only after 
the mystery was supernaturally revealed that the mind 
of man was able to discover the relation existing between 
the Trinity and Creation.1¢ 

The second part of our thesis, viz.: that every rational 
creature bears within itself an image of the Trinity, is 
to be understood with the same limitations. The created 
intellect being endowed with understanding and free-will, 
its “internal word” (verbum mentis) reflects the Logos, 
while the immanent love which it entertains for itself 
emblems the Holy Ghost. Cfr. Gen. I, 26: “ Faciamus 
hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram — Let 
us make man to our image and likeness.” A still more 
perfect image of the Trinity is produced in the human 
soul by sanctifying grace 1” and the beatific vision." 


AR TIGER 2 


CREATION AS A FREE DIVINE ACT 


It belongs to the treatise on the Essence and Attri- 
butes of God to prove that the Divine Will is essentially 
free. Here we have merely to show that, in creating 
the universe, God acted as a free agent, and, more spe- 
cifically, that He acted libertate contradictionis sive ex- 
ercitu and libertate specificationis, not, however, libertate 
contrarietatis, which latter term means freedom of choice 
between good and evil. 


16 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine II, pp. 232 sqq., London 1895. We 


Trinity, pp. 261 sqq. shall recur to certain aspects of this 
17 Filiatio adoptiva, inhabitatio subject in our treatise on Grace. 
Spiritus Sancti. 1Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 


18 Cfr. Hurter, Compend., Vol. Knowability, Essence, and Attri- 
ll, thes.-127; S. J. Hunter, Oug- butes, pp. 430 sqq. 
lines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. 


CREATION AvVPREEV DIVINE ACT 41 


Thesis I: Creation was a free act, libertate con- 
tradictionis, i. e., God was free either to create or not 
to create, as He pleased. 


This proposition is de fide. 

Proof. The Council of Florence (A. D. 1439) 
defined: “Deus, quando voluit, bonitate sua 
universas . . . condidit creaturas — God in His 
goodness created all things, when He willed.” 
The Vatican Council (A. D. 1870), with an eye 
to the heretical teachings of Hermes and Giin- 
ther, further developed this definition as follows: 
“[Deus] liberrimo consilio . . . utramque de ni- 
hilo condidit naturam, spiritualem et corporalem, 
angelicam videlicet et mundanam — God, with ab- 
solute freedom of counsel, created out of nothing 
. . . both the spiritual and the corporeal creature, 
to wit, the angelical and the mundane.” ? And 
in Canon 5 the Council adds: “Si quis . 
Deum dixerit non voluntate ab omni necessitate 
libera, sed tam necessario creasse, quam neces- 
Sario amat se ipsum, . . . anathema sit —If any 
one... shall say that God created, not by His 
will, free from all necessity, but by a necessity 
equal to the necessity whereby He loves Him- 
self, ... let him be anathema.” 3 

Holy Scripture teaches this truth in numerous 
passages, especially in those which accentuate 


2 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridi- 3 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridi- 
On, D. 1783. on, n. 1805. y 


4 


42 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 


the fact that God “hath done all things what- 
soever he would.’’* The dogma is enforced as 
it were by contrast in 2 Mach. VIII, 18: “Nos 
in omnipotente Domino, qui potest... uni- 
versum mundum uno nutu delere, confidimus 
—We trust in the Almighty Lord, who at a 
beck can utterly destroy . . . the whole world.” 
God cannot destroy at a beck except what He 
has freely created. We have a still more definite 
statement of this truth in Apoc. IV, 11: “Tu 
creastt omnia, et propter voluntatem tuam erant 
et creata sunt — Thou hast created all things; 
and for thy will they were, and have been 
created.” St. Paul writes: “Operatur omnia 
secundum consilium voluntatis suae — [He] 
worketh all things according to the counsel of 
his will.” ° Where there is “counsel” there must 
be liberty. 

The teaching of the Fathers on this point is 
in perfect consonance with Holy Scripture. St. 
Irenzus says: “Ipse omnia libere fecit et quem- 
admodum voluit— He made all things freely 
and according to His will,’*® and Hippolytus: 
“He created even as He would, for He was 
God.” * St. Ambrose exclaims: “Quid difficile 
est et, cut velle fecisse est?—What is difficult for 


45. gs, Pe. CAI, 33) “Deus 5 Eph. I, 11. 
autem noster in coelo; omnia quae- 6 Adv. Haer.,| Iil,:8, 3. 
cunque voluit, fecit.’’ 7 Contr. Noét., 10. 


A eo, = 


So a a nee 


CREATION A FREE DIVINE ACT 43 


Him to whom to will means to do?”’® We 
close the Patristic argument with a brief quota- 
tion from the works of St. Augustine: “He 
made [the universe] with an absolutely free 
wall.’ ® 


Reason argues thus: If God had not been free in 
creating the universe, He must have acted under com- 
pulsion either from without (coactio), or from within 
(necessitas ab intrinseco). God cannot have acted under 
external compulsion, because no higher Being existed 
which could have exercised such compulsion. Nor can 
He have been actuated by immanent necessity, because 
in this hypothesis He would not be infinitely perfect, 
nor self-sufficient, nor absolutely independent (ens a 
se). Consequently, God was free either to create or 
not, according to His good pleasure. 


Thesis II: The divine act of Creation was free, 
libertate specificationis ; that is, God was free to create 
either this present universe or any other. 


This thesis may be technically qualified as doc- 
trina catholica. ? 

Proof. The Provincial Council of Cologne 
(A. D. 1860)" defines: “Quemadmodum penes 
Deum erat, mundum creare aut non creare, ita 
penes ipsum etiam erat, hunc creare mundum aut 
alium — As it lay in the power of God to create 
or not to create a world, so it also lay in His 


8 In Hexaém., II, 2. 10 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine 
9 De Civ. Dei, II, 24. Trinity, p. 262. 3 


A4 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 


power either to create he particular world, or 
a diferent one.’)** 

a) The Scriptural argument for this thesis is 
based upon the sovereignty whereby God ordains 
all things according to His good pleasure. Ps. 
CXXXIV, 6: “Ommia, quaecunque  voluit, 
Dominus fecit in coelo, in terra, in mari et in 
omnibus abyssis — Whatsoever the Lord pleased 
he hath done, in heaven, in earth, in the sea, 
and in all the deeps.” Theodoret comments 
upon this text as follows: “The Lord created 
all things whatsoever He pleased, as Holy Scrip- 
ture testifies. He did not, however, will all that 
it lay in His power to do, but only what seemed 
to Him to be sufficient. For it would have been 
easy for Him to create ten or twenty thousand 
worlds.” ™* 

For the rest, it is easy to see, even without the 
aid of Revelation, that, had God had no other 
choice than to create or not to create the present 
cosmos, there would be but one possible world— 
a view repugnant to the attribute of divine 
omnipotence, which halts only at contradiction; 
incompatible also with divine wisdom and per- 
fection, for it is peculiar to wisdom to select and 


11 Synod. Colon., 1860, tit. 3, cap. 360 sqq., Oeniponte 1903. Cfr. also 
D2. Fortescue, The Orthodox Eastern 
12 De Curand. Graecor. Affect., Church, pp. 56, 58, 70, London 
4. On Theodoret of Cyrus cfr. 1907; Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrol- 
Hurter, Nomenclator  Literarius 09, Pp. 370 sqq. 
Theologiae Catholicae, Vol. I, coll. 


CREATION A FREE: DIVINE AGT © 45 


vary creatable forms with the utmost freedom; 
while God would not be infinitely perfect if His 
Essence could be the exemplar of but one cre- 
atable world. 


b) Absolute Optimism is incompatible with Catholic 
teaching. This philosophical system, excogitated by 
Leibniz,** holds that the Divine Intellect, in contemplating 
an infinite number of possible worlds, was constrained 
by the divine wisdom and goodness to select, and that 
the divine power was forced to create, that which was 
absolutely the best, 7. e., the world in which the greatest 
number of realities harmoniously co-exist.14 The idea 
of an “absolutely best world ” involves an intrinsic con- 
tradiction, because in the domain of finite objects there 
can be no summum bonum or absolute optimum. The 
Leibnizian conceit is also disproved by experience, which 
shows that the universe is seriously disfigured by evil. 
No sane person will deny that a world in which there 
was no sin, and no misery caused by sin (such as pain 
and death, sickness and poverty), would be a far “ bet- 
ter” world than the one in which we now live. But 
even if such a thing as an absolutely “ best’ world were 
conceivable, the Creator would be under no compulsion 
to produce it. For no matter whether He makes 
things great or small, perfect or imperfect, God is suffi- 
cient unto Himself, and nowise depends on His creatures. 
In the words of St. Augustine: ‘“ Deus nulla necessi- 


13 Theodic., part. 11. Bayle, who had-tried to show that 


14 Cfr. Tennemann’s Manual of 
the History of Philosophy, ed. John- 
son-Morell (Bohn’s Philological Li- 
brary), pp. 340 sqq., London 1878. 
“ Leibniz’s . . . Théodicée was com- 
posed for the purpose of refuting 


reason and faith are incompatible. 
The work is devoted, in a large 
measure, to the discussion of the 
problem of evil and to the defence 
of optimism.”— Turner, History of 
Philosophy, p. 511. 


46 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 


tate, nulla suae cuiusquam utilitatis indigentid, sed sola 
bonitate fecit, quod factum est— God made the world 
not because He was compelled to make it, or because 
He needed it for any advantage of His own, but out 
of sheer goodness.” 4 

It is to be remarked, however, that not all forms of 
Optimism are irrational and repugnant. The relative 
Optimism advocated by Ruiz and Palmieri, and even by 
some of the Fathers of the Church,’* is supported by 
solid arguments and carefully safeguards the liberty of 
the Creator. The present universe may be regarded as 
the best in a relative sense, 7. e., in so far as it is per- 
fectly consonant to the divine idea, adequately serves the 
purpose for which it was created, and embraces all pos- 
sible species of natural?” and supernatural perfection.1® 


Thesis III: The divine act of Creation was not, 
however, a free act libertate contrarietatis; that is to 
say, God was not free to create a bad world; He could 
create none but a good world. 


Proof. By a bad world we understand, not 
one in which there is physical evil (disease, pain, 


15 De Civit. Det, XI, 24. Among 18 Grace, glory, hypostatic union. 


OS a a 


a 
af 
; 
i 
b, 
4 
' 


those who have effectively refuted For further information on the 


absolute Optimism we may mention: 
Jos. Hontheim, Instit. Theodic., pp. 
622 sqq.; -Hugh of St. \Victor, De 
Sacram., I, qu. 2, cap. 22, cited by 
Kilgenstein, Die Gotteslehre des 
Hugo von St. Viktor, pp. 212 sqq., 
Wurzburg 1897. 

16 Cfr. St. Augustine, De Lib. 
Arbit., III, 5; St. Chrysost., Hom. 
in I Cor., 12; St. John Damasc., De 
Fide Orth., ‘Il, 29. 

17 Matter, plants, brute animals, 
men, and angels. 


whole subject the student is re- 
ferred to Palmieri, De Deo Creante, 
thes. 12, Romae 1878; Stentrup, 
De Deo Uno, pp. 650 sqq., Oeni- 
ponte 1878; Humphrey, “ His Di- 
vine Majesty,’ pp. 247 sqq., London 
1897. Prominent among the more 
recent defenders of absolute Opti- 
mism is G. W. Allen, The Mission 
of Evil. Being a Suggestion to- 
wards a Philosophy of Absolute Op- 
timism, London 1900. 


CREATION A FREE DIVINE ACT 47 


death), but one replete with sin. Evil in its 
primary and proper sense is sin. But God, who 
is absolutely holy, cannot be the author of sin. 
In this sense our thesis is an article of faith, 
defined as such by the Fourth Lateran Council, 
and also by the Councils of Florence ?® and Trent. 
The Tridentine canon says: “Si quis dixerit, 
non esse in potestate hominis, vias suas malas 
facere, sed mala ita ut bona Deum operari, non 
pernussive tantum, sed etiam proprie et per se, 
anathema sit —If any one say that it is not in 
the power of man to make his ways evil, but that 
God worketh evil in the same manner that He 
worketh good, not by permitting it, but properly 
speaking and per se, let him be anathema.” 2° 

Of the Fathers we will only cite Augustine, who 
says: “Naturas igitur Deus omnes fecit, non 
solum in virtute et iustitia mansuras, sed etiam 
peccaturas, non ut peccarent, sed ut essent orna- 
turae universum, sive peccare sive non peccare 
voluissent — God therefore created all beings, 
not only those which were to persevere in virtue 
and justice, but those also which were to sin; 
and He created them not in order that they 
should sin, but that they should be an ornament 
to the universe, regardless of whether they would 
will to sin or not.” #4 


19 Supra, p. 28. ability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 
20 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, can. 6. 253 sqq. and 449 sqq. 
Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Know- 21) De EAb. Aros tilors, 


48 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 


This dogma is denied by Pessimism, which has justly 
been called “an error that is contemporaneous with 
philosophic thought.” Its traces appear in every stage 
of history.*? Arthur Schopenhauer may be regarded 
as its chief and most consistent exponent. He holds 
that the existing universe is the worst imaginable; that 
it is, in fact, a veritable hell in which “man is the 
devil of his fellows,” and that its only natural end and 
object apparently is, to be whelmed in utter destruc- 
tion.** Such a theory is plainly repugnant to faith and 
reason. We will not deny that the problem of evil, which 
has baffled so many thinkers since the days of the Gnos- 
tics and Manichzans, is one of the most difficult in phi- 
losophy.** But the Pessimism of Schopenhauer is op- 
posed to common sense, which tells us that evil does not 
preponderate in the world; that side by side with physical 
and moral evil there exists an immense amount of 
good; that even where it takes the form of sin, evil is 
oftentimes the source of good which would otherwise re- 
main undone; and, lastly, that a fair equalization and the 
restoration of the right order, which is partially disturbed 
here on earth, can only be expected in the world beyond. 
If we duly consider all these things we shall be persuaded 
that relative Optimism will ultimately prevail. The most 
satisfactory solution of “ the riddle of the painful earth” 


22 Cfr. Driscoll, Christian Philos- such questions as these really lie at 
ophy: God, pp. 275 sqq. the root of all philosophizing, 


23 Cfr. Turner, History of Ph- 
losophy, p. 589 sq. For a good 
critical exposition of Schopenhauer’s 
system see Driscoll, Christian Phi- 
losophy: God, pp. 283 saqq. 

24“ What place the principle of 
evil occupies in the constitution of 
things: how it came to exist: and 
how it may best be treated and its 
consequences avoided in practice — 


whether speculative or didactic, an- 
cient or modern; and it is mostly 
as a practical way of possible es- 
cape from some of the most painful 
and distressing of actual or possible 
experiences that religion in general 
has commended itself to the mind of 
man.”— A, B. Sharpe, Evil: Its 
Nature and Cause, p. 7, London 
1907. 


CREATION IN TIME 49 


is that offered by Christianity; in fact, “the existence of 
evil is a serious difficulty in the way of accepting any non- 
theistic interpretation of the universe.” 25 

According to Catholic teaching man was originally 
destined for a life of innocence and bliss. He fell 
from his high estate through his own fault. The Son of 
God descended from Heaven to redeem the sinful human 
tace, and through His merits this present life of pain 
and sorrow will be followed by one of unending happi- 
ness for those who faithfully obey the divine will. Our 
Redeemer, who has justly been styled the “Man of 
Sorrows,” furnishes a splendid pattern for the heroic 
endurance of this terrestrial exile, which lasts but a 
short while and affords us an opportunity to accumulate 
tich merits for the life beyond. In the cross of Christ 
lies our salvation and reconciliation ; its glory dispels the 
terrors to which evil has given birth.2¢ 


ARTICLE 4 


CREATION IN TIME 


It is an article of faith that the world was 
created in time, 7. e., that “a certain finite num- 
ber of days has elapsed since the instant when 
the angels and the material world were brought 
into being.” * But theologians differ with tre- 


25 Sharpe, of. cit., p. 4. Jis Cause, London 1907; IpEM, in 

26 Cfr. J. Dippel, Der neuere Pes- the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. V, 
simismus, Wirzburg TOSAM MH sun Lue article ‘* Evil”; Driscoll, Christian 
Fischer, Das Problem des Ubels und Philosophy: God, Chapter XV, pp. 
die Theodicee, Mainz 1883; v. Kep- 297 sqq.; Boedder, Natural The- 
pler, Das Problem des Leidens in ology, pp. 393 sqaq. 5 
der Moral, new ed., Freiburg 1911; 1 Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic 
A. B. Sharpe, Evil: lis Nature and Theology, Vol. II, p. 249. 


50 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 


gard to the question whether God, had He so 
willed, could have created an eternal world. 


Thesis I: God created the existing universe not 
from everlasting, but in time. 


This is de fide. 

Proof. In its famous Caput “Firmiter,’ the 
Fourth Lateran Council solemnly defined against 
the Albigenses, that God “simul ab initio temporis 
utramque de nililo condidit naturam,’ and the 
Council of the Vatican repeated this definition 
word for word: “God created out of nothing, 
from the very first beginning of time, both the 
spiritual and the corporeal creature.’’? This 
dogmatic definition is based on solid Scriptural 
grounds. 

a) The very first verse of Genesis declares 
that the world began in time: “Jn principio 
(YORIZ) creavit Deus coelum et terram—In 
the beginning God created heaven and earth.” 
Some theologians doubt whether these words 
refer to the beginning of time;* but it is easy 
to show that they do. YS), in Biblical usage, 
signifies either the beginning of time, or a pri- 
macy due to dignity, or the cause that produces 
an effect, or headship in a local sense. In Gen. 
I, 1 the context clearly excludes the three last 


2 Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, c. 1. 
3 Cfr. Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II. p. 250. 


ming sal 


Se ee 


CREATION IN TIME 51 


mentioned meanings. Consequently, the term 
-must here denote the beginning of time. 

Some of the Fathers* apply “beginning” to 
the Divine Logos, as principium de principio. 
But it is highly improbable that Moses had in 
mind the Logos. Moreover, the Fathers in 
question did not propound their construction as 
the primary and only correct one; they merely - 
suggested it as a possible secondary interpreta- 
tion resulting from a deeper study of the text.® 

There are numerous other Scriptural passages 
which could be adduced in confirmation of our 
faosis.\) Cir. e.g) Psi aba nia palo. 
mine, terram fundasti—In the beginning, O 
Lord, thou foundedst the earth.” Ps. LXX XIX, 
2: “Priusquam montes fierent aut formaretur 
terra et orbis, a saeculo et usque ad saeculum tu 
es, Deus — Before the mountains were made, or 
the earth and the world was formed, from eter- 
nity and to eternity thou art God.” ® 


With the possible exception of Origen, the Fathers 
unanimously teach that the world is not eternal. Tatian, 
the Apologist, says: ‘“‘ O88 yap dvapyos 9 Urn, Kabarep 6 
@cds — Matter is not beginningless, as God is.”7 St. 
Basil, the ablest among the Patristic commentators of 
the Hexaémeron, declares: “Because many believed 


4Cfr. Theophil., Ad Autol., II, 6 Cfr. also Prov. VIII, 22 sqq.; 
10; Clem. Alex., Strom., VI, 7; John XVII, 5; Eph. I, 4. 
Basil., Hom. in Hexaém., 1. 7 Contr. Graec., 5. 


5Cfr. Tertull., Contr. Hermog., 
C,759. 


52 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 


that the world was eternal, like God, Moses purposely 
chose these words: In the beginning God created heaven 
and earth.” * St. Ambrose insists that the world began 
simultaneously with time. “In principio temporis,’ he 
says, “ Deus coelum et terram fecit; tempus enim ab hoc 
mundo, non ante mundum— In the beginning of time 
God made heaven and earth; for time began simulta- 
neously with, not prior to, the world.”® In other words, 
time began with Creation. Before the Creation of the 
world there was no real, but ‘only imaginary time. 
Quite appositely, therefore, does St. Augustine observe: 
“ Procul dubio non est factus mundus in tempore, sed 
cum tempore — The world was doubtless not made in 
time, but with time.” 44 And he brushes aside the ludi- 
crous question: “ What did God do during the time 
that preceded the Creation?” with the remark: “ Non 
enim erat tunc, ubi non erat tempus — There was no 
then, because there was no time.” ?? 


Thesis II: Creation from all eternity seems to in- 
volve a contradiction, and hence was probably impos- 
sible. 


Proof. As against the revealed truth that the world 
had its beginning in time, it is a purely speculative ques- 


8 Hom. in Hexaém., 1. 

9 Praef. in Hexaém. contr. Peri- 
pat. 

10 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
Knowabihty, Essence, and Attri- 
butes, pp. 306 sqq.—* The now of 
time is the boundary line between 
the past and the future. As soon, 
therefore, as the world was created, 
there existed a boundary line be- 
tween an imaginary or possible past, 
and a real future. This was the 
beginning of real time.”— Hum- 


phrey, “His Divine Majesty,” p. 
2576 

11 De Civ., Dei, V; 6.— Creation 
is said to have taken place in 
time, in the sense that real time 
began with creation. Before real 
time, there was only possible time, 
This was indefinite, in the possibil- 
ity of it. Hence we may, with St. 
Augustine, say that the world was 
made with time, rather than made 
in time. Cfr. Humphrey, “ His Di- 
vine Majesty,” p. 257. 

12 Confess., XI, 13. 


CREATION IN TIME 53 


tion of decidedly minor importance, whether or not an 
eternal world is intrinsically possible. Granted that it is 
possible, we must carefully distinguish between “ be- 
ginning in time” and “being a creature.” From the 
fact that a thing began in time we can rightly conclude 
to its being a creature, but we could not argue conversely 
that it must have begun in time because it is a creature; 
an eternal creature would be as truly a creature as one 
produced in time. 

Still some of the Fathers, believing that an eternal 
world would involve an intrinsic contradiction, boldly 
concluded from the dependence of the world to its cre- 
ation in time. It should however, be noted that not a 
few of the Patristic texts usually cited in this connec- 
tion do not really bear on the question at issue. They 
merely affirm that the dualistic assumption of an un- 
created eternal hyle involves a contradiction, whereas 
the question we are now considering is whether or not 
creation from eternity would entail a contradiction. But 
there is another group of Patristic dicta which are ger- 
mane to our topic. Thus St. Cyril of Alexandria says: 
“That which has been brought into being by creation, 
cannot possibly have existed from all eternity.” 1% This 
view was adopted by a number of eminent Scholastics, 
e. g., Albertus Magnus and Richard of St. Victor. St. 
Bonaventure went so far as to declare: ‘To assume 
that the world is eternal . . . and [at the same time] to 
hold that all things were created out of nothing, is so 
contrary to right reason that I cannot persuade myself 
that any philosopher, no matter how small his intel- 
lectual capacity, ever took this ground.” 14 

But St. Bonaventure’s opinion was not shared by all 


13 Thes. Assert., 32. 
14 Comment, in Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 1, p. 2. 


54. EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 


Catholic theologians and philosophers. Those two great 
antagonists, St. Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, 
agreed that the proposition that the world necessarily 
began in time, cannot be cogently established by philo- 
sophic arguments. “ Mundum non semper fuisse, sola 
fide tenetur et demonstrative probari non potest,” says 
St. Thomas; “That the world is not eternal we hold 
solely as a matter of faith; reason cannot demonstrate 
it by stringent arguments.” 1° The Angelic Doctor care- 
fully reviews the objections raised against this thesis in 
his work De Aeternitate Mundi.* 

Still less is it demonstrable that an eternal creation is 
necessary.’ Such being the status of the vexed con- 
troversy, there is plainly no need for us to embrace 
either of the contradictory opinions current among 
Catholic philosophers and theologians. We merely note, 
in passing, that the authority of the Fathers seems rather 
to favor the intrinsic impossibility of an eternal creation.2® 


ARTICLE 5 


THE INCOMMUNICABILITY OF GOD’S CREATIVE POWER 


Revelation tells us that no creature ever exercised the 
creative power. Still the purely speculative question may 
be asked: Could God, if He would, communicate His 
creative power to a creature, e. g., an angel of the 
highest rank? Of course no angel could wield the cre- 


16S. Th.,) 1a,qu. a6; art. 2, 18 Cfr. Hontheim, Instit. Theo- 

16 Cfr. the learned monograph of — dicaeae, pp. 710 sqq., Friburgi 1893; 
Dr. P. Thomas Esser, O. P., Die Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic The- 
Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquino ology, Vol. II, pp. 249 sqq.; Sten- 
tiber die Méglichkeit einer anfangs- trup, Das Dogma von der geitlichen 
losen Schépfung, Miinster 1895. Weltschépfung, Innsbruck 1870. 

17 Cfr. St. Thomas, De Pot., qu. 
3, art. 17. 


7 
ad 


ee me Ey ee ee 


—*. 


ay a ae 


CREATIVE POWER INCOMMUNICABLE 55 


ative power to the full extent of its infinite perfection, 
or independently of the preservative and concurring in- 
fluence of the Divine First Cause. The meaning of our 
question is: Could any creature, as principal, or at 
least as an instrumental cause, produce anything (e. g., 
a blade of grass) out of nothing? A categorical denial 
of this possibility, it is easy to see, will redound to the 
glory of the Creator. 


Thesis I: No mere creature ever created anything 
out of nothing. 


This proposition embodies an article of faith. 

Proof. The Fourth Lateran Council dogmatic- 
ally declared the Blessed Trinity to be “unwm uni- 
versorum principium, creator omnium visibilium et 
mvisibilium, spiritualium et corporalium — The 
one principle of all things, the Creator of all 
things visible and invisible, spiritual and cor- 
poreal.” * This truth can be proved from Sacred 
Scripture by a twofold method: (1) by show- 
ing that Creation is never attributed to any 
one but God; and (2) by demonstrating that 
the Bible positively denies that any creature ever 
exercised creative power. Heb. III, a: “Out 
autem omnia creavit, Deus est — He that created 
pithines,is God.” Apoc TiVo 1: 22a ereasti 
omnia et propter voluntatem tuam erant et creata 
sunt — Thou hast created all things; and for 
thy will they were, and have been created.” This 


1 Cfr, Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 428, 


50 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 


truth is enunciated even more solemnly in Is. 
XLIV, 24: “Ego sum Dominus, faciens omnia, 
extendens coelos solus, stabiliens terram, et nullus 
mecum —I am the Lord, that make all things, 
that alone stretch out the heavens, that estab- 
lish the earth, and there is none with me.” And 
in John I, 3: “Omnia per ipsum facta sunt, et 
sine ipso factum est nihil, quod factum est — All 
things were made by him: and without him was 
made nothing that was made.” In the light of 
these and similar texts the Fathers of the Church 
did not hesitate to brand as heretical the proposi- 
tion that the world was made by beings of an 
inferior order. “Those who allege,” says St. 
John of Damascus, “that the Angels are the 
creators of any substance whatever, are mouth- 
pieces of the Devil, who is their councillor; for 
being themselves creatures, the Angels cannot be 
creators.”.* This view is shared by all theolog- 
ical schools. 


Thesis II: God cannot, even by way of grace, 
communicate His creative power to any creature. 


This thesis merely represents a theological conclusion. 
Proof. The Scholastics generally hold* that no crea- 
ture, how high soever its rank, is able, even with 
divine assistance, to create anything out of nothing.* 
Holy Scripture, Tradition, and ecclesiastical teaching 


2De Fide Orth., II, 3. Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist., 1, 
3 Against Durandus and Gabriel qu. 4. 
Biel. Cfr. the latter’s Comment. in 4 Durandus was ill-advised when 


CREATIVE POWER INCOMMUNICABLE 57 


alike regard the power to create as the true criterion 
of omnipotence, and consequently as an exclusive and 
incommunicable divine attribute, which as essentially 
differentiates God from His creatures as His eter- 
nity or immensity. Theologically, therefore, it is quite 
consistent to conclude from God’s creative power to 
His omnipotence and, ultimately, to His self-exist- 
ence.) Lhe notion) of a)‘ creating’ creatire,’ on the 
other hand, is as much a contradiction as would be that 
ofa “created God.’ Whenever, in fact, Holy Scrip- 
ture wishes to exalt God’s omnipotence and to impress 
His creatures with their own impotence, it usually accen- 
tuates His creative power.’ Hence we may properly 
conclude that creative power is a mode of operation 
peculiar to God, qua God, distinguishing Him from the 
creature, gua creature. This is most certainly the opinion 
of the Fathers, who hold that a “creatura creatrix” 
would involve an intrinsic contradiction. Thus St. 
Athanasius says: “All things were made through the 
Word, who would not have wrought all things, were 
He Himself a creature. Hence even the angels are un- 
able to create, since they are themselves creatures.” ° 
Similarly St. Augustine: “ An angel can no more create 
a substance than he can create himself.” 7 | 

The Scholastics tried to demonstrate the incommuni- 


possess the power to produce some- 
thing out of nothing.” L.c., 1. 23. 


he wrote: “ Quamvis nulli_crea- 
turae sit communicatum, quod creet, 
in con- 


tamen non apparet aliqua ratio con- 
vincens necessario, quod Deus non 
posset facere aliquam creaturam, 
quae possit aliquid producere nullo 
supposito in quo agat — Though it 
has not been given to any creature 
to create, yet there appears to be 
no stringent and necessary reason 
why God should not be able to 
make some creature which would 


5 


5 See the texts quoted 
firmation of Thesis 1, supra, p. 55. 

6 Serm. contr. Arian., ii, n. 21. 
Newman’s translation; cfr. Select 
Treatises of St. Athanasius in Con- 
troversy with the Arians, Vol. I, p. 
277, 9th impression, London 1903. 

@ De? Gentiad Eats, MIX? 25, 128% 
For other Patris‘ic texts bearing 
on this topic cfr. Tepe, Instit. 


58 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 


cability of God’s creative power by various philosophical 
arguments. St. Thomas bases his demonstration on the 
fact that pure being (ens in quantum est ens), which is 
the terminus of creation, can be produced solely by the 
causa universalissima.® Suarez starts from an analysis 
of the creative act, which of its very nature, he says, 
cannot be limited to this or that being (e. g., a grain 
of sand), but embraces all creatable things. A power 
that is able to create by a mere act of the will—so 
runs his argument — can meet with no material obstacle, 
and must therefore extend to all possibles. Now, such 
a power cannot be conceived except as actually infinite, 
and therefore cannot belong to any finite creature. 
Hence God alone can create. 


Thesis III: The Creator cannot employ a creature 
as an instrumental cause in creating. 


This thesis may be qualified as highly probable (pro- 
babilissima). 

Proof. An instrumental cause is far inferior to a 
principal cause, because it is moved rather than moving 
(as, for instance, a saw in the hands of a carpenter). 
The absolute impossibility of God’s employing creatures 
as instrumental causes in the act of creation is, there- 
fore, not quite so evident as the truth embodied in the 
preceding thesis. In fact, not a few Scholastics, follow- 
ing the lead of Peter Lombard,’ opposed the thesis we 
are here upholding. St. Thomas at first followed the 
“ Master of the Sentences,” but later in life changed 
Theol., Vol. II, pp. 436 saqq., Paris 9 Suarez, Metaph., disp. 20, sect. 
1895, and Chr. Pesch, Praelect. 24a). alt tow Cir... Palmierty De Deo 
Dogmat., t. III, 3rd ed. pp. -12 Creante, thes. 6. 


sqq., Friburgi 1908. 10 Lib. Sent., 5, dist. 4. 
OSs They ra, quj48, arte<; 


CREATIVE POWER INCOMMUNICABLE  ¢9 


his opinion and admitted that it is impossible for any crea- 
ture to create, even though it were only as an instrument 
in the hands of God: “ Sic igitur impossibile est, quod 
alicut creaturae conveniat creare, neque virtute propria 
neque imstrumentaliter, sive per ministerium.’? A 
transfer of the creative power to an instrumental cause, 
akin to the transfer of divine power to man in the 
working of miracles, the forgiving of sins, and at Con- 
secration during Holy Mass, is inconceivable because of 
the absence of a materia circa quam; for, in the act of 
creating something out of nothing there is no subject to 
which the instrumental cause could be applied and on 
which it could exercise its causality. This consideration 
removes a difficulty raised by Oswald, viz.: that “a con- 
version of one substance into another (transubstantia- 
tion) would seem to postulate as great a power as the 
production of a substance out of sheer nothing.7) 725) A¢ 
the Consecration the priest takes bread and wine as a 
substratum upon which to exercise his ministerial powers; 
but Creation is the production of something out of noth- 
ing without a pre-existing substratum." 


READINGS : — *Palmieri, S. J., De Creatione et Praecipuis Crea- 
turis, 2nd ed., Rome 1910.— Mazzella, De Deo Creante, 4th ed., 
Rome 1908.— Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. EV SS) 259— 
263, Mainz 1885.— Oswald, Schopfungslehre, Paderborn 1893.— 
Th. H. Simar, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik, Vol. I, §§ 62-90, F reiburg 


11S. Th., 1a, qu. 45, art. Sy 

12 Schépfungslehre, p. 53, Pader- 
born 1893. 

13 Cfr. St. Thom., Contr. Gent., 
II, 21 (Rickaby, God and His Crea- 
tures, pp. 88 sq., London 1905); 
Ipem, De Pot., qu. Satta, 4valso 
Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. II, pp. 
451 sq. 

*The asterisk before an author’s 


name indicates that his treatment of 
the question is especially clear and 
thorough. As St. Thomas is inva- 
riably the best guide, the omission 
of the asterisk before his name 
never means that we consider his 
work in any way inferior to that of 
others. There are vast stretches of 
theology which he scarcely touched. 


60 EXPLANATION OF THE DOGMA 


1899.— *G. B. Tepe, Jnstit. Theol., Vol. II, pp. 417 sqq., Paris 
1895.— Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. III, ed. 3, Friburgi 
1908.— Pesnell, Le Dogme de la Création et la Science Contem- 
boraine, 2nd ed., Arras 1894.—L. Janssens, De Deo Creatore et 
de Angelis, Friburgi 1905.— *St. Thom., S. Theol., ta, qu. 44 sqq. 
— Suarez, De Opere Sex Dierum.— Sane Dogmengeschichte, 
Vols. I and II, 2nd ed., Freiburg 1892-1895.— Vigener, De Ideis 
Divinis, Monast. 1869.— Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, § 134, Frei- 
burg 1878 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 356 sqq., 2nd 
ed., London 1899).— *Kleutgen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. I, 
2nd ed., Minster 1867 Stentrup, Das Dogma von der gzeit- 
lichen Weltschopfung, Innsbruck 1870—Kleutgen, Vom zeit- 
lichen Anfang der Welt (Beilagen to the Theologie der Vorzeit, 
Heft 2), Miimster 1870—Th. Esser, O. P., Die Lehre des hi. 
Thomas iiber die Méglichkeit einer anfangslosen Schépfung, 
Minster 1895.— St. Thom., Opusc. De Aeternitate Mundi.— Bil- 
luart, De Opere Sex Dierum, diss. I, art. 6.—J. T. Driscoll, 
Christian Philosophy: God, pp. 179 sqq., 2nd ed., New York 
1904.— K. Gutberlet, Gott und die Schépfung, Ratisbon t910— 
W. Humphrey, “ His Divine Majesty,” pp. 205 sqq., London 1897. 


CHAPTER TE 


THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF THE CREATED UNI- 
VERSE, OR DIVINE PRESERVATION 
AND CONCURRENCE 


God, having produced out of nothing the va- 
rious substances that constitute the created uni- 
verse, with all their properties and powers, con- 
tinues to influence them, (1) by preserving them 
in their being,’ and (2) by concurring in their 
operations.” We shall consider the divine Pres- 
ervation of the universe and God’s Concurrence 
with His creatures in two separate Sections. 


1 Conservatio in esse. 2 Concursus in operando. 


61 


SECTION |x 


DIVINE PRESERVATION 


1. THe Nature oF Divine PRESERVATION.— 
All created beings are contingent and absolutely 
dependent on the creative First Cause. It fol- 
lows that, once created, they cannot continue in 
substantial existence without the co-operation of 
the Creator. A created being never for a mo- 
ment ceases to be an ens ab alio,* and therefore 
forever depends upon the preservative influence 
of God. A sudden withdrawal of that influence 
would result in the inevitable annihilation of the 
creature. Consequently divine Preservation is 
as indispensable for the continued existence of 
the cosmos as Creation was for its beginning.‘ 
In this sense the preservation of the universe is 
sometimes called “continued creation.” 


3“* The fact that a creature actu- between the creative and the pre- 
ally exists, does not exist neces- Servative action of God, has been 
sarily, but depends on an external justly rejected by all theological 
cause as much for its continuous schools. Cfr. St. Thom., S. Theol., 


as for its initial existence.” (Wil- ta. qu. 104, art. 2, ad 4.—QOn 
helm-Scannell, Manual of Catholic Henry of Ghent (Doctor Solemnis) 
Theology, Vol. I, p. 364.) see Turner, History of Philosophy, 


4The peculiar theory advanced pp. 384 sqq.; on Peter d’Auriol 
by Henry of Ghent and Aureolus, (Aureolus), ibid., pp. 403 sq. 
that there is a specific difference 


62 


THE TEACHING OF REVELATION 63 


This does not mean that all created beings sink back 
into nothingness at every moment of their existence, to 
be each time promptly recreated by God, as Bayle scof- 
fingly insinuated.® Divine preservation must not be con- 
ceived as intermittent, but as the continued action of God. 
The power which sustains the universe is an incommuni- 
cable attribute of God in the same sense as the creative 
power which called it into being. 

What we have so far said is sufficient to show the 
falsity of the systems that have been at various times 
devised in respect of divine Preservation. First and 
above all we must note that the divine Preservation of 
the cosmos is not merely negative. “It is not enough 
for God not to destroy His creatures, He must exercise 
some positive influence on them.”® Preservation must 
be conceived as a positive divine influence directed to 
the very substance of a creature, and by which the crea- 
ture is enabled to continue its existence.? 

Like Creation, Preservation, entitatively considered, is 
an eternal and necessary act; terminatively, however, it 
is temporal and free. 


2. THE TEACHING OF REVELATION.—Though 
never formally defined as an article of faith, the 
doctrine of the divine Preservation of the uni- 
verse is undoubtedly contained in the sources of 


5If Bayle’s opinion were true, 
justly observes B. Boedder, S. J. 
(Natural Theology, p. 354, 2nd ed., 
London 1899), “‘there would be 
properly no preservation at all, but 
only renewal by divine creation of 
interrupted existences.’’ 

6 Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual of 
Catholic Theology, Vol. I, p. 363. 

7 This last-mentioned point must 


be strongly emphasized against cer- 
tain modern theologians (e. g., Ber- 
lage and Klee), who postulate the 
Divine Preservation only for dis- 
soluble compound substances (or- 
ganisms), but hold that the so- 
called incorruptible and simple sub- 
stances (the elements, pure Spirits) 
preserve themselves, 


64 DIVINE PRESERVATION 


Revelation. ‘The Roman Catechism declares that, 
unless preserved by God’s Providence, the uni- 
verse would instantly return to its original noth- 
ingness.® 

a) Holy Scripture clearly enforces the neces- 
sity of divine Preservation, as distinct from 
Creation. Wisd. XI, 26: “Quomodo posset 
aliquid permanere (vévev), nisi tu voluisses, aut 
quod a te vocatum non esset, conservaretur? 
How could any thing endure, if thou wouldst 
not? or be preserved, if not called by thee?” If 
this preservative influence were withdrawn, all 
living beings would perish. Ps. CIII,29: “Au- 
feres spiritum eorum, et deficient et in pulverem 
suum revertentur—Thou shalt take away their 
breath, and they shall fail, and shall return to 
their dust.’ Holy Scripture describes divine 
Preservation either actively as an “upholding” 
or keeping together, or passively as the indwell- 
ing of all things in God. Heb. I, 2 sq.: “Per 
quem fecit et saecula,... portansque® omnia 
verbo virtutts suae — By whom also he made the 


world . . . upholding all things by the word of 

his power.” Col. 1, 16 sq.: “Omnia per ipsum et 

im ipso creata sunt ... et omnia in ipso con- 
8 Cat. Rom., P. I, cap. ii, qu. stitutae sunt, illas conservaret, 

19. “‘ Nisi conditis rebus perpetua statim ad nihilum reciderent.” 

ems [Dei] providentia adesset, at- 9 hépwr, 


que eadem vi, qua ab initio con- 


THE TEACHING OF THE FATHERS 65 


stant “—All things were created by him and in 
him . . . and by him all things consist.” 1! 


b) The teaching of the Fathers on the whole conforms 
to the Scripture texts just quoted. Origen commen- 
tates on Acts XVII, 28 as follows: “In what manner 
then shall we live and move and be in God, unless with 
His power He grasps and holds together the uni- 
werse?.”.? St. Chrysostom observes: “To hold the 
universe together is no smaller matter than to have 
created it. Nay, if we be allowed to marvel, it is some- 
thing even greater. For while the act of Creation pro- 
duced beings, the act of Preservation sustains them, lest 
they return to nothingness.” ** St, Augustine remarks :. 
* The world would scarcely endure even for one single 
moment, if God were to withdraw His governance from 
af52,74 

We will close the Patristic argument with a passage 
from the writings of St. Gregory the Great: “Cuncta 
ex mhilo facta sunt, eorumque essentia rursum ad ni- 
Iulum tenderet, nisi eam auctor omnium regiminis manu 
teneret — All things were made out of nothing, and their 
essence would tend to return to nothing, did not the 
author of all sustain them by his governance.” 18 
in bringing any theist to avow that 
things could not be at all, if they 
dropped out of the thought of the 


Supreme Mind. But God’s mere 
thinking of them is not enough to 


10 ra wavra évy aire ovvésrnker, 
11 Cfr. also Acts XVII, 28. 

12 De Princip., II, 1. 

13 Hom. in Hebr., II, 1, 3. 

14In Gen. ad Lit., IV, 14.  “* Be- 


ing is not the nature or essence 
of anything created, but of God 
alone,” says St. Thomas Aquinas, 
“Nothing then can remain in be- 
ing when the divine activity ceases.” 
(Contr. Gent., III, 65.) “This is 
a truly magnificent argument,’’ com- 
ments Fr. Rickaby. “In these 
idealist days, there is no difficulty 


raise them out of the order of pure 
possibilities, and transfer them into 
the region of actual being. To give 
them actuality, God must will them; 
and to keep them in existence He 
must will them continually.” (Of 


God and His C reatures, p. 236, 
note.) i 
15 Moral.. XVI, 37, 45. Other 


66 DIVINE PRESERVATION 


c) It may be set down as a certain theological con- 
clusion that in point of fact God will never actually 
withdraw His preserving influence either from the uni- 
verse as a whole, or from any of its constituent parts. 
He will forever sustain the substance of His Creation. 
With regard to spiritual substances, their eternal dura- 
tion (immortality) is an ethical postulate based upon 
God’s wisdom, sanctity, and fidelity. As to material 
substances (not, however, their combinations) we have 
positive assurance that they will also endure forever, 
Cfr. Wisd. I, 14: “ Creavit Deus, ut essent [t. €., per- 
manerent| omma—He created all things that they 
might be,’ 16 

Transubstantiation proves nothing against this; for 
though bread and wine disappear in the conversion, they 
are not properly annihilated. The same quantity of nat- 
ural substance is restored when the species becomes cor- 
rupted.” 


READINGS : —*Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, §§ 130, 131, Frei- 


burg 1878 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. r, ppi gor sqq.cu 


Heinrich, Dogmat. Theologie, Vol. V, §§ 272-273, 2nd ed., Mainz 
1888; Lessius, De Perfect. Moribusque Div., 1. to-11: St. Thom., 
Contr. Gent., III, 65 (Rickaby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 
236 sqq.) ; Inbem, De Potent., qu. 5; Petav., De Deo: NUIT 2s 7B) 
Boedder, S. J., Natural Theology, pp. 348 sqq., 2nd ed., London 
1899; L. J. Walker, S. J., art. “ Providence,” in the Catholic Ency- 
clopedia, Vol. XII. 


Patristic texts will be found in 17 For a detailed treatment of 
Stentrup, De Deo Uno, pp. 658 this point we must refer the stu- 
sqq., Oenip. 1878. dent to the treatise on the Blessed 


16 Cir. also’-Ps, CIE,) es CXLV; Eucharist, 
6. 


‘ 
’ 
4 
i 
& 
i) 
My 
t 
3 


SECTION 2 


DIVINE CO-OPERATION OR CONCURRENCE 


I. DEFINITION OF THE TERM.—The causality 
of God extends to the operations (operari) of 
His creatures as well as to their being (esse). 
He co-operates in their operation by preserving 
their substance and energy. But His co-opera- 
tion is more than mediate. We hold with Cath- 
olic theologians generally, against Durandus,! 
that God lends His immediate physical co-opera- 
tion or Concursus to each and every creatural 
act. This particular function of divine Provi- 
dence is called concursus divinus generalis, in 
contradistinction to the special assistance granted 
_ in the order of supernatural grace. 


Two extremes must be avoided in defining the divine 
Concursus. First, all creatural operations are not at- 
tributable solely to God. This is the error of the so- 
called Occasionalists, who assert that the causae secundae 
are not true causes.2, Secondly, we must not exclude 
the divine causality altogether by ascribing all causal in- 
fluence to the creature. The First Cause actually co- 

1Comment. in Quatuor Libros Occasionalism, see J. L. Perrier, 
Sent., II, dist. 1, qu. 5. The Revival of Scholastic Philos- 


2For a brief summary of the ophy, pp. 70 sq., New York rgog. 
considerations usually urged against 


67 


68 DIVINE CONCURRENCE 


operates with the secondary causes,’ though this co-oper- 
ation is not a cooperatio in the strict sense of the 
term; that is, God does not posit one part of the effect, 
and the creature the other, but the same effect is fully 
and completely wrought by the First Cause, and just as 
fully and completely by the second causes. “When 
one and the same effect is attributed to a natural cause 
and to the divine power,” says St. Thomas Aquinas, 
“this does not mean that the effect is produced partly 
by God and partly by the natural agent. The whole 
effect is produced by both, though in different ways, 
just as the same effect is produced wholly by the in- 
strument and wholly also by the principal cause.” * The 
right relation between Causa prima and causa secunda 
demands that the creatural be subordinated to the divine 
principle in such wise that the effect produced by both 
derives its physical entity from God more than the 
creature.® 

As regards sin, we must distinguish between its ma- 
terial and its formal cause, that is, between the physical 
entity of the sinful act (entitas peccati), and its in- 
herent malice (malitia peccati). God lends His co- 
operation solely to the act as such; the malice inherent 
in it, or, in other words, the sinning creature’s inclination 


3“ To signify that all capabilities quod non sic idem effectus causae 


of creatures for action must be 
reduced to divine creation and 
preservation, and that the exercise 
of these capabilities can never take 
place but with dependence upon di- 
vine volition, Scholastics say that 
God concurs with His creatures in 
action as the first cause, whilst the 
creatures are second causes.” 
(Boedder, Natural Theology, p. 395 
sq.) 


4 Contr. Gent., III, 70: “ Patet 


-instrumento et 


naturali et divinae virtuti attribui- 
tur, quast partim a Deo et partim 
a naturali agente fiat, sed totus ab 
utroque secundum alium modum, 
sicut idem effectus totus attribuitur 
principalt agent 
etiam totus.” (Cfr. Rickaby, Of 
God and His Creatures, p. 242, 
London 1905.) 

5 Cir. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, 
qu. 105, art. 5. 


PROVED FROM REVELATION 69 


towards evil, is due entirely to the exercise of its free- 
will.® 


2. THE DivinE Concursus DEMONSTRATED 
FROM REVELATION.—The doctrine of the divine 
Concursus is not strictly a revealed dogma. But 
it is a certain theological conclusion, as appears 
from the fact that it is held by all theological 
_schools.* We quote the Roman Catechism as of 
special weight in this matter: “Non solum autem 
Deus universa, quae sunt, providentiad sud tuetur 
atque administrat: verum etiam, quae moventur 
et agunt aliquid, intima virtute ad motum atque 
actionem ita impellit, ut, quamvis secundarum 
causarum efficientiam non impediat, praeveniat 
tamen, quum eius occultissima vis ad singula 
pertineat, et quemadmodum Sapiens testatur, 
‘attingat a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit 
omnia suaviter. Quare ab Apostolo dictum est, 
quum apud Athenienses annuntiaret Deum, quem 
agnorantes colebant: ‘Non longe est ab unoquo- 
que nostrum; im ipso enim vivimus, et movemur, 
et sumus'— Not only does God by His Provi- 
dence protect and govern all things that exist, 
but by His intimate power He also impels to 
motion and action whatever things move and act, 
and this in such manner that, although He ex- 


6 God’s predetermination, in the ural Theology, Diisz2emcOtre Ste 
words of Fr. Boedder, “‘ causes the Thomas, De Malo, qu. 3, art.. 2. 
free choice which is sinful, but He 7 The isolated opposition of Du- 
does not cause it as sinful.” (Nat- randus must be styled foolhardy. 


70 DIVINE CONCURRENCE 


cludes not, He yet prevents, the agency of sec- 
ondary causes; for His most secret influence 
extends to all things, and as the Wise Man tes- 
tifes, ‘reacheth from end to end mightily, and 
ordereth all things sweetly.’ Wherefore the 
Apostle, when announcing to the Athenians the 
God, whom not knowing they adored, said: 
‘He is not far from every one of us, for in Him 
we live, and move, and be.’ ” ® 


a) The Scriptural argument offers some difficulties. | 


In selecting probatory texts we must be careful to 
choose only such as do not, on the face of them, refer 
to the supernatural aid of grace or to the purely mediate 
co-operation of God. For this reason, e. g., 1 Cor. XII, 
6 is unavailable. This text runs as follows: “ Divi- 
stones operationum sunt, idem vero Deus, qui operatur 
omnia [opera] in ommibus [operantibus]|— And there 
are diversities of operations, but the same God, who 
worketh all in all.” St. Paul here speaks of supernatural 
co-operation on the part of God.® 

Equally unavailing for our present argument is Job 
X, 8 sqq.: “Manus fecerunt tuae [Domini] me et 
plasmaverunt me totum in circuitu, ... pelle et carni- 
bus vestisti me, ossibus et nervis compegisti me — Thy 
hands have made me, and fashioned me wholly round 
about. . . . Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh: 
thou hast put me together with bones and sinews.” 
As the plastic power of the womb is undoubtedly due 

8 Cfr. Cat. Rom., P. I, cap. 2, omdvra ép mao, because of the 
qu. 22. general terms in which it is 


9It should be noted, however, couched, is most probably meant to 
that the phrase 6 évepymy rd include man’s natural acts. 


PROVED FROM REVELATION 71 


to the creative and preservative causality of God, this 
text would not lose its force even if it did not refer to 
His immediate co-operation. 

There is another series of Scriptural texts so worded 
as to be equally applicable to the Preservation of the 
universe and to the divine Concursus with which we 
are here concerned. For instance, John V, Wye Later 
meus usque modo operatur et ego operor —My Father 
worketh until now, and I work.” 

Bell more) ta) the ( point’ isi) Is). XV 2+)  Do- 
mine, dabis pacem nobis; omnia enim opera nostra 
operatus es nobis — Lord, thou wilt give us peace, for 
thou hast wrought all our works for us.” Here “our 
works” are attributed to God. Cfr. also Acts XVII, 
25: “Quum ipse det omnibus vitam? et ims pira- 
tionem et omnia *— Seeing it is he who giveth to all 
life, and breath, and all things.” Probably the most 
conclusive text is Acts XVII, 28, cited by the Triden- 
tine Catechism: “Jn ipso enim vivimus, movemur et 
sumus — For in him we live, and move, and are.” The 
Apostle here emphasizes the fact that we are dependent 
upon the divine co-operation for our existence as well as 
our life and operation. 

b) The Fathers of the Church regarded this as a truth 
both natural and revealed. Their teaching clearly ap- 
pears from their polemical writings against the Pelagians. 
St. Augustine censures those “ qui arbitrentur, tantum- 
modo mundum ipsum factum a Deo, cetera iam fiert ab 
ipso mundo, Deum autem nihil operari. Contra quos 
profertur illa sententia Domini: Pater. meus usquemodo 
operatur.”™* The doctrinal position of the Pelagians is 
aptly hit off in St. Jerome’s dialogue between Crito- 


10 fwqy, 12 7a wavTa, 
11 rvony = breath, 13 In Gen. ad Lit., V, 20. 


92 DIVINE CONCURRENCE 


bulus and Atticus. Critobulus, who speaks for the Pe- 
lagian heretics, objects that, “If we need God’s aid in 
everything we do, we cannot put a pen to paper, or keep 
silence, or speak, or sit, or stand, or walk about, or 
run, or eat, or fast, or weep, or laugh, etc., unless God 
lends us His assistance.” Atticus, who defends the 
Catholic view, replies that it is quite evident that we 
can do none of these things except by the aid of God.” 
Gregory the Great clearly teaches both the Preservation 
and the divine Concursus: “ Omnia, quae creata sunt, 
per se nec subsistere valent nec moveri, sed intantum 
subsistunt, inquantum ut esse debeant acceperunt, in- 
tantum moventur, inquantum occulto instinctu disponun- 
tur — Created things, of themselves, can neither con- 
tinue to exist nor move; they subsist only in so far as 
they have received the power of subsistence, and they 
move only in so far as they are disposed thereunto by 
a hidden instinct.” *° 


3. THE ConTROvERSY BETWEEN MOLINISM 
AND THomismM.—The famous controversy be- 
tween the Molinists and the Thomists, which we 
have already sketched in our volume on God: 
His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes," 
sharply reasserts itself in discussing the relation 
of the concurring First Cause to the operation of 
the secondary causes, especially in regard to the 
free acts of rational creatures. While both 


14 Dial. contr. Pelag., I, n. 2. Schoolmen on this point see Sten- 
15‘ Juxta meum sensum non trup, De Deo Uno, thes. 82. 
posse perspicuum est.” Cfr. St. 17 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
Jerome’s Ep. ad Ctesiph. Knowability, Essence, and Attri- 


16 Regarding the consensus of the butes, pp. 383 sqq., St. Louis 1911. 


PHE MOLINIST CON PROVERSY 73 


schools agree in upholding the necessity of the 
divine Concurrence in all human acts, including 
those which are free, and even those which are 
sinful, they differ widely in regard to its measure 
and mode. 


a) The Molinistic theory may be outlined thus. The 
divine Concurrence postulates two efficient causes 
(namely, the First Cause and a secondary cause), which 
by their harmonious co-operation produce the whole 
effect. The question arises: How is the free act of 
the will produced by this double cause? Liberty of 
choice is essentially conditioned by an absolutely free 
self-determination on the part of the will, and hence it 
is evident that God, while remaining the First Cause, 
must so shape His concurrence that the liberty of the 
creature remains intact. “‘ Albeit the First Cause exerts 
the strongest influence upon the effect,” says St. Thomas, 
“that influence is nevertheless determined and specified 
by the proximate cause.’ ?® Hence the divine Concur- 
sus must comprise a twofold act: an offer of co-oper- 
ation, and actual co-operation. The former is called 
concursus oblatus, the latter, concursus collatus. 

The concursus oblatus does not as yet produce a de- 
termined act of the free will, but is of its nature in- 
different, equivocal, and hypothetical, though at the same 
time necessary, because free volition cannot operate of 
itself and independently of the First Cause. By seizing, 
as it were, and leaning on the proffered arm of God, the 
human will is enabled to get its bearing according to the 
- full extent of the active indifference which constitutes 
its freedom, and to act according to its good pleasure. 


18 De Potent., qu. 1, art. 4, ad 3. 


74. DIVINE CONCURRENCE 


Did God proffer only a particular concursus along certain 
definite lines, the choice of the will would by that very 
fact be determined and its freedom destroyed. 

By Concursus collatus or exhibitus we understand the 
actual bestowal of divine help for the performance of a 
specific act which the will freely posits, and which God 
by virtue of the scientia media foresees with absolute 
certainty from everlasting. This particular concursus is 
by its very nature precisely as definite, univocal, and 
absolute as the free determination of the will. It consists 
in God’s physically positing the selfsame act to which the 
free will has determined itself. The will’s self-deter- 
mination precedes the divine causality as a condition 
precedes that which it conditions, not, however, as a 
cause precedes its effect. It follows that the concursus 
collatus, taken in the sense explained, is and must be 
strictly simultaneous.” 

b) Thomism ”° postulates what is technically known as 
the concursus praevius, that is, a co-operation on the 
part of God which not only co-produces the free act of 
the creature, but as a praemotio physica causally pre- 
determines it, and formally applies the will, which is 
of itself indifferent, to the free act. According to this 
much-debated theory the free-will of the creature is pre- 
determined by God physically and ad unum before it 
determines itself. Concursus praevius and praemotio 
physica, therefore, are merely different names for one 
and the same thing. 


19 For further information on pp. 355 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1899. 


this question see Suarez, Opusc. de 
Concursu, I, 14 saqq.; Hontheim, 
Instit. Theodicaeae, pp. 621 sqq., 
770 sqq., Friburgi 1893; Schiffini, 
Disput. Metaph. Specialis, Vol. Il, 
pp. 331 sqq. August. Taurinor. 
1888; B. Boedder, Natural Theology, 


20 So called on the plea that it 
is the doctrine of St. Thomas; the 
Molinists claim that the Saint is 
not rightly interpreted by those 
who impute to him this teaching. 
Cfr. Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 
371 sdq., 439 sad. 


THE MOLINIST CONTROVERSY 75 


Gonet defines physical premotion as follows: “ Actio 
Dei, qua voluntatem humanam, priusquam se determinet, 
ita ad actum movet insuperabili virtute, ut voluntas 
nequeat omissionem sui actus cum illa praemotione con- 
jungere.’** Let us analyze this definition. Physical 
premotion is a determination, not merely an: indif- 
ferent, manifold, and hypothetical offer of co-operation 
like the concursus oblatus of the Molinists. It imme- 
diately and irresistibly (insuperabili virtute) determines 
the free will ad unum, after the fashion of some 
transient quality, designed, in the words of Alvarez, 
to communicate to the will and to all secondary 
causes the ultimate complement of the actus primus.2? 
Physical premotion is, more specifically, a predeter- 
mination, for the reason that both with regard to 
causality and nature it precedes the exercise of free 
will on the part of the creature. It is called physical, 
in order to distinguish it from every species of moral 
determination (such as, e. g., a counsel, command, pe- 
tition), and also to emphasize the absolute effectiveness 
and irresistibility of the divine impulse. For, as it is 
metaphysically impossible for the human will to act at 
all without being predetermined, so, too, it is metaphys- 
ically impossible for the will not to act when it is pre- 
determined, or to perform an act other than that to 
which it is predetermined. This predetermination does 
not, however, destroy freedom of choice, because God 
predetermines the will not only with regard to the sub- 
stance of the act to be performed, but also in respect 
of its mode, that is, He predetermines the will to act 

21 Gonet, Clyp. Thomist., disp. 9, voluntatt et omnibus causis secun- 
Lbs Si. dis ultimum complementum  actis 


22°Alvarez, De Aux., III, disp. primi.” i 
18, n. 18, ad 1: ‘.. . ut conferat 


76 DIVINE CONCURRENCE 


freely. Needless to say, none but an omnipotent First 
Cause can so predetermine free-will as to cause it to co- 
predetermine itself, and, consequently, to act with full 
liberty. Therefore, say the Thomists, physical premo- 
tion does not destroy free-will, but postulates and con- 
firms it.” 

c) This is not the place to enter into a minute criticism 
of the two systems. To conform fully to the demands 
of right reason, Molinism must meet the objection that 
“ free-will, by predetermining itself, forces the divine 
First Cause into inadmissible co-ordination.” It is more 
important to guard the majesty and primacy of the di- 
vine First Cause, than to preserve the freedom of the 
human will. Molinism overcomes this objection by ex- 
plaining that God depends on free-will merely as on a 
condition, and that the divine causality is far and away 
superior to that of the creature.** ‘That the First Cause 
should accommodate and conditionally subordinate itself 
to the nature and properties of the individual free crea- 
ture, is not derogatory to the infinite dignity and sover- 
eignty of God, any more than that God should make 
the execution of His holy Will dependent on a condition 
which the creature is free either to posit or not. Having 
bound Himself by a solemn promise to reward His 
creatures for the good they do, God cannot violate 
their free-will, but owes it to His own wisdom, sanctity, 


23 Cfr. Zigliara, Theologia Natu- 
ralis, Lyon 1876, pp. 380 sqq. 

24 “ Primo,’ says Suarez, ‘ causa 
prima altior est et nobilior magisque 
independenti modo influit in effec- 
tum. Secundo causa prima respicit 
per se primo actionem illam sub 
quadam universaliori ratione; nam 
causa prima influit in quemlibet ef- 
fectum vel actionem ex eo praecise, 
quod aliquid entitatis participat, 


causa autem secunda semper influit 
sub aliqua posteriori magisque de- 
terminata ratione entis. Unde fit 
tertio, ut influxus causae primae ex 
se et ex suo genere dicatur etiam 
prior subsistendi consequentia; nam 
influxus causae primae absolute non 
pendet a causa secunda, sed quan- 
tum est ex suo genere, potest esse 
sine illa, non vero e converso.” 
Metaphys., disp. 22, sect. 3, M. 10. 


THE MOLINIST CONTROVERSY 79 


and justice to preserve it, to foster it, and to give it 
full sway. This is not derogatory to His dignity, nor 
does it imply self-abasement; it is simply a mystery of 
the divine omnipotence.”® 

The Molinistic charge that Thomism destroys free- 
will and makes God the author of sin, will be duly con- 
sidered in the treatise on Grace. Another objection 
against Thomism is that the concursus praevius, being 
neither wmmediatus nor simultaneus, cannot properly be 
called a concursus ad actum. Nature and Revelation 
agree that a free act of the creatural will requires an 
immediate and simultaneous concurrence on the part of 
God. The Thomistic concursus to all appearances pos- 
sesses neither the one nor the other of these qualifications. 
It is not per se simultaneus, because it is praevius, and 
it is not immediatus, because it is primarily directed to 
the efficient cause, 1. e., the actus primus, and not to 
the effect as such, 7. e., the actus secundus. Cardinal 
Zigliara tries to evade this difficulty by pointing out 
that the concursus simultaneus may be a continuation 
of the influxus praevius.® It is indeed quite true that 
the concursus simultaneus may be a continuation of 
the imfluxus praevius,—but does not the theory of 
which the learned Cardinal is an advocate, demand 
that it must always be so? Duly considered, the con- 
cursus praevius, as such, is not really a concursus at all, 
it is merely a praecursus. As Liberatore convincingly 
argues: “Si divinus concursus in re aliqua consisteret 
actiont creaturarum praevia, huius vi Deus in actionem 
non immediate influeret, sed mediate, nimirum media 
re illa praevid, ad quam eius operatio proxime termina- 

25Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 26 Theol. Naturalis, p. 384, Lyon 


Knowability, Essence, and Attri- 1876. 
butes, pp. 440, 455 saq. 


78 DIVINE CONCURRENCE 


tur. Ut igitur salvetur Det concursus tmmediatus, ne- 
cesse est ut in ipsa actione creaturarum concipiatur.” ™ 


READINGS : — *Suarez, Opusc. de Concursu; *Stentrup, S. J., 
De Deo Uno, cap. 10, Oeniponte 1878; IpEM, (more briefly), 
Synopsis De Deo Uno, pp. 286 sqq., Oeniponte 1895; Dummer- 
muth, O. P., S. Thomas de Doctrina Praemotioms Physicae, 
Paris 1886; J. Pecci, Lehre des hl, Thomas tiber den Einfluss 
Gottes auf die Handlungen der verniinftigen Geschdpfe und iiber 
die Scientia Media, Paderborn 1888; F. G. Feldner, O. P., Die 
Lehre des hl. Thomas iiber die Willensfreiheit der verniinfitigen 
Wesen, Graz 1890; Frins, S. J., De Cooperatione Dei cum Omni 
Natura Creata, presertim Libera, Paris 1892; *L. de San, S. J., 
De Deo Uno, t. 1: De Mente S. Thomae circa Praedeterminationes 
Physicas, Louvain 1894; I. Jeiler, O. F. M., S$. Bonaventurae Prin- 
cipia de Concursu Dei Generali ad Actiones Causarum Secunda- 
rum Collecta et S. Thomae Doctrind Confirmata, Quaracchi 1897. 


27 Instit. Philos., Vol. II, n. 66, student is also referred to the 
Naples 1881. For a more com- works cited under * Readings ’’ and 
plete treatment of these subtleties to the treatise on Grace, which is 
see Stentrup, S. J., De Deo Uno, to appear later as a separate volume 
pp. 676 sqq., Oeniponte 1878. The of this series. 


OCEDAE TR Lit 


THE FINAL CAUSE OR END OF CREATION, AND 
; DIVINE PROVIDENCE 


Having treated of the efficient and the exem- 
plary cause of the created universe, we now pro- 
ceed to inquire into its final cause or end. 

What is the final cause or ultimate object of 


Creation? And by what means is that object 
attained? 


St 
\O 


SEC PION 
THE FINAL CAUSE OR OBJECT OF CREATION 


I, PRELIMINARY REMARKs.—An end, object, 
or purpose (fms, TéAos) is that for the sake of 
which the effect or result of an action is pro- 
duced.* Aristotle calls it simply 76 od évexa. Since 
infinite progression is impossible, there must 
somewhere exist a “last cause’ (fins ultiuus), 
in respect of which all other causes are but means 
(fines intermedu). Thus man has a last end, 
an ultimate goal, beyond which there can be no 
other, and to the attainment of which he must 
subordinate all other ends for which he may be 
striving. The created universe, too, must have 
such a final cause, or last end, and this we now 
proceed to examine. 


It is important for the purpose of our present inquiry 
to draw a clean-cut distinction between fimis operis and 
finis operantis. A finis operis is an end immanent in 
the act or work itself, such as the alleviation of poverty 
in giving alms, or the indication of time on the part of 
a clock. <A finis operantis, on the other hand, is that 
particular end or purpose which guides or impels an 
agent in acting and which constitutes the motive or 


1 Finis est id, cuius gratia aliquid fit. 


SO 


TEE OV RINES OPERANTIS” 81 


cause of his action. The finis operantis may or may not 
coincide with, though it can never frustrate, the finis 
operis. Thus some men give alms out of vanity, or to 
be reputed charitable, while clock-makers in construct- 
ing horologes are usually impelled by motives of gain 
or love of art. Similarly, in inquiring into the ultimate 
end of the created universe, we must carefully distin- 
guish between these two questions: (1) What induced 
God (finis operantis) to create the universe ? (2) What 
is the ultimate end or object (finis operis) for which 
the universe was created? Divine Revelation returns a 
clear and distinct answer to both these questions. 


2. THE TEACHING OF REVELATION.—The 
teaching of Revelation on this head can be stated 
in two propositions: (1) God in creating the 
universe was impelled by His benevolence; (2) 
The final object of Creation is, primarily, the 
glorification of the Creator, and secondarily, the 
beatitude of His rational creatures, 


Thesis I: God’s sole motive in creating the uni- 
verse (finis operantis) was His benevolence. 


This is de fide. 

Proof. God is the Sovereign Lord and. in- 
finitely perfect, and therefore the motive of His 
external operations must be within Himself. 
For, being eternally self-sufficient and enjoying 
absolute beatitude in and for Himself,? He re- 
quires for His being or happiness nothing that 


2“... im se et ex se beatissimus.’’— Conc. Vaitc., Sess. TI; cap. 1. 


82 THE FINAL OBJECT OF CREATION 


exists outside Himself. Furthermore, being sub- 
stantial goodness or love,? He must have been 
impelled by His own goodness or love in creating 
the universe, and, since creation is free, by a free 
act of His Love. This is in fact the express teach- 
ing of Holy Church. “Deus bonitate sua .. . 
non ad augendam suam beatitudinem nec ad ac- 
quirendam, sed ad mamfestandam perfectionem 
suam per bona, quae creaturis wunpertitur, liber- 
rumo consilio ... utramque de nilulo condidit 
creaturam — God, of His own goodness, ... 
not for the increase or acquirement of His own 
happiness, but to manifest His perfections by the 
blessings which He bestows on creatures, and 
with absolute freedom of counsel, created out of 
nothing . ... both [the spiritual and the corpo- 
teal’ creatures Os ACCOT Cine ALO vie oly 
Scripture, God is Alpha and Omega, the begin- 
ning and the end,° 7. e., the final and the first 
Cause, who derives the motives of His operation 
solely from’, Hanseltiviisarms| OCU Cider: 
“Propter me, propter me faciam, ut non blas- 
phemer, et gloriam meam alteri non dabo — 
For my own sake, for my own sake will I do 
it, that I may not be blasphemed: and I will 
not give my glory to another.’’ Origen couches 


3 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 5**T am Alpha and Omega, the 
Knowability, Essence, and Attri- beginning and the end, saith the 
butes, pp. 423 sqq. Lord God.” (Apoc. I, 8.) 


4 Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, cap. 1. 


‘ 
vi 
: 

% 


PEE RINIS OPRERIS? 83 


this fundamental theological verity in the words: 
“When in the beginning He created the things 
He willed to create, He had no other motive for 
His action than His own self, that'is, His good- 
Mess.) ot, Augustine says (iit sy suficient 
for a Christian to assume that the goodness of 
the Creator was the sole cause of creation.” * 


Thesis II: The ultimate purpose of Creation (finis 
operis) is, primarily, the glorification of God, sec- 
ondarily, the beatification of His rational creatures. 


Proof of the First Part of the Thesis (which 
is de fide). The proposition that the glory of 
God is the ultimate end of Creation, was denied 
by Descartes, who insisted that we cannot con- 
ceive God as influenced by egoism and vain- 
glory.* Against this error the Vatican Council 
defines: “St quis... mundum ad Dei gloriam 
conditum esse negaverit; anathema sit — lf any 
one... shall deny that the world was made 
for the glory of God, let him be anathema.” ® 


a) The same truth is implicitly taught in all those 
Scriptural texts which describe God as the absolutely 
final as well as the highest end and object of all created 
things. The universe serves its ultimate end by revealing 
and proclaiming the divine perfections, and thereby 


6 De Princip., II, 9, 6. St. Thomas in the Summa Theolo- 
7 Enchirid., c. 9. Cfr. also St. gicad, 1a; qu.\ 19, ants !2=3. 

John Damascene, De Fide Orth., 8 Medit., 4. 

II, 2. The philosophical argument 9 Concilium Vaticanum, Sess. III, 


is developed somewhat at length by can. 5. 


84 THE FINAL OBJECT OF CREATION 


glorifying God as the last end of all things. It is in this 
sense that Sacred Scripture again and again says that 
God created the universe for Himself. Prov. XVI, 4: 
“Universa propter semetipsum operatus est Dominus 
— The Lord hath made all things for himself.” That 
propter Deum here means ud gloriam Dei is patent from 
Rom. XI, 36: “Ex ipso et per ipsum et im 1pso* sunt 
omnia: ipsi gloria in saecula— For of him, and by him, 
and in him, are all things: to him be glory for ever.” 


In his letter to the Hebrews (II, 10) St. Paul, by an ~ 


inimitable play upon words, identifies the causa finals 
of the world with its causa efficiens: “ Propter quem 
omnia et per quem omnia — 80 bv ra mévta Kat 8’ ob Téa, 
advra.” For this reason Yahweh Himself says: “ Om- 
nem, qui invocat nomen meum, in gloriam meam creavt 
eum, formavi eum et feci ewm— And every one that 
calleth upon my name, I have created him for my glory, 
I have formed him and made him.’** The material 
universe glorifies God by objectively reflecting His maj- 
esty. Ps. XVIII, 2: “Coeli enarrant gloriam Dei et 
opera manuum eius annuntiat firmamentum — The 
heavens shew forth the glory of God, and the firmament 
declareth the work of his hands.” Rational creatures 
have the additional and higher mission of converting 
the objective glory of the Creator (gloria obiectiva) 
into a subjective glorification (gloria formalis) by 
means of knowledge, love, and praise.** This obliga- 
tion is solemnly enjoined upon them by divine command. 
Deut. X, 20 sq.: “Dominum Deum tuum timebis et 
ei soli servies; ipsi adhaerebis iurabisque in nomine allius. 
Ipse est laus tua, et Deus tuus —Thou shalt fear the 
Lord thy God, and serve him only: to him thou shalt 


10 eis atdrév = finis ultimus. 12)'@fr. Rom: 1, 19 sqq. 
Ais A7. 


<4 
wes 


ES NT ee eR Ee erg a oT ee RN 


rE RINT S Oe BR ESE 85 


adhere, and shalt swear by his name. He is thy praise 
and thy God.” Hence the Christmas hymn of the an- 
gelic hosts, “Gloria in excelsis Deo;” hence also the 
incessant exhortation of the Psalmist, “ Laudate Do- 
minum,” and of Daniel, “ All ye works of the Lord, 
bless the Lord,” + 

b) The teaching of the Fathers on this point agrees 
so perfectly with that of Sacred Scripture that we 
need not rehearse it at length. “ What we adore,” says 
St. Clement of Rome, “is the one God, who has made 
this whole mass out of nothing and fashioned it as an 
ornament to His majesty.” '* Tertullian copies this 
passage word for word in the seventeenth chapter of 
his A pologeticum.™ 

c) The Schoolmen draw an important distinction, 
which is based on the teaching of Scripture, between 
gloria obiectiva and gloria formalis:® By gloria obiec- 
tiva they understand the objective grandeur of the cre- 
ated universe as a mute manifestation of divine wis- 
dom, benevolence, beauty, etc. Gloria formalis is the 
subjective glorification of the Creator by His rational 
creatures, in so far as they are moved by the beauty and 
grandeur of the physical universe to know, love, and 
praise Him.’” It is in this manner, and in this manner 
only, that the ultimate object of Creation (which con- 
sists in the glorification rather than in the simple glory 
of God) can be truly, completely, and perfectly at- 

13 Dan. III, 57.—Why God’s 


zeal for His own glory does not 
imply egoism and vainglory, we 


Doctrina Christiana, I, 32. The 
philosophical argument is forcibly 
stated by St. Thomas, Contr. Gent., 


have explained in God: His Know- 
ability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 
432 sqq. 

14 Ep. ad Corinth., I, n. 33. 

15 For the teaching of St. Augus- 
tine, see that holy Doctor’s work, 


III, 16 sq. (Rickaby, Of God and 
His Creatures, pp. 196 sqq.). Cfr. 
also Lessius, De Perfect. Moribus- 
que Div., 1, XIV. 
16 Cfr, Lessius, J. ¢., c. 10, nm. 7. 
17) Cir. Rom], ‘19 saa. 


86 THE FINAL OBJECT OF CREATION 


tained. We conclude that, in creating the universe, God 
aimed principally at being glorified by those of His crea- 
tures whom He has endowed with reason. Had He 
omitted to kindle the light of reason, at least in some 
of His creatures, the universe would be “a book with- 
out a reader, a voice with no one to listen, an altar 
without a priest, a dwelling without inmates.”*® In 
view of these considerations it has justly been argued 
that a purely material world without rational denizens 
would be repugnant.’® 


Proot of the Second Part of the Thesis) That 
the happiness of rational creatures is one of the 
ultimate objects of Creation, is denied by two 
classes of opponents. Descartes, King, Stattler, 
and Kant regard the happiness of the rational 
creature as the sole object of Creation, irrespec- 
tive of the glory of God. Others, like Hermes 
and Gtinther, hold that the chief end of Creation 
is the beatification of rational creatures, and that 
the glory of the Creator must be subordinated 
to this end. The opinion of the former has 
already been refuted. It remains to show that 
the happiness of rational creatures, though one of 
the chief purposes of Creation, is not its highest 
end, but essentially subordinate to the glorifica- 
tion of God. In other words, beatitude is merely 
the secondary object of Creation.” 

18 Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. II, «und ihre Bewohner, 6th ed., pp. 
n. 461. 467 sqq., 495 sqq., Cologne 1910. 


19 Cfr. Pohle, Die Sternenwelten 20 Cfr. Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, 
cap. 2. 


EE OREN I STORRS 87 


a) Holy Scripture teaches, (1) that the material uni- 
verse is subject to man and exists for his benefit and 
use; (2) that man’s well-being is not an end in itself, 
but a means to the glorification of God. The former 
purpose being subordinate to the latter, it follows that 
the happiness of man (and of the Angels) is the sec- 
ondary, not the primary end of Creation. Many Scrip- 
tural texts could be quoted to show that all irrational 
creatures are subject to, and destined to serve man, 
and that his eternal happiness is one of the ends of 
Creation. It is on this truth that theologians base what 
is known as the voluntas Dei salvifica, that is, the ear- 
nest and sincere will of God to free all men from sin 
and lead them to supernatural happiness. But as He is 
the Sovereign Good, the Creator must ultimately refer 
the eternal happiness of His rational creatures to Him- 
self, 7. e., He must seek in it His own glorification. 
Eph. I, 5 sq.: “Qui praedestinavit nos in adoptionem 
filiorum per Iesum Christum... in laudem gloriae 
gratiae suae .. . ut simus in laudem gloriae eius — Who 
hath predestinated us unto the adoption of children 
through Jesus Christ unto himself . . . unto the praise 
and glory of his grace ... that we may be unto the 
praise of his glory.” Only in this way can those who 
despise the divine glory be confounded. 1 Kings II, B01; 
“ Quicunque glorificaverit me, glorificabo eum; qui autem 
contemnunt me, erunt ignobiles — Whosoever — shall 
glorify me, him will I glorify: but they that despise 
me, shall be despised.” There is no exception to this 
fundamental rule. Even Christ, the Godman, glorified 

21a. oe Gen iD 283 \f And. God rule over the fishes of the sea, and 
blessed them [our first parents], the fowls of the air, and all living 


Saying: Increase and multiply, and creatures that move upon the 
fill the earth, and subdue it, and earth.”’ 


88 THE FINAL OBJECT OF CREATION 


His Heavenly Father in all things. John XVII, 4: 
“Ego te clarificavt super terram, opus consummavi — 
I have glorified thee on the earth, I have finished the 
work.” Hence the life of the Elect in Heaven is nothing 
but an unceasing hymn of praise in honor of the Cre- 
ator. Apoc. IV, 11: “ Dignus es, Domine Deus noster, 
accipere gloriam et honorem et virtutem, quia tu creasti 
omnia — Thou art worthy, O Lord our God, to receive 
glory, and honor, and power: because thou hast created 
all things.” Cfr. 1 Cor. III, 22: “Omnia vestra sunt, 

_ vos autem Christi, Christus autem Dei— For all 
things are yours, .. . and you are Christ's, and Christ 
is God's." 

b) There is no need of elaborating the argument 
from Tradition. The Fathers all teach in perfect con- 
formity with Sacred Scripture that the material uni- 
verse was made for man. “Non quasi indigens Deus 
hominis plasmavit Adam,’ says St. Irenzeus,2? . “ sed 
ut haberet, in quem collocaret sua beneficia— God 
formed Adam, not as if He had need of him, but as 
a subject upon which to confer His benefits.” On the 
other hand, however, the Fathers insist that man should 
be constantly mindful of the honor and glory he owes to 
God, according to the exhortation of St. Paul: “ Sive 
ergo manducatis sive bibitis sive aliud quid facitis, omnia 
in gloriam Dei facite — Therefore, whether you eat or 
drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all to the glory of 
God.” 22. In his commentary on the Psalms ** St. Augus- 
tine says: “ Quo fine facias, vide. Si eo id facis, ut tu 
glorificeris, hoc prohibuit Deus; si autem ideo, ut Deus 
glorificetur, hoc iussit — Look to the end thou hast in 

22 Adv. Haer., IV, 14. consult St. Augustine’s treatise De 


231 Cor. X, 31.° On this text Doctrina Christiana, ch. 22. 
YEG I leo a. USA 


Se 


THE OPINISJOPERTS 89 


view. If thou dost it in order to glorify thyself, thou 
dost something which God has forbidden; but if thou 
dost it in order that God be glorified, thou compliest with 
His command.” 

c) The glory of God and the happiness of His crea- 
tures are two ends which can never clash, because the 
one is subordinate to the other, and the two are so inti- 
mately bound up that the attainment of either promotes 
that of the other. In the last analysis, therefore, Cre- 
ation has but one adequate end, wez., the glory of God, 
and this is accomplished by the beatification of His ra- 
tional creatures, which consists in knowing, loving, and 
praising the Creator. In fact, the higher purpose is at- 
tained in direct proportion to the attainment of the 
lower —the greater the happiness of the creature, the 
more ardent will be its love, the more intense its glorifi- 
cation of God. And conversely, the more intense the 
love and praise which the creature renders to God, the 
greater will be its own beatitude. 

It has been objected that, as some of God’s rational 
creatures are eternally damned, Creation does not attain 
its last end and purpose. God inevitably obtains that 
measure of external glory which He wills; and Hell 
itself is ultimately a revelation and glorification of the 
divine justice, though, of course, God does not, voluntate 
antecedente, seek His glory in the tortures of the repro- 
bate sinners, but in the jubilant hymns of-the Elect.” 


25 Lessius explains the intrinsic 
relation existing between the glory 
of God and the beatitude of His 
creatures as follows: “ Iiaque in 
summa Det gloria extrinseca for- 
maliter et intrinsece includitur sum- 
mum bonum nostrum, ita ut sine 
illo concipi nequeat; et hoc ipso 


7 


quod Deus illam gloriam intendit 
et quaerit, intendit et quaerit sum- 
mum bonum et commodum nostrum. 
Unde non minus Deo gratias agere 
debemus, quod quaerit gloriam 
suam, quam quod quaerat salutem 
nostram, quia gloria eius est salus 
nostra.’ De Perfect. Moribusque 


go THE FINAL OBJECT OF CREATION 


READINGS: — Kleutgen, Theologie der V orzeit, Vol. I, 2nd ed., 
Sec. 5, Minster 1867.— Palmieri, De Creatione et de Praecipuis 
Creaturis, thes, 10-11, Romae 1910.— Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. 
II, §§ 132-133, Freiburg 1878 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, 2nd 
ed., Vol. I, pp. 369 sqq.).— Stentrup, De Deo Uno, thes. 68-73, 
Oeniponte 1878.— Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, 2nd ed., Vol. 
V, §§ 265-276, Mainz 1888.— Tepe, Instit. Theol., Vol. Il, pp. 
453 sqq., Paris 1895. 

Divin., XIV, 3, n. 36. For a ref- gen, Theologie der Vorzeit, Vol. I, 


utation of the false theories of Sect. 5. 
Hermes and Giinther consult Kleut- 


SECTION 


DIVINE PROVIDENCE 


I. DEFINITION OF THE TERM.—St. Thomas 
defines Divine Providence as the all-regulating 
and stable plan by which God, as the Supreme 
Ruler of the universe, ordains all things.1 


This definition postulates the existence of two divine 
operations, one of which is proper to the divine In- 
tellect, viz.: foreknowledge of all, especially the con- 
ditioned events of the future,? whereas the second, viz.: 
a preordainment of whatever is to happen or not to 
happen, with due regard to the free will of rational 
creatures, belongs to the divine Will. In a wider sense 
Providence is called the divine government of the world 
(gubernatio mundi), in as far as it is the successive 
execution of the divine plan in time. 

Providence, therefore, is related to the divine gov- 
ernment of the world as a design is related to its execu- 
tion. Providence is eternal, while the divine government 
of the world is exercised in time. 

Nor are “Providence” and “divine disposition ” 
Synonymous terms. What is usually called a divine dis- 
position (dispositio) has reference to the ordering of 
things to one another, while Providence ordains things 


WS d Heol, 1a) \aus | 22. afte Wi. Knowability, Essence and Attri- 
2See Pohle-Preuss, God: His  butes, pp. 361 saq. 


gli 


92 DIVINE PROVIDENCE 


to their final end. Because of their intrinsic relation 
to the final object of the universe, the various divine dis- 
positions must be conceived as necessary functions of 
Providence. The same is true of the divine Preserva- 
tion of the universe and also of divine Concurrence, with 
both of which we have dealt in a preceding chapter. 


2. THE DocmMa.—The existence of an all-gov- 
erning Providence was formally defined as an 
article of faith by the Council of the Vatican: 
“Universa vero, quae condidit Deus, providentia 
sua tuetur atque gubernat, attingens a fine usque 
ad finem fortiter et disponens omma suaviter ; 
omnia enim nuda et aperta sunt oculis ems, ea 
etiam, quae liberaé creaturarum actione futura 
sunt — God protects and governs by His Provi- 
dence all things which He hath made, ‘reaching 
from end to end mightily, and ordering all things 
sweetly.’ For ‘all things are bare and open to 
His eyes,’ even those which are yet to be by the 
free action of creatures.” * This definition ex- 
cludes the pagan notion of “fate” (<#apuem), 
which had already been rejected by the Council of 
Braga (A.D. 561), and also modern Deism, 
which either denies Providence point-blank, or 
represents God as an idle, uninterested spectator 
of mundane affairs. 

For the Scriptural argument we must refer 
the reader to our work entitled God: His 


3 Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, c. I. (Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, 
n, 1784.) 


akan sh ~ a . 
SR aie lies ste Oa ie 


a 
; — 


DEISM 93 


Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 260 


sqq. 
Among Patristic texts we would call special 


attention to Theodoret’s ten beautiful discourses 
on God’s Providence in the government of the 
world,* and to the last of St. Chrysostom’s three 
books to Stagirius, a treatise of consolation 


written for the benefit of a sorely tried and 
nearly despairing friend.° 


3. Dre1sm.— By Deism we understand a conception of 
the universe which acknowledges the existence of a 
personal Creator, distinct from the world, but holds that 
He does not care for the universe which He has created, 
simply letting it shift for itself. Deism differs not only 
from Christian Theism, but likewise from Pantheism and 
Materialism, and consequently also from Atheism. It 
may be fitly described as an incomplete, defective, and 
halting Theism.°® 

Deism originated in the seventeenth century, in Eng- 
land, by way of reaction against the Episcopal Church. 
Under the leadership of Toland (1696), Collins 
(+ 1724), Tindal (1730), who is called “the great 
apostle of Deism,” Thomas Morgan (1737), and other 
notorious Freethinkers, it began by attacking the super- 


4Tlept mpovoias déyou f. 

5 IIpos Zrayeipiov aoxynryny dac- 
LovevTa, Cfr. Bardenhewer-Sha- 
han, Patrology, p. 334. There is a 
difficult passage in the writings of 
St. Jerome, which the reader will 
find quoted, with a brief expla- 
nation, in Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
Knowability, Essence, and Attri- 
butes, pp. 358 sq. Ruiz has brought 
together quite a number of Patris- 


tic texts in his work De Providen- 
tia, disp. 3, sect. 3. The philosoph- 
ical argument is well developed by 
J. Hontheim, S. J., in his Institu- 
tiones Theodicaeae, pp.- 805 saqq., 
Friburgi 1893. Cfr. also Pohle- 
Preuss, op. cit., pp. 445 sqq. 

6 For a good account of Deism 
see Fr. Aveling in the Catholic En- 
cyclopedia, Vol. IV, s. wv. 


94 DIVINE PROVIDENCE 


natural truths of Christianity and, under Dodwell 
(1742) and David Hume (+ 1776), sank deep into the 
quagmire of religious scepticism. German Rationalism 
(die Aufklirung)—whose leading champions were 
G. E. Lessing and Im. Kant —like the Freethought of 
the French Encyclopedists, was merely an offshoot of 
English Deism. In Germany Deism ultimately devel- 
oped into Pantheism. In France it engendered Athe- 
ism, which celebrated its terrible triumphs in the Revo- 
lution. At present Deism is leading a shadowy exist- 
ence in certain Freemasonic lodges which have not yet 
adopted rank Pantheism. It is a comfortable creed, 
for, while freely acknowledging the existence of a 
“ Grand Architect of the Universe,” it cares not how He 
is worshipped or whether He be worshipped at all. The 
God of the Deists allows the mighty engine of the uni- 
verse to run at rovers and permits the droll little crea- 
tures called men to disport themselves as they please. 
Of course, if the universe is ruled by immutable laws 
and left to itself by its Creator, there can be no room for 
miracles; supernatural Revelation is impossible and the 
Christian world-view must be set down as a chimera. 
In its last analysis, therefore, Deism is pure Naturalism, 
or Rationalism, and utterly incompatible with revealed 
religion. It cannot even keep up the appearance of a 
“religion of pure reason” upon which it loves to plume 
itself. Having cut loose from God it has lost all sem- 
blance of religion and must lead to rank Atheism. Thus 
the most effective refutation of Deism is its own his- 
tory.” 

7 On God’s relation to evil, espe- ity, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 
cially moral evil or sin,—a relation 442 sqq. See also our remarks on 


which Deism blandly ignores,— cfr. Pessimism, supra, pp. 48 sq. St. 
Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowabil- Thomas deals with this aspect of 


DEISM 95 


READINGS: — St. Thomas, Contr. Gent., III, 64-97 (Rickaby, 
Of God and His Creatures, pp. 235 sqq.).— Ruiz, De Providentia 
Dei, disp. 1-4.— Lessius, De Perfect. Moribusque Div., 1. XI.— 
IpEM, De Providentia Numinis, etc— Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dog- 
mat., t. II, 3rd ed., pp. 173 sqq., Friburgi 1906.— Wilhelm-Scan- 
nell, A Manual of Catholic Theology, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 372 saq., 
London 1899.— B. Boedder, Natural Theology, pp. 381 sqq., 2nd 
ed., London 1899.— A. Lehmkuhl, Die géttliche Vorsehung, sth 
ed., Koln 1906.—K. Gutberlet, Gott und die Schépfung, pp. 
106 sqq., Ratisbon 1910.— F. Aveling, art. “ Deism ” in the Catholic 
Encyclopedia, Vol. IV. 


the subject in his Summa Theo- Natural Theology, Appendix VI, 
logica, 1a, qu. 49. On the Opti- PP. 467 sqq. 
mism of St. Thomas, cfr. Boedder, 


Py 7 
sue taney 
ZA te 


Re ty ; 
SD arith i 
Vee ey 
% a oF : 
i e 


at 
i 


PART II 


CREATION PASSIVELY CONSID- 
ERED, OR THE CREATED 
UNIVERSE 


By Creation in the passive sense (creari s. 
creatum ess€) we understand the created uni- 
verse or world (mundus). This, as its Greek 
Name (*éopvos) indicates, is not a chaos, but a 
well-ordered, graduated, and articulated whole, 
consisting of three kingdoms, which rise one 
above the other: (1) The material universe, 
which embraces animals and plants, (2) the 
human race, and (3) the Angels.+ 

Accordingly we shall treat of Creation pas- 
sively considered, 7. ¢., the created universe, in 
three Chapters, entitled respectively: (1) Cos- 
mology, (2) Anthropology, and (3) Angel- 
ology. 


1 Cfr. Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, cap. 1 (quoted supra, PP. 29 saqq). 


97 


CHAPTER I 


+ DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 


SHO ULON a 


FIRST AND SECOND CREATION 


1, DEFINITION oF TERMS.—In respect of 
matter, both inorganic and organic, God’s cre- 
ative operation is divided into two logically 
and really distinct functions, viz.: (1) The cre- 
ation of primordial matter out of nothing, and 
(2) the formation of chaotic matter, 1. e., the a 
fashioning of earth and heaven, oceans and con- ft 
tinents, plants and animals out of the primitive | x 
world-stuff. 

The former of these two functions is called first cre- 
ation (creatio prima). It is creation in the proper sense ~ 
of the term. The second (creatio secunda) can be called i 
creation only in a figurative or metaphorical sense. 
Creatio secunda may be said to partake of the nature © 
of creation proper, inasmuch as no one but God in His — 
omnipotence was able to fashion and form the cos-. — 
mos. Active formation? has for its term or object pas- 


2‘*Formation is an operation their own proper forces, and or — 


which, from already created matter, dains them towards an end.” 


moulds different natures, . fittingly (Humphrey, “ His Divine Majesty,” a 
compounds them, collects them into p. 262.) ‘ 
one synthesis, furnishes them with 


98 


FIRST AND SECOND CREATION 99 


sive formation, 7. e., the things formed or fashioned. In 
this passive formation St. Thomas discriminates between 
distinctio and ornatus. The work of distinction or dif- 
ferentiation which God performed on the first three 
days of the Hexaémeron consisted in the separation of 
light from darkness, of the firmament from the waters 
below, and of the solid land from the sea. The work 
of ornamentation, which took place on the last three days, 
consisted in the allocation of the various celestial and 
terrestrial bodies, supplying the water with fishes, the air 
with birds, and the continents with plants and animals. 


2. THE TEACHING OF DIVINE REVELATION.— 
Revelation furnishes a sufficient basis for the 
_ distinction between first and second creation. 


a) The book of Genesis begins by describing how 
God created all things out of nothing. Before He un- 
dertook the work of formation, which took six “ days,” 

the earth was “void and empty,” and the light as yet 
_ undivided from the darkness; in other words, the uni- 
verse was still in a chaotic state. To this twofold 
_ condition there corresponded a twofold operation on the 
part of the Almighty, viz.: creare and formare, which 
we call first and second creation. It is characteristic 
of the conception existing in the mind of the Sacred 
_ Writer that He does not describe the act of mere for- 
_ Mation or ordering by the verb 812, which he em- 
ployed in the first verse, but by stich verbs as n¥Y and 


Wi, which are capable of being construed with a materia 
ex qua.* The only exceptions to this rule are Gen. JI, 


21: “Creavit (833) Deus cete grandia — God created 
the great whales;” and Gen. I, 27: “Et creavit Deus 


2 Supra, p. 15. 


100 DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 


hominem ... masculum et feminam creavit (83) eos 


—And God created man,...male and female he 
created them.’ With regard to these two passages it 
should be noted that in the one there is question of a 
true creation, viz.: the creation of the human soul; while 
the other is specially designed to show forth God’s 
omnipotence, which manifests itself with special gran- 
deur in the creation of the huge ocean monsters. The 
playful ease with which the Creator produced these gi- 
gantic beings, proves that He is absolutely independent 
of matter and, therefore, at least indirectly demonstrates 
His creative power. 

For a further confirmation of the distinction between 
first and second creation we may quote from Wisd. XI, 
18 the phrase “ex materia invisa (scil. informi, é@& 
dudppov trys).”* It is no argument against our thesis 
that a distinction is made in Gen. I, 1 between “ heaven” 
and “earth,” for heaven and earth were present at the 
Creation of the universe only with regard to their sub- 
stance ; they were not as yet divided off and moulded into 
shape,— this took place later (Gen. I, 7-8). 

b) The distinction between first and second creation 

is quite common in the writings of the Fathers. Thus 
Severian of Gabala (++ after 408) says: “On the 
first day God created out of nothing (é pH dvrov) 


whatever He has made; but on the following days He — 


did not create out of nothing (oi é py évtwv), but ac- 
cording to His good pleasure fashioned (peréBadev) that 
which He had made on the first day.”*> The three Cap- 
padocians expressed themselves in a similar manner.® 


4 Our English version correctly 5 De Mundi Creatione, Or. 1, n. 3 
cenders this passage thus: ‘‘ Thy al- (Migne, P.G., LVI, 433). 
mighty hand, which made _ the 6 Basil., Hom. in Hexaém., 2; 
world of matter without form.” Greg. Naz., Orat.,.44, mn. 4;. Greg. 


(Cfr. supra, p. 15). Nyss., Hom. in Hexaém., 2. 


a es 
or 


FIRST AND SECOND CREATION Io 


St. Augustine very distinctly insists on the concept of 
creatio secunda. 

In determining the nature of the materia informis 
out of which God gradually fashioned the cosmos in 
the course of six days, the Fathers were entirely de- 
pendent on the scientific theories prevalent in their day. 
In expounding these theories, needless to say, they 
do not represent Tradition, but merely the inade- 
quate notions of an unscientific age, and we are not 
bound by their speculations. St. Chrysostom’s*® or St. 
Ephrem’s® explanations of the process of Creation in 
the light of the peripatetic theory of the four elements 
(earth, water, air, and fire), have no more authority 
than the Patristic or Scholastic defense of the geocentric 
system of the universe, and we Catholics of the twentieth 
century are free to substitute for the crude hypotheses 
of the Patristic period the more solidly established con- 
clusions of modern science, e. g., to regard the molecules 
as the proper object of the creatio prima and the various 
chemical compositions as the objects of the creatio se- 
cunda. 

While, as we have shown, Revelation offers a solid 
basis for a real distinction between first and second 
creation and their products, it remains an open question 
whether or not the two processes were separated by a 
_ temporal interval. The great majority of the Fathers not 
- only admit but positively assert an intermission be- 
tween creatio prima and creatio secunda. It was only 
the great authority of St. Augustine that preserved later 


_ theologians from unduly limiting freedom of interpreta- 


tion in regard to a question which, because of its rela- 
_ tions to natural science, must be handled with the greatest 


7 Supra, p. 14. 8 Hom. in Gen., 3. 9In Gen., I. 


102 DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 


reserve. St. Augustine’s own interpretation *° has, it is 
true, been generally rejected as forced and artificial; 
but St. Thomas,’! though himself a defender of the 
theory of temporal succession, invariably speaks of the 
Augustinian theory with great respect, and many later 
theologians, especially those who in some form or other 
prefer the so-called ideal interpretation, base their right 
to espouse a less slavishly literal view upon the example 
of the learned and pious Bishop of Hippo.” 


Reapincs:— Palmieri, De Creatione et Praecipuis Creaturis, 


thes. 14-15, Romae 1910.— Stentrup, De Deo Uno, thes. 78-79, 
Oeniponte 1875.— Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. Il, § 144, Freiburg 
1878 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, pp. 383 sqq.).— Os- 
wald, Schépfungslehre, pp. 42 sqq., Paderborn 1885.— G. B. Tepe, 
Instit. Theol., Vol. II, pp. 461 sqq., Paris 1805.— Chr. Pesch, 
Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. III, 3rd ed., pp. 32 sqq., Friburgi 1908.— 
Among the commentaries on Genesis we recommend especially 
those by Lamy, Hummelauer, and Hoberg. 


10 Basing on Ecclus. XVIII, 1: 
“ Creavit omnia simul (xowwy)— He 
created all things together,” Au- 
gustine contracts the six days of 
Creation into one day, nay, into one 
single moment of time, and inter- 
prets “evening” as referring to 


the cognitio vespertina of the An- 
gels. 
11 S. Theol., 1a, qu. 74, art. 2. 
12 Cfr. Petavius, De Opere Sex 
Dierum, I, 5; Grassmann, Die 
Schépfungslehre des hl. Augustinus 
und Darwins, Ratisbon 1889. 


Pe ga ml J 
a a aaa te 


SECTION 2 


THE HEXAEMERON IN ITS RELATION TO SCIENCE 
AND EXEGESIS 


ARDICI Hat 


THE MOSAIC ACCOUNT OF THE CREATION AND PHYSICAL 
SCIENCE 


This subject properly belongs to higher apolo- 
getics or fundamental theology. In the present 
(purely dogmatic) treatise it will suffice to lay 
down certain leading principles which theolo- 
gians and scientists must constantly keep before 
them in order to safeguard the sacred rights of 
revealed religion without trenching on the just 
claims of science. 


Thesis I: Nature and the Bible both tell the his- 
tory of Creation, and consequently the assured results 
of scientific investigation can never contradict Holy 


Writ. 


Explanation. The Word of God, rightly interpreted, 
cannot clash with the firmly established conclusions 
of science, because both Sacred Scripture and science 
have God for their author. Any apparent contradiction 
_ 1Cfr, Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, p. 

7 sq. 
103 


104. DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 


between the two must be traceable either to some false 
and unproved claim on the part of science, or to an in- 
correct interpretation of Holy Writ. A thorough in- 
vestigation of all the data involved usually lays bare the 
source of error. The Galilei controversy is a case in 
point.2 There can be no doubt that the various natural 
sciences — astronomy, geology, paleontology, etc.— fur- 
nish, or at least are able to furnish, valuable aids to the 
exegete who undertakes to interpret the Mosaic cos- 
mogony. The prudent theologian will not spurn these 
aids. On the contrary, the respect he owes to the Al- 
mighty Creator, whose vestiges these sciences seek to 
trace, will prompt him to welcome their co-operation and 
to pay due regard to whatever evidence they may have to 
offer. God has, as it were, set down an objective com- 
mentary on the Bible in the “ Book of Nature,” to which 
the theologian can and should devote most careful atten- 
tion. All true scientists are after a fashion exegetes,” and 
therefore friends, not enemies, of the theologians. Those 
among them who antagonize revealed religion,’ have de- 
serted the solid ground of science for moors and fens 
in which they gleefully chase deceptive will-o’-the-wisps. 
Of course, Science has a perfect right to follow her 
own methods, and the fact that her representatives con- 
duct their researches without constantly trying to square 
themselves with the Bible does not argue that they mis- 
trust religion or despise Christianity. The history of 
the inductive sciences shows that in many cases an undue 


2 The most recent and the best 
account of the Galilei case is that 
by Adolf Miller, S. J., in his two 
excellent volumes: Galileo Galilet 
and Der Galileiprozess (Freiburg 
1909), which deserve to be trans- 
lated into English. Cfr. also G. V. 
Leahy, Astronomical Essays, Ppp. 


181 sqq., Boston 1910; J. Gerard, 
S. J., The Church vs. ‘Science, pp. 
22 sqq., London 1907. 

3Some of them, like Cuvier, 
Linné, Newton, Secchi, consciously; 
others, like Lyell, Kélliker, Vir- 
chow, unconsciously. 

4E. g. Vogt, Biichner, Hackel. 


THE HEXAEMERON AND SCIENCE 105 


regard for certain favorite interpretations of Scripture 
has misled science and bred false theories which it 
took ages to get rid of. We may instance the Coper- 
nican system,° the debate between Neptunists and Plu- 
tonists,® the problem of the geological deluge,’ etc. Un- 
fortunately, too, there have always been over-zealous 
though perfectly well-intentioned theologians who were 
ready to add to the confusion by supplying “ theological 
arguments’ for unproved and unprovable hypotheses. 
This explains the existence and animus of such works 
as J. W. Draper’s History of the Conflict between Re- 
ligion and Science.® 


Thesis II: The proper purpose of the Mosaic nar- 
rative is not scientific, but strictly religious; hence 
we must not seek astronomy, physics, geology, etc., 
in the Hexaémeron, but chiefly religious instruction. 


Explanation. The grounds for this proposition are 
quite evident. The Bible is not a text-book of science. 
Had it been written to teach a supernaturally revealed 
system of physics, chemistry, astronomy, or geology, it 
would be a sealed and unintelligible book, nay, it would 
have proved positively dangerous to the faith of the 
masses, becatise scientific views and terms are subject 
to constant change. Consequently, in order to accom- 
plish its purpose, it was necessary that the Bible in 
matters of natural science should adopt the language of 
the common people, who derive their views of nature 
from external appearances. This popular idiom is ever 


5 Cfr. G. V. Leahy, Astronomical Last Geological Period, New York 


Essays, pp. 45 saq. 1895. 
6 Cfr. A. M. Clerke, Modern Cos- 8 New York 1889. A splendid an- 
mogonies, London 1905. tidote to this venomous book is Fr. 


7 Prestwich, On Certain Phenom- Lorinser’s Das Buch der Natur, 7 
ena Belonging to the Close of the vols., Ratisbon 1876-80. 
8 


106 ~DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 


true, because it employs relative standards in the con- 
templation of nature, and remains forever intelligible 
to the masses, because it makes no claim to describe abso- 
lute facts. Even at the present day, despite the universal 
adoption of the Copernican system, certain popular modes 
of expression, based upon ocular observation of the ap- 
parent movements of the heavenly bodies, retain the geo- 
centric color which they had in the days of Ptolemy. 
Even learned astronomers still speak of the summer and 
winter solstices, still refer to the sun as rising and set- 
ting, and so forth. “ We must remember,” says St. 
Thomas, ‘‘ that Moses addressed himself to an unculti- 
vated people, and, condescending to their ignorance, pro- 
posed to them only what was obvious to the senses.” ® 
Moses’ chief purpose was to impress the Jews and 
the nations that were to come after them, with four fun- 
damental truths, vig.: (1) The existence of one true 
God, Lord of heaven and earth; (2) the creation of 
all things out of nothing, which implied the falsity of 
the Egyptian animal and star worship no less than of 
Dualism and Pantheism; (3) the duty of keeping holy 
the Sabbath day, after the example of the divine Arti- 
ficer, who created the universe in six days, and rested 
on the seventh;?® (4) that all the things which God 
made were originally good.1* We do not mean to say, 
of course, that the purely scientific portions of the Bible 
have no claim to divine authority, or to deny that they 
are absolutely infallible. As part of the Inspired Word 
they embody divine revelation. However, since the 
Hexaemeron is susceptible of many different explana- 
tions, and the infallible Church has never given an 
authentic interpretation of it, but, on the contrary, has 


OSs lL heolsyvrasqu, 68, ‘artrigs 11‘* And God saw that it was 
10 Cfr:) Exod; XX, ‘8 sa. good.” Gen. I, 25. 


z 7 as, 
~ 60 =i cael See | 


THE HEXAEMERON AND SCIENCE 107 


granted full liberty to exegetes, Science is nowise 
hampered in her peculiar field of enquiry. St. Augustine 
went so far as to contend that the creation of the uni- 
verse was simultaneous with its formation and that what 
Sacred Scripture calls six days was in reality but a 
single moment of time.?? 


Thesis III: The relationship between the Mosaic 
narrative and natural science may, in principle, be 
defined thus: The Hexaémeron constitutes a nega- 
tive, but not a positive guiding principle for scientists. 


Explanation. By a positive guiding principle (norma 
positiva) we mean a rule, the conscientious observance 
of which guarantees the immediate possession of truth, 
while its non-observance entails error. Thus the mul- 
tiplication table is a positive guiding principle in all 
mathematical calculations and in the affairs of everyday 
life. A negative guiding principle merely requires that, 
while enjoying the greatest possible latitude in a certain 
sphere, we avoid forming any conclusion which directly 
contradicts said principle. Thus the axiom of parallel 
lines is a negative guiding principle in geometry, because 
any proposition that runs counter to it must inevitably 
prove false. That the Mosaic Hexaémeron does not pre- 
scribe what route science must travel is plain from the 
fact that the true sense of Genesis I, 1 has never been 
defined either by the infallible teaching office of the 
Church or by scientific exegesis. Hence the Mosaic 
narrative is not a positive norm for the guidance of the 


12 De Gen. ad Lit., 


IV, 22; De Spiration der hl. Schrift in der An- 
Civ. Dei, XI, 9. Supra, pp. 101 sq. schauung des Mittelalters von Karl 
Cfr. Fr. Schmid, De Inspirationis dem Grossen bis zum Konzil von 


Bibliorum Vi et Ratione, Brix. 1895; 
P. Dausch, Die Schriftinspiration, 
Freiburg 1891; K. Holzhey, Die In- 


Trient, Miinchen 1895; Chr. Pesch, 
De Inspiratione S. Scripturae, Fri- 
burgi 1906. 


108 DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 


naturalist. The very multiplicity of attempted interpre- 
tations which the Church has countenanced at various 
times, confirms this proposition. All that can justly be 
demanded, therefore, is that the scientist refrain from 
positively contradicting the Word of God, e. g., by de- 
fending such propositions as: “ Matter is eternal;” 
“Matter and energy are the sole principles of the uni- 
verse;’”’ “ The world originated by mere chance,” and so 
forth. In all other matters, such as the nebular hy- 
pothesis,** the evolution of species, etc., he may hold 
any conclusions that seem warranted. 

The exegete, on his part, is free to interpret the sacred 
text in accordance with the rules of hermeneutics and 
in harmony with each particular author’s peculiar style 
and with the context. Grammar, syntax, and the dic- 
tionary are quite as valuable scientific aids as the tele- 
scope, the microscope, and the testing tube. It will not 
do to impose the conclusions of physical science as a 
positive norm upon exegesis and to demand that the 
Hexaémeron be interpreted in accordance with constantly 
changing hypotheses. Modern exegetes, especially of 
the last half-century, have been justly charged with pay- 
ing too much attention to science and too little to the 
Mosaic text. Though the scientists have an undeniable 
right to be heard,'* they have no authority to dictate 
how the Hexaeémeron must be interpreted. All they can 
reasonably demand is that exegetes accept the established 
conclusions of science as a negative guiding principle and 
refrain from advocating as certain, or even probable, 
any theory that contradicts clearly ascertained facts.*® 


13 Cfr. Leahy, Astronomical Es- infra, p. 112). On this question of 


says, pp. 231 sqq.; Clerke, Modern 
Cosmogonies, pp. 21 sqq. 
14 Supra, Thesis I, 


15 Such are, for instance, the Res- 
titution and the Deluge theories (v. 


principle cfr. Kaulen, “ Grundsitz- 
liches zur kath. Schriftauslegung ” 
in the Lit. Handweiser, 1895, Nos. 
4 and 5; and A, Schépfer, Bibel 
und Wissenschaft, Brixen 1896. 


THE HEXAEMERON AND SCIENCE _ 109 


Thesis IV: Those theologians and scientists who 
deny that the so-called fossils or petrifactions are real 
remains of plants and animals, representing them as 
mere freaks of nature (lusus naturae), needlessly ex- 
pose the Word of God to ridicule. 


Explanation. There have been and still are theo- 
logians who, in order to save the literal interpretation 
of the Mosaic narrative, regard the paleontological 
finds in the lower strata of the earth as specially created 
products of divine omnipotence, rather than as real tre- 
mains of primordial organisms. Nothing is so apt to 
excite ridicule on the part of infidels and indignation 
in the camp of educated Catholic laymen, as recourse 
to such pitiable hypotheses, which are altogether un- 
worthy of a true theologian. To assume that the Cre- 
ator leads truth-seeking man into invincible error, is to 
stamp Him a cruel deceiver, who makes it His business 
to lay annual rings around carbonized trees found 
standing erect in coal-mines, and to fashion in perfect 
detail large and small trilobites in siluric deposits — 
some of them even contain well-developed embryos — 
all mere lusus naturae! St. Augustine and St. Thomas 
Aquinas vigorously protested against this curious way of 
“reconciling ” faith and science. 

Noteworthy for all time is the principle which St. 
Augustine lays down in his famous treatise De Genesi 
ad Literam: “In rebus obscuris atque a nostris ocults 
remotissimis, si qua inde scripta etiam divina legerimus, 
quae possint salva fide, qua imbuimur, alias atque alias 
parere sententias, in nullam earum nos praecipiti af- 
firmatione ita proticiamus, ut, si forte diligentius dis- 
cussa veritas eam recte labefactaverit, corruamus; non 
pro sententia divinarum Scripturarum, sed pro nostra 


110 DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 


ita dimicantes, ut eam velimus Scripturarum esse, quae 
nostra est, cum potius eam, quae Scripturarum est, no- 
stram esse velle debeamus.”1® With equal earnestness 
the Saint censures the stupidity of those who, in the 
mistaken interest of faith, provoke the sarcastic ridicule 
of learned infidels: “ Turpe est autem nimis et pernicio- 
sum ac maxime cavendum, ut Christianum de his rebus 
quasi secundum christianas litteras loquentem ita delirare 
quilibet infidelis audiat, ut... risum tenere vix possit. 
Et non tam molestum est, quod errans homo deridetur, 
sed quod auctores nostri ab tis, qui foris sunt, talia sen- 
sisse creduntur et cum magno eorum exitio, de quorum 
salute satagimus, tamquam indocti reprehenduntur atque 
respuuntur.’ 17 These sentiments of the greatest among 
the Fathers were shared and re-echoed by the most 
eminent of the Church’s theologians. “ Dicendum est,” 
says St. Thomas Aquinas, “ quod sicut Augustinus docet, 
in huiusmodi quaestionibus duo sunt observanda: primo 
quidem, ut veritas Scripturae imconcusse teneatur; se- 
cundo, cum Scriptura divina multipliciter expont possit, 
quod nulli expositioni aliquis ita praecise inhaereat, ut, 
si certa ratione constiterit hoc esse falsum, 1d nihilomi- 
nus asserere praesumat, ne Scriptura ex hoc ab infideli- 
bus derideatur et ne eis via credendi praecludatur.” ** 
St. Thomas rightly distinguishes between such Scrip- 
tural truths as appertain to the substance of faith, 
and such as are altogether secondary. “Si ergo circa 
mundi principium aliquid est, quod ad substantiam fidet 
pertinet, scil. mundum incepisse creatum, et hoc omnes 
Sancti concorditer dicunt. Quo autem modo et ordine 
factus sit, non pertinet ad fidem nisi per accidens, in- 
quantum in Scriptura traditur, cuius veritatem diversa 


16 De Genesi ad Literam, I, 18, LTO Pcit vis yO, 30> 
37- 18S. Theol., 1a, qu. 68, art. 1. 


THE HEXAEMERON AND SCIENCE 111 


expositione Sancti salvantes diversa  tradiderunt.’ 
The Creator, when He established nature, also laid 
down the laws by which it is governed, hence we must not 
have recourse to miracles except where no natural ex- 
planation suffices: “Scriptura in principio Genesis com- 
memorat institutionem naturae, quae postmodum per- 
severat. Unde non debet dici, quod aliquid tunc factum 
fuerit, quod postmodum desierit.” 2° And again: “In 
prima institutione naturae non quaeritur miraculum, sed 
quid natura rerum habeat, ut Augustinus dicit.? 1 


Thesis V: Since the true interpretation of the Hex- 
aémeron with regard to the origin of the universe is 
uncertain, theologians and scientists are free to adopt 
whatever theory they prefer, provided only it be rea- 
sonable and moderate, and not evidently opposed to 
Scripture. 


Explanation. This is merely a corollary from the pre- 
ceding theses. It is scarcely necessary to point out that 
scientists have vied with theologians in making liberal 
use of the privilege named. During the last half of 
the nineteenth century innumerable theories designed to 
harmonize science and the Bible have sprung up, and 
the end is not yet in sight. Most of these theories are 


19 Comment. in Quatuor Libros Archbishop Messmer’s translation 


Sent., II, dist. 12, art. 2. 

20 S. Theol., 1a, qu. 68, art. 4. 

21 Ibid. ad 3. Cfr. Aug., De Gen. 
ad Lit., II, 1. On the whole sub- 
ject see Leo XIII’s admirable En- 
cyclical “ Providentissimus Deus,” 
of Nov. 18, 1893, of which an Eng- 
lish translation can be found in 
Seisenberger’s Practical Handbook 
for the Study of the Bible, pp. 159 
sqq., New York 1911, and also in 


of Brithl’s Bibelkunde (Outlines of 
Bible Knowledge, pp. 257 sqq., Frei- 
burg and St. Louis 1910). Cfr. also 
Zanecchia, Divina Inspiratio SS. 
Scripturarum ad Mentem Divi 
Thomae, Rome 1898; C. Chauvain, 
L’Inspiration des Divines Ecritures, 
Paris 1896; Chr. Pesch, De In- 
spiratione Sacrae Scripturae, Fri- 
burgi 1906, 


Liz DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 


tissues of more or less airy conjectures, and not a few 
evince a woeful lack of consistency. The Hexaémeron 
has become a playground where imagination runs amuck. 
The Church evidently apprehends no real contradiction 
between the Mosaic narrative and the established con- 
clusions of science. Among the forty or fifty theories 
which have been thus far contrived, it is reasonable to 
assume that one or two can be used for exegetical pur- 
poses without straining the sacred text. 

The number and variety of these theories is so great 
that they cannot easily be grouped in logical categories. 
For the following rough classification we are indebted 
to Msgr. Gutberlet.?? 

1. The Verbal theory interprets “day” literally as a 
period of twenty-four hours. “ This,’ says Suarez, “is 
the more common opinion of the Fathers; .. . it is also 
favored by the Scholastics, though, on account of the 
authority of St. Augustine, they treat his divergent 
interpretation very modestly and with great reserve.” 
To-day this theory is generally called the Deluge theory, 
for the reason that most of its modern defenders as- 
cribe the origin of the geological strata and their or- 
ganic deposits to a catastrophe caused by the Deluge.** 
In this hypothesis the Hexaemeron would antedate the 
so-called geological epochs. It is now quite generally 
held that the creation and formation of the cosmos must 
have required millions of years, and the Verbal theory 
no longer has any eminent defenders. 

2. The Restitution theory (held by Buckland, Wise- 
man, A. Wagner, Hengstenberg, Vosen, and others), 

22C. Gutberlet, Das Sechstage- 24 Thus Keil, Bosizio, Veith, So- 
werk, Frankfurt 1882. rignet, Laurent, Trissl. 


23 Suarez, De Opere Sex Dierum, 
Nese Rr 


THE HEXAEMERON AND SCIENCE 113 


assumes that the ante-diluvian flora and fauna ante- 
dates the chaos described in Genesis (tohu-vabohu) 
and was destroyed by a great catastrophe, following which 
God recreated the world, forming the present cosmos 
in the course of six natural days. According to this 
theory the Hexaémeron postdates the geological epochs. 
A. Westermayer** represents the chaos as the work 
of the fallen angels. Restitutionism was revamped by 
A. Stenzel, but it has now been quite generally aban- 
doned in view of the fact that the undisturbed position of 
the fossils found in the lower strata of the earth makes it 
improbable that all living organisms were buried by a 
sudden catastrophe. To attribute such a catastrophe to 
the fallen angels almost verges on superstition, Stenzel, 
moreover, confused the tohu-vabohu with the Deluge. 
3. The numerous Concordance theories seek to syn- 
chronize the successive geological periods with the 
“days” of the Hexaémeron. They place the Hexaé- 
meron either between the different geological periods, or 
within them. Hence the names of “ Interperiodism ” and 
“ Periodism.” ?° “ Interperiodism,” which is a rather 
obscure system, divides the Hexaémeron into six ordinary 
days of twenty-four hours each, separated by long in- 
tervening periods, which contain the millions of years 
demanded by geology. According to “ Periodism” the 
six days of Genesis coincide with the geological periods, 
and the word “ day ” means. an epoch or period of time. 
There is an older and a more recent Periodism. The 
former * construes a strict parallelism between the six 


25 Erschaffung der Welt und der periodism.’’ Cfr. y. Hummelauer, 


Menschen und deren Geschichte bis 
nach der Siindflut, Schaffhausen 
1861. 

26 The Deluge theory might anal- 
ogously be called “ Anteperiodism,” 
and the Restitution theory ‘“ Post-— 


Nochmals der biblische Schépfungs- 
bericht, p. 54, Freiburg 1898. 

27 It was held by Cuvier, Fraas, 
Pfaff, Hugh Miller, Guyot, Dana, 
Pianciani, Dawson, etc. 


114 DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 

days of Creation on the one hand and six “ geological 
epochs ” on the other. Modern Periodism, seeing the 
impossibility of such a close parallelism, has adopted a 
more or less idealistic Concordism.** Among recent 
champions of Periodism the following deserve to be 
mentioned: J. Brucker,?® F. Vigouroux,®® M. Seisen- 
berger,*! and Bourdais.*?. From this idealistic Con- 
cordism to pure Idealism is but one step.** 

4. The Idealist theories disregard the chronological se- 
quence of the different stages of Creation and interpret 
the first chapter of Genesis in a purely religious sense. 
This puts the Bible and science on different planes; 
there are no points of contact between them, and a 
conflict is therefore impossible. The Hexaémeron 
transcends the geological periods and has absolutely 
nothing to do with them. Let the exegete and the 
scientist each pursue his own way in peace! “ Idealism,” 
says Hummelauer,** “does not interpret the six days 
as necessarily meaning six consecutive periods of 
time, but as six logically distinct, outstanding momenta 
of God’s creative activity, or as six divine ideas real- 
ized in Creation. Cannot the historian truly assert that 
the Romans subjugated Europe, Asia, and Africa? Or 
that Goethe wrote prose and poetry? Similarly the in- 
spired writer describes for us how God created light 
and the firmament, land and sea, plants, stars, and ani- 
mals.”’ 


28 C. Giittler; cfr., however, this 
writer’s article “ Hexaémeron” in 
Herder’s Kirchenlexikon, Vol. V; 
col. 1980 sqq., Freiburg 1888. 

29 Questions Actuelles @’Ecriture 
Sainte, Paris 1895. 

30 Dictionnaire de la Bible, Paris 
1895 sdq. 

31 Der bdiblische Schépfungsbe- 
richt, 2nd ed., Freising 1882. 


32 Le Jour Génésiaque,” in La 
Science Catholique, 1889, pp. 550 
sqq. 

33 Compare, e. g., the first with 
the fourth edition of Reusch’s work 
Bibel und Natur (4th ed., Bonn 
1876). 

34 Nochmals der biblische Schop- 
fungsbericht, p. 73- 


THE HEXAEMERON AND SCIENCE 115 


The simplest and most acceptable form of Idealism re- 
gards the Hexaémeron as a treatise arranged according 
to purely logical points of view, with its main emphasis 
upon the “ week,” and the seventh day as the Sabbath. 
Cfr. Exod. XXIII, 12: “Sex diebus operaberis, sep- 
timo die cessabis — Six days thou shalt work: the sev- 
enth day thou shalt cease.” The divine week of creation 
is the model upon which man should pattern his week 
of labor, the divine Sabbath is the exemplar of his 
day of rest, which he is to consecrate to God. The in- 
troduction of the figure six is not arbitrary ; nor is it due 
to chronological considerations; it is based upon the 
pragmatism of God’s creative activity, in which the num- 
ber three of the work of distinction corresponds to a 
like number in the ornamentation of the universe. This 
hypothesis has the twofold advantage of safeguarding 
the historic character of the Hexaémeron and of avoid- 
ing a slavish Concordism. Science can find nothing 
objectionable in an account of the Creation which is 
arranged pragmatically rather than chronologically.*° 
. Allegorism, Poetism, and Liturgism virtually destroy 
the historic character of the Hexaémeron, and it is not 
_ surprising, therefore, that they have met with small 
favor.° 

5. The most widely discussed among the so-called Ideal- 
istic theories just now is the Vision theory advocated by 
Kurtz, Hummelauer, Hoberg, and others. It regards 


_ the six days of Creation as so many visions of Adam. 


In six living pictures or tableaux, symbolizing six nat- 
_ ural days, there passed before the mental vision of-our 
_ ecstatic progenitor the history of creation, which could 


35 Thus Michelis, Baltzer, Reusch, theories may be mentioned: Stop- 


Niland others, - pani, Hauser, Clifford, and De 


86 Among the advocates of these Gryse, 


116 DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 


be known to no one but God. The facts thus revealed 
to Adam were handed down by Primitive Tradition 
to Moses, who faithfully recorded them in the Book 
of Genesis. “It can truly be said,’ remarks Hummel- 
auer, “ that the universe was created in six days, that is 
in a vision, like as the heroes of a drama engage in com- 
bat on the stage.” °7 This theory claims to eliminate 
even the possibility of a clash between Revelation and 
science. ‘The Vision theory,’ to quote Hummelauer 
again, “meets all objections by pointing to the differ- 
ence which must naturally exist between a vision of 
the creative act and that act itself. Science and the 
Bible do not deal with precisely the same object; a dif- 
ference between them, therefore, does not necessarily 
argue contradiction.” ** 

But what becomes of the historic character of the 
Mosaic narrative? ‘“ What is there to correspond to the 
six days of Adam’s vision? Six ordinary days? or six pe- 
riods of time? or six logical momenta? — or nothing?” * 
Here is the weak spot of the Vision theory. Hummel- 
auer frankly advocates ‘“‘a theory of Vision sans phrase,” 
and refuses to accept Periodism in any shape or form.*° 
But if there is no reality corresponding to the consecutive 
days of Adam’s vision, the division of time into six 
days of labor and one day of rest is based on a mere 
dream, and the Sabbath has no foundation in fact, © 
despite the solemn declaration in Exodus XX, II: 
“Sex enim diebus fecit Dominus coelum et terram et 
mare et omnia, quae in tis sunt, et requievit in die sep- 
timo; idcirco benedixit Dominus diet Sabbati et sanc- 

87 Nochmals der biblische Schop- schrift fiir katholische Theologie, 
fungsbericht, p. 112. Innsbruck 1895, p. 730. 


38 Ibidem, pp. 113 Sq. 40 Nochmals der biblische Scho- 
30 J. Kern, S. J., in the Zeté- pfungsbericht, p. 123. 


THE HEXAEMERON AND EXEGESIS 117 


tificavit eum — For in six days the Lord made heaven 
and earth, and the sea, and all things that are in them, 
and rested on the seventh day: therefore the Lord 
blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it.’ We must 
not forget that this revealed truth has been formally 
proclaimed a rule of human conduct: “Ser diebus 
operaberis, septimo die cessabis— Six days thou shalt 
work, the seventh day thou shalt cease” (Exod. XXIII, 
12). Obviously the Creator instituted this particular 
order not because Adam had six visions, but because 
the universe was actually created in the course of six 
days. To deny the objective truth of this fact is to do 
violence to the sacred text. One might as consistently 
adopt the extreme Idealistic theories. Hence we cannot 
admit that moderate Concordism and moderate Idealism 
have lost their raison d’étre. The Vision theory, in our 
humble opinion, can be successfully defended only on 
the assumption that the six days of Adam’s vision are 
based on some kind of objective reality.‘ 


ARTICLE: 2 


THE HEXAEMERON AND EXEGESIS 


Exegetically those interpretations that devi- 
ate from the literal sense of the Mosaic narrative 
_—we have in mind chiefly moderate Concordism 
and Idealism—can be justified only on the as- 
sumption that the Hebrew word > does not 


41 On this controversy the student 
may profitably consult K. Holzhey, 
Schépfung, Bibel und Inspiration, 
Stuttgart 1902; N. Peters, 
ben und Wissen im ersten bibli- 


Glau- 


schen Schopfungsbericht, Paderborn 
1907; F. E. Gigot, Special Intro- 
duction to the Study of the Old 
Testament, 2nd ed., Vol. I, pp. 142 
sqq., New York 1903. 


118 DOGMATIC: COSMOLOGY 


necessarily mean an ordinary day of twenty-four 
hours, but may signify a longer period of time. 

1. Concordism and Idealism can claim the 
high authority of St. Augustine and St. Thomas, 
which every Catholic exegete has a perfect right 
to follow. We have already adverted to the 
fact that the eminent Bishop of Hippo regarded 
the whole week of the Hexaémeron as one sin- 
gle moment, and that St. Thomas approved of 
this interpretation. As the Church has never dis- 
owned the teaching of St. Augustine, it cannot 
fairly be claimed that ecclesiastical Tradition 
compels us to take the Hebrew >” in the sense 
of an ordinary day of twenty-four hours. Ori- 
gen and Athanasius anticipated the teaching of 
Augustine. While the Fathers and Scholastics 
generally preferred to adhere to the literal sense, 
they never condemned the Augustinian inter- 
pretation. St. Thomas says: “Moyses rudem 
populum de creatione mundi instruens per partes 
divisit, quae simul facta sunt. Gregoris vero 

_ et alii Sancti ponunt ordinem temporis m 
distinctione rerum servatum; et haec quidem po- 
sitio est communior, et magis consonare videtur 
litterae quantum ad superficiem; sed prior est 
rationabilior, et magis ab irrisione imfhdelium — 
sacram Scripturam defendens, quod valde ob-— 
servandum docet Augustinus,’ ut sic Scripturae — 


1De Gen. ad Lit., I, 19, 39- 


THE HEXAEMERON AND EXEGESIS 119 


exponantur, quod ab infidelibus non wrrideantur ; 
et haec opinio plus mihi placet.”2 Under these 
circumstances the all but universal consensus of 
the Fathers and Scholastics in favor of the literal 
interpretation of the Mosaic narrative has no 
binding: force. 

2. There are also intrinsic reasons for reject- 
ing the literal interpretation of the word “day.” 
In the first place geology, palzontology, and as- 
tronomy all maintain that the formation of the 
universe, including our own planet, cannot have 
taken place within the limits of one natural week. 
Paleozoic coal, for example, mesozoic chalk, and 
the so-called tertiary formations postulate im- 
mense periods of time. It is to be noted, also, 
that the first three “days” of the Hexaémeron 
cannot have been solar days in the strict sense 
of the term, because the sun was not created 
until the fourth day. St. Augustine observes 
that it is practically impossible to define the 
exact nature of these ante-solar days.? In an- 
other portion of his writings he says that it is 
highly improbable, not to say incredible, that the 
earth should have brought forth full-grown trees 
in fruitage within the short Space of twenty-four 
hours. | 

2Comment. in Quatuor Libros — dies cuiusmodi sint, aut perdiffictle 


_ Sent., II, dist. r2, Que rvartegs: nobis aut impossibile est cogitare, 
3De Civit. Dei, ME 655 | Out quanto magis dicere.’ 


120 _ DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 


A decisive argument for our contention is 
found in the fact that the word 5” is frequently 
employed by Sacred Scripture in a wider sense, 
to denote an indefinite period of time.* In Gen. 
II, 4 the entire period of six days is referred 
to as “one day.” “Istae sunt generationes coelt 
et terrae, quando creata sunt in die (o%2) quo 
fecit Dominus Deus coelum et terram — These » 
are the generations of the heaven and the earth, 
when they were created in the day that the 
Lord God made the heaven and the earth.” 
Ezech. VII, 7 we read: “Vemit tempus, prope 
est dies occisionis — The time is come, the day of 
slaughter is near.” Here “time” and “day” are 
evidently synonymous. Amos VIII, 13 has this 
passage: “In die illa deficient vir gines — In 
that day [i. e., at that time] the fair virgins 

shall faints 

“Day” as a synonym for “time” is also fre- 
quent in such Scriptural phrases as dies vanitatts 
(day of vanity),® dies tribulationis (day of tribu- 
lation),®° dies peccatoris (the sinner’s day)," dies 
frigoris (day of frost),° etc. 


99 66 


If Di does not mean an ordinary “ day,” “ evening” 


vespera, 21%) and “ morning,” (mane, 122) must like- 
NM § 2 


4St. Hilary already took notice 5 Eccles. VII, 16. 
of this. “ Diem frequenter signifi- 64 Kings XIX, 3. 
cari pro aetate cognovimus,’ he 7 Ps, XXXVI, 13. 
says, “ut ubi dies tota est, illic 8 Nah. III, 17. 


omne vitae tempus ostensum sit.” 


(In Ps. LV, n. 2+) 


THE HEXAEMERON AND EXEGESIS 121 


wise be capable of a figurative interpretation. Ereb 
etymologically means “ mixture, confusion.” It is analo- 
gously applied to matter in a chaotic state, 7. e., awaiting 
formation. Boker, on the other hand, which originally 
means “opening” or “ revelation,’ may be interpreted 
as signifying the work of seven days reduced to per- 
fect order. This distinction is at least as old as St. 
Augustine, who says: “Cum dixit: ‘Facta est ves- 
pera, materiam informem commemorat; cum autem 
dicit: “ Factum est mane,’ speciem, quae ipsa operatione 
impressa est materiae.’” ® 

But why did Moses choose the term “ day” to de- 
scribe the periods of Creation? Why did he not em- 
ploy some such word as 0% or poiy, to indicate that he 


meant indefinite periods of time? The week of the 
Creation with its six periods crowned by the Creator’s 
day of repose — which was surely not an ordinary day, 
since it still continues —was intended to typify man’s 
week of labor which terminates with the Sabbath. Be- 
tween a type and that which it figures there generally 
obtains a relation of real similarity, which by virtue of 
the laws of analogy justifies the use of the same con- 
cept and the same term.!° 

3. Nor does the assumption of the moderate Tdealists, 
that the Hexaémeron must be regarded as history written 
from the pragmatic rather than the chronological point of 

view, necessarily run counter to the principles of sound 
Biblical hermeneutics. Secular historians often refer to 
something done on a certain day briefly as “ day ” 
 (@. g., the day of Waterloo, or dies Alliensis for pugna 
| 8 Op. Imperfect. de Gen., c. 15. t. III, ed. 3a, pp. 39 sqq., Friburgi 
10 Cfr. Corluy, Spicil. Dogmatico- 1908; Duilhé-Brzig, Apologie des 


Bibl., t. I, pp. 163 sqq., Gand. Christentums, pp. 178 sqq., Freiburg 
1884; Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., 1889. 


9 


122 DOGMATIC COSMOLOGY 


Alliensis). In like manner Holy Scripture sometimes 
employs the word “day” to describe some particular 
event (as, for instance, dies Madian," dies occisionis,” 
dies Dominij* dies magnus irae),* irrespective of 
duration. Similarly, in the Book of Genesis “day” 
may mean act, work, operation, or performance, regard- 
less of duration. The analogous terms “ evening” and 
~“ morning” probably signify the completion of one and 
the beginning of another action, just as we sometimes 
speak of the evening of life or the dawn of a better 
future. 


Reapincs: — Kurtz, Bibel und Astronomie, Berlin 1847.— J. B. 
Pianciani, Evliuterungen zur mosaischen Schépfungsgeschichte, 
Ratisbon 1853—A Bosizio, Das Hexaémeron und die Geologie, 
Mainz 1865.—*F. H. Reusch, Bibel und Natur, 4th ed., Bonn 1876. 
— *Hummelauer, Der biblische Schopfungsbericht, Freiburg 1877. 
—*C, Gittler, Naturforschung und Bibel, Freiburg 1877—*F. E. 
Gigot, Special Introduction to the Siudy of the Old Testament, 
I, pp. 142 sqq., 2nd ed., New York 1903.—*F. Pfaff, Schopfungs- 
geschichte mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung des biblischen Scho- 
pfungsberichtes, 2nd ed., Frankfurt 1877—*B. Schafer, Bibel und 
Wissenschaft, Minster 1881—J. W. Dawson, The Origin of the 
World according to Revelation and Science, New York 1880.— 
F. N. Moigno, Les Splendeurs de la Foi, 3rd ed., 5 vols., Paris 
1883.— A. Stoppani, Sulla Cosmogonia Mosaica, Milano 1887.— 
De Gryse, De Hexaémero secundum Caput Primum Geneseos ad 


12 Is-EX,) 4, rum operum, quia plerumque a 
12 Ezech. VII, 7. _ mane incipiunt et ad vesperam de- 
18 Joel I, 15. sinunt. Habent enim  consuetudi- 
14 Apoc. VI, 17. nem divinae Scripturae, de rebus 


15 “‘ Restat ergo,’- says St. Au- humanis ad divinas res verba trans- 
gustine (De Gen. contr. Manich., ferre.’ Cfr. Tepe, Instit. Theol., 
I, 14, 20), “ut intelligamus, in Vol. II, pp. 461 sqq., Paris 18953 
ipsa quidem mora temporis ipsas Reusch, Bibel und Natur, 4th ed., 
distinctiones operum sic [scil. dies] pp. 250 sqq., Bonn 1876; F. Kau- 


appellatas, vesperam propter trans- len, Der biblische Schopfungsbericht 
actionem consummati operis, et (Gen. I, 1-2, 3) erklart, Freiburg 
mane propter inchoationem futuri 1902. 


operis: de simtlitudine scil, humano- 


THE HEXAEMERON AND EXEGESIS 123 


Literam, Bruges 1889.— J. McCosh, The Religious Aspect of Evo- 
lution, New York 1890.— Mir y Noguera, La Creacion, Madrid 
1890.— C. Giittler, Wissen und Glauben, 2nd ed., Miinchen 1904.— 
A. Trissl, Das biblische Sechstagewerk, 2nd ed., Ratisbon 1894.— 
W. D. Strappini, S. J., “ What Were the Days of Genesis?” in 
the Month, Jan. 1881.— A. Stenzel, Weltschépfung, Sinthut und 
Gott, Braunschweig 1804. C.\, Brain, Sips Kosmogonie vom 
Standpunkte christlicher W. issenschaft, 3rd ed., Miinster 1905.—*A. 
Schopfer, Geschichte des Alten Testaments mit besonderer Riick- 
sicht auf das Verhdltnis von Bibel und Wissenschaft, Brixen 
1907.— Vigouroux, Dictionnaire de la Bible, is) ys Cosmogonie 
Mosaique,” Paris 1898—*F, y. Hummelauer, Noch einmal der 
biblische S chopfungsbericht, Freiburg 1898.— Zapletal, Der S chop- 
fungsbericht der Genesis, Freiburg 1902,— P. Schanz, Apology, 
Vol. I, 4th ed., New York, s.a.— M. Selsenberger, Practical Hand- 
book for the Study of the Bible (Engl. tr. by Buchanan), Pp. 260 
sqq., New York, tort, 

The older theologians, like Suarez, Billuart, Tournely, etc., 
treat the Hexaémeron, and Dogmatic Cosmology generally, under 
the title “ De Opere Sex Dierum,” in connection with the Summa 
Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas, Ia, qu. 65-74. 


CEUA Pe. AL 


DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


Anthropology, as a branch of dogmatic the- 
ology, partly coincides with the philosophical dis- 
cipline of the same name, and partly with psy- 
chology. Its object is to determine the natural 
basis for the supernatural endowment of man- 
kind in Adam, which was forfeited by original 
sin. Hence in this Chapter of our treatise we 
shall consider: (1) The nature of man, (2) 
The Supernatural in man, and (3) Man’s de- 
fection from the Supernatural (Original Sin). 


GENERAL READINGS: — St. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, qu. 75 sqq., and 
in connection therewith the treatises De Anima by Toletus, 
Suarez, and Ruvius; also Kleutgen, Die Philosophie der V orzeit, 
Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 453 sqq., Minster 1878.— Card. Gotti, De Deo 
Creatore, tract. 10— Palmieri, De Creatione et de Praecipuis 
Creaturis, thes. 25-29, Romae 1910.—*Card. Mazzella, De Deo 
Creante, ed. 2a, disp. 3 sqq., Romae 1880.— T. Pesch, Instit. Psy- 
chologice secundum Principia S. Thomae Aquinatis, 3 vols., Fri- 
burgi 1897-8.—J. Thein, Christian Anthropology, New York 
1892,— W. Humphrey, “ His Divine Majesty,’ pp. 272 sqq., Lon- 
don 1897,— H. Muckermann, S. J., Attitude of Catholics Towards 
Darwinism and Evolution, St. Louis 1906; Fr. Aveling, art. 
“Man” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IX; E. Wasmann, S. J., 
Modern Biology and the Theory of Evolution, London 1gro. 

On the history of the various dogmas involved, cfr. A. Stockl, 
Die spekulative Lehre vom Menschen und ihre Geschichte, 2 vols., 

124 


DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 125 


Wirzburg 1858-9.— *Schwane, Dogmengeschichte, 2nd ed., Vols. 
T and II, Freiburg 1892-5.— E, Klebba, Die Anthropologie des hi. 
Irenius, Minster 1895.— *G. Esser, Die Seelenlehre Tertullians, 
Paderborn 1893.— F. Hilt, Des hl. Gregor von Nyssa Lehre vom 
Menschen, systematisch dargestellt, Koln 1890. 


SECON ir 


THE NATURE OF MAN 


The subject-matter of this Section may be 
treated under four subdivisions, viz.: (1) The 
origin of man and the unity of the human race; 
(2) The essential constitution of human nature 
and the relation of soul to body; (3) The im- 
mortality of the human soul; and (4) The origin 
of individual souls. The first two of the subse- 
quent Articles regard man as a whole, that is to 
say, as composed of soul and body; the last two 
deal with the soul alone (Dogmatic Psychology ). 
Such incidental questions as the probable age of 
the human race belong to fundamental theology 
or apologetics. 


ARTICLE 4 


THE ORIGIN OF MAN AND THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN 
RACE 


God directly created Adam and Eve, from 
whom all other human beings are descended by _ 
way of propagation. Holy Scripture lays par- — 
ticular stress on the truth that the entire human _ 

126 


THE ORIGIN OF MAN 127 


race is descended from a single pair of progeni- 
tors, and thus forms but one family. 


Thesis I: The body of the first man as well as his 
soul were created immediately by God. 


This thesis may be technically qualified as 
“sententia satis certa.” 

Proof. There is no need of entering upon a 
refutation of the obsolete heretical contention of 
the Gnostics and the Manichzans, that Adam 
was created by a subordinate Demiurge, or by 
the author of evil. The modern antithesis of 
Christian Anthropology is atheistic Darwinism, 
which teaches that in soul and body alike man 
is descended from the brute, the human soul 
being merely a more highly developed form of 
the brute soul. This teaching is as heretical as 
it is absurd. The modified Darwinism defended 
by St. George Mivart, who holds that the body 
of Adam developed from the animal kingdom, 
whereas his spiritual soul was infused imme- 
diately by the Creator must likewise be rejected; 
for while not directly heretical, it is repugnant 
to the letter of Sacred Scripture and to Chris- 
tian sentiment.” 

a) The creation of man occurred towards the 


1Cfr. H. Muckermann, S. J., Af- cussion of the Problem of Evolu- 
titude of Catholics Towards Dar- tion, pp. 49 sqq., London 1909. 

winism, pp. 39 sqq., St. Louis 1906; 2Cfr. W. Lescher, O. P., The 

E. Wasmann, S. J., The Berlin Dis- Evolution of the Human Body, 2nd 
; ed., pp. 15 sqq., London 1899. 


128 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


end of the Hexaemeron, immediately prior to 
the Creator’s day of rest. The Bible contains 
two separate accounts of it (Gen. I, 26 sqq., and 
Gen. II, 7), both of which represent Almighty 
God as personally creating man. 


a) The Creator proceeds with great solemnity in this 
act. Gen. I, 26sq.: “And he said: let us make man to 
our image and likeness . . . and God created man to his 
own image: to the image of God he created him: male 
and female he created them.” This text, be it remarked 
in passing, excludes the Platonic error, which was es- 
poused by certain ancient rabbis, that Adam was a herm- 
aphrodite. The distinction of sexes is immediately 
from God. As God took a direct hand in the creation 
of material and irrational beings, there can be no doubt 
that He personally created Adam, “the crown of 
creation,” whose material body from the moment of its 
origin was to be animated by a soul endowed with sanc- 
tifying grace. From the irrational brute to man was 
indeed a farther cry than from inanimate matter to 
plant, or from plant to brute, and hence if the imme- 
diate operation of the Creator was required for the 
latter, it was even more urgently demanded for the 
former. That God created the soul of Adam out of 
nothing and personally fashioned his body, becomes still 
clearer from Gen. II, 7: “And the Lord God formed 
man of the slime of the earth, and breathed into his face 
the breath of life, and man became a living soul.” These 
words, taken in their natural and obvious sense, present 
the creative act of God as one, though divided into two 
momenta, viz.: formation and breathing. 

Did the Creator employ the services of the Angels 


THE ORIGIN OF MAN 129 


in preparing the “ slime of the earth ”? The assumption 
cannot be positively disproved. But even if He did em- 
ploy the Angels as His agents, God Himself was the sole 
causa principalis in the formation of the human body.® 


8) The creation of Eve furnishes a decisive ar- 
gument against the evolutionist hypothesis. 


It is quite inconceivable, and at the same time re- 
pugnant to the spirit of divine Revelation, that woman 
should have had a sublimer origin than man. Eve was 
fashioned immediately by God from a rib which He 
had taken from Adam.4 Cardinal Cajetan’s allegorical 
interpretation of this text has been unanimously re- 
jected by theologians as fanciful and unwarranted. St, 
Paul says: “ Non enim vir ex mulicre est, Sed mulier ex 
viro. Etenim non est creatus vir propter mulierem, sed 
mulier propter virum—For the man is not of the 
woman, but the woman of the man. For the man was 
not created for the woman, but the woman for the 
man.’”*® If Eve had not sprung bodily from Adam, he 
could not have exclaimed: “This now is bone of my 
bones, and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called woman 
(virago), because she was taken out of man (quoniam 
de wiro sumpta est).’*® If the sumptio de viro was an 
immediate act of God, so, a fortiori, was the formatio 
de limo terrae; and hence Adam’s body,. like his soul, 
must have come directly from the hands of the Creator.’ 


3 “Tt was necessary,” says St. dust.” (S. Theol., Ta, qu. g1, art. 
Thomas, “that the first human 2.) 


body should be fashioned imme- 4 Gen. II, 21 sqq. 

diately by God... though possibly 51 Cor. XI, 8 sq. 

the Angels rendered some assist- 6 Gen. II, 23. 

ance, as they will also do at the 7 Hummelauer, Comment. in Gen., 


resurrection by gathering up the PP. 129 sqq., Paris 1895, 


130 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


b) The Patristic teaching on this subject is 
quite unanimous. Not a single one of the Fath- 
ers can be quoted in favor of Mivart’s hypothe- 
sis. We shall confine ourselves to a few speci- 
men quotations. 


Gregory of Nyssa writes: “If it were simply writ- 
ten: ‘He created,’ you would be free to think that 
man was made in the same manner as the brute ani- 
mals, the monsters, plants and herbs. In order to make 
you see that you have nothing in common with the 
beasts of the field, Moses describes God’s artistic pro- 
cedure in creating man thus: ‘God took dust of the 
earth. Then he relates what God did; then he tells us 
how God did it. He took dust of the earth and with His 
own hands formed man.”,* John of Damascus, who 
exalted man’s dignity to the extent of calling him 
a “little god” (pxpdOeos), deems it quite natural and 
proper that the body of the first man should have been 
immediately created by God. “Thus God created man 
with His hands: He formed his body out of earth, 
but gave him the soul by breathing.”® To show the 
propriety of such direct intervention on the part of the 
Almighty, St. John Chrysostom compares man to a king, 
whom God Himself wished to induct into the created 
universe as his palace.1? Tertullian hails man as “an- 
gent divint curam, manuum Dei operam, molitionis suae 
regem, liberalitatis suae heredem.’** It is one of this 
author’s favorite sayings that Adam bore a bodily re- 
semblance to the “second Adam,” i. e., Christ, and that 
the Creator fashioned the body of the first man after 


8 Orat. 2 (Migne, P.G., XLIV, 10 Hom. in Gen., 8, n. 2. 
279). 41 De Resurrect. Carnis, % 9- 


9 De Fide Orth., Il, 12. 


THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE 131 
the pattern of Jesus.12 The Fathers and Patristic 
writers generally love to descant on the great dignity 
of Eve because she had sprung from Adam’s side. Eve, 
they say, did not spring from the head of Adam, which 
would have signified that she should rule over him; nor 
from his feet, that she might be his slave; but from 
his side, that she might be loved by her husband, thus 
symbolizing the procession of the Church from the side 
of Christ.* Such utterances are as incompatible with 
the views of Mivart,* as they are with crude Darwinism 
in its application to man.1® 


Thesis II: All mankind is decended from one pair 
of progenitors, Adam and Eve. 


Proof. The unity of the human race, though not yet 
formally defined, is a Catholic doctrine. 

The dogmatic commission of the Vatican Council 
drew up the following canon: “Si quis universum 
genus humanum ab uno protoparente Adam ortum esse 
negaverit, anathema sit.’** Heresies opposed to this 
teaching are Pre-Adamism and Co-Adamism. The Pre- 
Adamites claim that there were men before Adam; the 


12 Op. cit., c. 6: “ Quodcunque 
enim limus exprimebatur, Christus 
cogitabatur homo futurus.”’ 

13“ Dormit Adam, ut fiat Eva; 
moritur Christus, ut fiat ecclesia. 
Dormientit Adae fit Eva de latere; 
mortuo Christo lancea percutitur la- 
tus, ut profluant sacramenta, quibus 
formatur ecclesia.’ (Aug., Tract. 
te LOG. 95) 4.) 10; Cir.) ‘Conc. 
Viennense, apud Denzinger-Bann- 
wart, n. 480. 

14 On the Genesis af Species, pp. 
277. sqq., London 1871; Lessons 
from Nature, pp. 177 sqq., London 
1876. 


15 Cfr. A. Jakob, Der Mensch, 
die Krone der Schépfung, Freiburg 
1900; O. Mohnike, Affe und Ur- 
mensch, Minster 1888; J. Diebolder, 
Darwins Grundprinzip der Abstam- 
mungslehre kritisch beleuchtet, 2nd 
ed., Freiburg 1891; E. Dennert, At 
the Deathbed of Darwinism, Bur- 
lington, Ia., 1904; W. Lescher, OQ. 
P., The Evolution of the Human 
Body, 2nd ed., London 1899; E. 
Wasmann, S. J., Modern Biology 
and the Theory of Evolution, Lon- 
don 1910. 

16In Martin’s Collectio 
ment., p. 30, Paderb. 1873. 


Docu- 


132 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


Co-Adamites, that other human beings co-existed with 
Adam and Eve. Pre-Adamism was reduced to a the- 
ological system by the French Calvinist Isaac Peyrére,’’ 
who later became a Catholic and abjured his error before 
Pope Alexander VII. It has been revamped in modern 
times with much scientific acumen by Professor Win- 
chell.18 The defense of Christian monogenism against 
the objections of infidel scientists is a task which we 
must leave to apologetics. The dogmatic argument for 
our thesis may be formulated as follows: 


a) The Bible does not permit us to doubt that 
all men without exception—including such widely 
divergent races as the negroes of Australasia, the 
Chinese, and the aborigines of the South Sea 
Islands—are descended from the same progeni- 
tors. This unity of descent sufficiently guar- 
antees the unity of the human race, which would 
remain a fact even if the so-called Neandertal 
race constituted a new zoological species, as is 
asserted by such eminent authorities as Schwalbe 
and Klaatsch.*® Dogmatic theology is not con- 
cerned with zodlogical distinctions. The pur- 
pose of the Mosaic narrative is simply to de- 
scribe the origin of the universe, including man. 
We have in Gen. I, 26 sqq. and II, 4 sqq., as 


17 Systema Theologicum ex Prae- erroneous guesswork,” cfr. P. De 
adamitarum Hypothesi, 1655. Roo, History of America Before 
18 Preadamites, or A Demonstra- Columbus, Vol. I, pp. 14 sqq., Phil- 
tion of the Existence of Men Be- adelphia 1900. 
fore Adam, Chicago 1890. On the 19 Cfr. E. Wasmann, The Berlin 
main theses of this work, which is Discussion of the Problem of Evo- 
“almost as replete with facts and lution, pp. 71 sqd. 
science as with suppositions and 


THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE 133 


it were, the original charter of the human race. 
The very fact that God, when He was about 
to create man, debated with Himself—“Let us 
make man,”—shows that a new and very im- 
portant link still remained to be inserted in the 
chain of created beings. Moreover, Gen. II, 5- 
7 expressly tells us: “There was not a man to 
till the earth ...and the Lord God formed 
man,” O38", 7. e., man as a species and as the 
first individual of that species. 


With equal certainty we know from Revelation that 
Eve was the first woman. Gen. II, 20: “Adae vero 
non inveniebatur adiutor similis eius —But for Adam 
there was not found a helper like himself.” Had any 
other human beings existed at that time (Pre-Adamites 
or Co-Adamites), Eve would not have been the first 
woman. Her very name “Eve” is intelligible only on 
the assumption that she is the proto-mother of man- 
kind: “Vocavit Adam nomen uxoris suae Eva, eo 
quod mater esset cunctorum viventium— Adam called 
the name of his wife Eve, because she was the mother 
of all the living.” °° This is confirmed by various other 
Scriptural texts. Wisd. X, 1: “[Adamus] primus 
formatus est a Deo pater orbis terrarum, cum solus 
esset creatus— Adam was first formed by God the 
father of the world, when he was created alone.” 
Christ Himself says, Matth. XIX, 4: “Qui fecit 
hominem ab initio, masculum et foeminam fecit eos — 
He who made man from the beginning, made them male 
and female.” St. Paul repeats the same truth, Acts 


20Gen, III, 20, 


134 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


XVII, 26: “Fecitque [Deus] ex uno omne genus 
honunum ** inhabitare super universam faciem terrae — 
He hath made of one all mankind, to dwell upon the 
whole face of the earth.” ?? 


b) Peyrére himself admitted that his theory 
was opposed to the unanimous teaching of the 
Fathers and to the many conciliar definitions 
which assert the universality of original sin and 
of the Redemption. 


“T confess,” he says in a letter to Philotimus, “ that 
I was not unaware of the fact that my hypothesis [as- 
serting the existence of Pre-Adamites] was entirely for- 
eign to the opinion of the holy Fathers and to the teach- 
ing of orthodox councils; and that the whole fabric of 
doctrine concerning the fall and redemption of man was 
based by the Fathers and councils on the hypothesis 
[sic!] that Adam was the first man.” 7° 

The Fathers often make the common descent of all 
men from one pair of progenitors the text of inspiring 
reflections. Lactantius, e. g., dwells on the utter wick- 
edness of hatred, which, he says, is repugnant to the 
blood relationship that binds all human beings together 
as members of one family.2* St. Ambrose and others 
demonstrate the unity of humankind from the manner 
in which our first parents were created.?® Lastly, the 


21é& évds wav vos avOpwrwyr, mum scelus putandum est, odisse 
22For a _ refutation of certain hominem vel nocentem.’ (Instit., 
specious objections drawn from Sa- 1068) 
cred Scripture consult Palmieri, 25 “ Non de eadem terra, de qua 


De Deo Creante et Elevante, pp. 


251 sq. 
23 Epist. ad Philotimum. 
24° Si ab uno homine, quem 
Deus finxit, omnes orimur, ergo 


consanguinet sumus, et ideo maxi- 


plasmatus est Adam, sed de ipsius 
costa facta est mulier, ut sciremus, 
unam in viro et muliere esse natu- 
ram, unum fontem generis humant.” 
(De Paradiso, c. 10,.n. 48.) 


THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE 135 


dogma of the universality of original sin, and the con- 
sequent duty for all men of whatever race to receive 
Baptism, as well as the dogma of the Redemption of all 
through Jesus Christ, eats common descent from 
Adam. 


c) Pre-Adamism is heretical only when it 
culminates in Co-Adamism, because the assertion 
that certain post-Adamic races had a pre-Adamic 
origin involves a direct denial of the universality 
of original sin and of the Redemption. 


Fabre d’Envieu*® held that human beings existed 
upon this earth long before the Biblical Adam, but that 
they were totally extinct when God created our first 
parents. While this airy hypothesis is not directly re- 
pugnant to the dogma of the universality of original sin 
and the Redemption of all men through Jesus Christ, 
it is difficult to reconcile with the Mosaic narrative. 
Nor is there need of any such gratuitous assumption, 
so long as science has not discovered the “ tertiary man” 
—the “missing link” which alone could give us the 
certainty that hundreds of thousands of years ago 
there lived upon this earth human beings whose traces 
became entirely obliterated in the later geological strata, 
only to re-appear in the glacial epoch. Modern man is 
no doubt genetically related to the diluvial man of the 
so-called interglacial period. His descent from Adam 
is Catholic teaching, and it naturally implies that all 
the different races of men, including the North American 
Indians and the Esquimos, are members of the Adamitic 
family.*7. The early Christians regarded the assumption 


26 Les Origines de la Terre et de 27 On the “tertiary man,” cfr. 
VHomme, 1878, - J. Ranke, Der Mensch, Vol. II, 


136 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 

of antipodes, 7. e., men who live diametrically opposite 
each other, as repugnant to revealed religion. This hy- 
pothesis was in consequence proscribed until it became 
scientifically established. We know now that the unity 
of the human race is sufficiently safeguarded by the 
assumption that the remotest corners of the earth were 
peopled from one common centre of migration. St. 
Augustine found this problem a very thorny one. Lac- 
tantius brushed it aside with misdirected sarcasm.?8 


Reapincs: —H. Liiken, Die Stiftungsurkunde des Menschen- 
geschlechtes oder die mosaische Schépfungsgeschichte, Freiburg 
1876.— St. George Mivart, On the Genesis of Species, London 
1871.— Rauch, Einheit des Menschengeschlechtes, Augsburg 1873. 
—J. Ranke, Der Mensch, 2 vols., 2nd ed., Leipzig 1900.—*C. 
Gutberlet, Der Mensch, sein Ursprung u. seine Entwicklung, 2nd 
ed., Paderborn 1903.— Lépicier, De Prima Hominis Formatione, 
Romae 1910.— Hettinger, Apologie des Christentums, oth ed., II, 
I, 5ter Vortrag, Freiburg 1906.— Fr. Kaulen, Die Sprachverwir- 
rung zu Babel, Mainz 1861.—*A. Giesswein, Die Hauptprobleme 
der Sprachwissenschaft, Freiburg 1892— J. Thein, Christian An- 
thropology, New York 1892.—E. Wasmann, S. J., The Berlin 
Discussion of the Problem of Evolution, London 1909.— W. 
Lescher, O: P., The Evolution of the Human Body, 2nd ed., Lon- 
don 1899. 


ARTICLE 2 


THE ESSENTIAL CONSTITUENTS OF MAN AND THEIR 
MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP 


In proceeding to consider the composite nature of 
man, we shall have to answer two separate and distinct 


pp. 456 sqq., 2nd ed., Leipzig 1900. 
On the North American Indians, see 
De Roo, History of America Before 
Columbus, Philadelphia 1900. 

28 On the moot decision of Pope 
Zacharias against Bishop Vigilius of 


Salzburg, who was a contemporary 
of St. Boniface (cfr. Baronius, An- 
nales, ad annum 748), see Pohle, 
Die Sternenwelten und thre Bewoh- 
ner, 6th ed., pp. 523 sqq., Koln 
1910. 


MAN'S ESSENTIAL CONSTITUENTS © 137 


questions, zviz.: (1) Of how many essential elements 
does human nature consist? and (2) How are these 
elements mutually related? 

To these questions the Church replies: (1) Man 
is composed of two essential constituents, body and soul. 
This teaching is called Dichotomy, or Dualism. (2) 
The rational soul constitutes the essential form of the 
body, and the two are substantially united in one nature. 

That these philosophical questions have an important 
dogmatic bearing is evident from the fact that Jesus 
Christ was true man as well as very God. By finding 
a correct solution for them we shall obtain accurate theo- 
logical notions on the substantiality, individuality, and 
spirituality of the human soul. This will obviate the 
necessity of entering into a separate discussion of these 
points. As regards free-will, which is unquestionably a 
natural endowment of the soul, its existence flows as a 
corollary from the dogmatic teaching of the Church (to 
be expounded presently) that original sin did not de- 
stroy man’s natural freedom of choice. 


Thesis I: Man consists of but two essential con- 
Stituents, viz.: a body and a spiritual soul. 


This proposition is strictly de fide. 

Proof. All philosophical and theological sys- 
tems that assumed more than two constituents 
have been condemned as heretical. 


Aside from the Platonic theory that there are two 
or even three souls in the human body, the error under 


1 Father Rickaby, by the way, Timaeus, 69c-70Aa, describing how 
thinks that the traditional idea of ‘the mortal kind of soul,’ with its 
Plato’s teaching on this head does two divisions, was allocated in the 
him an injustice. “ The passage, body by inferior deities, after the 


10 


138 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
consideration was in ancient times held chiefly by the 
Gnostics and the Manichzans, and later by Apollinaris. 
The Gnostics believed that man has a threefold soul : rveipa, 
yoxn, vAn, while the Manichzans thought that the two 
eternal principles of good and evil, which are essentially 
opposed to each other, met in Adam, when his soul, 
which was an emanation from the good principle, was im- 
prisoned in the body by the evil one.? Apollinaris, on 
his part, made the trichotomy of vois, yuxh, odpé the 
basis of his Christological heresy that the Logos sup- 
plied reason, which was lacking in the purely sensitive 
soul of Christ. Passing over the trichotomic errors 
of the Arabian philosopher Averroés, and of Ockam in 
the Middle Ages, we will mention only the modern 
heresy of Anton Gunther. Though formally adhering 
to the Dualist system (according to which man is a syn- 
thesis of spirit and nature), Ginther practically taught 
Trichotomy by endowing matter, gua matter, with a na- 
ture-psyche of its own and refusing to regard the spirit 
as the sole vital principle, from which the human body 
derives its “nature life.” ® 


At the Eighth General Council held in Con- 
stantinople, A. D. 869, the Church raised Dicho- 


Supreme Deity had produced the in- 
tellect, misled early commentators, 
and after them St. Thomas, into 
the belief that Plato supposed three 
distinct souls in one human body. 
Plato never speaks of ‘souls’ ex- 
cept in reference to distinct bodies. 
He speaks of ‘the soul’ of man 
as familiarly as we do. The ypovs 
in the head, the @uyds (St. Thomas’s 
pars irascibilis) in the chest, and 
the émriduuia (pars concupiscibilis) 
in the belly, are not three souls, but 
three varieties of one soul. ...In 
the ultimate analysis of Plato’s 


meaning nothing more will appear, 
I believe, than the triple division, 
accepted by Aristotle and St. 
Thomas, of yots, Ouuds, émibumia, 
three phases of one soul, the first 
inorganic and spiritual, the two lat- 
ter organic and involving connexion 
with the body.” (Of God and His 
Creatures, p. 120, n.) 

2Cfr. St. Augustine, De Duabus 
Animabus, c. 12. 

3 Cfr. Kleutgen, Philosophie der 
Vorzeitt, 2nd ed., Vol. II, n. 7or 
sqq., Innsbruck 1878. 


MAN'S ESSENTIAL CONSTITUENTS 139 


tomy to the rank of a dogma and condemned 
Trichotomy as heretical: “Veteri et Novo Te- 
stamento unam animam rationalem et intellec- 
tualem* habere hominem docente . . .in tantum 
impietatis quidam .. . devenerunt, ut duas eum 
habere animas impudenter dogmatizare .. . per- 
tentent. Itaque sancta haec et universalis SYNo- 
dus ... talis impietatis inventores . . . magna 
voce anathematizat.... Si autem quis con- 
traria gerere praesumpserit, ... anathema sit 
— Both the Old and the New Testament teach 
that man has one rational and intellectual soul 
. . . [nevertheless] some have been impious 
enough to assert, quite impudently, that man has 
two souls. This sacred and ecumenical Council 

. vehemently anathematizes the inventors of 
such impiety. . . . If any one shall presume to 
act contrary to this definition, let him be ana- 
thema.:’ * 

a) Sacred Scripture is quite positive in its 
teaching that man is composed of but two ele- 
ments, a material body and a spiritual soul. 
Gen. II, 7: “Formavit Dominus Deus hominem 
de limo terrae [corpus | et inspiravit in faciem eius 
spiraculum vitae [animam], et factus est homo 
[synthesis] in animam viventem — And the Lord 
God formed man [i. ¢., his body] from the slime 


4 wlapy Wuxny AoyiKny TE Kal dion, toth ed. edited by Cl. Bann- 
voepay, e wart, n. 338. 
5 Quoted in Denzinger’s Enchiri- | 


140 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


of the earth, and breathed into his face the 
breath of life [1. e., the soul], and man [z. e., the 
synthesis of body and soul] became a living soul.” 
“Breath of life’ (spiraculum vitae) in this con- 
text does not mean an independent animal or 
plant soul, but the spiritual soul. This is ob- 
vious from the fact that the sacred writer sets 
out with the express purpose of describing the 
origin of the first man (animal rationale). The 
man thus dichotomically constituted is identical 
with the one described in Gen. I, 27 sqq., who, 
created to God’s own image, is commanded to 
“rule over all living creatures,” which can only 
mean that he is to hold sway as an intelligent and 
free being. Hence spiraculum vitae is synony- 
mous with anima rationalis. In Eccles. XII, 7 
man is resolved into his constituent elements, and 
again there are but two: “Et revertatur pulvis 
[corpus| in terram suam, unde erat, et spiritus 
[anima spiritualis| redeat ad Deum, qui dedit 
illum — And let the dust [the body] return to its 
earth, from whence it was, and the spirit [the 
spiritual soul] return to God, who gave it.” 
None but an immortal soul—immortal because 
spiritual—can “return to God.” ® 


While Sacred Scripture occasionally draws a distinc- 
tion between “soul” (anima, wy, YD) and “ spirit” 


6Compare Luke XXIII, 46: my spirit” with John XII, 27: 
“Father, into thy hands I commend ‘“ Now is my soul troubled.” 


MAN’S ESSENTIAL CONSTITUENTS 141 


(spiritus, mvetwa, 7), it nowhere countenances the 


theory that man has two souls. Seemingly discordant 
passages must be explained either by a poetic parallelism, 
as in the Psalms, or as a juxtaposition of the higher 
and lower soul-life, or, lastly, by a desire to differentiate 
between the pneumatic supernatural life and the merely 
natural life in man. Under one or other of these aspects 
it is easy to interpret such texts as Luke I, 40 sq.: 
“ Magnificat anima mea Dominum, et exultavit Spiritus 
meus in Deo, salutari meo — My soul doth magnify the 
Lord, and my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour; ” 
Heb. IV, 12: “ Usque ad divisionem animae ac spiritus? 
— Unto the division of the soul and the spirit; ” 1 Cor. 
IT, 14 sq.:  “ Animalis homo *® non percipit ea, quae sunt 
Spiritus Det. . . spiritualis autem ® indicat omnia — But 
the sensual man perceiveth not these things that are of 
the Spirit of God; ... but the spiritual man judgeth 
all things.” The attempt to bolster Giinther’s psychology 
by Scriptural texts has proved utterly futile. 


b) The Fathers are all strict dichotomists be- 
cause they consistently refer to the “soul” as the 
principle of thought. 


It must be observed that the word “soul” (anima, 
yx) is a relative, whereas “ spirit ” is an absolute term. 
To identify “spirit” and “soul,” therefore, is tanta- 
mount to asserting the existence of but one life-princi- 
ple in human nature, viz.: the spiritual soul. Thus St. 
Athanasius says: ‘‘ The body of man is called body and 
not soul, and the soul of man is called soul and not 
body. The one is a correlative of the other, i. ¢., the 


Tdxpt pepiouod Wuxyns re Kal 8 puxixds d€ &vOpwros, 
WVEVLATOS, _ 96 bé mvevparikés, 


142 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 

spirit of the body.” 7° Even before St. Athanasius, St. 
Justin Martyr, who had been unjustly charged with 
Trichotomy, taught quite positively: 
dvOpwros dA’ 7) TO ék Yox7ns Kal odpatos cuvestos LHov AoyiKOv ; 
— What is man but a rational living being composed of 
soul and body?” +? 


/ 
Ti yap éotw o 


Thesis II: The spiritual soul is the immediate sub- 
stantial form of the body. 


This is also de fide. 

Proof. Body and soul do not co-exist side by 
side in a loose mechanical or dynamic con- 
nexion, as e. g. a demon might exist in an ener- 
gumen, but are combined in a substantial unity 
of nature. Consequently, the spiritual soul, as 
such, is the immediate substantial form (forma 
substantialis) of the body, and man’s sensitive 
and vegetative processes proceed from it as 
their principle. All philosophical systems that 
deny this substantial union of nature * directly 
contravene the teaching of the Church, which 
the Council of Vienne (A. D. 1311) formulated 
against Petrus Ioannis Olivi as follows: “Quis- 
quis deinceps asserere, defendere seu tenere per- 
tinaciter praesumpserit, quod anima rationalis 


10 De Incarn. contr. Arian., I, n. ma. For the philosophical argu- 


20. 
11 De Resurrect., fragm. 10. On 
the orthodoxy of St. Irenzus cfr. 


Klebba, Die Anthropologie des hil. 
Irenadus, pp. 162 sqq., Miinster 1894. 


St. Augustine’s dichotomic stand- 


point clearly appears in his De Ani- 


ments see, St. Thomas, S. Theol., 
Ia, qu. 76, art. 3, and Contr. Gent., 
II, 58 (Rickaby, Of God and His 
Creatures, pp. 120 sq.). 

12 Plato, Cartesius, Leibniz (har- 
monia praestabilita), et al. 


THE SOUL THE FORM: OF ‘THE (BODY: 143 


seu intellectiva non sit forma corporis humani 
per se et essentiahiter, tamquam haereticus sit 
censendus — Whosoever shall pertinaciously pre- 
sume to assert, defend or teach, that the rational 
or intellectual soul is not per se and essentially 
the form of the human body, shall be considered 
Eaiereticy** 


This important dogmatic definition, couched in strictly 
Scholastic terminology, contains the following heads of 
doctrine: 

(1) Human nature has but two essential constituents, 
namely, the anima rationalis and the corpus humanum."4 

(2) The rational soul “informs,” 7. e., animates and 
quickens the human body as its true and real forma; 
and that (a) per se, not through the instrumentality of 
a second (sensitive or vegetative) soul, and (b) essen- 
tially (per essentiam suam), not through some accidental 
influence (as, for instance, by a mere dynamic com- 
mingling of spiritual energy with the faculties of the 
body). 

(3) The spiritual soul is consequently the true form 
of the body — forma corporis, forma substantialis cor- 
ports, not a mere forma accidentalis seu assistens. 

(4) It follows as an obvious corollary that man’s 
vegetative and sensitive life is derived from his spir- 
itual soul, which is virtually vegetative and sensitive. 

Pope Leo X solemnly approved the Viennese defini- 
tion at the Fifth Lateran Council, A.D. 1512.% 


13 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiri- 14 Dichotomy, 
dion, n. 481. On this dogmatic defi- 15 Sess. VIII, Constit. “ Apostolict 
nition cfr. W. Lescher, The Evolu- regiminis.” 


tion of the Body, 2nd ed., pp. 8 
sq., London 1899. 


144 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


The misrepresentations of Giinther and his school 
were repeatedly condemned by Pius IX, who, on the 
one hand, insisted: “ Noscimus, iisdem libris laedi ca- 
tholicam sententiam ac doctrinam de homine, qui corpore 
et anima ita absolvatur, ut anima eaque rationalis sit 
vera per se atque immediata corporis forma,’ and on 
the other hand declared: “Sententiam quae unum in 
homine ponit vitae principium: animam scilicet rationalem, 
a qua corpus quoque et motum et vitam omnem et sen- 
sum accipiat,...cum Ecclesiae dogmate ita videri 
coniunctam, ut huius sit legitima solaque vera inter pre- 
tatio nec proinde sine errore in fide possit negart,”’ 18 


a) According to Holy Scripture, man is con- 
stituted a “living being” (anima vivens, Mn. WP: 
—=ens vivum) by the union of the limus terrae 
(7. @., body) with the spiraculum vitae (i. e., 
spiritual soul). Consequently, his whole life 
(vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual), must 
flow from the spiritual soul, which vivifies the 
body by a process of “information” in the true 
and proper sense of the word. Ezechiel’s vision 
of the resurrection of dry bones (Ezech. 
XXXVII, 4 sqq.) illustrates this truth. “Ossa 
arida, audite verbum Domini... . Dabo super 
vos nervos et succrescere faciam super vos carnes, 
et. . . dabo vobis spiritum et vivetis et scietis, 
quia ego sum Dominus — Ye dry bones, hear the 


16 Breve “Eximiam tuam” ad ant refutation of Giinther’s erron- 
Card. de Geissel, Archiep. Colon., eous teaching see Oswald, Schép- 
15 Junit 1857; Epist. “ Dolore haud fungslehre, pp. 176 sqq., Paderborn 
mediocrt”’? ad Episc. Vratisl. (Bres- 1885. 
lau) d. 30 Apr. 1860. For a trench- 


THe SOUL THE FORM OF (THE BODY, 145 


word of the Lord . . . I will lay sinews upon 
you, and will cause flesh to grow over you, and 
. . . I will give you spirit, and you shall live, 
and you shall know that I am the Lord.” To 
understand this sublime prosopopeia we must 
observe that the Sacred Writer enumerates only 
two essential constituents of man, vig.: the body 
(sinews, bones, flesh) and the spirit (spiritus). 
The spirit revivifies the body by entering into 
the bones, consequently all life comes from the 
spiritual soul. This would be impossible if both 
factors did not coalesce into an unum per se by 
a substantial synthesis of nature. 

b) The teaching of the Fathers was brought 
out most clearly in connection with the Christo- 
logical heresy of Apollinaris, Bishop of Lao- 
dicea.** 


It is worth while to recall Augustine’s drastic dictum 
against the Apollinarists: “ Animam irrationalem eum 
[scil. Christum] habere voluerunt, rationalem negaverunt ; 
dederunt ei animam pecoris, subtraxerunt hominis — 
They attribute to Him [Christ] an irrational, but they 
deny Him a rational soul; they grant Him the soul of 
a brute, but they deny Him the soul Of armani) 14.4) Ay 
gustine himself held that the human body derives its life 
from the soul: “Ab anima [scil. rationali| corpori 
sensus et vita.’*® How the Fathers conceived the 

47 Died A.D. 300° Cfr. J. F. 18 Tract. in Ioa., 47, 9. 

Sollier’s article on ** Appollinarian- 19 De Civ. Dei, XXI, 3, 2. 


em. )in-)'Vol. lof | the: Catholic 
Encyclopedia. - 


146 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


mutual relationship of these two constituent elements ap- 
pears from their favorite comparison of the union of 
soul and body in man to the Hypostatic Union of the 
divine with the human nature in Christ. This simile has 
found its way into the Athanasian Creed: “ Nam sicut 
anima rationalis et caro unus est homo, ita Deus et 
homo unus est Christus — For as the reasonable soul 
and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ.” 

There is an important Christological axiom: “Ver- 
bum assumpsit carnem mediante anima” (the Word as- 
sumed flesh by means of the soul), of which the 
Fathers made frequent use against Arianism and Apol- 
linarianism. Only by assuming a rational soul, they ar- 
gued, was. the Divine Logos able to take bodily flesh 
into the Hypostatic Union; for soulless flesh, or flesh 
animated merely by a brute soul (vy Corin adoyos), 
would not have been becoming to the Godhead, nor 
would it have met the requirements of the Redemption. 
Only flesh animated by a spiritual soul as its essen- 
tial form constitutes man; similarly the human nature 
of Christ is constituted only by human flesh animated 
by a spiritual soul as its essential form.?? After the 
outbreak of the Arian and Apollinarian controversy the 
Fathers never wearied of insisting on the “ rationality 
of the flesh,” 2* not, of course, in the sense of a hylozoistic 
Panpsychism, as advocated many centuries later by 
Spinoza, but in consonance with the dogmatic definition 
of Vienne, which, despite its Scholastic phraseology, may 
be said to flow from Divine Revelation rather than from 
philosophy. 

20See the dogmatic treatise on of Alexandria), odpé éupuxos 


Christology, Vol. IV of this Series. Noyixn (Sophronius). 
2Zloaua Puxwhév voepwos (Cyril 


THE SOUL THE FORM OF THE BODY 147 


c) Later theologians have warmly discussed 
the incidental question, whether the definition of 
the Council of Vienne can be used as an argu- 
ment in favor of the Aristotelian doctrine of 
Hylomorphism as developed by the Scholastics. 
This philosophic theory holds that all bodies are 
composed of a substantial form and primordial 
matter (forma substantialis et materia prima). 
Is the Vienne definition to be taken as a dog- 
matic indication that the spiritual soul is imme- 
diately united with primordial matter (materia 
prima, *» pom) rather than with an organized 
body? 


a) St. Thomas distinctly teaches that the spiritual 
soul is not only the forma corporis, but the unica forma 
corporis —the sole form of the body.22. He conceives 
the compositum humanum as consisting not of body 
and soul, but of primordial matter and soul, because it 
is the spiritual soul which renders the body materia 
secunda, 1. e., constitutes it a body, and thereby gives 
it its esse corporis. 

The Scotists, on the other hand, hold that the body 
is first constituted by a separate forma corporeitatis, and 
subsequently receives the intellectual soul as its essential 
form. In order to obtain an unum per se as the re- 
sult of this synthesis, the Scotists conceive the forma 
corporeitatis to be an imperfect, subordinate form, which 


ita virtute continet omnes inferiores 
formas, et facit ipsa sola, quidquid 


22“ Dicendum est, quod nulla 
alia forma  substantialis est in 


homine nisi sola anima -intellectiva, 
_ et quod ipsa, sicut virtute continet 
animam sensitivam et nutritivam, 


imperfectiores formae in aliis fa- 
ciunt.”’ S. Theel., 1a, qu. 7Owmarts 
4. 


148 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


offers no obstacle to the substantial completion of the 
whole by the spiritual soul. It is in this sense that 
Scotus teaches: “ Anima est principium formale, quo 
vivum est vivum. . . . Est anima immediatum principium 
formale essendi et immediatum principium operandi,” 7° 
so that “una forma rationalis dat esse triplex, scil. 
vegetativum, sensitivum et intellectivum.’?* But the 
esse corporis is not immediately communicated by the 
soul; it 1s derived from the forma corporeitatis, which 
is distinct from the soul. This explains the Scotist 
conclusion that the body retains its forma corporeitatis 
after death, whereas the Thomists are compelled to in- 
vent a new form for the dead body, which they call 
forma cadaverica. Neither of the two systems is free 
from logical difficulties. The whole question properly 
belongs to the sphere of philosophy. 

8B) It would be absurd to say that the Church has 
raised Hylomorphism to the rank of a dogma and con- 
demned in advance the fundamental principles of modern 
physics and chemistry as heretical. The Council of 
Vienne did not mean to affirm the existence of pri- 
mordial matter. Nor did it intend to deny the exist- 
ence of a forma corporeitatis in man. We know that 
the Thomistic doctrine was anything but popular 
among the theologians of that age. Moreover, the 
Viennese definition was drawn up by Scotist theolo- 
gians, who cannot have intended to persuade the Council 
to condemn a pet theory of their own school and order. 
“That the Council did not harbor any such purpose,” 
says Schell, “is proved by the unquestioned orthodoxy 
of the Scotist and allied schools.” 2° The Jesuit Schiffini, 

23 Comment. in Quatuor Libros . 25 Dogmatik, Vol. II, p. 287, 


enti Ui,r dist... 26, que x. Paderborn 1890, 
24 De Rer. Princ., qu. 11, art. 2. 


THE SOUL THE FORM OF THE BODY i409 


who defends the Thomistic doctrine with great zeal and 
acumen, finds himself constrained to counsel mod- 
eration in this controversy and to warn theologians 
against drawing hasty conclusions.2® So long, there- 
fore, as the Church permits modern scientific Atomism 
and the Scotistic system to be taught without let or 
hindrance, so long will the definition of Vienne be suffi- 
ciently safeguarded by saying that the spiritual soul ani- 
mates the human body (not: primordial matter) as its 
immediate essential form.27 We are confirmed in this 
view by the sharp disapproval expressed by Pope Pius 
IX (June 5, 1876) of any and every extreme inter- 
pretation of the papal and conciliar definitions against 
the opponents of the Thomistic system.28 The most 
that can be said in favor of the latter is that “ by lay- 
ing a sharper emphasis upon the union of body and soul 
in one essence, it embodies a deeper and more con- 
sistent conception of the Church’s teaching, and thereby 
more emphatically accentuates the direct fusion of the 
soul with the innermost essence of the body, the utter 
dependency of the body upon the soul, and the intrinsic 
perfectioning and unification of the body, as such, by the 
soul. However, this teaching is hard to understand 
because of its profundity, and difficult to handle because 
tiae limites excederet ac temeritatis 


merito argueretur is, qui in rebus 
eiusmodi propriam sententiam sic 


26“ An vero,’ he writes, “ legi- 
iima consecutione inde colligatur vel 
existentia primae materiae, prout 


haec intelligitur in doctrina scholas- 
tica, praesertim D. Thomae, vel sen- 
tentia eiusdem Aquinatis de unitate 
formae substantialis in eodem cor- 
pore, complures quidem rational 
discursu id deducunt, sed minime 
dict potest quasi ab Ecclesia defini- 
tum, nec oppositum censuram ali- 
quam theologicam meretur, quamdiu 
Ecclesiae iudicio res ulterius deter- 
minata non fuerit. Quare pruden- 


bropugnaret, ut ceteros contra sen- 
tientes quasi violatae religionis vel 
sublestae fidei viros traduceret.’’ 
Disp. Metaphys. Spec., Vol. I, ed. 
2a, p. 395, Aug. Taurin. 1893. 

27 Cfr. Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dog- 
mat., Vol. III, ed. 3a, 66, Friburgi 
1908. 

28 For the text of this document 
see Schiffini, 1. c. 


150 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


of its delicacy. Hence it must not be insisted upon too 
strongly, lest the dogma itself be involved in difficulties 
insoluble to any but the most subtle minds specially 
trained for this purpose.” ° 


REApvINGS:— Thumann, Bestandteile des Menschen und ihr 
Verhdlinis zgueinander, Bamberg 1846.—Liberatore, Del Com- 
posto Umano, 2 vols., Roma 1858.— Morgott, Geist und Natur im 
Menschen nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas, Eichstatt 1860.— Soff- 
ner, Dogmat. Begriindung der kirchlichen Lehre von den Be- 
Standteilen des Menschen, Ratisbon 1861.— Vraetz, Spekulative 
Begrindung der Lehre der kath. Kirche iiber das Wesen der 
menschlichen Seele, Koln 1865.— *Katschthaler, Zwei Thesen fiir 
das allgemeine Konzil, 2, Abteil., Ratisbon 1870—v. Hertling, 
Materie und Form und Begriff der Seele bei Aristoteles, Bonn 
1871.— *Zigliara, De Mente Concilii Viennensis in Defniendo 
Dogmate Unionis Animae Humanae cum Corpore, Romae 1878. 
— *Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. V, §§ 295-296, Mainz 
1887.— E. Rolfes, Die substantiale Form und der Begriff der 
Seele bei Aristoteles, Paderborn 1896.— T. Pesch, S. J., Seele und 
Leib als zwei Bestandteile der einen Menschensubstanz gemdass 
der Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin, Fulda 1893.— W. Lescher, 
O. P., The Evolution of the Human Body, London 1899.— M. 
Maher, S. J., Psychology, pp. 545 sqq., 6th ed., London 1906.— 
J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy: A Treatise on the Human 
Soul, New York 1808. 


_ 29 Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, and writings of Olivi the student 
p- 153, Freiburg 1878. On _ the may profitably consult the Archiv 
whole question cfr. Botalla, La Let- fir Literatur und  Kirchenge- 
tre de M. Czacki et le Thomisme, schichte des Mittelalters, II, 377 
Paris 1878; Palmieri, De Deo sqq., III, 409 sqq., Freiburg 1886- 
Creante, pp. 769 sqq., Romae 1878; 87, and L. Oliger’s article, ‘‘ Olivi, 
Zigliara, De Mente Concili Vien- Pierre Jean,” in Vol. .XI of the 
nensis, Romae 1878. On the life Catholic Encyclopedia. 


TRE IMMORTALITY: OF THE SOUL! 161 


ARTICLE 3 


THE IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL 


1. THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH AND VarI- 
ous Heresies.—There is a threefold immor- 
tality: the essential immortality of God, the nat- 
ural immortality of the soul, and the supernatural 
immortality of the body. It is an article of faith 
that the human soul is immortal. That this im- 
mortality is natural, 7. e., founded on an exigency 
of human nature, may be said to be Catholic 
teaching. 


There are three revealed truths which the Church 
declares to be demonstrable by philosophical arguments. 
They are: (1) The existence of God, (2) the spir- 
ituality of the soul, and (3) free-will The dogma of 
the soul’s immortality is based on its simplicity and 
spirituality. Whether this truth is philosophically de- 
monstrable or not is a question that the Church has left 
open out of consideration for the Scotists. 

In every age there have been men who denied the 
immortality of the soul; these the Church has always 
treated as heretics. 

a) We have it on the authority of Eusebius? and 
St. Augustine? that, as early as the third century, there 
existed in Arabia a sect called Hypnopsychites,t who 
held that the soul slept, i. e. temporarily ceased to exist 


1 Decr. Congr. S. Indicis 1855: Knowability, Essence, and Aitri- 


“ Ratiocinatio Dei existentiam, ani- butes,\ pp. 30 sqq. 
mae spiritualitatem, hominis liber- 2 Hist. Eccles., VI, 37. 
tatem cum certitudine probare po- 3 De Haeres., 83. 


test.” Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 4 From tarvos Wux7s = soul-sleep, 


152 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


after death, until the resurrection of the flesh. Nicepho- 
rus Callistus® relates how at an Arabian Council held 
in 247, Origen combated this heresy with such con- 
vincing eloquence that all who had espoused it returned 
to the pale of the Church. 

The theory of a “ soul-sleep ” does not directly contra- 
vene the dogma of immortality, especially if it con- 
fines itself to the assertion that the soul survives after 
a fashion in a dreamy, semi-conscious state. This at- 
tenuated Hypnopsychism was combated by Tertullian in 
his treatise De Anima. He raises the question: ‘‘ What 
will happen during the time that we are in the nether 
world? Shall we sleep?” and answers it as follows: 
“The soul never sleeps, not even in this life.” ® 

Another, still more radical sect is mentioned by St. 
John Damascene. Its adherents were called @vnrow ira, 
because they believed that the souls of men, like those of 
brutes, cease to exist at death. 


b) The question of the immortality of the hu- 
man soul entered upon a new phase when, towards 
the close of the fifteenth century, paganizing 
humanists of the stamp of Pietro Pomponazzi 
alleged that the soul is by nature necessarily 
mortal. Abul Ibn Roschd, commonly called 
Averroés, denied that there are individual ra- 
tional souls. There is, he said, one universal 
impersonal and objective over-soul (imtellectus 
universalis), which, by illuminating the inferior 
souls of individuals, enables mankind to par- 

5 Hist... V, 23. was advocated by Aphraates, A. D. 


6 De Anima, c. 58. Among the 336. 
Syrians the theory of the soul-sleep 


PAR IMMORTALITY, Ob UTHE. SOU. 158 


ticipate perennially in the great eternal truths. 
“This doctrine involves the extinction of the 
individual consciousness and the impersonality 
of life after death: human individuals die, but 
humanity is immortal in the eternity of the 
objective, universal intelligence.” * Against this 
heresy the Fifth Council of the Lateran, under 
mone Iueo NX (A, D552), dehmedsin7 Cw. 
diebus nostris . . . (nonnullt aust sint dicere) de 
natura... animae rationalis, quod mortals sit 
aut unica im cunctis hominibus, . . . sacro ap- 
probante Concilio damnamus et reprobamus 
omnes asserentes, animam intellectivam mortalem 
esse aut unicam in cunctis honunibus— As... 
in our days (some have dared to assert) con- 
cerning the nature of the rational soul, that it is 
mortal, or that there is but one soul in all men, 

. . with the approval of the sacred Council we 
condemn and reprobate all who assert that the 
intellectual soul is mortal or is but one in all 
get 


The decree proceeds as follows: “Cum illa [scil. 
anima intellectiva| non solum vere per se et essentialiter 
humani corporis forma existat, sicut 1m general... . 
Viennensi Concilio ... continetur;® verum et immor- 
talis, et pro corporum, quibus infunditur, multitudine 

7De Wulf-Coffey, History of in Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiri- 
Medieval Philosophy, pp. 233 sq4., dion, n. 738. 

London 1909. 9 See supra, pp. 142 sq. 
8 Constit. ‘‘ Apost. regim.,” quoted 


ome 


154 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


singulariter [1. e., individualiter] multiplicabilis et mul- 
tiplicata et multiplicanda sit.” 

An analysis of this dogmatic definition, and of the rea- 
soning by which it is supported, gives us.the following 
points of view: - | 

(1) This definition condemns two distinct heresies: 
(a) That the spiritual soul is mortal, and (b) that there 
exists but one universal soul in all men. Consequently, 
the contradictory proposition, that the spiritual soul is 
immortal and individual, is an article of faith. 

(2) The individuality of the soul is a necessary pos- 
tulate of personal immortality, and is therefore specially 
emphasized, first by reference to the dogmatic defini- 
tion of Vienne concerning the forma corporis, and 
again by reference to the individual origin of each 
human soul in the process of generation. 

(3) By the immortality of the soul Leo X and the 
Fifth Council of the Lateran understand that physical 
indestructibility (incorruptibilitas) which flows as a 
logical corollary from its nature as a spiritual substance. 
For this reason the dogmatic definition quoted above 
begins with the statement that the condemned errors 
concern the “nature of the rational soul” (natura 
animae rationalis). Unlike the bodily immortality of 
our first parents in Paradise, the immortality of the soul 
therefore is not a pure grace. 

The above-quoted definition is the most important and 
the clearest pronouncement ever made by the Church on 
the subject of the natural immortality of the soul. 

c) In modern times Materialism and emanatistic Pan- 
theism deny the natural immortality of the soul as well 
as its spirituality and individuality. Materialism asserts 
that nothing is immortal except force and matter,!° 


10 Bichner. 


i 
4 
} 
h 
; 
4 


THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL  1s5 


while Pantheism ascribes immortality solely to the 
impersonal Absolute, of which it holds each individual 
man to be merely a part. The Vatican Council con- 
tented itself with condemning Materialism and Pan- 
theism im globo and re-affirming the spirituality of the 
soul, which forms the philosophical basis of its natural 
immortality. 


2. PRooF OF THE DOGMA FROM REVELATION. 
—The demonstration of the immortality of the 
soul properly belongs to Eschatology. However, 
as this doctrine forms so important and funda- 
mental a part of our faith, we cannot pass it over 
in the present treatise. 

a) Most non-Catholics hold that the Old Tes- 
tament Jews did not believe in the immortality 
of the soul, and that this doctrine is the result 
of a slow and laborious evolution. We admit 
that the idea of temporal reward and punish- 
ment in the present life had a far stronger 
attraction for the Jews than retribution in the 
life beyond. Yet it is entirely wrong to say, as 
so many Rationalist critics do, that the Old Tes- 
tament contains no trace of belief in the immor- 
tality of the soul. To begin with the Proto- 
evangelium or prophecy of Paradise,—its promise 


11 Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, cap. created] the human [creature], as 
Tt: “Ac deinde [condidit Deus] partaking, in a sense, of both, con- 
humanam [creaturam] quasi com- sisting of spirit and body.’ Cfr. 


munem ex spiritu et corpore con- Conc. IV. Lateran. 1215, quoted 
stitutam— And afterwards [God SUPTA, DP. 27. 


156 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


of redemption through the seed of the Woman 
who was to crush the head of the ancient Serpent, 
would be utterly meaningless if the souls of men 
ceased to exist after death. The Patriarchs 
looked upon this present life as a pilgrimage ” 
and spoke of death as “going to the fathers.” ! 
By clearly distinguishing between “going to 
the fathers,” or “being gathered to their peo- 
ple,” and burial in a common sepulchre,!* Moses 
indirectly asserted the survival of the soul in 
the world beyond. Such phrases as: “I will 
go down to sheol” * and “You will bring down 
my gray hairs with sorrow unto sheol,’” '° do not 
refer to the grave, but to the “nether world” (4s) 
considered as the abode of departed souls. In 
confirmation of His teaching on the resurrec- 
tion of the flesh, Jesus, arguing with the Sad- 
ducees, quotes Exod. III, 6: “I am the God 
of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the 
God of Jacob,” and adds by way of explana- 
tion: “He is not the God of the dead, but of 
the living.” “’ Personal immortality could not 
be more plainly taught than in this exclamation 
of the pious Job: ** “TI shall see my God, whom I 


12 Gen. XLVII, 9; cfr. Heb. XI, 15 Gen. XXXVII, 35. 

13 sqq. 16 Gen. XLIV, 29; cfr. also Gen. 
13 Gen. XV; 153 XV 8S? XXXVI MEI 48, 

29; XLIX, 32. 17 Matth. XXII, 32. 
14Gen. XXV, 8 sq.; XXXV, 29; 18 Job XIX, 26 sq. 


XLIX, 32, etc. 


THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL) 457 


myself shall see, and my eyes shall behold, and 
not another.”’ 

The so-called Sapiential Books of the Old 
Testament are especially rich in proofs for the 
immortality of the soul. Cfr. Wisd. III, 2 sqq.: 
“Vist sunt [iusti| oculis insipientium mori, 
uh autem sunt in pace, ... spes illorum im- 
mortalitate plena est — In the sight of the unwise 
they [the souls of the just] seemed to die, 
but they are in peace. . . . Their hope is full of 
immortality.” Wisd. IV, 7: “Justus si morte 
praeoccupatus fuerit, in refrigerio erit — The just 
man, if he be prevented with death, shall be in 
mest,” 

The ghost of Samuel said to Saul: “Why 
hast thou disturbed my rest, that I should be 
brought up?” '® 
_ These and similar texts represent immortality 
as a natural endowment of the soul and not 
as a gratuitous gift of grace. This follows 
from the fact, recorded in Gen. I, 26, that the 
spiritual soul of man was created to the likeness 
of God. The soul is an image God, not because 
it is the principle of vegetative and. sensitive life 
(which is perishable), but because, being an im- 
perishable, indestructible spirit, it resembles the 
infinite and immortal spirit of Yahweh. 


191 Kings XXVIII, 15. 


158 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


It has been asserted that Ecclesiastes III, 19 is incom- 
patible with the doctrine of immortality, because it puts 
the death of man on the same plane with the ex- 
tinction of the brute beast: ‘‘ Unus interitus est ho- 
minis et iumentorum, et aequa utriusque conditio— 
The death of man and of beasts is one, and the con- 
dition of them both is equal.” But the context clearly 
shows that the Sacred Writer does not mean by this 
comparison to deny the immortality of the human soul. 
His purpose is to emphasize the mortality of the body, 
and to remind man that he who once aspired to equality 
with God was in punishment for his presumption re- 
duced to the level of perishable beasts.2° Nor is this 
train of thought disturbed by the sceptical question: 
“Quis novit, si spiritus filiorum Adam ascendat sursum, 
et st spiritus iumentorum descendat deorsum?— Who 
knoweth if the spirit of the children of Adam ascend 
upward, and if the spirit of the beasts descend down- 
ward?” *+ For a little later Ecclesiastes himself in- 
sists on the immortality of the soul: “ Revertatur 
pulvis in terram suam, unde erat; et spiritus redeat ad 
Deum, qui dedit illum — The dust return into its earth, 
from whence it was, and the spirit return to God, 
who gave it.’*? Assuredly it will not do to interpret 
Eccles. III, 21 as implying denial or doubt of a truth 
so clearly taught in Eccles. XII, 7. How, then, are we 
to understand this difficult text? Exegetes have sug- 
gested different interpretations. Some think that the 
Sacred Writer wished to adapt himself to the mind of the 
average person, who can perceive no essential difference 
between the symptoms of agony in man and beast. Giet- 
mann ** holds that the hagiographer simply desired to 


20 Gen. III, 22. 23 Comment. in Eccles. ct Cant. 
21 Eccles. III, 21. Canticor., pp. 172 sqq., Paris 1890. 
22 Eccles, XII, 7. ; 


Pee IMMORTALITY ORV PR PSO ULyt bso 


intimate the uncertainty of man’s fate in the world be- 
yond, because three verses farther up he speaks of the 
judgment of God, and no man knows, before that judg- 
ment has been pronounced, whether he will enjoy ever- 
lasting bliss or be condemned to suffer eternal punish- 
ment in hell. Thus interpreted the text furnishes a new 
proof for the doctrine of immortality. Other exegetes, 
among them Cornely,?* think Eccles. III, 21 is meant 
to censure the carelessness of men in regard to their 
future destiny. In this hypothesis the question would 
mean: “ Who payeth the slightest attention to whether 
the spirit of man tends upward and the spirit of the 
beast downward?” It is quite obvious that the Jews 
before Christ could not have had such well-defined ideas 
about the other world as we Christians have, who know 
that we are destined to enjoy the beatific vision in Heaven. 
This fact sufficiently accounts for their gloomy concep- 
tion of sheol or the nether world. 


The New Testament teaching on immortality 
is so explicit that not even the Rationalists ven- 
ture to dispute it. Hence it will be sufficient 
for our purpose to cite the Saviour’s famous 
dictum: “Nolite tumere eos, qui occidunt cor- 
pus, animam autem non possunt occidere, sed 
potius timete eum, qui potest et anumam et corpus 
perdere in gehennam — Fear ye not them that kill 
the body, and are not able to kill the soul; but 
rather fear him that can destroy both soul and 
body in hell.” 


24 Introd. in Utriusque Test. Libr. 25 Matth. X, 28. For the teach- 
Sacros, Vol. II, pp. 179 sqq., Paris ing of St. Paulsee 1) Cori XV, 1 
1887. " sqq-; Heb. XI, 13 saqq. A more 


160 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


b) Since the immortality of the soul is the 
very foundation stone of ethics and of the en- 
tire supernatural order of salvation, it goes with- 
out saying that this truth was unanimously 
taught, philosophically investigated, and scienti- 
fically developed by the Fathers. 


The unknown author of the Epistle to Diognetus 
professes: “Jmmortalis anima habitat in corpore mor- 
tal, — The immortal soul dwells in a mortal body.” 2° St. 
Ireneeus gives this philosophical reason for the immor- 
tality of the soul: “ Incompositus est enim et simplex 
spiritus, qui resolvi non potest — For the spirit [soul | 
is incomposite and simple, and [therefore] cannot be re- 
solved.” *7 Tertullian,?* Gregory of Nyssa,2? and Am- 
brose *° express themselves in similar language. St. 
Augustine, as is well known, wrote a special treatise 
“On the Immortality of the Soul.” 

Some ancient writers (e. g., the author of the third 
pseudo-Clementine homily) ,?+ are suspected of having 
held that God annihilates the souls of the wicked. Their 
utterances must be read with caution. Some of them 
are undoubtedly susceptible of an orthodox interpreta- 
tion. St. Justin Martyr, for instance, in writing: 
“ Neque immortalis anima dicenda est; nam si immor- 
talis, etiam profecto ingenita [increata] est,’ plainly 
did not mean to deny that the soul is endowed with 
natural immortality,** but had in mind that essential 


detailed treatment of the subject 28 De Testim. An., c. 4 sq. 

in F. Schmid, Der Unsterblichkeits- 29 Or. Catech., c. 8. 

und <Auferstehungsglaube in der 30 De Bono Mortis, c. 9. 

Bibel, Brixen 1902. 81 Cfr. Migne, P.G., Il, 118. 
26On the Letter to Diognetus 32 Dial. c. Tryph., c. 5. Migne, 

cfr. Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrology, P.G., V1, 486. 

pp. 68 sq. 33 Natural immortality implies 


2% Adv. Haeres., V, 7, 1. that the nature of a being is such 


QRIGIN OF THE, SOUL 161 


immortality which belongs to God alone. Of course the 
creature is immortal in quite a different sense than the 
Greator,*4 


REApDINGS: — B. Schafer, Neue Untersuchungen tiber das Buch 
Kohelet, Freiburg 1870.— L. Schiitz, Vernunftbeweis fiir die Un- 
sterblichkeit der Seele, Paderborn 1874.— J. Knabenbauer, Das 
Zeugnis des Menschengeschlechtes fiir die Unsterblichkeit der 
Seele, Freiburg 1878—E. Melzer, Die Unsterblichkeit auf Grund 
der Schopfungslehre, Neisse 1896.— Fell-Villing, The Inumortality 
of the Human Soul Philosophically Explained, London 1906.— 
*W. Schneider, Das andere Leben, 7th ed., Paderborn 1904.— Ph. 
Kneib, Die Beweise fiir die Unsterblichkeit der Seele aus allge- 
meinen psychologischen Tatsachen, Freiburg 1903.— F. C. Kemp- 
son, The Future Life and Modern Difficulties, London 1907.— 
Piat, Destinée de Homme, Paris 1898—Elbé, Future Life in 
the Light of Ancient Wisdom and Modern Science, London 1907. 
—M. Maher, S. J., Psychology, 6th ed., pp. 525 sqq., London and 
New York 1906.— Ipem, art. “Immortality” in the Catholic En- 
cyclopedia, Vol. VII.— For a comparatively complete bibliography 
of the subject cfr. Alger, The Destiny of the Soul. A Critical 
History of the Doctrine of a Future Life, 14th ed., New York 
1889. 


ARTICLE 4 


ORIGIN OF THE SOUL 


Unlike their progenitor, the children of Adam do 
not owe their existence to a creative act of God in 
the strict sense of the term. The race propagates it- 
self by sexual generation in accordance with the divine 


as to have no inherent tendency only hath immortality.” For the 
to death, so that it will not die or philosophical arguments see . St. 
cease to exist, unless God with- Thomas, Contr. Gent., II, 79 sqq. 
draws. His conservation. Cfr. S. (Rickaby, Of God and His Crea- 
Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic The- WUres, “Pps | Th20 Saq.)inw) Cfra. Ph: 
ology, Vol. II, p. 334. Kneib, Die Unsterblichkeit der 

sein.) rt Tims Vi, 262) 8 Quad Seele bewiesen ans dem hoheren 
Solus habet immortalitatem—Who  Erkennen und Wollen, Wien 1900. 


162 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


command “ Increase and multiply.” The question arises 
— How does the individual human soul come into 
being? This problem is of interest alike to the phi- 
losopher and the theologian. Three different attempts 
have been made to solve it. The theory of Pre-existence 
holds that all souls exist prior to the creation of their 
respective bodies, in which they are enclosed as in a 
prison. Generationism (which in its crude form is 
called Traducianism) asserts that the souls of children, 
like their bodies, are produced by the parents. Cre- 
ationism teaches that each human soul is created by God 
and immediately united with the material product of 
parental generation. 


Thesis I: The theory of Pre-existence, which as- 
serts that the individual soul exists prior to its union 
with the body, is heretical. : 


This proposition obviously embodies an article 
of faith. 

Proof. The soul may be conceived as pre- 
existing either in a state of sin, for the atonement 
of which it is incarcerated in the body; or as 
merely slumbering in a state of innocence or in- 
difference.” Both assumptions, more especially 
the first, are opposed to the express teaching of 
Revelation. 

a) A spirit incarcerated in a material body 
would be in a state of violent and unnatural 
compulsion. Hence the first of the aforesaid 


1 This notion was derived from 2 This was the belief of the Pris- 
Plato and held by Origen. cillianists and some other heretics. 


PRE-EXISTENTISM 163 


theories implicitly denies the substantial unity of 
human nature,®? in fact it degrades it by repre- 
senting the union of body and soul as acci- 
dental, after the manner of demoniacal possession. 
Holy Scripture expressly teaches that man as he 
proceeded from the hand of God, like all other 
products of the creative act, was “good,” and that 
he became bad through sin.* Hence it must 
be received as a revealed truth that the soul of 
Adam at the moment when his body was formed, 
was perfectly pure and sinless, and that it was 
breathed into the material body simultaneously 
with its creation. Consequently the soul cannot 
have been affected by some previous catastrophe. 


The same is true of Adam’s progeny. St. Paul, in 
speaking of Esau and Jacob, says: “Cum nondum natt 
fuissent aut aliquid bom egissent aut mali, ... non ex 
operibus, sed ex vocante dictum est et: quia maior. serviet 
minort — When the children were not yet born, nor had 
done any good or evil, .. . not of works, but of him 
that calleth, it was said to her [Rebecca]: The elder 
shall serve the younger.” ® The Origenistic doctrine of 
Pre-existence was condemned by the Church at a very 
early date as incompatible with Revelation. A Council 
held in Constantinople, A. D. 543,° pronounced anathema 
against those who “ assert the fabulous pre-existence of 


3 As defined by the: Council of founded with the Fifth General 


Vienne; v. supra, p. 142 Sq. Council of Constantinople, A. D. 
4\Gfr. Gen. 1/31; Rom. <V; 12 553; cfr. Hefele, Concilienge- 

sqq. schichte, Vol. II, pp. 790 sqq., 
5 Rom. IX, 11 sq. ~ Freiburg 1875. 


6 This Council must not be con- 


164 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


souls, and the doctrine of the Apocatastasis, which logic- 
ally flows therefrom.” Against the Priscillianists, who 
shared the error of Origen, the Council of Braga, A. D. 
561, defined: “Si quis animas humanas dicit prius in 
coelesti habitatione peccasse et pro hoc in corpora humana 
in terram deiectas, sicut Priscillianus dicit, anathema sit 
— If any one shall say, as doth Priscillian, that the souls 
of men sinned in their celestial habitations, and in punish- 
ment therefor were cast into human bodies on earth, let 
him be anathema.” ? 


b) The milder form of this heresy, which 
asserts that the souls of men pre-existed in a 
state of moral innocence, is likewise repugnant to 
Catholic dogma. Nemesius® supported it by 
the threadbare argument that God rested after the 
sixth day, and now no longer creates souls out 
of nothing. But, as St. Augustine pointed out, 
“these opinions, which attribute to the human 
soul a meritorious life and condition previous to 
its union with the flesh, have already been con- 
demned by the Catholic Church, not only in the 
case of some ancient heretics, . . . but also more 
recently in the instance of the Priscillianists.” ® 


7 See Denzinger-Banwart, Enchi- the end of the fourth century, may 
ridion, n. 236. On the doctrine of be considered as the first complete 
the amokaraoraois, cfr. P. Batiffol and systematic treatise on anthro- 
in the Catholic Encyclopedia, S. U.; pology. It was translated into Eng- 
On Origen’s teaching on this point, lish (The Nature of Man) by 
see J. Tixeront, History of Dogmas, George Wither, London 1636. Cfr. 
Engl. tr., Vol. I, pp. 280 sq., St. De Wulf-Coffey, History of Medie- 


Louis rgro. . val Philosophy, p. 98; Turner, His- 
8 De Nat. Hom., c. 2. This pop- tory of Philosophy, p. 223. 
ular work of Nemesius, who was 9De Anima et eius Origine, 


Bishop of Emesa in Phoenicia, about I, 7: “‘Haee dogmata, quibus 


PRE-EXISTENTISM 165, 


Pope Leo the Great, in his dogmatic Epistle to 
Turribius, Bishop of Astorga, branded the pre- 
existence theory in all its forms as heretical. 
“Decimo autem capitulo referuntur [Priscilian- 
istae| asserere, animas quae humans corporibus 
inseruntur, fuisse sine corpore et in coelesti habi- 
tatione peccasse. . . . Quam wmpietatis fabulam 
ex multorum sibi erroribus contexuerunt; sed 
omnes eos catholica fides a corpore suae unitatis 
abscidit, constanter praedicans atque veraciter, 
quod animae humanae, priusquam suis inspira- 
rentur corporibus, non fuere — In the tenth chap- 
ter the Priscillianists are reported as asserting, 
that the souls which are planted in human 
bodies were without a body and sinned in their 
celestial habitation. . . . This impious fable they 
have made up from the errors of many; but all 
of these the Catholic faith has cut off from the 
body of its unity, constantly and truthfully pro- 
claiming that the human souls had no existence 
prior to the time when they were breathed into 
their respective bodies.” 


This condemnation manifestly includes the modern 
form of Pre-existentism taught by Kant and Schelling. 
It is scarcely necessary to add that Metempsychosis, so- 
called, or the theory of the transmigration of souls, 
which may be classified as an offshoot of the theory 
putatur anima ante carnem habuisse haereticis et recentius in Priscillian- 


aliquem statum bonum et meritum istis tam catholica damnavit Eccle- 
bonum, si forte nescis, in antiquis sia.” 


166 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


of Pre-existence,!° is equally repugnant to right reason 
and Revelation. The same may be said of the so-called 
Involution theory, according to which the souls of all 
men were implicitly contained in the soul of Adam, 
which is successively split up, as it were, and divided 
among his descendants.*4 


Thesis II: Generationism, both in its crude and 
in its refined form, must be unconditionally rejected. 


This proposition is theologically certain. 

Proof. a) Generationism in its crude form 
is called Traducianism (from tradux, cutting, 
slip). Traducianism holds that the soul is pro- 
duced immediately from the male sperm (semen 
corporale), and that children are as it were “cut- 
tings” or “slips” detached from the souls of their 
parents. This opinion was defended in the East 
by Apollinaris, and in the West, apparently, by 
Uertullians 


Tertullian appears to teach that the germ of a new 
soul disengages itself from the souls of the begetting 


parents, as a “slip from the stem of Adam.” 18 


10The Transmigration theory 
seems to be almost co-eval with 
history. There are traces of it 
among the early Egyptians, and it 
was and is almost universal among 
the Hindus. To a large extent it 
swayed the philosophies of Greece 
in the days of Pythagoras, Plato, 
and Plotinus. Cfr. J. Gibbons, 
Theories of the Transmigration of 
Souls, London 1907; SE PAW lO yert 
coll, Christian Philosophy: God, 2nd 
ed., pp. 276 sqq., New York 19043 


But as 


Dowd, The Soul, its Powers, Mi- 
grations, and Transmigrations, San 
Francisco 1888. 

11 This theory is sometimes called 
Panspermy. 

12 We say apparently, because the 
peculiar sense in which Tertullian 
uses the word ‘“‘ body” makes it 
dificult to arrive at a just evalu- 
ation of his teaching, 

13 Cfr. De Anima, c 19: “ Ani- 
ma velut surculus quidam ex ma-— 
trice Adam in propaginem deducta 


GENERATIONISM 167 


an incorporeal soul cannot possibly proceed from a cor- 
poreal principle, this theory degrades man to the level 
of the beast. The brute soul, being entirely merged 
in matter, can be produced by generation out of the 


‘potency of matter; but the soul of man, which is a simple 


spiritual substance, does not produce material germs 
from which a new spiritual soul could sprout. Tertul- 
lian tries to improve his case by distinguishing between 
humor and calor seminis, deriving the soul from the 
former and the body from the latter. But the very 
suggestion that flesh might possibly beget spirit is 
essentially materialistic. No wonder Tertullian has 
been frequently reckoned among the Materialists.‘* Lac- 
tantius’s refutation of Traducianism still retains its full 
force: “Jllud quoque venire in quaestionem potest, 
utrumne anima ex patre, an potwus ex matre, an vero 
ex utroque generetur. Sed ego in eo iure ab ancipiti 
vindico: ... corpus enim ex corporibus nasct potest, 
quoniam confertur aliquid ex utroque; de animis animus 
non potest, quia ex re tenui et incomprehensibili [1. e. 
spirituali|] nihil potest descendere. Atque serendarum 
ammarum ratio unt ac soli Deo subtacet,... ex quo 
apparet, non a parentibus dart anmas, sed ab uno 
eodemque omnium Deo Patre— The question may also 
arise, Is the soul engendered by the father, or by the 
mother, or by both? I think that it is engendered by 
neither. ... A body may be produced from a body, 
since something is contributed from both; but a soul 
cannot be produced from souls, because nothing can de- 
part from a thin and intangible [1. e., spiritual] sub- 
stance. Therefore the manner of the production of 
et genitalibus foeminae foveis cum 14 Cfr. -Pohle-Preuss, God: His 


omni sua paratura pullulabit tam Knowability, Essence and Attri- 
intellectu quam sensu.” butes, p. 294. 


168 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


souls belongs to God alone. . . . From this it is evident 
that souls are not given by parents, but by one and the 
same God, the Father of all.’ | 

The attitude of the Church is sufficiently indicated by 
a decision of Pope Benedict XII in the matter of reunion 
(A.D. 1342). When the Armenians were asked to 
condemn the proposition that “the human soul is prop- 
agated from father to son, as body is propagated by 
body, or one angel by another,’ ?® their bishops assured 
the Pope that “this error, that the soul of man is propa- 
gated from the soul of the father, as body is propagated 
from body, . . . was always proscribed in the Armenian 
Church, and shall be accursed.” 17 


b) Generationism in its refined form is far 
less repugnant to Catholic teaching than the 
crude Traducianism of which we have been 
speaking, though the two systems do not seem to 
differ much in principle. The chief distinction is 
that refined Generationism recognizes the spir- 
ituality of the soul by postulating a kind of spir- 
itual semen (semen spirituale), which, however, 
from the purely philosophical point of view, is 
an impossible chimera. The unequivocal bias 
of some Patristic writers ** in favor of Gener- 
ationism has done much to weaken the ecclesi- 


15 De Opif. Det ad Demetr., c. 19. sicut corpus a@ corpore ... semper 

16 “ Quod anima humana filii pro- fuit excommunicatus in ecclesia 
pagatur ab anima patris sui, sicut Armeniorum, et maledictus sit.” 
corpus a corpore et angelus etiam (Marténe, Vet. Monum., t. VII, p. 
unus ab alio.’ Denzinger-Bannwart, 319.) 
Enchiridion, n. 533; cfr. Raynald., 18 Especially Theodore Abucara 
Annal. Eccles. ad a. 1341, ". 50. (Opusc. 35), Macarius (Hom. 3o, n. 

17 “‘ Hic error, quod anima homi- 1), and Gregory Nyssen (De Opif. 
mis propagetur ab anima patris sui, Hom., c. 29). 


GENERATIONISM 169 


astical tradition and to retard the complete tri- 
umph of Creationism, which is after all the only 
tenable system. 


For eight full centuries (from the time of St. Augus- 
tine to Peter Lombard) the question of the origin ot 
the human soul was treated with much hesitation and 
uncertainty. It remained for St. Thomas Aquinas to 
pave the way for a general adoption of Creationism. 
Generationism had obtained currency by the high au- 
thority of St. Augustine, whose sole reason for hesi- 
tating to place himself squarely on Creationist ground 
was that this system had been ostentatiously espoused 
by the Pelagians in attacking the doctrine of original 
sin. The Pelagians argued as follows: Nothing un- 
clean can come from the hand of God; therefore the 
souls of children, created by Him directly out of noth- 
ing, cannot be tainted with original sin. Unable to 
solve this subtle objection, Augustine inclined to the 
theory that the souls of children are not immediately 
created by God, but engendered by their parents. He 
believed in the possibility of a semen incorporeum, from 
which, he says, the soul in a manner incomprehensible 
to us, originates in the act of parental generation,— 
which accounts for the transmission of original sin.’® 
But Augustine was no decided adherent of the Gener- 
ationist theory. Indeed he never quite overcame his 
doubts as. to its correctness. On more than one occa- 
sion he humbly confessed his ignorance of the true solu- 
tion of the problem.”® In his epistolary correspondence 

19 Ep. ad Optat., 190: “ Incor- 20“ Libentius disco quam dico, 
poreum semen animae sua quadam ne audeam docere, quod nescio,” 


occulta et invisibili via seorsum a he says in his work Contr. Iulian., 
paire currens in matrem.” Vig. 


12 


170 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 

with St. Jerome, who was a determined Creationist, he 
frankly declares that he would like to espouse Creation- 
ism, if he could only make sure that it was compatible 
with the dogma of original sin.?* 

It follows that St. Augustine cannot be quoted as a 
traditional witness either for or against Creationism. 

c) The authority of this great Doctor was sufficient 
to keep his doubts and misgivings alive for many cen- 
turies.? The Venerable Moneta?* and St. Thomas 
Aquinas finally broke the spell. St. Thomas did not 
hesitate to condemn Generationism as “heretical.” *4 
His immediate predecessors (e. g., Peter Lombard 2 
and Albert the Great**), though decided champions 
of Creationism, had not dared to express themselves 
quite so vigorously. It was no doubt premature on the 
part of St. Thomas to brand Generationism as a heresy; 
yet no one can fail to perceive that even in its mildest 
form this theory is incompatible with the dogma of the 
simplicity and spirituality of the soul.27 


21“ Unde illa de novarum ani- qu. 118, art. 2: “ Haereticum est 


marum creatione sententia, si hane 
fidem fundatissimam [peccati ori- 
ginalis] non oppugnat, sit et mea; 
st oppugnat, non sit tua... . Ecce 
volo, ut lla sententia etiam mea 
sit, sed nondum esse confirmo.” 
Ep. 166, 25, ad S. Hieron. — 


22 Cfr. the writings of his pupil - 


Fulgentius (De Verit. Praedest. et 
Grats itl, irs) rand -those ot) St 
Gregory the Great (Ep. 53 ad Se- 
cundin.). 

23 In his Summa contra Catharos 
et Waldenses, II, 4. On Moneta 
Cremonensis, a Dominican writer of 
the thirteenth century (-+ 1235), 
cfr. Hurter, Nomenclator Literarius 
Theologiae Catholicae, t. II, 2nd. 
ed., col. 267 sq., Oeniponte 1906. 

24 Cfr. S. Thom., S. Theol., 1a, 


dicere, quod anima intellectiva tra- 
ducatur cum semine.”’ 

25 Lib. Sent., II, dist. 17, qu. 3. 

26S. Theol., p. 2, qu. 72, memb. 
3. : 
27 Cfr. S. Thom., Contr. Gent., 
II, 86: “ Ridiculum est dicere ali- 
quam intellectualem substantiam vel 
per divisionem corporis dividi vel 
etiam ab aliqua virtute corporis pro- 
duct. Sed anima humana est quae- 
dam intellectualis substantia... . 
Non igitur potest dici, quod divida- 
tur per divisionem seminis neque 
quod producatur in esse a virtute 
activa, quae est in semine; et sic 
nullo modo per seminis traductio- 
nem anima humana incipit esse — 
It is ridiculous to say that any sub- 
sistent intelligence is either divided 


CREATIONISM 171 


d) Creationism held full sway in the theological schools 
of the Middle Ages, but in modern times timorous at- 
tempts have been made to revive the apparently defunct 
system of Generationism. Hermes, Klee, and Oischin- 
ger endeavored to restore it at least to the rank of a 
probable opinion. But can a proposition that involves 
a contradiction in terms be defended as_ probable? 
Frohschammer, who remodeled the ancient theory by 
raising the act of parental generation to the dignity of 
a secondary creation, barely managed to escape one con- 
tradiction only to fall into another, namely, that God’s 
creative power is communicable to creatures.” Ros- 
mini?® held that the Creator transforms the sensitive 
soul, which the child receives by generation from his 
parents, into an intellective soul by permitting it to 
catch a glimpse of the “idea of being.’ This is an 
utterly fantastic theory. If it were true, all brute souls 
could by means of this simple expedient be transformed 
into human souls. Generationism can no longer be up- 
held; its fate is sealed for good. 


Thesis III: The origin of the human soul can be 


explained only by an immediate act of creation. 


This proposition is “theologically certain.” 


Proof. a) It is difficult to draw a cogent proof for 
Creationism from Sacred Scripture, because Sacred 
Scripture does not tell us whether the creation of the soul 


by division of the body or pro- 
duced by any corporeal power. 
But the soul is a subsistent intelli- 
gence. Therefore it can neither be 
divided by the separation of the 
semen from the body, nor produced 
by any active power-in the same, 


And thus the division of the se- 
men can in no wise be the cause 
of the soul commencing to be.” 
(Rickaby, Of God and His Crea- 
tures, p. 164.) i 

28 Supra, pp. 54 sad. 

29 Prop. a Leone XIII. damn., 20. 


172 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


is an immediate (creatio ex nthilo) or only a mediate act 
(concursus) of God. There are, however, certain Biblical 
texts which seem to favor the Creationist view. Thus St. 
Jerome comments on Eccles. XII, 7 as follows: “ Ex quo 
satis ridendi sunt, qui putant, animas cum corporibus seri 
et non a Deo, sed a corporum parentibus generari. Cum 
enim caro revertatur in terram et spiritus redeat ad 
Deum, qui dedit illum, manifestum est, Deum patrem 
esse animarum, non homines — Hence those are surely 
to be laughed at who believe that the souls of men 
are begotten with their bodies, and are generated not 
by God but by the parents of their bodies. For since 
the flesh reverts to dust and the spirit returns to 
God, who has given it, manifestly the Father of souls 
is God, not men.” According to 2 Mach. VII, 22 sq. 
the mother of the seven brethren said to them: “ Neque 
enim ego spiritum et animam donavi vobis, et vitam 
et singulorum membra non ego ipsa compegi, sed enim 
mundt Creator —I neither gave you breath, nor soul, 
nor life, neither did I frame the limbs of every one 
of you, but the Creator of the world.” St. Paul calls 
attention to the sharp antithesis between the “ Father of 
spirits ” and “the fathers of the flesh.” “Patres quidem 
carms nostrae,” he says (Heb. XII, 9),“ eruditiores ha- 
buimus et reverebamur eos; non multo magis obtempera- 
bimus Patri spirituum et vivemus? —We have had 
fathers of our flesh for instructors, and we reverenced 
them: shall we not much more obey the Father of spirits, 
and live?”’ To judge from this text, the Apostle favored 
the opinion that the souls of men are created imme- 
diately by God.*° 


30 Cfr. Estius’ commentary on this text. 


CREATIONISM 173 


b) After what has been said above the reader 
will not be astonished to learn that the argument 
from Tradition is fraught with peculiar difficul- 
ties. Not as if Creationism had at any time in 
the Church’s history lacked numerous and de- 
termined defenders. St.) Jerome's): statement: 
“The majority of western Christians hold that 
soul is born from soul in the same manner 
as body is born from body,’ ** is no doubt ex- 
aggerated, for we know that Generationism in 
its pronounced form really had but one, or at 
most two champions in the West, we.: Tertul- 
lian, and later, perhaps, Rufinus. Nor were con--. 
ditions much different in the East.** But the 
fact that this important and all but self-evident 
truth was for eight centuries obscured by doubt 
and contradiction, is sufficient to show that 
Creationism cannot be regarded as a dogma in 
the strict sense of the word. 


c) In view of these facts Cardinal Norisius insisted 
against Bellarmine,®* that the lack of a true ecclesias- 
tical Tradition in support of the Creationist system 
leaves modern theologians free to adopt the doubt- 
ing attitude of St. Augustine. “ Evanescit,’ he says, 
“ ecclesiastica traditio, ex qua creatio animarum deduci- 
tur.’ ** What are we to think of this assertion? 


31 Ep., 126: “ Maximam partem both the East and the West, and 


Occidentalium autumare, ut quo- published them in the Zeitschrift 
modo corpus ex corpore, sic anima fiir katholische Theologie, Innsbruck 
nascatur ex anima.” 1883, pp. 196 sqq. 

32 Kleutgen has collected numer- 33 De Amiss. Grat., IV, 11. 


ous Patristic texts from writers of 34 Vindic. August., c. 4, § 3. 


174 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


A careful study of the facts shows that Creationism 
was always implicitly contained in the Church’s belief, 
and immediately upon its revival assumed all the char- 
acteristics of a real and true Tradition, which it had in 
fact already possessed before the time of St. Augus- 
tine. From A.D. 400 to A.D. 1200 Creationism had 
as many determined champions throughout the world 
as Generationism had staunch opponents. These crit- 
ical centuries were not a period of positive, much less 
of dogmatic affirmation, but of hesitancy and prob- 
lematic assumption. If we enquire into the deeper 
causes of the prevailing doubts, we find that they were 
based not upon the lack of an Apostolic Tradition, but 
on the apparent impossibility of reconciling the trans- 
mission of original sin with the absolute purity of the 
divine act of Creation. As soon as this difficulty had 
been cleared away by the Schoolmen, and theologians be- 
gan to realize the far-reaching implications of the dogma 
of the spirituality of the soul, the traditional consensus 
revived with all the marks of a true ecclesiastical Tra- 
dition. 


d) We may point to certain ecclesiastical de- 
cisions as so many landmarks in the history of 
Creationism. 


In his dogmatic Epistle Pope Leo the Great (-+ 461) 
speaks of the breathing of souls into their bodies: 
“ Anumae humanae, priusquam suis inspirarentur cor- 
poribus, non fuerunt.’ > Considering that the Mosaic 
narrative likewise describes the infusion of Adam’s soul 
into his body as “inspirare spiraculum witae,’ ** we 
cannot escape the conclusion that Leo the Great em- 


35 Cfr. supra, p. 165. 36 Gen, II, 7. 


CREATIONISM 175 


ployed spirare not as synonymous with generare, but 
in the sense of a creatio ex nihilo. Strangely enough, 
the famous dogmatic Epistle of Pope Anastasius II to 
the Bishops of Gaul, discovered about forty years ago by 
Fr. Maassen in a seventh-century codex, now preserved 
at Darmstadt, has hitherto almost entirely escaped the 
notice of Catholic theologians. Anastasius (496-498) 
upholds Creationism and condemns Generationism (in 
its crude form) as a “nova haeresis.’** Basing his 
judgment on reports received from the Bishop of Arles 
regarding the propaganda carried on by certain cham- 
pions of Generationism, who seem to have shared Ter- 
tullian’s views on the origin of the human soul, the 
Pope sharply inveighs “contra haeresim,... quod 
humano generi parentes, ut ex materialt faece tradunt 
corpora, ita etiam vitalis animae spiritum tribuant.” He 
exhorts the mistaken champions of this theory to accept 
the “sound doctrine” of Creationism: “Sanae igitur 
doctrinae acquiescant, quod ille indat animas, qut vocat 
ea, quae non sunt, tamquam sint.’ In the course of 
his instruction Anastasius solemnly defines: “ Ego ab- 
sens corpore, spiritu vero praesens, vobiscum ita redargut 
volo, qui im novam haeresim prorupisse dicuntur, ut a 
parentibus animas tradi genert humano adserant, quem- 
admodum ex faece materialt corpus imfunditur.” The 
only thing the parents transmit, besides the body, is 
original sin: “Quod ab illis [scil. parentibus] nihil 
aliud potest tradi quam... . culpa poenaque peccatt, 
quam per traducem secuta progenies evidenter ostendit, 
ut pravi homines distortique nascantur.’ Recalling Is. 
LVII, 16: “Nonne omnem flatum ego feci?” the Pope 
asks with a show of astonishment: “ Quomedo sti 


37 The text of his letter will be Pontif. Genuinae, t. I, pp. 634 saq., 
found in A. Thiel, Epist. Romanor. Brunsbergae 1868. 


176 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


novi haeretici a parentibus dicunt factum et non a Deo, 
sicut ipse testatur? Aut sibi volunt potius credi quam 
Deo omnipotenti?” He proceeds to point out other 
Scriptural texts,®* which the Bishops would find effective 
against the new heresy, and closes his letter with an 
ardent appeal for the purity of Catholic doctrine: “ Nos 
vero inter multas diversasque occupationes haec interim 
per indicem titulum significasse sufficiat, ut vos velut 
conministri mei vocem sequentes meam in hoc pugnare 
debeatis, ne quid catholicae ecclesiae ... foeditas ulla 
nascatur.” 

The solemn tenor of this epistle might lead one to 
regard it as an infallible ex cathedra pronouncement. 
But the concluding phrase plainly idicates that the 
Pontiff merely wished to give instruction, not to de- 
cide the controversy. The fact that the letter soon fell 
into desuetude is sufficient evidence that Creationism 
was not generally received as an article of faith at the 
close of the fifth century. It was not even so regarded 
in the fourteenth century, when Pope Benedict XII 
(A.D. 1342) required the Armenians to abjure Gen- 
erationism.*® 

Creationism is also taught, at least by implication, in 
Leo X’s dogmatic Bull “ Apostolici regiminis,’ issued 
on the occasion of the Fifth Lateran Council, A. D. 1512. 
This Pope says among other things: “ Anima intel- 
lectiva .. . immortalis et pro corporum, quibus infundi- 
tur, multitudine singulariter multiplicabilis et multiplicata 
et multyplicanda.” This can only mean that each ra- 
tional soul is “infused” into, 7. e. created in, its own 
body. For the soul is either “infused” by God or by 

38 Gen. IV, 25; Ex. IV, 11. and importance of Pope Benedict’s 


39 Fr. Kleutgen, S. J., was the demand. (Zeitschrift fiir kath. The- 
first in 1883 to point out the scope ologie, 1883). 


CREATIONISM 177 


the parents: —if by God, “infusion” is equivalent to 
creation; if by the parents, “infusion” either means 
creation out of nothing, or generation. It cannot mean 
creation out of nothing, because God alone has power 
to create. Nor can it mean generation, because the 
Pope does not say: anima infunditur filus, but: infundi- 
tur corporibus, a phrase which indicates that the act 
of infusion is not performed by the parents, and there- 
fore differs from the act of sexual generation. It 
should be noted that in the Bull under consideration 
Leo X employs the theological terminology of his time. 
It was quite usual at that period to say: Animae 
hominum infundendo creantur et creando infunduntur.*° 

Lastly, the definition of the dogma of the Immaculate 
Conception of the Blessed Virgin Mary rests squarely 
upon Creationism. Both the Apostolic Constitution of 
Alexander VII known as “ Sollicitudo” and Pius IX’s 
dogmatic Bull “Ineffabilem” expressly declare that 
“The soul of the Blessed Virgin Mary was from the 
first moment of its creation and infusion into the body 
Pav stree from all taint of original’ siny, 

Creationism, therefore, is not merely the doctrine of 
some particular school, but a theologically certain truth, 
which no Catholic can deny without temerity.*! 

There remains the subordinate question: When is 
the soul created or infused into the body? The medieval 
theologians generally followed the physiological teach- 
ing of Aristotle, who held that the human embryo during 

40 Cfr. Albert. Magnus, Comment. ments for this thesis, and the solu- 
im Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. tion of various objections raised 
17; O. Zehetbauer, Animae Hu- against it, we may refer the student 
manae Infundendo Creantur et to Oswald, Schédpfungslehre, pp. 221 
Creando Infunduntur, Sopronii sqq., Paderborn 1885; G. B. Tepe, 


1893. Instit. Theol., Vol. II, pp. 486 saq., 
41 For the philosophical argu- Paris 1895. 


178 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


the early history of its existence passes through a series 
of transitional stages in which it is successively informed 
by the vegetative, the sentient, and, finally, by the ra- 
tional soul. To-day the opinion prevails that the ra- 


tional soul is created and infused at the moment of 
conception.*® 


READINGS : — Oswald, Schépfungslehre, 2nd ed., §§ 12-13, Pa- 
derborn 1893.—O. Zehetbauer, Animae Humanae Infundendo 
Creantur et Creando Infunduntur, Sopronii 1893.— Galassi, Sul?’ 
Origine dell’ Anima Umana, Bologna 1888.— *Scheeben, Dog- 
matik, Vol. Il, § 151, Freiburg 1878—C. Gutberlet, Der Kampf 
um die Seele, 2nd ed., 2 vols. Mainz 1903—M. Maher, S. J., 
Psychology, 6th ed., pp. 572 sqq., London and New York 1905.— 
J. T. Driscoll, Christian Philosophy, The Soul, New York 1808. 
— St. George Mivart, Origin of Human Reason, London 1889.— 
D, Mercier, La Psychologie, Vol. 11, Ch. 2, Louvain 190s. 


42 Cfr. S. Thom., S. Theol., 14, 
qu. 118, Jart. 2,/ad 2, and in eluci- 
dation thereof Kleutgen, Philosophie 
der Vorzeit, Vol. II, p. 657; Maher, 
Psychology, pp. 575 sq.; Harper, 
Metaphysics of the Schools, Vol. 
II, pp. 553 sqq. 


43 Cfr. Jos. Antonelli, Medicina 
Pastoralis, Vol. I, 2nd ed., Rome 
1906. On the doctrine of Lotze 
and Ladd cfr. Maher, Psychology, 
Pp. 576 sqq. 


SECTION 2 
THE SUPERNATURAL IN MAN 


Man’s whole natural endowment was intended 
merely as the basis and groundwork of a higher 
and specifically different one, viz.: that of super- 
natural grace, which renders him capable of 
participating in prerogatives truly divine." In 
order rightly to understand this sublime destina- 
tion, we need a working theory of the Supernat- 
viral.’ To acquire a correct idea. of ‘the Super- 
natural, and properly to evaluate the prerogatives 
enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise, a critical 
consideration of such heretical antitheses as Pe- 
lagianism, Protestantism, and Jansenism will 
prove extremely helpful. Since, however, man’s 
high estate in Paradise was due solely to Grace, 
and not to any claim or exigency of pure na- 
ture, it follows that per se man could have ex- 
isted in any other state, and in part did so exist. 

We shall, therefore, divide this present Sec- 
tion into four Articles: (1) Of nature and. the 
Supernatural in general; (2) Of man’s super- 


12 Pet. I, 4: “* Oelas Kowvwvol piacews — pattakers of the divine nature.” 


179 


180 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


natural endowment in Paradise; (3) Of various 
heresies concerning the Paradisaical state of man 
and the dogmatic teaching of the Church in 
regard thereto; and (4) Of the different states 
of man, particularly the pure state of nature. 


GENERAL READINGS: — Heinrich, Dogmatische Theologie, Vol. 
V, §§ 277-280; Vol VI, §§ 300-311, Mainz 1884-87.— Palmieri, 
De Ordine Supernaturali et de Lapsu Angelorum, Romae 1910.— 
Mazzella, De Deo Creante, disp. 4 sqq., Romae 1880.— Scheeben, 
Dogmattk, Vol. II, §§ 158-184 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. 
I, pp. 428 sqq., 2nd ed., London 1899).—*Simar, Dogmatik, Vol. 
I, 3rd ed., §§ 83 sqq., Freiburg 1899.— Scheeben, Natur und Gnade, 
Mainz 1861.— Bainvel, Nature et Surnaturel, Paris 1905. 


ANWR) 2 OS) A EP 


NATURE AND THE SUPERNATURAL 


Neither Revelation nor the dogmatic teaching of the 
Church supplies us with a ready-made theory of the 
Supernatural. However, the concrete realization of the 
Supernatural Order both in humankind and in the an- 
gels, is so definitely marked, and the pronouncements 
of the ecclesiastical teaching office furnish so many 
positive indications, that a theological theory can be 
easily construed. Let us, in logical order, consider the 
concept of the Supernatural (a) in its comprehension, 
and (b) in its extension. 


A. Definition of the Supernatural 


I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS.—To obtain a cor- 
rect notion of the Supernatural, we must begin 


THE SUPERNATURAL 181 


by analyzing the concept of Nature, because Na- 
ture precedes and supposes the Supernatural. 

The term Nature, because of its many mean- 
ings, may truly be called protean. To escape 
misunderstanding, which in these matters easily 
entails heresy, we must study all these various 
meanings and carefully determine in what sense 
precisely Nature (¢%os) is the antithesis of the 
Supernatural. 


a) As a technical term in logic, “ Nature” denotes 
the essence of a thing (quidditas, 16 ti jv eivac), aS eXx- 
pressed in its definition. It is in this sense that we 
speak of the nature of God, or the nature of the uni- 
verse, nay, even of the nature of the Supernatural. 
Also sin (which is a privation), and the non-ens (which 
is a negation), possess each a nature or essence by which 
they are what they are. This definition of Nature takes 
in the entire domain of actual and logical beings, of 
being and not-being, of the real and the imaginary, in 
a word, whatever can be expressed by a definition. 
In this logical sense Nature is manifestly not opposed 
to the Supernatural, since the Supernatural, too, has its 
own peculiar nature, that is, its quiddity or formal es- 
sence by which it is what it is. 

b) In the ontological sphere, which embraces all 
actually existing things, there are beings that have no 
nature, though, logically considered, they have an es- 
sence of their own. Such are, e. g., evil, blindness, etc. 
Ontologically considered, “ Nature” is synonymous with 
substance (substantia prima, ovcia zpwty). In this sense 
God is the “ Highest Nature,” 7. ¢., the supernatural sub- 


182 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


stance (substantia superessentialis, imepodaws). In this 
sense, too, an angel is called a “ spiritual nature,’”’ while 
man’s nature is said to be partly spiritual, partly cor- 
poreal. According to the particular antithesis in which 
we choose to place it, the term Nature, in ontology, 
may have a variety of meanings, each of which requires 
to be carefully defined. Thus, despite the objective 
identity of the two terms, “ Nature” differs from “ Es- 
sence’ in that the latter term denotes simple being, 
while the former describes that being as a principle of 
action. “ Nature” must be defined differently according 
as it is opposed to hypostasis (or person) in the 
Blessed Trinity,? or to spirit. Other meanings of the 
term are indicated by such juxtapositions as Nature 
and Liberty, Nature and Art, Nature and Morality, 
God and Nature (1. e., the created universe), Nature 
and Miracle, etc. With the possible exception of “ Na- 
_ ture and Miracle”* none of these antitheses gives us 
the exact meaning of the term ‘“ Nature” when used in 
contradistinction to “ Supernatural.” 

In identifying Supernatural with spiritual, unbelieving 
modern scientists contradict right reason, which justly 
regards the human spirit to be as truly a part and parcel 
of Nature as is matter, inanimate and animate. Knoodt 
erred when he declared the antithesis “ creatural — 
super-creatural ” to be equivalent to “ natural — super- 
natural.” The divine Preservation of the universe, God’s 
Concurrence with His creatures, and His benign Provi- 
dence, though supercreatural, emphatically form a part 
of Nature, because without these operations on the part 
of God Nature as such could neither exist nor energize. 

2Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine supernatural, though it cannot be 


Trinity, pp. 221 sqq. said, conversely, that the supernat- 
3 A miracle is always something ural is always miraculous. 


THE SUPERNATURAL 183 


For the same reason we must reject the teaching of 
Vock,* who defines the Supernatural as that which can 
be wrought by God alone. 

c) That which is essentially Supernatural is yet, in the- 
ology, sometimes called Natural, though only in a figura- 
tive sense. In this connection we must note two mean- 
ings of the word “ Nature” which occur in the writings 
of the Fathers, and which Baius and Jansenius have 
abused in their heretical attempts to counterfeit the true 
ecclesiastical concept of the Supernatural. Some of the 
Fathers, notably St. Augustine, refer to the incontestably 
supernatural state of our first parents in Paradise as 
“the nature of Adam.” Baius and Jansenius interpret 
this expression as meaning that the original justice of 
the first man, with all its preternatural endowments, 
such as corporeal immortality and freedom from con- 
cupiscence, was something essentially natural, that is, 
demanded by human nature. But Augustine uses the 
word natura in its purely etymological sense, to desig- 
nate that which Adam had from the very beginning 
received from God as a supernatural complement of his 
nature. “ Natural,” therefore, in the usage of the great 
Bishop of Hippo, means “ original.” Cfr. Ephes. II, 3: 
“Eramus natura |. e., a nativitate| filu irae—We 
were by nature [7. e., originally, from our birth] chil- 
dren of wrath.” The supernatural state of grace which 
Adam enjoyed in Paradise is also called by St. Augus- 
tine ® and St. Leo the Great,’ naturalis generis conditio, 
that is to say, “a state in accordance with nature” (con-— 
vemens, consentaneum) ; for the supernatural ennoble- 


4 Theol. Dogmat., t. II, tract. 4, una cum origine; naturale = ori- 
§ 202. ginale. 


5 Natura = nascitura, nativitas = 6 Contr. Faust., XXVI, 3. 
. 7 Serm. de leiunio, 1. 


184 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


ment and perfectioning of human nature is neither “ un- 
natural” nor ‘contrary to nature,” but entirely “ nat- 
ural,” 7. e., in accordance with nature, befitting nature.® 
In all these meanings, the terms Nature and Supernatural 
involve no opposition. By elimination, therefore, we ar- 
rive at the following conclusions: 


d) “Nature” designates that which (1) intrin- 
sically constitutes the being of a created sub- 
stance, either as an essential or as an integral 
note; or (2) spontaneously flows from its es- 
sence (é. g., faculties, talents, powers), or at 
least can flow therefrom through the exertion of 
one’s own or some one else’s power (technical 
skill, training); or (3) whatever, though exter- 
nal to a thing, is necessary or suitable for its 
existence (e. g., food, air), for its development 
(e. g., instruction, civil society) or for the at- 
tainment of its end (e. g., the knowability of 
God, beatitude). All these factors (7. e., the 
constitutive elements of a thing’s being, the fac- 
ulties, powers, and accomplishments flowing 
from its essence, and lastly such external agen- 
cies as are necessary or suitable for its subsist- 
ence, development, or the attainment of its final 
end), in their totality and severally respond to a 
proximate or remote claim of the thing under 
consideration. Its essence demands them. The 


8 Cfr. Coelestini I Epist. 21, ad turalem possibilitatem et tnnocen- 
Episc. Gall., a. 431: “In praevari- tiam perdidisse.” 
catione Adae omnes homines na- 


THe SUPERNATURAL 185 


Scholastics embrace these momenta under the 
term “debitum naturae’ and define “Nature” or 
“Natural” as that whichis duetoathing. (‘“Na- 
tura sive naturale est omne id, quod alicui ret 
debetur.”’ ) | 

Every creature has its own specific claims, cor- 
responding to its peculiar nature, aptitude, and 
final end. Hence, in determining the full extent 
of Nature, we must go beyond the individual 
creature and the various species of being (matter, 
man, angel), and consider the totality of all be- 
ings with all their just claims or natural de- 
mands. “Nature” must consequently be defined 
as the aggregate of all those perfections to 
which created beings have a claim, each accord- 
ing to its specific essence, and which, therefore, 
the Creator may not deny them. The sum-total 
of these perfections is commonly called the Nat- 
ural Order (ordo naturalis). Of course, any 
superfluity of natural goods which the Creator 
gives to a creature over and above its strict 
necessities, is not Supernatural, but part of the 
natural order. If the soil produces more food 
than the human race is able to consume, if the 
atmosphere contains more oxygen than we re- 
quire to breathe, these gifts are not “graces’’ in 
the strict sense of the term.° 


9Cfr. T. Pesch, S. J., Institu- tur und Ubernatur,” in Esser-Maus- 
tiones Philos. Naturalis, pp. 345 bach, Religion, Christentum, Kirche, 
sqq., Friburgi 1880; J. Pohle, “ Na- Kempten 1911, pp. 315-469. 
13 


186 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


2. DEFINITION OF THE SUPERNATURAL.— The 
Supernatural, on the other hand, lies beyond or 
transcends the order of Nature. It is the con- 
trary of naturae debitum. It is naturae im- 
debitum, in a positive as well as in a negative 
sense. It may be defined as a gratuitous gift of 
God superadded to the nature of a rational be- 
ing; or, in the terms of the formal definition ab- 
stracted from the condemned propositions of 
Baius and Quesnel, “Donum Dei naturae inde- 
bitum et superadditum.” 


a) In this definition donum Dei, being common to 
both Nature and the Supernatural, is the proximate 
genus, while naturae indebitum et superadditum ex- 
presses the specific difference. The term superadditum 
indicates that the Supernatural supposes, or postulates, 
Nature, that it inheres therein as something super-added, 
and elevates it to a specifically higher order. To em- 
phasize the last-mentioned element as the most important 
in the whole definition, the superadded higher perfection 
is further described as naturae indebitum, 1. e., grace.*° 


b) Now, a gift of God may be an indebitum, 
i. €., a supernatural grace, either with regard to 
the manner of its production (supernaturale 
quoad modum, as, for instance, a miraculous 
cure), or with respect of its very substance 
(supernaturale quoad substantiam). ‘There is 
an essential distinction between these two cate- 


10 Indebitum = gratuitum. 


THE SUPERNATURAL 187 


gories of the Supernatural. The supernaturale 
quoad modum has its seat not in nature, 7. e., in 
the creature itself, but outside of it, wz.: in the 
divine causality. It is Supernatural only with 
regard to the manner in which it is communicated 
to the creature, as when a man is raised from 
the dead. The gift itself (in the case mentioned, 
life), is something intrinsically and essentially 
natural. This species of the Supernatural ap- 
pertains to the domain of Apologetics. Dog- 
matic Theology proper is concerned mainly with 
the supernaturale quoad substantiam, 1. e., that 
which essentially and intrinsically transcends the 
bounds of Nature. 

c) The supernaturale quoad substantiam may 
be subdivided into two well-defined species, ac- 
cording as the supernatural gift which God com- 
municates to the creature transcends the sphere 
and power of Nature absolutely (swmpliciter) 
or in a relative sense only (secundum quid). 
The supernaturale simpliciter is the Supernatural 
in the strict and proper sense of the term (super- 
naturale stricte dictum). The supernaturale se- 
cundum quid is also called Preternatural. There 
is an essential difference between the Preter- 
natural and the Supernatural. The Supernat- 
ural involves divine perfections, 7. e., such as 
by nature belong solely to God. The Preter- 
natural communicates only such perfections as, 


188 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


though belonging to a higher order, do not tran- 
scend the creatural domain. Thus freedom from 
concupiscence is natural to an angel, because his 
nature demands it; but it is not natural to man. 
If, therefore, God grants freedom from concu- 
piscence to a man, He gives him a real grace, 
1. €., something which is not due to his na- 
ture, and which is consequently Supernatural. 
However, since such a Supernatural perfection- 
ing of man does not in principle transcend the 
creatural order, a grace of the kind just men- 
tioned is merely a praeternaturale. It is quite 
otherwise with the supernaturale stricte dictum. 
The strictly Supernatural absolutely transcends 
the sphere and power of all real and possible 
creatures. The possession of such strictly di- 
vine prerogatives as the beatific vision or sanctify- 
ing grace, therefore, always entails a sort of 
deification (deificatio, %iwos) of the rational crea- 
ture. For the creature to claim such prerogatives 
as strictly due to its nature, would be tantamount 
to a demand to be made like unto God. 


3. DEFINITION AND IMPORTANCE OF THE POTENTIA 
OBEDIENTIALIS.— The best means of distinguishing 
_ properly between Nature and the Supernatural is fur- 
nished by the Scholastic concept of the “ potentia obe- 
dientialis.” No satisfactory theory of the Supernatural 
can be constructed without a proper appreciation of this 
term. : 


THE SUPERNATURAL 189 


As we have already pointed out, the Supernatural, 
though it transcends Nature, is designed for and be- 
comes effective only in Nature. By the inherence of 
the Supernatural in Nature, Nature is raised to a higher 
sphere of being and operation, exceeding all natural 
limitations and possibilities. Such an elevation of a 
creature beyond the limits and powers of Nature cannot 
be attained by purely moral means, and therefore the 
realization of the Supernatural postulates on the part 
of God a special physical impulse distinct from His 
preservation of the universe and His general concur- 
rence. Susceptibility to this specific physical impulse 
cannot coincide with any of the ordinary active or pas- 
sive potencies of Nature, else the Supernatural would 
not really transcend the natural order. On the other 
hand, since the Supernatural does not hover above or 
alongside of Nature, but is intended for and becomes 
effective in Nature, Nature must needs be endowed 
with some specific passive potency which, while unre- 
sponsive to any creatural stimulus, willingly obeys the 
special impulse exercised by the Creator. This is the 
potentia obedientialis. The Scholastics define it as a 
passive potency by which a creature is enabled to re- 
ceive into itself a supernatural impulse from God.** This 
potency may be compared to a bridge connecting Nature 
with the Supernatural. Not as if Nature itself could by 
any creatural agency ever become supernatural; but it 
must contain some faculty which receives the divine im- 


11‘ In anima himana,” explains 
St. Thomas, “ sicut in qualibet crea- 
tura, consideratur duplex potentia 
passiva: una quidem per compara- 
tionem ad agens naturale; alia vero 
per comparationem ad agens pri- 
mum, quod potest quamlibet crea- 


turam reducere in actum aliquem 
altiorem actu, in quem reducitur 
per agens naturale. Et haec con- 
suevit vocari potentia obedientiae in 
creaturis.”  S.. TPheol., 3a, qu. 11, 
art. I. 


190 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
pulse and by means of which this impulse effects the su- 
pernatural elevation of the recipient.!? 


B. The Prerogatives That Constitute the Super- 
natural Order 


We now proceed to consider the substantially Super- 
natural (supernaturale quoad substantiam) in its two- 
fold form, viz.: (1) as the Supernatural in the strict 
sense of the term, and (2) as the Preternatural.1® 

From the sphere thus marked off must be excluded 
such supernatural perfections as the Hypostatic Union, 
the Blessed Eucharist, and the Sacraments, because these 
exist outside of human nature. They form the subject- 
matter of separate dogmatic treatises. We are here 
concerned with those graces only which effect a spe- 
cifically higher sphere of being and operation in rational 
creatures, and which can therefore be objectively real- 
ized only in Angels and men. Of the subjoined two 
theses the first concerns Angels and men alike, while the 
second has reference to men alone. 


Thesis I: There are two gifts of God which are 
Supernatural in the strict sense, and therefore belong 
to the divine order, namely, beatific vision and the 
state of grace. 


Proof. Beatific vision is the highest gift 
which God bestows on a rational creature in 


12 For further information on _ profitably consult v. Tessen-Wesier- 


this point cfr. Glossner, Lehrbuch 
der Dogmatik nach den Grundsit- 
zen des hl. Thomas, Vol. II, pp. 
197 sqq.; G. B. Tepe, Instit. Theol., 
bods pp. S12 eddy, Paris 1898" 1 On 
the whole subject the student may 


ski, Die Grundlagen des Wunder- 
begriffes nach Thomas von Aquin, 
pp. 48 sqq., Paderborn 1899. 

13 Miracles and prophecies belong 
to the supernaturale quoad modum, 
and hence do not concern us here. 


THE SUPERNATURAL 191 


the status termini. It is therefore justly re- 
garded as the standard for gauging all other 
graces enjoyed by Angels and men. By the 
state of grace here on earth (im statu viae) we 
understand the aggregate of those divine gifts 
which aid man in immediately preparing for, and 
attaining to, his supernatural end, 7. e., the beatific 
vision. Besides sanctifying grace with all its 
prerogatives, the state of grace, therefore, also 
includes actual grace. The supernatural char- 
acter of the beatific vision as vouchsafed to ex- 
isting rational creatures in Heaven is a dogma; 
with regard to purely possible and creatable be- 
ings it may be set down as a theological con- 
clusion.** 

a) From this teaching the supernatural char- 
acter of the state of grace im statu viae 1s a neces- 
sary inference. The state of grace on earth is re- 
lated to the beatific vision in Heaven as a means 
to an end. Since a means must always be duly 
proportioned to its end, a supernatural end can- 
not be attained by purely natural, or even preter- 
natural, means. 


It is not quite correct, theologically, to distinguish 
between beatific vision in Heaven and the state of grace on 
earth as though they were separated by an abyss, and 
to contemplate them merely in their relation of end and 


14 We have demonstrated this in a God: His Knowability, Essence, and 
previous volume. fr. Pohle-Preuss, Atiributes, pp. 86 sqq. 


192 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
means. Glory and grace are far more intimately re- 
lated. The character of divine Sonship conferred by 
both constitutes a common note which puts them 
on the same essential level and separates the state of 
grace on earth from the beatific vision in Heaven 
merely after the manner of what is imperfect from 
what is perfect.° St. Paul describes the endowment 
of grace which God grants to man on earth as an 
heirship of adopted children, while the state of grace 
which He bestows on man in Heaven resembles an 
heir’s taking possession of his inheritance.1* Else- 
where ** the same Apostle refers to the state of grace 
on earth as “the pledge of our inheritance, unto the 
redemption of acquisition, unto the praise of his 
glory.” ** But if the divine Sonship which we are 
vouchsafed here below is of the same specific nature as 
that which God grants to the Elect in Heaven, both 
states must be as strictly supernatural in their essence 
as the visio beatifica itself. And what is true of di- 
vine Sonship, must be equally true of sanctifying grace 
and of the theological virtue of charity, which, like 
divine Sonship, endures unchanged in Heaven, whereas 
hope becomes possession and faith gives way to in- 
tuition through the lumen gloriae.® The necessity of 
the /umen gloriae as a means of attaining to the beatific 
vision of God furnishes another proof for the strictly 
supernatural character of that vision. 

b) We do not know with the certainty of faith 


15 Cfr. 1 Cor. XIII, 9 sqaq. 

16 Rom. VIII, 17 sqq. 

Lf Eph Ty) 14. 

18 dppaBov rhs KkAnpovouias, 
““Pignus enim ponitur,’ says St. 
Augustine, “ quando cum fuerit res 
ipsa reddita, pignus aufertur; arrha 


autem de ipsa re datur, quae danda 
promittitur, ut res quando redditur, 
impleatur quod datum est nec muta- 


tur.” (Serm., 156, 15.) 
19 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
Knowability, Essence and Attri- 


butes, pp. 101 sqq. 


THE SUPERNATURAL 193 


that there could not exist a spiritual being (such as a 
seraph or cherub) to whom the beatific vision, and con- 
sequently also the supernatural preparation for it (di- 
vine Sonship, charity, sanctifying grace), would be due 
as a postulate of its nature. Ripalda holds that such 
a being is possible, and that, if it existed, it would be 
a substantia intrinsece supernaturalis.2° But this theory 
implies a contradiction in terms.2!_ No creature, no mat- 
ter how exalted, can claim what by its very nature 
belongs solely to God.?? Christ alone, the only-begot- 
ten Son of God, has a strict claim to Divine Sonship 
and Consubstantiality with the Father because of His 
eternal generation from the Father. He alone can 
claim the intuitive vision of God and Trinitarian In- 
existence ** as a right,— which, of course, mutatis mu- 
tandis, also belongs to the other two Persons of the 
Divine Trinity. No mere creature, actual or possible, 
can rightfully claim prerogatives of a strictly divine 
order.** To hold with Ripalda that it is possible to 
conceive at least one creature with a natural claim to 
the above-mentioned prerogatives of grace, would be to 
deny the divine character of the eternal yévyous of the 
Logos from the Father, to put natural sonship on a 
par with adoptive sonship, and to confound the Con- 
substantiality and In-existence of the Three Divine Per- 
sons with the analogical accidents of deification and 
spiritual indwelling. It would, in a word, be equivalent 
to reducing the Supernatural to the level of the purely 
natural.?° 


20De Ente Supernaturali, disp. qu. 12, art. 4; Contr. Gent., III, 52. 


23. 23 Cir. Pohle-Preuss, The Divine 
21 Cir. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Trinity, pp. 281 sqq. 

Knowability, Essence, and Attri- 24Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 

butes, pp. 86 sqq. Ta 2ae,) QU 112, arti yt. 


22 Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, 25 For a more exhaustive treat- 


194 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY. 


Thesis II: Exemption from concupiscence, bodily 
immortality, habitual infused science, and impassibility 
are prerogatives which are not natural to man; they 
are preternatural gifts of divine grace. 


Proof. The censures which the Church has pro- 
nounced against the teachings of Baius compel us to hold 
as fideit proximum, that the first two of the four prerog- 
atives mentioned, namely, exemption from concupiscence 
and bodily immortality, are indebita, 1. e., pure graces. 
The other two, viz.: infused science and impassibility, 
are likewise held by all theological schools to be free and 
unmerited gifts of God. 

These prerogatives are called preternatural rather than 
supernatural, first, because the Angels have a just claim 
to them in virtue of their angelic nature; and secondly, 
because by the possession of them human nature, though 
it does not receive any strictly divine prerogative, is 
perfected far beyond anything it can rightfully demand. 
These characteristics exactly verify the concept of “ Pre- 
ternatural”’ which we gave above. As a matter of fact 
concupiscence is per se only a natural and spontaneous 
effect of man’s composite nature, and the Creator, as 
such, is not bound to exercise any special intervention 
to suppress the strife which results from that nature, 
especially since concupiscence is not in itself a sin nor yet 
inevitably leads to sin. In the words of St. Thomas: 
“Poterat Deus a principio, quando hominem condidit, 
etiam alium hominem ex limo terrae formare, quem in 
conditione naturae suae relinqueret, ut scil. mortalis et 
passibilis esset et pugnam concupiscentiae ad rationem 
sentiens; in quo nihil humanae naturae derogaretur, quia 


ment see Palmieri, De Deo Creante Instit. Theol., t. III, pp. 193 saaq., 
et Elevante, thes. 37, 39; Tepe, Paris 1896. 


THE SUPERNATURAL 195 


hoc ex principiis naturae consequitur. Non tamen iste 
defectus in eo rationem culpae et poenae habuisset, quia 
non per voluntatem iste defectus causatus assets, 

Death being a necessary resultant of the synthesis of 
body and soul, corporeal immortality, too, must be a pre- 
ternatural gift of grace. 

The same is true in an even higher measure of impassi- 
bility, because incapacity for physical *’ and psychical 
suffering °° is a lesser evil than death.” 

As regards knowledge, God was not obliged to give 
man more than the faculty of reasoning, which enables 
him to attain to a true natural knowledge of his Creator 
and to acquaint himself with the essential precepts of 
the moral law. Infused science (scientia imfusa, in 
contradistinction to scientia acquisita), is a free gift of 
pracc.?, 


REapincs:— The opus classicum on the subject is *Ripalda, 
De Ente Supernaturali, 4 vols—*Schrader, S, J., De Triplict Or- 
dine Naturali, Supernaturali et Praeternaturali, Vindob. 1864.— 
Dom. Soto, De Natura et Gratia— Tournely, De Gratia, qu. 3.— 
Du Plessis d’Argentré, De Gratia Primi Hominis et Angelorum. 
— Scheeben, Natur und Gnade, Mainz 1861.—*v. Schazler, Natur 
und Ubernatur, Mainz 1865.—Ipem, Neue Untersuchungen uber 
das Dogma von der Gnade, Mainz 1867.— Kleutgen, Theologie 
der Vorzeit, Vol. II, 2nd ed., Minster 1872.— Kirschkamp, Gnade 
und Glorie in ihrem inneren Zusammenhange, Wirzburg 1878. 
—A. Kranich, Uber die Empfinglichkeit der menschlichen Na- 
tur fiir die Giiter der iibernatiirlichen Ordnung nach der Lehre 


26 Comment. in Quatuor Libros suis principiis naturae,... sed ex 


Sent., II, dist. 31, qu. 1, art. 2, ad 
35 

27 Disease, pain, etc. 

28 Sadness, disgust, etc. 

29Cfr. St. Thom., Comment. in 
Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 19, 
qu. 1, art. 4: “Immortalitas illa 
et impassibilitas, quam homo habuit 
in primo statu, non inerat sibi ex 


beneficio Conditoris; unde naturals 
proprie dict non potest, nist forte 
naturale dicatur omne illud, quod 
natura incipiens accepit.” 

30 Cfr. on the whole subject of 
this thesis A. M. Weiss, Apologie 
des Christentums, Vol. III, 4th ed.: 
“ Natur und Ubernatur,’ Freiburg 
1907. 


196 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY. 


des hl. Augustin und des hl. Thomas von Aquin, Mainz 1892.— 
A. M. Weiss, Apologie des Christentums, Vol. III, 4th ed., Frei- 
burg 1907.— *J. B. Terrien, La Grace et la Gloire ou la Filiation 
Adoptive des Enfants de Dieu, etc., Paris 1897.— A. Rademacher, 
Die wbernatiirliche Lebensordnung nach der paulinischen und 
johanneischen Theologie, Freiburg 1903.— W. Humphrey, “ His 
Divine Majesty,” pp. 283 sqq., London 1897.— Bainvel, Nature et 
Surnaturel, Paris 1903.—Pohle, “Natur und Ubernatur,” in 
Esser-Mausbach, Religion, Christentum und Kirche, Vol. I, pp. 
315-469, Kempten IgI11. 


AR SICLE 2 


MAN’S SUPERNATURAL ENDOWMENT IN PARADISE 


Having theoretically defined the extent and character 
of the supernatural and preternatural prerogatives of 
grace, we now proceed to demonstrate that our first 
parents actually enjoyed these prerogatives in Paradise. 
Without this fundamental truth it is impossible to under- 
stand the dogma of original sin. We shall deal with the 
subject in six connected theses. 


Thesis I: Adam, the progenitor of the human 
race, was endowed with sanctifying grace before the 
Fall. 


This proposition embodies a formally defined 
dogma of the Catholic faith.’ 

Proof. The Biblical argument can best be 
stated in the form of a syllogism, the major and 
minor premises of which rest on numerous Scrip- 
tural texts:—Adam originally possessed that 
which was restored by Christ; now Christ re- 


1 Concil. Trid., Sess. V, can. 1 ef 2. 


MAN IN PARADISE 197 


stored the lost state of justice, 7. e., sanctifying 
erace;* consequently Adam originally possessed 
sanctifying grace. 


a) Some theologians have tried to prove this thesis 
directly from Sacred Scripture; but their demonstra- 
tions do not produce anything more than probability. 
The text upon which they chiefly rely is Eph. IV, 24: 
“Induite novum hominem, qui secundum Deum creatus 
est in iustitia et sanctitate veritatis — Put ye on the new 
man, who according to God is created in justice and 
holiness of truth.” But it is by no means certain that 
St. Paul speaks of Adam in this passage. In fact it is 
far more likely that he did not mean to advert to Adam 
at all. In the first place, it is entirely foreign to the 
Apostle’s manner of thinking to set up Adam as an ideal 
of holiness,? and, secondly, the phrase novus homo ap- 
plies far more fittingly to the “second Adam,” (1. e. 
Christ), though this interpretation, too, is not strictly 
demanded by the context. Probably St. Paul simply 
wished to say: ‘‘ Be converted, become new creatures 
through sanctifying grace.” | 

Still less convincing is the argument based on Gen. I, 
26: “Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem 
nostram — Let us make man to our image and likeness.” 
For though the example of several of the Fathers would 
justify us in referring this passage to Adam’s super- 
natural endowment, the literal sense is sufficiently safe- 
guarded if we take it to mean merely that Adam bore 
the natural likeness of His Creator.* 


2 Cfr. Roma Ve t2esddss..L.Cor. ing certain other, equally weak ar- 
XV, 45 saa. guments adduced from Sacred Scrip- 
Bieter Cor. Vera. Sad. ture, see Chr. Pesch, Praelect. 


4Cfr. Palmieri, De Deo Creante Dogmat., t. III, ed. 3a, pp. 88 sq., 
et Elevante, pp. 410 sqq. Concern- Friburgi 1908. 


198 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


b) The Fathers conceive the possession of 
sanctifying grace with its attendant prerogatives 
as a “deification” of the soul, and consequently 
count it among the strictly supernatural gifts of 
grace. “Deus hominem creavit accessu. ad 
Deum detficandum,’ says, e. g., St. John Damas- 
cene, “deificatum (Geovuevov) vero participatione 
divinae illuminationis, non vero in essentiam di- 
vinam mutatum.” ® 

The belief of the Fathers may be gathered 
partly from their formal doctrinal teaching, 
partly from the way in which they inter- 
preted Holy Scripture. Certain of the Greek 
Fathers (e. g., SS. Basil and Cyril of Alexan- 
dria), think the supernatural sanctification of 
Adam is intimated in Gen. II, 7. They take 
spiraculum vitae to mean the grace of the Holy 
Ghost as a supernatural vital principle. Others 
(SS. Irenzeus, Gregory of Nyssa, and Augustine) 
hold that imago Dei (Gen. I, 26) has reference 
to Adam’s nature, while similitudo Dei describes 
him as being in the state of sanctifying grace. 
This is a rather arbitrary interpretation and open 
to objections from the purely scientific point of 
view; but the fact that it was adopted by these 
Fathers sufficiently proves that, as witnesses to 
Tradition, they firmly believed in the original 
sanctity of our first parents.® 


5 De Fide Orthodoxa, II, 12. can be seen from St. Thomas, 
6 The teaching of the Schoolmen Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 95, art. 13 


MAN IN PARADISE 199 


c) The question as to the precise instant when Adam 
was raised to the state of supernatural grace, has long 
been in dispute between the Thomists and the Scotists. 
The Thomists hold that the elevation of man was con- 
temporaneous with his creation, while the Scotists assert 
that Adam was created in puris naturalibus, and that 
an interval of time must consequently have elapsed be- 
tween his creation and his elevation to the state of 
grace. They contend that his elevation took place 
at the moment when he was “put into the paradise 
of pleasure, to dress it and to keep it.”’* The Scotist 
view, which was shared by Hugh of St. Victor, Peter 
Lombard, and St. Bonaventure, is founded chiefly on the 
supposed necessity, on the part of Adam, of preparing 
himself for justification, since he was not a child but a 
full-grown man. In the early period of Scholastic the- 
ology the Franciscan view was the prevailing one.* St. 
Thomas demolished its main argument by showing that 
Adam’s personal preparation for the grace of justifica- 
tion must have been synchronous with the divine act of 
Creation. “Cum motus voluntatis non sit continuus,” 
he says, “nihil prohibet etiam in primo instant suae 
creationis primum hominem gratiae consensisse.”® Al-. 
though the Tridentine Council purposely evaded this 
controversy by substituting the phrase im iustitia con- 
stitutus for in iustitia creatus in the original draft of 
its canon on justification,’® the Thomistic view has ob- 


St. Bonaventure, Breviloquium, part. 
V, cap. 1; Suarez, De Opere Sex 
Dierum, III, 17. On the curious 
attitude of Giles of Rome (Aegidius 
Romanus; cfr. De Wulf-Coffey, His- 
tory of Medieval Philosophy, pp. 
361 sqq.) and Eusebius Amort, see 
Scheeben, Dogmatik; Vol. II, pp. 
194 sq., Freiburg 1878. 


7 Gen, II, 15. 

8 St. Thomas himself refers to it 
as ‘“‘communior.” (Comment. in 
Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 4, 
arcing.) i 

9 St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 
O5;narty | Panads 5. 

10) Sessiz V0) Camanit. yieery) balla- 
vicini, Hist. Conc. Trid., VII, 9. 


200 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


tained all but universal currency since the fifteenth cen- 
tury. * 


Thesis II: Our first parents in Paradise were by 
a special grace exempt from concupiscence. 


This thesis may be qualified technically as 
“doctrina catholica.” 

Proof. The Tridentine Council teaches that 
St. Paul calls concupiscence “sin,” “because it 
originates in and inclines to sin.’ From this 
dogmatic definition it follows that man was 
free from concupiscence until after the Fall. 
This special prerogative of our first parents in 
Paradise is called the gift of integrity (donum 
imtegritatis), because it effected a harmonious 
relation between flesh and spirit by completely 
subordinating man’s animal passions to his rea- 
son. 

a) That this harmony was a prerogative of 
our first parents in Paradise is sufficiently indi- 
cated by Holy Scripture. Gen. II, 25: “rat 
autem uterque nudus, Adam scil. et uxor eius, et 
non erubescebant — And they were both naked: 
to wit, Adam and his wife: and they were not 
ashamed.” Shame among savages spells want of 
pride or decency; in children it flows from inno- 
cence. Adam and Eve were certainly not shame- 
less, because the Bible tells us that after the Fall 


11 For the teaching of the Fath- Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t 
ers on this disputed point consult III, ed. 3a, pp. 94 saq. 


MAN IN PARADISE 201 


a feeling of disgrace suddenly overwhelmed 
them. Nor were they wild, uncivilized savages. 
The Sacred Writer represents them as perfect 
and highy developed human:beings. Hence the 
fact of their not being ashamed must have been 
due to a state of childlike innocence, in which 
the evil impulses of sensuality were kept under 
perfect control. There is no other satisfac- 
tory explanation. It has been suggested that 
our first parents were blind and could not see 
each other. But the phrase upon which this 
interpretation is based, viz.: “And the eyes 
of them both were opened,” *? plainly refers to 
their spiritual vision. St. [renzeus’s theory that 
Adam and Eve were infants,’* is refuted by the 
fact that God commanded them to “increase and 
multiply.” ™ 

That our first parents enjoyed complete im- 
munity from concupiscence follows with still 
greater cogency from St. Paul’s referring to 
the carnal law which works in our members as 
“sin.” *° This carnal law, or concupiscence, is 
not a sin in itself, but, in the Tridentine phrase, 


12 Gen. -IIl, 7. 

18 Adv. Haer., III, 22, 4: “ Non 
intellectum habebant filiorum gen- 
erandorum, oportebat enim  illos 
primo adolescere, dein sic multipli- 
cari.” 

14Gen, I, 28. Cfr. also Gen. II, 
23 sq.: “*And Adam. said: This 
now is bone of my bones, and flesh 


of my flesh; she shall be called 
woman, because she was taken out 
of man. Wherefore a man_ shall 
leave father and mother, and shall 
cleave to his wife: and they shall 
be two in one flesh.’’ ’ 

15 Peccatum, duapria, Rom. VII, 
16 sqq. 


202 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


“originates in and inclines [man] to sin.” %° 
Concupiscence cannot have existed prior to the 
sin of Adam, because an effect cannot precede 
its cause, and consequently our first parents in 
Paradise were exempt from concupiscence. 


b) The Fathers were so firmly persuaded of the nat- 
ural integrity of our first parents in Paradise that some 
of them (e. g., Athanasius,’ Gregory of Nyssa,!® and 
John Damascene)* derived marriage from original sin. 
This was, of course, an unjustifiable exaggeration. 
Sexual propagation does not exclude natural integrity, 
and there can scarcely be a doubt that matriage would 
have been instituted even if man had remained in the 
state of innocence.?° It was such considerations as these, 
no doubt, that prompted St. Augustine to retract 21 his 
earlier dictum that, had the human race preserved its 
primitive innocence and grace, propagation would have 
been asexual. The primitive Tradition was most clearly 
brought out in the controversy with the Pelagians, who 
maintained that concupiscence was a vigor rather than 
a defectus naturae. This view was energetically com- 
bated by St. Augustine in his work De Nuptiis et Con- 
cupiscentia.* In Contra Iulianum, by the same author, 
freedom from concupiscence is explained to be a gift of 
grace. The supernatural character of the prerogatives 


16 Conc. Trid., Sess. V, can. 5. cibo prohibito nuditas indicata nisi 
AT In: Ps. 5a 7. peccato nudatum, quod gratia con- 
18 De Opif. Hom., c. 17. tegebat? Gratia quippe Dei magna 
19 De Fide Orth., II, 30. ibi erat, ubi terrenum et animale 
20 For a detailed discussion of corpus bestialem libidinem non habe- 
this point consult St. Thomas, S. bat. Qui ergo vestitus gratia non 
Theol., 1a, qu. 95, 98 sq. habebat in nudo corpore, quod pude- 
21 Retract., I, 109. ret, spoliatus gratid sensit, quod 


22Cfr. also his Contr. LIulian., operire deberet.’’ 
IV, 16, 82: “Quid est gustato 


MAN IN PARADISE 203 


enjoyed by our first parents in Paradise is emphasized 
also by some of the other Fathers.** 

c) From the purely theological point of view it will 
be well to explain that man has a twofold appetite, viz., 
the sensitive appetite (appetitus sensitivus) and the will 
(appetitus rationalis). Each of these faculties has its 
own circle of good by which it is attracted, and its own 
sphere of evil by which it is repelled. The sensitive 
appetite can seek only sensitive things, whereas the will 
is able to strive after intellectual goods as well (e. g., 
virtue, honor). The sensitive appetite is inordinate 
when it rebels against reason, and in every such case 
the will can attain the higher spiritual good only by 
dint of vigorous resistance. Unfortunately the appetitus 
rationalis (or will) is also affected by an immanent 
tendency to reject that which is truly good in favor of 
what is good only in appearance (sin). Rom. VII, 17 
sqq.: “ Nunc autem iam non ego operor illud, sed quod 
habitat in me peccatum [1. e., concupiscentia]. ... St 
autem quod nolo, illud facio, iam non ego operor illud, 
sed quod habitat in me peccatum.... Video autem 
aliam legem in membris meis, repugnantem legi mentis 
meae, et captivantem me in lege peccati, quae est m 
membris mets — Now then it is no more I that do it, 
but sin that dwelleth in me. Now if I do that which 
I will not, it is no more I that do it, but sin that 
dwelleth in me. . .. I see another law in my members, 
fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating 
me in the law of sin, that is in my members.” 

This inordinate leaning of human nature towards evil, 
which is called concupiscence, exerts itself most violently 
in the pars concupiscibilis of the lower soul life (libido, 


2a rcs Casini, Quid est Homo? art. 4, ed. Scheeben, Moguntiae 1862. 


204 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


gula). But in a wider sense the inordinate affections of 
the pars irascibilis (as anger, jealousy, pugnacity) like- 
Wise pertain to concupiscence. In our first parents all 
these passions were kept in due subjection by virtue of 
the donum integritatis.*4 

Theologians differ as to how man in Paradise was 
enabled to keep his passions under the absolute control 
of reason. Durandus held that God infused a preter- 
natural habitus into the sensitive element of human na- 
ture; Scotus, that such an habitus was infused into the 
will ; Cajetan, that God established the proper equilibrium 
Beveen man’s higher and lower nature. simply by 
strengthening his intellect. The problem is not as simple 
as it appears. The variety of the psychological factors 
involved, and the wide scope which must be assigned to 
the will, seem to postulate a rather complicated endow- 
ment which enriched the various higher and lower fac- 
ulties of the soul with habits and enabled these habits to 
co-operate harmoniously.” The problem may be simpli- 
fied by assuming that divine Providence exercised a 
special external governance by carefully removing all 
occasions apt to provoke an outbreak of man’s animal 
passions, and in case of actual danger simply withholding 
the necessary concursus. On the other hand we must 
be careful not to exaggerate the donum integritatis, else 
the Fall of our first parents would appear inexplicable, 
nay impossible. The question whether by virtue of the 
gift of natural integrity Adam and Eve were able to 
commit venial sin, has been answered affirmatively by 

24 Cfr. (Gal. : V;. 17. art. 4; Mangenot, art. “ Arbres de 

25 Cir. Suarez, De Opere Sex a Vie, etc.” in Vigouroux’s Dic- 
Dierum, III, 12; St. Augustine, tionnaire de la Bible, Vol. I, cols. 


De Civitate Dei, XX, 20; XIV, 26; 895 sqq., Paris 1895. 
St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 97, 


MAN IN PARADISE 205 


Scotus and Gabriel Biel, against Albert the Great, 
Aquinas, and Bonaventure, and we are inclined to adopt 

the Scotist view. For, as Schell correctly remarks: 
“Adam, as he was actually constituted, must have been 
liable to err in non-essentials, seeing that he was able to 
go astray in matters of decisive moment.” *° 


Thesis III: Our first parents before the Fall were 
endowed with bodily immortality. 


This proposition is strictly of faith.?‘ 

Proof. By immortality we here understand 
neither the natural immortality of the soul,*”* nor 
the glorious immortality to be enjoyed by the 
Elect after the resurrection of the flesh, but an 
intermediate prerogative peculiar to man’s orig- 
inal state of justice in Paradise.” In that state, 
according to St. Augustine,*” man was immortal, 
not because he could not die (non posse mort), 
but simply because it was not necessary that he 
should die (posse non mort). This Paradisaical 
immortality must have been a_preternatural 
grace, because it constituted no strict postulate 
of human nature.** 

The Scriptural argument for our thesis rests 
on the story of the Fall as recorded in Gene- 
sis. Under penalty of death God had forbidden 


26 Dogmatik, Vol. II, p. 303. ai Citi So Phoms Sand heol.y \ta, 

27/Conc. Trid., Sess. V, can. I. qu. 97, art. 2: “ Vis illa_praeser- 

28 Supra, pp. I51 sqq. vandi corpus a corruptione non erat 

29 Cir. St) Dhomas,(S: Theol., za, animae humanae naturalis, sed per 
Qis5O75) artes Ls ; donum gratiae.” 


30De Gen. ad Lit., VI, 25, 36. 


200 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


our first parents to eat of the tree of knowl- 
edge. “For in what day soever thou shalt eat 
of it, thou shalt die the death.” #2 After the 
Fall He pronounced sentence as follows: “Dust 
thou art, and into dust thou shalt return.” 2° 
From all of which it is quite evident that, had 
Adam never sinned, he would not have been 
under the necessity of dying. Cfr. Wisd. II, 23 
sq.: “Deus creavit hominem inexterminabilem *4 
et ad imaginem similitudinis suae fecit illum. 
Invidia autem diaboli mors introivit in orbem ter- 
rarum — God created man incorruptible, and to 
the image of his own likeness he made him. But 
by the envy of the devil, death came into the 
world.” St. Paul represents the death of Adam 
and all his descendants as a divinely inflicted 
punishment for sin. Rom. V, 12: “Per unum 
hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit et 
per peccatum mors, et ita in omnes homines mors 
pertransut — As by one man sin entered into this 
world, and by sin death; and so death passed 
upon all men.” 

The Fathers unanimously echo the teaching of 
Scripture on this point. 


What part the “tree of knowledge ” (DTyY) played 
in the preservation of life is not apparent. From the 


32 The Hebrew text has: noon 83 Gen, III, 109. 

, % 34 én’ adbapola 
MW , literally: “Thou wilt have , isha nih x 
to die.”” (Gen. II, 17.) 


MAN IN PARADISE 207 


words of Jehovah quoted in Gen. III, 22 sq., we know that 
to eat of its fruit was a necessary condition of 1m- 
mortality: “Now, therefore, lest perhaps he [Adam] 
put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, 
and eat, and live forever, ... the Lord sent him out 
of the paradise of pleasure.” This passage has led 
some of the Fathers to regard the tree of life as ddppaxov 
tis a0avacias. Others explain it allegorically.*° 


Thesis IV: Our first parents were also endowed 
with an infused knowledge of natural and supernat- 
ural truth. 


Proof. Sanctifying grace, freedom from con- 
cupiscence, and immortality of the body were a 
heritage of Paradise, and as such destined to 
descend to all of Adam’s children. Besides these 
our first parents possessed as a fourth strictly 
personal prerogative, an unusual measure of nat- 
ural and supernatural knowledge. 


a) While the Bible nowhere explicitly refers to Adam’s 
natural knowledge as infused (sctentia infusa), we have 
sufficient Scriptural warrant for holding that it could 
not have been acquired by ordinary human means. It 
must have been infused knowledge which enabled Adam 
immediately after his creation to call all the beasts of 
the earth and the fowls of the air by their proper 
names ** and intuitively to understand the nature and 
mission of Eve.?7 St. Augustine observes that Adam 
“yniversis generibus animarum vivarum nonina wm- 
posuit, quod excellentissimae fuisse indicium sapientiae 


35 Cfr. Suarez, De Op. Sex Dier., 36 Gen. II, 19 sqq. 
TT rasa. 87 Gen, IT, 23. 


208 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
im saecularibus etiam libris legimus. Nam ipse Pytha- 
goras ... dixisse fertur, illum fuisse omnium sapien- 
tissimum, qui vocabula primis indidit rebus.? 38 

A further confirmation of our thesis may be found 
in Helis, OVID, ig usa Fe Disciplina intellectus re- 
plevit illos, creavit [1. e. infudit] illis scientiam Spiritus, 
sensu implevit cor illorum, et mala et bona ostendit 
hs — He filled them with the knowledge of under- 
standing, he created in [i. e., infused into] them the 
science of the spirit, he filled their heart with wisdom, 
and shewed them both good and evil.’ What we can 
learn only by dint of painstaking application, Adam and 
Eve knew by virtue of infused knowledge; which is not, 
of course, equivalent to saying that their knowledge was 
substantially different from ours.®® 

That the progenitors of the human race should be 
endowed with infused knowledge was meet and con- 
gruous for three reasons, to wit: (1) The Creator 
could not in justice abandon grown-up men to complete 
ignorance in. matters of religion and morality; (2) 
Adam and Eve had no parents or teachers to give them 
the necessary instruction; and (3) As the head of the 
human race, Adam was destined to be its natural guide 
and teacher.*° 

b) The knowledge of our first parents must have 
extended to the domain of the Supernatural. Above all 
they must have been cognizant of their final destiny. 
This follows from the fact of their elevation to the 


38 Op. Imperf. contr. Iulian., V, 
I. 

39 Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, 
qu. 94, art. 3, ad 3: “ Primus 
homo habuit scientiam omnium re- 
rum per species a Deo infusas, nec 
tamen scientia illa fuit alterius ra- 


tionis @ scientia nostra, sicut nec 
ocult, quos caeco nato Christus 
dedit, fuerunt alterius rationis ab 
oculis, quos natura produxit.” 

40 Cfr. St. Thomas, SS. Theol., 1a, 
qu. 94, art. 3. 


MAN IN PARADISE | 209 


state of grace,** which can be preserved only by means of 
external revelation and internal acts of faith, hope, and 
charity. Our first parents, be it remembered, were 
adults, not children. 

As regards the precise character of their supernatural 
knowledge, they must have had supernatural faith, be- 
cause without faith “it is impossible to please God.” * 
St. Bonaventure was hardly justified in denying ** that 
Adam and Eve in Paradise had faith, on the ground that 
“faith cometh by hearing.” ¢* Until he attains to the 
beatific vision of God, man must necessarily walk in the 
twilight of faith, which, in the words of the Apostle,*® 
“is the substance of things to be hoped for.” 

The extent of Adam’s supernatural knowledge is a 
problem open to debate. This much, however, is cer- 
tain: He must have known, as he was bound to believe 
in, the existence of God and eternal retribution in the 
life beyond, because Sacred Scripture teaches that an 
explicit knowledge of these two truths is necessary for 
salvation (necessitate medii).4® In addition to this 
knowledge Adam probably had a belief in the Blessed 
Trinity and the future Incarnation of the Logos.‘ 

c) Any attempt to ascertain the extent of Adam’s 
natural knowledge would lead us from solid ground into 
the domain of more or less hazardous speculation. The 
Schoolmen, as a rule, were inclined to exaggerate the 
intellectual powers of our progenitor. To reduce specu- 
lation to reasonable bounds, St. Thomas. Aquinas laid 


41 Cfr. First Thesis, supra, p. 196. 46 Heb. XI, 6: ‘* Without faith 

42 Heb. XI, 6. it is impossible to please God. For 

43 Comment. in Quatuor Libros he that cometh to God, must believe 
Sent., II, disp. 23, art. 2, qu. 3. that he is, and is a rewarder to 

44 Rom. X, 17. them that seek him.” 

45“ Est fides sperandarum sub- 47 Cfr. Suarez, De Op. Sex Die- 


Stantia rerum.” Heb. XI, 1. rum, III, 18. 


210 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


down two hard and fast rules. The first is: Adam 
depended on phantasms for his intellectual concepts; 
whence it follows: (a) That, unlike the human soul 
of Christ, he was not endowed with beatific vision here 
on earth,*® (8) that he could have no intuitive but only 
an abstractive knowledge of the nature of the Angels,*® 
and (y) that he had no intuitive knowledge of his own 
soul. The second rule laid down by St. Thomas is: 
In the domain of nature Adam had a perfect infused 
knowledge only with regard to such things as were in- 
dispensable to enable himself and his descendants to 
live in conformity with the laws of reason. This does 
not mean that he was not compelled to learn and to 
inquire, or that he was unable to progress in matters 
of science and culture. There is no reason whatever 
for assuming that Adam was acquainted with the Coper- 
nican world-view, the stellar parallaxes, spectrum analy- 
sis, electricity, X-rays, or the infinitesimal calculus. The 
progenitor of the human race was well able to dispense 
with a knowledge of such abstruse scientific matters as 
these. Besides, had he possessed such knowledge, tra- 
dition would surely have preserved fragments of it. The 
typical exemplar of Adam’s natural attainments, there- 
fore, is not the human knowledge of our Lord and 
Saviour Jesus Christ, whom Holy Scripture calls ‘“ the 
second Adam,” but the wisdom of Solomon. It is worthy 
of note, in this connexion, that the Scholastics were not 

all persuaded that Adam was wiser than Solomon.* 
Another question has been raised, vig.: Was Adam 
gifted with infallibility in his capacity as teacher and 
48 Cir. S. Theol., 1a, qu. 94, art. Dierum, III, 9, 29. On the human 
knowledge of Christ, we must refer 


49 Ibid., art. 2. the student to the dogmatic treatise 
50 Cir. Suarez, De Opere Sex on the Incarnation. 


x 


“MAN IN PARADISE ey 


guide of the human race? On this point, too, it is im- 
possible to form a certain conclusion. St. Thomas sets 
up some strong arguments to show that Adam was in- 
fallible: “ Sicut verum est bonum intellectus, ita falsum 
est malum eius. ... Unde non poterat esse, quod in- 
nocentia manente intellectus hominis alicui falso ac- 
quiesceret quasi vero. Sicut enim in membris corporis 
primi hominis erat quidem carentia perfectionts alicuius, 
puta claritatis, non tamen aliquod malum inesse poterat, 
ita im intellectu poterat esse carentia notitiae alicuius, 
nulla tamen poterat 1bi esse existimatio falsi.’*+  Con- 
sidering that when ordinary mortals go astray, it is usu- 
ally due to the fact that the will is too weak to resist and 
control passion and prejudice, it is highly probable, to say 
the least, that our first parents in Paradise, keen-witted, 
unprejudiced, and dispassionate as they were, gave their 
assent only to what was evidently true, and cautiously 
felt their way whenever the evidence was insufficient or 
unconvincing. . 

d) We now come to another difficult problem, to wit: 
How did speech originate? The Bible says: ‘“ Omne 
enim, quod vocavit Adam animae viventis, ipsum est 
nomen eius— For whatsoever Adam called any living 
creature, the same is its name.”®? This text would 
seem to indicate the existence of a primitive language. 
The naming of the different creatures may be explained 
either naturally or preternaturally. In the last-men- 
tioned hypothesis Adam must have received language 
ready made by a miraculous infusion from God. Those 
who prefer the natural explanation hold that the first 
human idiom was evolved by virtue of a native im- 
pulse. Both explanations have found ardent defenders 


51S. Theol., 1a, qu. 94, art. 4. 52 Gen. II, 19. 


212 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


among theologians, philosophers, and exegetes. Until 
quite recently it was pretty generally held that Adam 
received the Hebrew language directly from God as 
a ready-made and perfect medium of speech.®* This 
belief was shared by a nineteenth-century exegete of 
the unquestioned ability of Fr. Kaulen, who was im- 
pressed in favor of Hebrew by the following facts: 
(1) In no other language is there such an intimate rela- 
tion between nouns and their objects; (2) the peculiar 
Hebrew use of three consonants is based upon a variation 
of the third letter and closely resembles logical defini- 
tion by proximate genus and specific difference. These 
important phenomena are especially interesting from the 
viewpoint of the philosophy of language. Yet the theory 
can hardly be upheld. Comparative Philology shows 
that ancient Hebrew is the product of a well-defined 
process of evolution, and therefore cannot be the orig- 
inal language of the human race. Onomatopoeia is com- 
mon to all civilized languages.°* The discovery that the 
inflected languages (Semitic and Aryan) are derived 
from the agglutinative (Turanian group), and these in 
turn from the isolating tongues,°> has led philologians 
to surmise that the primitive idiom of the human race 
consisted exclusively of simple, uninflected root-words. 
On philological grounds, not to speak of others, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the first man possessed a 
onomatopoeic (and the  interjec- 


tional) principles is extremely lim- 
ited, many apparent instances of 


53 Cfr. Ben. Pererius, S. J., Com- 
ment. im Gen., II, 20 (Romae 
1591): “Lingua vero, quam a 


primo habuit Adam [a Deo] et 
secundum quam imposuit animali- 
bus nomina, concessu omnium he- 
braeca fuit.’’ 

54 This feature has, however, been 
greatly exaggerated. Max Miller 
holds that the efficiency of the 


onomatopoeia not being really so. 
Cfr. M. Maher, S. J., Psychology, 
4th ed., p. 456, London 1900. 

55 An isolating language is one 
of simple, uninflected root-words. 
Chinese has never developed beyond 
this stage. 


MAN IN PARADISE 213 


highly developed intellect and created his own language 
by forming monosyllabic root-words. This theory gains 
additional probability from the fact that the original 
Semitic root-formations closely correspond to the process 
of intellectual conception and bear all the earmarks 
of human invention. The names which Adam gave 
to various creatures, and which can still be ascertained 
from a study of ancient Semitic roots, are in each 
case based on some characteristic note representing a 
universal concept abstracted from a phantasm. Thus 
the word “moon,” mensis, Greek piv, Gothic ména, 
Sanskrit mds and masa, is derived from MA, 1. e., “to 
measure,” from which root was formed MAN, 2. e., “to 
think,” which in its turn furnished the etymon of such 
words as mens, man, Sanskrit mana.*® 

Strangely enough, in rejecting the antiquated notions 
of the Hebraists, modern Comparative Philology has un- 
consciously reverted to the scientific view-point of the 
Fathers, who regarded primitive speech as a purely hu- 
man invention. St. Augustine, for example, extols the 
transcendent genius of Adam as revealed in naming 
the different creatures passing before his eyes, and 
lays down the general proposition: “ Jllud quod est in 
nobis rationale, . . . vidit esse imponenda rebus vocabula, 
1. €. significantes quosdam sonos. ... Sed audir verba 
absentium non poterant: ergo illa ratio peperit litteras, 
notatis omnibus oris ac linguae sonis atque discretis.’” ** 
St. Gregory of Nyssa, who discusses the probable origin 
of language at some length,®* vigorously defends the 
opinion of his teacher, St. Basil, that language is a 
human invention. Against the objections of Eunomius 
he lays down the thesis that, endowed as they were by na- 


56 Cir. C. Gutberlet, Psychologie, 57 De Ordine, II, 12, 35. 
3rd ed., p. 133, Miinster 1896. i) 58 Contr. Eunom., 1. 12. 


214 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


ture with both reflexion and the power of making signs, 
men could not but learn to communicate their ideas to one 
another.®® This opinion, which is the most ancient, is 
probably also the correct one, because it conforms to 
the sane and sound principle that secondary causes must 
be credited with all the power they are able to exert.®° 


Thesis V: Bound up with the prerogatives already 
mentioned was the impassibility of our first parents 
in Paradise. 


This proposition embodies a common teaching 
of Catholic theologians. 

Proof. The impassibility with which man will 
be endowed after the resurrection of the flesh 
must be conceived as non posse pati, 1. €., aS in- 
capability of suffering. The impassibility of our 
first parents in Paradise, on the other hand, con- 
sisted in posse non pati, 1. e., in the non-necessity 


59 Cfr. Maher, Psychology, p. 455- 

60 Cfr. Max Miller, Lectures on 
the Science of Language, 2 vols., 
London 1880. “Apart from the 
question of the original fund of 
root-sounds,” says Fr. Maher, l. ¢., 
p. 457, n., “which is equally a 
difficulty to all purely rational the- 
ories— Miiller’s general doctrine 
seems plausible. The fierce conflict, 
however, which still prevails on 
most fundamental questions of the 
science of Comparative Philology, 
makes one feel that beyond the 
limited region of common agree- 
ment even the most attractive hy- 
potheses are extremely hazardous. 
. . . Opposed equally to Max Miller 
and Schleicher is the chief Amer- 
ican philologist, Professor Whitney. 


With him language, which separates 
man from the brute, is essentially a 
voluntary invention, an ‘ institu- 
tion’ like government, and ‘is in 
all its parts arbitrary and conven- 
tional.’ (Life and Growth of Lan- 
guage, p. 282.) Steinthal’s teaching 
increases the novelty; and Heyse, 
who stands to Hegel as Schleicher 


_ to Darwin, evolved a mystical creed 


on the subject, in unison with the 
spirit of his master’s philosophy.” 
An account of the various theories 
is given in Sayce’s Introduction to 
the Science of Languages, Vol. I, c. 
1, London 1875. On the dogmatic 
aspect of the question the reader 
may profitably consult Chr. Pesch, 
Praelect. Dogmat., Vol. III, 3rd 
ed., pp. 112 sqq. 


MAN IN PARADISE 215 


of suffering. They irretrievably forfeited this 
prerogative for themselves and their descendants 
by sin. The Biblical argument for our thesis 
is based upon the fact that Paradise was a 
“garden of pleasure.” °* Whether we interpret 
this term literally, as most exegetes do, or meta- 
phorically after the example of Philo, Origen, 
and others, it is certain that our first parents 
in the Garden were free from pain and suffer- 
ing. They led a life of unalloyed pleasure 
and pure delight. The pains of parturition and 
hard labor are punishments inflicted for sin. 
The immortality of the body with which the 
Creator had endowed Adam and Eve, necessarily 
excluded all those sufferings and infirmities | 
which are the harbingers of death, while the 
gift of integrity (donum integritatis) effectively 
stopped the principal source of mental sorrow 
and temptation, which is concupiscence. St. 
Augustine gives an alluring description of the 
life of our first parents in his great work De 
Civitate Dei: “Vivebat homo in paradiso, sicut 
volebat, quamdiu volebat, quod Deus iusserat. 
Vivebat sie ulla egestate, ita semper vivere 
habens in potestate. . .. Nihil corruptionis in 
corpore vel ex corpore ullas molestias ullis eius 
61 ys {2 Which the Septuagint in the Canticle of Canticles IV, 13, 


it is called sy55. 
renders by tmapddewos, the Vul- pI 
gate by paradisus voluptatis; in later 62 Gen. ITI, 16 sqq. 
portions of the Old Testament, e. I> 


216 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


sensibus ingerebat. Nullus intrinsecus morbus, 
nullus ictus metuebatur extrinsecus. Summa in 
carne sanitas, in anima tota tranquillitas. ... 
Nihil omnino triste, nihil erat inaniter laetum. 
. .. Non lassitudo fatigabat otiosum, non som- 
nus premebat invitum.” °° 

The “golden age’ so enthusiastically cele- 
brated in the folklore of many nations repre- 
sents but a faint recollection of the state of our 
first parents in the Garden of Pleasure.** 


Thesis VI: The five prerogatives enjoyed by our 
first parents in Paradise were organically interrelated 
so that the preternatural graces served as a comple- 
ment to the supernatural state of grace, and the pres- 
ervation of the former was causally dependent on the 
retention of the latter. Theologians therefore justly 
characterize.this primitive state as “the state of orig- 
inal justice and sanctity.” 


This thesis embodies a doctrine common to all 
theological schools. 

Proof. Sanctifying grace and its preternat- 
ural concomitants were not necessarily inter- 
dependent, else they could not exist separately 
in the present state of repaired nature. Their 
harmonious combination in Paradise was a free 
institution oLithe, Uneatory) Sacted, Scripture 
tells us that the loss of sanctifying grace en- 


63 De Civit. Dei, XIV, 26. 
64 Cir. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 102. 


MAN IN PARADISE 217 


tailed the forfeit of the preternatural gifts en- 
joyed by our first parents in the Garden. After 
the Fall, concupiscence, until then properly sub- 
dued, suddenly became rebellious,°® death as- 
sumed sway over the human race,** and all man- 
ner of suffering followed.°’ By the Redemption 
the race recovered its lost supernatural destiny; 
but the bond that originally connected sanctify- 
ing grace with the preternatural gifts enjoyed by 
our first parents in Paradise was never restored. 


Catholic theologians are not, however, agreed as to 
the precise meaning of the term original justice (iustitia 
originalis).°§ The majority take it to signify not the 
state of integral nature, as such, nor yet mere sanctifying 
grace, but the aggregate of all those organically corre- 
lated prerogatives which constituted the state of our 
first parents in Paradise. With the exception of in- 
fused science, this state of original justice was not a 
purely personal privilege, but a natural endowment which 
Adam was to transmit to all his descendants. This dis- 
tinction explains why the sin of our first parents is trans- 
mitted to all men by propagation. 


READINGS: — St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 94-102, and the 
commentators.— Bellarmine, De Gratia Primi Hominis.— Suarez, 
De Opere Sex Dierum, 1, III, c. 1 sqq.— *Casini, Quid est Homo? 
ed. Scheeben, Moguntiae 1862.— Lohan, Das Paradies nach der 
Lehre der katholischen Kirche, Mainz 1874—— Fr. Delitzsch, Wo 
lag das Paradies? Leipzig 1881.— Oswald, Religidse Urgeschichte 
dey Menschheit, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1887.— A. Urbas, Die Geo- 


65 Gen. III, 7. 68 Cfr. Bellarmine, De Gratia 
66 Gen. III, 19. Primi Elominis, cap. 3. 
67 Gen. III, 16, e¢ passim. 

15 


218 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


logie und das Paradies, Laibach 1889.— W. Engelkemper, Die 
Paradiesesfliisse, Minster 1901— S. J. Hunter,-S. J., Outlines of 
Dogmatic Theology, Vol. Il, p. 373 sqq., London 1895.— W. Hum- 
phrey, S. J., “ His Divine Majesty,’ pp. 338 sqq., London 1897. 
—F. Vigouroux, art. “Paradis Terrestre” in the Dictionnaire 
de la Bible, Vol. IV. 


ARTICLE 3 


VARIOUS HERESIES VS. THE DOGMATIC TEACHING OF THE 
CHURCH IN REGARD TO THE STATE OF ORIG- 
INAL JUSTICE 


The doctrine set forth in the preceding Article 
has in process of time been impugned by three 
great heresies; by Pelagianism in the early days 
of Christianity, by Protestantism at the begin- 
ning of the sixteenth century, and in modern 
times by Jansenism. 

1, PELAGIANISM.—Pelagianism, which flour- 
ished in the fifth century, held that the state of 
our first parents in Paradise was not one of 
supernatural grace, but essentially and purely a 
natural state: .°” 


a) In consequence of this fundamental fallacy the Pe- 
lagians denied the necessity and gratuity of actual grace, 
nay the very existence of original sin. They admitted 
that Adam possessed sanctifying grace, with its claim 
to the beatific vision of God, and that he enjoyed 
freedom from concupiscence, but insisted that man can 
merit Heaven and attain to absolute sinlessness by his 
own free volition, unaided and without transcending 


PELAGIANISM 219 


his natural faculties. Concupiscence, according to the 
Pelagians, is not a punishment for sin, nor yet, prop- 
erly speaking, an inherent defect of human nature, 
it is simply a vigor naturae, the ordinate or inordinate 
use of which depends entirely on man’s free will. To 
bolster the fiction that our first parents in Paradise were 
in no essential respect superior to their descendants, 
the Pelagians disparaged Adam’s bodily immortality and 
impassibility, holding that the only deterioration which 
mankind suffered in consequence of sin consists in this 
that Adam’s descendants have his evil example and other 
incitements to do wrong. Hence the Pelagian maxim: 
“Peccatum imitatione, non propagatione,” that is, orig- 
inal sin is not really a sin of nature, but merely a sin 
of imitation. Aside from it, the condition of Adam’s 
descendants is identical with that of their progenitor in 
Paradise. 


b) Against this arbitrary confusion of na- 
ture with the Supernatural the Church has again 
and again insisted that the sin of Adam resulted 
in a real deterioration of human nature by rob- 
bing it of sanctifying grace with its accompany- 
ing prerogatives. That these prerogatives were 
supernatural was not at first expressly empha- 
sized, but taught rather by implication. 


The second council of Mileve, which was confirmed 
by a plenary council held at Carthage, A.D. 418, and 
by Pope Zosimus in his Tractoria, defined: “ Quicum- 
que dixerit, Adam primum hominem mortalem fac- 
tum, ita ut, sive peccaret sive non peccaret, moreretur 
in corpore, hoc est, de corpore exiret, non peccati merito, 


220 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


sed necessitate naturae, anathema sit.’1 This definition 
embraces the following truths: (1) Adam _ enjoyed 
immortality of the body; (2) he lost this immor- 
tality through sin; (3) this loss was a punishment of 
sin. 

In 431, Pope Celestine I wrote to the Bishops of 
Gaul against the Semi-Pelagians: “Jn praevaricatione 
Adae omnes homines naturalem? possibilitatem et inno- 
centiam perdidisse, et neminem de profundo illius ruinae 
per liberum arbitrium posse consurgere, nisi eum gratia 
Det miserantis erexerit — By the fall of Adam all men 
lost their natural power and innocence, and no one can 
rise from the depth of that ruination by [his own] 
free-will, except the grace of a merciful God raise him 
A ES ng | 

Another important dogmatic pronouncement is con- 
tained in the fifteenth and nineteenth canons of the 
Second Council of Orange, A.D. 529. Canon 15 says: 
“Ab eo, quod formavit Deus, mutatus est Adam, sed 
in peius per iniquitatem suam. Ab eo, quod operata 
est iniquitas, mutatur fidelis, sed in melius per gratiam 
Christi — Adam was changed from that state in which 
God created him, but he was changed for the worse by 
his own iniquity. The faithful Christian is changed 
from the state brought about by sin, but he is changed 
for the better through the grace of Christ.” Canon 19: 
“ Natura humana, etiamsi in.illa integritate [1. e. sanc- 
titate|, in qua est condita, permaneret, nullo modo setp- 
sam, Creatore suo non adiuvante, servaret. Unde cum 
sine gratia Det salutem non possit custodire, quam ac- 
cepit, quomodo sine Det gratia poterit reparare, quod 

1Canon 1, quoted in Denzinger- 8 Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridi- 


Bannwart’s Enchiridion, n. 101. on, N, 130. 
2See supra, pp. 184 sq. 


PROTESTANTISM 221 


perdidit? — Human nature, even if it had remained in 
the state of integrity [7. e. holiness] in which it was 
created by God, could in no wise have preserved [this 
prerogative] without the divine assistance. Hence, if it 
was unable without the grace of God to keep the salva- 
tion which it had received, how should it have been able 
without the assistance of that grace to regain that which 
it had lost?” 4 

That the lost prerogatives were supernatural can be 
inferred from these definitions by the following process 
of reasoning: What is due to human nature on account 
of its creation, its conservation, and the divine con- 
cursus, er vt notionis can never be lost. Now the 
Church teaches that by original sin Adam and his prog- 
eny lost sanctifying grace, together with its concomitant 
prerogatives. Therefore the lost endowment was not 
due to human nature, but a gratuitous favor, in other 
words, it was a pure grace. Sanctifying grace, in par- 
ticular, was essentially identical with that prerogative 
which mankind regained through the Redemption. But 
this latter favor is restored only per gratiam Christi, to 
employ the Council’s own words, and therefore must be 
supernatural in character. 


2. PROTESTANTISM.—In the sixteenth century 
erroneous notions on the subject of the original 
state of the human race were propagated by the 
so-called Protestant reformers, who; failing to 
draw the proper distinction between nature and 
the Supernatural, heretically affirmed that, besides 
his preternatural prerogatives man by sin also 


4Syn Arausic. II, can. 15 et 19. Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, nn. 
188, 192. 


222 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


lost certain essential properties of human nature 
itself, such as the moral freedom of the will. 


a) Practically this basic error culminated in the doc- 
trine of man’s justification by faith alone (sola fide), 
without co-operation on his part. Though Pelagianism 
and Protestantism agree in acknowledging that man en- 
joyed an ideal state in Paradise, they are yet diametri- 
cally opposed to each other. For while Pelagianism con- 
ceives original justice as a purely natural state, “ ortho- 
dox ” Protestantism admits that it contained a divine ele- 
ment, but falsely asserts that this element formed part 
and parcel of the very nature of man. This identifica- 
tion of the divine with the human, of nature with the 
Supernatural is decidedly Pantheistic, and we need not 
wonder, therefore, that many later Protestant theologians 
(e. g., Schleiermacher) became true-blue Pantheists.° 


b) Though the chief purpose of the Council 
of Trent was to guard the dogmas of original 
sin and justification, that holy ecumenical synod 
left no doubt as to what is the orthodox teaching 
of the Catholic Church concerning the original 
state of man. 


The Tridentine Fathers implicitly condemned Pelagian- 
ism when they defined that Adam was created “in holi- 
ness and justice,” but “immediately lost” this state of 
grace, and thereby “ suffered deterioration both in body 
and soul.” “Si quis non confitetur, primum hominem 
Adam, quum mandatum Dei in paradiso fuisset trans- 
gressus, statim sanctitatem et iustitiam, in qua consti- 


5 Cfr. Oswald, Religidse Urgeschichte, p. 45, Paderborn 1887. 


g 
: 
: 
2 
5 
' 
3 
e 
Aik 


JANSENISM 223 


tutus® fuerat, amisisse ... totumque Adam per illam 
praevaricationis offensam secundum corpus et animam 
in deterius commutatum fuisse, anathema sit’? This 
deterioration of body and soul involved the loss of holi- 
ness and justice, and also of the gift of integrity ® and 
the immortality of the body.2 The two last-mentioned 
prerogatives were supplanted by “ death and bodily pun- 
ishments.” *° Since no one can “ lose” what he does not 
possess, our first parents in Paradise must have actually 
enjoyed sanctifying grace, freedom from concupiscence, 
immortality of the body, and impassibility. That these 
prerogatives were supernatural is not expressly defined 
by the Tridentine Council. 


3. JANSENISM.—The Jansenists applied Prot- 
estant principles to the domain of grace, which 
was their chief field of operation, and tried by 
various subterfuges to evade the dogmatic de- 
; crees of Trent. 


a) Perhaps no other heresy has so deeply wounded the 
Church as Jansenism, despite its oft-repeated pretence of 
loyalty. The chief protagonists of this sect were Baius, 
Jansenius, and Quesnel. One of their palmary teachings 
was that the state of primitive justice was strictly due 
to man, something “connatural to him,” a debitum na- 
turae which the Creator owed in justice to mankind. 
This assertion clearly involves a denial of the super- 
natural character of grace, though Baius tried to veil 
this inevitable conclusion by contending that to grant 


6 Not creatus; see supra, p. 199. 

7 Conc. Trid., Sess. V, c. Ie 

8Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. V, 
canon, 5: ‘“‘ Concupiscentia ... ex 
peccato est.” 


9 LE. '¢.3'\ can. 22“ Adam: . 
incurrisse mortem, quam antea illi 
comminatus fuerat Deus. 

10L. c., can. 2: “‘ mortem et 
poenas corporis.” 


224 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


grace and glory to a sinner might be called gratia se- 
cundum quid. Other Jansenists asserted that sanctify- 
ing grace was due to human nature as such, not to its 
“works.” But it is quite obvious that what is debitum 
naturae cannot at the same time be indebitum naturae, 
1. €., a grace. 


b) The Holy See upheld the true faith against 
Jansenism in a long series of struggles, which 
culminated in the explicit condemnation of this 
dangerous heresy. 


The most important ecclesiastical pronouncements 
against Jansenism are: (a) The condemnation, by 
Pius V (A.D. 1567), of seventy-nine propositions ex- 
tracted from the writings of Baius; (b) the rejection 
by Innocent X (A.D. 1653) of five theses formulated 
by Jansenius himself; (c) the censures uttered by 
Clement XI in the Bull “ Unigenitus” (A.D. 1713), 
against one hundred and one propositions advocated by 
Quesnel; and (d) the reprobation of the Jansenistic 
decrees of the pseudo-synod of Pistoia by Pius VI in 
his Bull “ Auctorem fidei” (A.D. 1794). In studying 
the question of man’s original state of justice the errors 
of Baius and Quesnel prove indirectly helpful, inasmuch 
as their contradictories, though not formally defined ar- 
ticles of faith, clearly embody the teaching of the 
Church.14 

The definition of the Supernatural which we have for- 
mulated on a previous page is confirmed by the Church’s 
official condemnation of the twenty-fourth proposition of 
Baius, to wit: “A vanis et otiosis hominibus secundum 
insipientiam philosophorum excogitata est sententia, homi- 


11 Supra, p. 194. 


JANSENISM. 225 


nem ab initio sic constitutum, ut per dona naturae super- 
addita fuerit largitate conditoris sublimatus et in Filiwm 
Det adoptatus.” The supernatural character of sanctify- 
ing grace may be inferred from the condemnation of 
the twenty-first proposition championed by Baius, viz.: 
“Humane naturae sublimatio et exaltatio in consortium 
divinae naturae debita fuit integritati primae conditionis, 
et proinde naturalis dicenda est, et non supernaturalis,” 
and likewise from the rejection of the thirty-fifth of the 
Propositions extracted from the works of Quesnel, to 
wit: “Gratia Adami est sequela creationis, et erat 
debita naturae sanae et integrae.” 

That Adam’s original immunity from concupiscence 
Was a supernatural grace follows also from the con- 
demnation of Baius’s twenty-sixth proposition: “ In- 
tegritas primae creationis non fuit indebita humanae 
naturae exaltatio, sed naturalis eius conditio.” 

The Church’s teaching on the subject of the bodily 
immortality of our first parents may be inferred from 
the reprobation of proposition number seventy-eight, ex- 
tracted from the writings of Baius: “ Immortalitas 
primi hominis non erat gratiae beneficium, sed naturalis 
conditio.” 18 

To sum up the argument: It is a Catholic doctrine, 
directly deducible from revelation (fidei proximum), that 
sanctifying grace, exemption from concupiscence, and 
immortality of the body, all of which Adam and Eve 
enjoyed in Paradise, were supernatural gifts. That the 
impassibility and infused knowledge enjoyed by our first 
parents were also supernatural prerogatives is not di- 
rectly taught by the Church. The supernatural character 

12Cfr. also proposition XVI of 13 Denzinger-Bannwart, nn. 1026 
the Synod of Pistoia, quoted in and 1078. Cfr. also proposition 


Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, XVII of the Pistoian Synod, Den- 
nN. 1516, zinger-Bannwart, n, T5107, 


226 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY, 


of the beatific vision, however, so far as it is granted 
to existing rational creatures, is an express article of 
faith."* 


READINGS : — Petavitus, De Pelagiana et Semipelagiana Haeresi. 
— Ripalda, De Ente Supernaturali (Append. adv. Baium et 
Baianos).—*F. Worter, Der Pelagianismus nach seinem Ur- 
sprung und seiner Lehre, Freiburg 1874 A. Krampf, Der Ur- 
sustand des Menschen nach der Lehre des hl. Gregor von Nyssa, 
Wiirzburg 1889.— A. Hoch, Lehre des Johannes Cassianus von 
der Natur und Gnade, Freiburg 1895—F. Klasen, Die innere 
Entuncklung des Pelagianismus, Freiburg 1882.— Schwane, Dog- 
mengeschichte, Vol, II, 2nd ed., §§ 56 sqq., Freiburg 1895.— S. 
Dechamps, De Haeresi Janseniana ab Apostolica Sede Merito 
Praescripta, Paris 1654.— A. Paquier, Le Jansénisme, Etude Doc- 
trinale d’aprés les Sources, Paris 1909— A. Vandenpeerenboom, 
Cornelius Jansenius, Septieéme Evéque d’Y pres, sa Mort, son Tes- 
tament, ses Epitaphes, Bruges 1882.— B. Jungmann, S. J., Disser- 
tationes Selectae in Hist. Eccles., Vol. VII, Diss. XL, Ratisbon 
1887.— Tixeront, Histoire des Dogmes, Vol. II, Paris 1909.— 
J. Pohle in the Catholic Encyclopedia, art. “ Pelagius and Pe- 
lagianism,” Vol. XI.—J. Forget, ibid., art. “ Jansenius and Jan- 
senism,” Vol. VIII. 


ARTICLE 4 


THE DIFFERENT STATES OF MAN, AND THE STATE OF PURE 
NATURE IN PARTICULAR 


I, THE DIFFERENT STATES OF MAN.—A sharp 
distinction must be drawn between historic and 
purely possible states. 

a) A historic state is one in which the human 
race some time or other actually existed, or 
now exists. Such states are: (1) the state of 


14 See supra, pp. 190 sqq. 


THE DIPPEREN DT STATES OF MAN). 227 


original justice in Paradise (status iustitiae ori- 
ginalis), of which we have already treated; (2) 
the state of fallen nature (status naturae lapsae), 
into which the human race was precipitated by 
the sin of Adam. ‘This state consisted in the loss 
of all supernatural and preternatural preroga- 
tives which our first parents enjoyed in the Gar- 
den, and soon gave way to (3) the state of re- 
paired nature (status naturae reparatae), in 
which God, in consideration of the merits of 
Jesus Christ, restored sanctifying grace, though 
without the preternatural prerogatives of integ- 
rity, impassibility, and bodily immortality which 
had accompanied it in’ Paradise. The state of 
repaired nature is the historic state par excel- 
lence, because it has been the condition of man- 
kind since the promise of Redemption. 

b) Those states in which man might, but in 
matter of fact never did exist, are called pos- 
sible. We may, in the first place, conceive of 
a state of natural integrity (status naturae in- 
tegrae) in the narrower sense, 7. é., one with 
a purely natural end,’ yet endowed with such 
preternatural prerogatives as, e. g., freedom from 
concupiscence. According as we combine the 
preternatural prerogatives (freedom from con- 
cupiscence, bodily immortality, impassibility, 
and infused knowledge) into one harmonious 


1 This would exclude beatific vision and sanctifying grace. . 


228 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


whole, or imagine any one of them separately 
realized to the exclusion of all others, we may 
subdivide the state of natural integrity into four 
different states, all of them devoid of strictly 
supernatural grace. It would serve no useful 
purpose to enter into a speculative discussion of 
these states here. Lastly, by eliminating man’s 
supernatural destiny together with sanctifying 
grace and all preternatural prerogatives, we ar- 
tive at what is termed the state of pure nature 
(status naturae purae). 

2. POSSIBILITY OF THE STATE OF PuRE Na- 
TURE.—The concept of the status naturae purae 
involves only such notes as belong to the es- 
sence of human nature and are due to it by 
virtue of creation, preservation, concurrence, 
and the general providence of God.2 Among 
the things that are due to man, as man, (aside 
from his physical endowment which is included 
in the definition of animal rationale), is the 
ethical faculty of knowing God as his natural 
end and of discovering and observing the moral 
law of nature. That is, man must be able, by 
leading a naturally good life, to attain to his 
natural destiny, which would not consist in the 
beatific vision, but in an abstractive knowledge of 
God apt to render the creature naturally happy. 
To these positive notes must be added a nega- 


2 See supra, pp. 181 sqq. 


THE STATE. OF PURE NATURE 229 


tive one, viz.: the exclusion of all such preroga- 
tives as are either strictly supernatural (e. g., 
grace, actual and habitual), or at least preter- 
natural.* A recent writer observes that “this 
state [of pure nature] is conceived as substan- 
tially identical with the state in which man ac- 
tually exists, minus the character of guilt and 
punishment which mark the absence of the higher 
prerogatives, and minus the grace which is 
operative in all men unto salvation.” * In this 
hypothetic state of pure nature, therefore, man 
would be subject to the same evils from which he 
suffers at present, viz.: concupiscence, ignorance, 
and death with its attendant sufferings. 


There is reason to doubt, however, whether the state 
of pure nature, thus conceived, would in every detail be 
essentially like the present state of original «sin. Orig- 
inal sin, with the consequences which it entails, impairs 
the purity of nature to a considerable extent. It is not 
likely that in the state of pure nature idolatry and bes- 
tiality would have wrought such havoc as they actually 
did and do in consequence of the Fall, especially if we 
consider that original sin has immensely increased the 
ravages of these two arch-enemies of humankind. Ab- 
stracting from the guilt of sin and the punishment due to 
it, the state of pure nature may consequently be conceived 
as somewhat more perfect than the state of original sin. 
It is permissible, too, with Cardinal Franzelin® and 
other eminent theologians, to postulate certain natural 


3 See supra, pp. 190 sq. 5 De Tradit. et Script., pp. 635 
4 Schell, Dogmatik, Vol. II, Pp. 293 sqq., Rome 1882, 


230 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


aids as substitutes for the missing supernatural assist- 
ance in the battle against concupiscence. We may con- 
ceive these adiutoria Dei naturalia as due to man in the 
pure state of nature, but they would not, of course, par- 
take of the essence of strictly supernatural grace.° 


Though it would not essentially coincide in 
every detail with the state of original sin, this 
hypothetical state of pure nature is per se possi- 
ble. To say that it is impossible would be tanta- 
mount to asserting that God was bound to endow 
man with supernatural graces and prerogatives. 
This was precisely the false teaching of Baius.? 
“Deus non potuisset,” reads the fifty-fifth of his 
condemned propositions, “ab initio talem .creare 
hominem, qualis nunc nascitur.’ The Catholic 
doctrine is that, had He so chosen, God could 
have created man in the state in which he is now 
born, minus original sin. 


The so-called Augustinians and some Thomists ® 
thought that the teaching of tte Church would be suffi- 
ciently safeguarded against the errors of Baius by hold- 
ing that God could have established the state of pure na- 
ture de potentia absoluta, though not de potentia ordinata. 
But this is not a safe position to take. What God 
may not do by virtue of His wisdom, sanctity, and 
benevolence (potentia ordinatd), He cannot do by virtue 


6 This theory is defended against 7 Cfr. Denzinger-Bannwart, En- 
Becanus (Summa Theol. Scholast., chiridion, n. 1055. 
p. II, tr. 4) by Schiffini, De Gratia 8 Augustinians — Berti, Norisius, 
Divina, pp. 71 sqq., 85 sqq., Fri- Bellelli; Thomists — Contenson, Ser- 
burgi 1oor. ry, De Lemos. 


THE STATE OF PURE NATURE 231 


of His omnipotence (potentid absoluté), which is in- 
variably directed in its operations by the other divine at- 
tributes. If God were constrained by some one or other 
of His attributes ° to endow man with supernatural gifts, 
these gifts would forthwith cease to be graces, because 
they would correspond to a legitimate demand of nature. 
The theologians with whom we are here dealing declare, 
in opposition to Baius, that these prerogatives are super- 
natural graces; but in this they are guilty of incon- 
sistency, because they confound nature with the Super- 
natural, and fail to distinguish between the characteristics 
of both.?° 


READINGS : — Berti, Augustinianum Systema Vindicat., diss. 2. 
—*Card. Norisius, Vindic. Augustin., c. 3.—Kuhn, Die christ- 
liche Lehre von der géttlichen Gnade, § 16, Tiibingen 1868.— G. 
Vandenesch, Doctrina Divi Thomae Aquinatis de Concupiscentia, 
Bonn. 1870.— Mohler, Symbolism, pp. 23 sqq., Robertson’s trans- 
lation, 5th ed., London 1906.— Suarez, Proleg. 4 ad Tract. de 
Gratia.— Goudin, Tract. Theol., t. I, qua.) 2) art rt Ps Xin: 
senmann, Michael Bajus, Tiibingen 1867—J. F. Sollier, art. 
“Baius” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. II.— Kroll, “The 
Causes of the Jansenist Heresy” in the Am. Cath. Quarterly Re- 
view, 1885, pp. 577 sqq.— W. Humphrey, “ His Divine Majesty,” 
PP. 338 sqq., London 1897. 

9 Ex decentia Creatoris et lege 10 Cfr. Palmieri, De Deo Creante 


iustissimae providentiae, as the Au- et Elevante, thes. 47, Rome 1878. 
gustinians put it, 


SECTION 3 


MAN’S DEFECTION FROM THE SUPERNATURAL 
ORDER, OR THE DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN 


We shall treat the subject-matter of this Sec- 
tion in five Articles, considering (1) The sin of 
Adam as the first sin and its effects on our proto- 
parents; (2) The sin of Adam as original sin in 
the technical sense of the term, 7. e., in so far as 
it affects the whole human race; (3) The nature 
of original sin; (4) Its mode of propagation; and 
(5) Its effects in Adam’s descendants. 

The doctrine of original sin is a fundamental 
dogma of Christianity, because on it is based the 
necessity of the Redemption. 


GENERAL READINGS: —*St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 81 
sqq.— Billuart, De Peccatis, diss. 6.— Suarez, De Vitiis et Pecca- 
tis, disp. 9. 

The principal Scholastic treatise on the subject is *De Rubeis, 
De Peccato Originali, Venetiis 1757, nov. ed. Herbipoli 1857. 

Of later authors the student may profitably consult the follow- 
ing: Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, §§ 197 sqq., Freiburg 1878 
(Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. II, pp. 20 sqq., 2nd ed., Lon- 
don 1901).— Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Elevante, thes. 65-81, 
Rome 1878.—*Oswald, Religidse Urgeschichte der Menschheit, 
Part II, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1887.— Kleutgen, Theologie der Vor- 
gett, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 616 sqq., Minster 1872.— Mazzella, De 
Deo Creante, disp. 5, Rome 1880.— Heinrich, Dogmatische The- 

232 


DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN 233 


ologie, Vol. VI, Mainz 1887,— Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. 
IIT, 3rd ed., pp. 121 sqq., Freiburg 1908— G. B. Tepe, Instit. Theol., 
t. II, pp. 551 sqq., Paris 1895.— Th. H. Simar, Lehrbuch der Dog- 
matik, 4th ed., Vol. I, pp. 393 sqq., Freiburg 1899.— D. Coghlan, 
De Deo Uno et Trino et de Deo Creatore, pp. 599 sqq., Dublinii 
1909.— S. J. Hunter, S. J., Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. 
IT, pp. 394 sqq., London 1894.— Le Bachelet, Le Péché Originel, 
Paris 1900. 


ARTICLE z 


THE SIN OF ADAM CONSIDERED AS THE FIRST SIN, AND 
ITS EFFECTS ON OUR PROTO-PARENTS 


All men are born in the state of original sin. This 
state necessarily supposes as its cause a sinful act of 
the free will; for the assumption that original sin is not 
incurred through actual guilt would logically lead to the 
Manichzean heresy of the existence of an essentially evil 
principle. 

The sin of Adam is original sin in a twofold sense: 
(1) As a sinful personal act (peccatum originale ori- ° 
ginans), and (2) as a sinful state (peccatum originale 
originatum). It is the state not the act that is trans- 
mitted to Adam’s descendants. | 

In the present Article we shall consider the sin of 
Adam as a personal act, (1) in its historic aspects and 
(2) in the immediate consequences which it entailed upon 
our first parents. 


Thesis I: Our first parents, seduced by Satan, 
committed a grave (mortal) sin by transgressing the 
precept of probation. 

This thesis embodies an article of faith. 

Proof. The Fall of our first parents, as every 


1 Conc. Trident., Sess. V, can. 1-3. 


16 


234. DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


Catholic knows from his catechism, is an im- 
portant historical fact, not a mere myth, as al- 
leged by the Rationalists. 


a) The Bible relates that God gave Adam and Eve 
a probationary precept by forbidding them to eat of the 
fruit of a certain tree in the Garden, called “the tree 
of the knowledge of good and evil.” This command 
bound them under pain of mortal sin — not because of 
its intrinsic importance, but on account of the at- 
tendant circumstances. We all know how Satan ap- 
proached Eve in the form of a serpent and persuaded 
her to transgress the divine command,— how “ She took 
of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave to her husband, 
who did eat.” * This simple account is plainly meant to 
be historical and is treated as such throughout the Bible. 
Cfr. Ecclus. XXV, 33: “A muliere initium factum est 
peccati, et per illam omnes morimur — From the woman 
came the beginning of sin, and by her we all die.” 1 Tim. 
II, 14: “Adam non est seductus [a serpente], mulier 
autem seducta im praevaricatione fuit— Adam was not 
seduced [by the serpent]; but the woman being se- 
duced, was in the transgression.” Ecclesiastical Tradi- 
tion, too, has always maintained the historic character 
of the Fall. St. Augustine* thus explains the gravity 
of the first sin: “There is in it pride, because man 
chose to be under his own dominion rather than under 
the dominion of God; and sacrilege, because he did not 

2 Gen. III, 6. tina suasione corrupta est; et fur- 

3“ Nam superbia est illic, quia tum, quia cibus prohibitus usurpatus 
homo in sua potius esse quam in est; et avaritia, quia plus quam illi 
Dei potestate dilexit; et sacrilegium, sufficere debuit, appetivit, et si quid 
quia Deo non credidit; et homici- aliud in hoc uno admisso diligenti 
dium, quia se praecipitavit in mor- consideratione inveniri potest.” 


tem; et fornicatio spiritalis, quia (Enchiridion, c. 45.) 
integritas mentis humanae_ serpen- 


DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN 235 


believe God; and murder, for he brought death upon 
himself; and spiritual fornication, because the purity of 
the human mind was corrupted by the seducing blan- 
dishments of the serpent; and theft, for man turned to 
his own use the food he had been forbidden to touch ; 
and avarice, for he had a craving for more than should 
have been sufficient for him; and whatever other sin 
can be discovered on careful reflection to be involved in 
this one admitted sin.” ¢ 

b) Differences of opinion are permissible with regard 
to certain questions of detail, provided only that original 
sin be acknowledged as a historical fact. The “tree of 
knowledge ” is as mysterious as the “tree of life.” Ca- 
jetan held that the story of the serpent merely symbolizes 
inward temptation. But this audacious hypothesis never 
found much support among Catholic theologians. The 
divine curse ® is intelligible only on the assumption that 
the serpent was a real animal, employed by Satan for the 
purpose of seduction. Cfr. Apocalypse DOA Me Mba i 
provectus est draco ille magnus, serpens antiquus qui 
vocatur diabolus et satanas— And that great dragon 
was cast out, that old serpent, who is called the devil 
ande Satan.) (2 Cor. XT, 3's; “eTimeo ne) sicid serpens 
Hlevam seduxit astutid sud, ita corrumpantur sensus 
vestri— I fear lest, as the serpent seduced Eve by his 
subtility, so your minds should be corrupted.” 

The holy Fathers and theologians generally hold 
that intellectual pride was the motive of the Pall eC rr: 
Feclus.. X, 15: “Initium omnis peccati superbia — 
miide.isithe beginning of all,sin.’. Considered in itself, 

4Cfr. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 2a, peccatum mortale und veniale. 
2ae, qu. 163, and H. Gerigk, Wesen Breslau 1903. 
und Voraussetzungen der Totsiinde, SiGens TLL) 24, 


Untersuchung der Frage nach dem 66 dqus 6 dpxaios 
Wesexsunterschiede swischen dem 


236 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


the sin of our first parents, according to St. Paul’s 
teaching, was an act of grave disobedience,— which dis- 
poses of the strange hypothesis that the Fall was due 
to the natural use of marriage.” 

It is not so easy to decide whether the transgression 
of the law of probation constituted the first mortal sin 
committed by Adam and Eve, or whether they had 
previously been guilty of other grievous offenses. Alex- 
ander of Hales held that previous mortal sins on the part 
of our first parents had smoothed the way for their trans- 
gression of the decisive precept of probation, which in- 
volved the fate of Adam and all his progeny. Among 
modern theologians this view has been adopted by 
Schell. Though not exactly untenable, it lacks prob- 
ability. The majority of Catholic divines hold that 
original sin was the first mortal sin committed by our 
first parents, because every mortal sin entails the loss of 
sanctifying grace. 


Thesis II: By transgressing the law of probation 
Adam forfeited sanctifying grace and merited eternal 
damnation; he became subject to bodily death and 
the dominion of Satan, and suffered a deterioration in 
body and soul. 


This is de fide.° 

Proof. Every grievous sin entails the loss 
of sanctifying grace and provokes the anger of 
God. The very grievous nature of the sin com- 
mitted by our first parents may be inferred from 


7Cfr. St. Paul’s Epistle to the dience of one man, many were made 


Romans, V.-19: “ Per inobedien- sinners,” 
tiam unius hominis peccatores con- 8 Dogmatik, Vol. II, p. 308. 
stitutt sunt multi-——By the disobe- 9 Conc. Trident., Sess. V, can. Ie 


7 Ae ee es 


DOCTRINE OF ORIGINAL SIN 237, 


the punishment with which God had threatened 
them. After the Fall He appears to Adam as 
the angry judge. The relation of sonship was 
turned into enmity, which spelled eternal damna- 
tion. Death, which had been the sanction of the 
law of probation,’® was actually inflicted on our 
first parents as a punishment."* “Jnvidid diaboli 
mors introwit in orbem terrarum—By the envy 
of the devil, death came into the world.” #2 In- 
cidental to it was the dominion of Satan, which 
is intimated in the so-called Protevangelium 
(Gen. ITI, 15), and explicitly taught in the New 
Testament.** The deterioration which human 
nature had suffered through the Fall manifested 
itself in the sudden awakening of concupiscence, 
which had till then been duly subject; the flesh 
rebelled against the spirit, the intellect was dark- 
ened and the will enfeebled."* 


The corruption of nature caused by original sin must 
have been far greater in Adam than it is in his 
descendants, and for two reasons: — first, because of 
the singularly privileged status of our progenitor, and 
secondly, because the first or original sin, which St. Au- 
gustine calls “ peccatum ineffabiliter grande,’ was a free 
personal transgression, deserving of far severer punish- 
ment than a merely inherited state. In Adam’s de- 
scendants original sin exists merely as habitual sin, in 


10 Gen, II, 17. 13 Cfr, John XII, 31; XIV, 30; 
11 Gen. III, 19. 2 Cor, IV; 43) a Petiiiiigo. 
12 Wisd. II, 24. 14 Cfr. supra, Section 2, Art, 2 


and 3. 


238 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY, 


which the personal will of the individual has no 
share. 

As for Adam and Eve, the Church piously believes 
that they repented and were ultimately saved® St. 
Irenzus ** defends this belief against Tatian. Rupert of 
Deutz’s assertion that our first parents were damned 
cannot be made to square with the fact that their names 
figure in the calendar of Saints (December 24th). Be- 
sides, the promulgation of the Protoevangelium in Para- 
dise would seem to indicate that they were saved. 


ReaDINGs: — Reinke, Beitrage zur Erklirung des Alten Tes- 
taments, Vol. II, pp. 210 sqq., Minster 1855.—*P. Scholz, The- 
ologie des Alten Bundes, Vol. II, pp. 90 sqq.— Patrizi, De Inter- 
pret. Scriptur., 1. II, qu. 3, Rome 1876.—Schopfer, Geschichte 
des Alten Testamentes, 3rd ed., pp. 40 sqq., Brixen 1907. J. F. 
Driscoll, art. “Adam” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I. 


ARTICLE 2 


THE SIN OF ADAM CONSIDERED AS ORIGINAL SIN IN THE 
TECHNICAL SENSE OF THE TERM 


I. HERETICAL THEORIES AND THEIR CON- 
DEMNATION BY THE CHuRCH.—Theologically 
as well as historically the different heresies that 
have arisen in regard to original sin may be 
reduced to three main heads. (1) Manicheism, 
Priscillianism, and Pre-existentism hold that 
there is a sin of nature (peccatum naturale),’ 


15 Cir. Wisd. X, 1 sqq. was at once a personal sin, inas- 
16 Adv. Haeres., III, 23. much as it deprived that first man 
1“ The sin of the first man, from of his own private good, and also a 
whom, according to the doctrine of sin of nature (peccatum naturale), 
faith, all other men are descended, inasmuch as it took away from that 


ORIGINAL SIN 239 


but no original sin in the technical sense of 
the word. (2) Pelagianism teaches that there 
iS a primeval sin, but no sin of nature and no 
original sin. (3) Protestantism and Jansenism 
contend that there is a sin of nature which is 
at the same time original sin, but that original 
sin is identical with concupiscence and destroys 
free-will, thereby seriously impairing human na- 
Pure. 


a) The earlier heresies concerning original sin all re- 
volve around the problem of evil. The Manichzans 
and Priscillianists admitted the existence of a sin of 
nature, but attributed it to an absolutely evil principle, 
which they called hyle (flesh), and which, they declared, 
necessarily contaminates the spirit on coming in contact 
with it. The Pre-existentists, or Origenists, conceived 
natural sin as the result of a moral catastrophe in the 
realm of pure spirits, antedating the existence of matter. 
All of these writers to a greater or less extent deny the 
doctrine of original sin.? 


b) A far more radical heresy was that of the 
Pelagians. They admitted that Adam sinned, but 
denied that his sin is transmitted to his descend- 
ants. Pelagius himself and Ccelestius? main- 
tained the following errors: (1) Man, as now 


man, and consequently from his pos- 20On the Church’s condemnation 


terity, a benefit conferred upon the 
whole of human  nature.’’ (St. 
Thomas, Contr. Gent., IV, 52; Rick- 
aby, Of God and His Creatures, p. 
381.) 


of these errors cfr. supra, pp. 20 
sqq.; pp. 161 sqq.; also K. Kiinstle, 
Antipriscilliana, Freiburg 1905. 

3 After A. D, 411. 


240 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


constituted, does not differ essentially in endow- 
ment from Adam before the Fall. The only dif- 
ference (an accidental one) is that personal sins 
are committed in the present order.* (2) New- 
born infants do not bring original sin with them 
into the world; they are baptized not “for the for- 
giveness of sins,” but merely that they may be 
enabled to attain to the regnum coelorum, which, 
in the mind of these heretics, is something quite 
different from eternal life. (3) The sin which 
Adam committed in Paradise injured him, but not 
his descendants, except in so far as their will- 
power is weakened by his bad example. (4) 
Since Adam’s sin is not transmitted to his de- 
scendants, they cannot be punished for it. Death 
is not a punishment for sin, but a necessity of 
nature (neécessitas naturae), and concupiscence is 
merely nature’s way of asserting itself (vigor 
naturae). 

Few heresies were so vigorously combated 
from their very birth, and condemned by so 
many councils, as Pelagianism. During the 
short period from A.D. 412 (or 411) to 431 
no less than twenty-four councils, in the East and 
in the West, denounced the new sect. Promi- 
nent among them is the Second Council of Mileve 
(416); its canons were taken over by a plenary 
council held at Carthage in 418, and approved 


4 Supra, pp.-26 sqq. 


apie fetes 5, 


———— 


ORIGINAL SIN 241 


and promulgated by Pope Zosimus in his Epis- 
tola Tractoria. Pelagianism was cut to the 
quick by the second canon of this council, 
which reads as follows: “Quicumque parvulos 
recentes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat aut 
dicit in remissionem quidem peccatorum eos bap- 
tizart, sed mhil ex Adam trahere originalis pec- 
cati, quod regenerationis lavacro expietur, unde 
sit consequens, ut in eis forma baptismatis ‘in 
remissionem peccatorum’ non vere sed false in- 
telligatur, anathema sit — Whoever denies that 
new-born infants should be baptized immediately 
after birth, or asserts that they are indeed bap- 
tized for the remission of sins, but do not con- 
tract from Adam original sin, which must be ex- 
piated in the waters of regeneration, and that con- 
sequently the baptismal form ‘for the remission of 
sins’ applies to them not truly, but falsely; let 
him be anathema.” The Council bases this defi- 
nition on Rom. V, 12 sqq., and on ecclesiastical 
Tradition, and concludes: “Propter hanc enim 
regulam fidet etiam parvult, qui nihil peccatorum 
m semetipsis adhuc committere potuerunt, ideo 
m peccatorum remissionem veraciter baptigan- 
tur, ut im eis regeneratione mundetur, quod ge- 
neratione traxerunt — According to this rule of 
faith little children, who are as yet unable to 
commit actual sin, are therefore truly baptized 
for the remission of sins, in order that by regen- 


242 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


eration they may be cleansed of that which they 
have contracted by generation.” ® 

The Council of Ephesus (A. D. 431) imposed 
this teaching on all clerics under pain of deposi- 
tion, and the Second Council of Orange (A. D. 
529) dealt Pelagianism a further blow by de- 
fining: “Si quis soli Adae praevaricationem 
suam, non et ews propagini asserit nocuisse, aut 
certe mortem tantum corporis, quae poena pec- 
catt est, non autem et peccatum, quod mors est 
animae, per unum hominem in omne genus hu- 
manum transusse testatur, iniustitiam Deo dabit 
contradicens Apostolo dicenti: Per unum homi- 
nem, etc.— If any one asserts that the prevari- 
cation of Adam injured himself only and not his 
progeny, or alleges that bodily death, which is 
the penalty of sin, but not sin, which is the death 
of the soul, was brought by one man upon the 
entire human race, he attributes an injustice to 
God and contradicts the Apostle, who says: ‘By 
one man, etc.’ ” 

c) In more modern times we meet with two 
great heresies which misrepresented the nature 
of original sin by describing it as an intrinsic 
and radical corruption of nature. The two here- 
sies in question are Protestantism and Jansenism. 
They denied free-will® and asserted that concu- - 


5 Synod. Milevit. II, can. 2, apud vin, Instit., IV, 18; Zwingli. De 
Denzinger-Bannwart n. to2. Providentia, c. 6. 
6 Luther, De Servo Arbitrio; Cal- 


ORIGINAL SIN 243 


concupiscence is the formal element of original 
sin. 


Zwingli flatly denied that original sin involves real 
guilt, and thus reverted to the teaching of Pelagius, 
from whom, however, he differed by entirely rejecting 
the doctrine of free-will. Jansenism (Baius, Jansenius, 
Quesnel) held that original sin formally consists in con- 
cupiscence, and that every act performed without grace 
is sinful.” 


The Protestant conception of original sin was 
solemnly condemned by the Tridentine Council 
in its supremely important Decretum de Peccato 
Origimali.® The first of the five canons of this 
decree describes the sin of Adam and_ the 
consequences which it entailed upon himself.® 
Canon II defines how “sin, which is the death 
of the soul,” *° is transmitted from Adam to his 
descendants."* Canon III defines original sin as 
“one in its origin, and being transfused into all 
by propagation, not by imitation, is in each one 
as his own.”’ Canon IV substantially repeats the 
second canon of the Council of Mileve,!? on the 
effect of infant baptism as the ordinary means 


7 Cfr. Baius’? condemned proposi- 
tion: “Omnia opera  infidelium 
sunt peccata et philosophorum vir- 
tutes sunt vitia.’ For further in- 


9 Cfr. supra, pp. 233 sqq. 

10 “ Peccatum, quod est mors ani- 
mae.” 

11 This canon employs almost the 


formation on this subject we must 
refer the reader to our treatise on 
Grace. 

8 Sess. V. Cfr. Denzinger-Bann- 
wart, Enchiridion, nn. 787 sqq. 


exact phraseology of the Second 
Council of Orange, cited above, p. 
242. 

12 Supra, p. 241. 


244 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


of purging the soul from guilt. Canon V de- 
fines the effect of Baptism to be an actual re- 
mission of sin, and reduces the influence of con- 
cupiscence to its true bounds. We reproduce 
this canon in full because of its dogmatic im- 
portance: “Sz quis per Iesu Christi gratiam, 
quae in baptismate confertur, reatum originalis 
peccatt remitti negat; aut etiam asserit, non tolli 
totum 1d, quod veram et propriam peccati ra- 
tionem habet, sed illud dicit tantum radi aut non 
imputart, anathema sit —If any one denies that, 
by the grace of Jesus Christ, which is conferred 
by baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted, 
or even asserts that the whole of that which has 
the true and proper nature of sin is not taken 
away, but says that it is only erased or not im- 
puted, let him be anathema.” 

Consequently it is an article of faith that orig- 
inal sin is real sin, and that its entire guilt is 
blotted out by Baptism. “Jn renatis enim nihil 
odit Deus,’ the Tridentine Fathers add, “quia 
nihil est damnationts tis, qui vere consepulti sunt 
cum Christo per baptisma in mortem — In those 
who are born again, there is nothing that God 
hates, because there is no condemnation to those 
who are truly buried together with Christ by 
Baptism into death.” 

As for the innate predisposition to sin, the 
fomes peccati or concupiscence which remains 


me el > ob 


ORIGINAL SIN 245 


in man after Baptism, the Council solemnly de- 
clares: “Hanc concupiscentiam, quam aliquan- 
do Apostolus peccatum appellat, sancta Synodus 
declarat, Ecclesiam catholicam nunquam intel- 
lexisse peccatum appellari, quod vere et proprie 
m renatis peccatum sit, sed quia ex peccato est 
et ad peccatum inclinat. St quis. autem con- 
trarium senserit, anathema sit — This concupis- 
cence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the 
holy Synod declares that the Catholic Church has 
never understood it to be called sin, as being truly 
and properly sin in those born again, but because 
it is of sin and inclines to sin. And if any one 
is of a contrary sentiment, let him be anathema.” 

Hence it is also an article of faith that concupis- 
cence as such 1s not really sin, but is merely so 
called by metonymy, because “‘it is of sin and in- 
clines to sin.” 

The Jansenist teaching on original sin was 
condemned as heretical by Popes Pius V, Inno- 
cent X, Clement XI) and: Pius) VL: 

2. SCRIPTURAL PROOF FOR THE EXISTENCE OF 
ORIGINAL Sin.—The dogma of original sin im- 
plies, first, the existence of habitual sin in man 
from birth, and, secondly, its connexion with the 
sin’ of Adam. Adam’s ‘sin; in as far as. it was 
personal, could not fall on his descendants. Like 
his death, it was by its very nature incommunica- 
ble. Original sin is consequently not a personal 


246 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


sin but a sin of nature, which inheres in all hu- 
man individuals as guilt, and is a true sin only 


in its logical connexion with Adam’s voluntary 


transgression of the divine command in Paradise. 


a) The nature of original sin is far less sharply de- 
fined in the Old than in the New Testament. The oft- 
quoted text Ps. L, 7: “ Ecce in iniquitatibus conceptus 
sum et m peccatis concepit me mater mea— Behold I 
was conceived in iniquities, and in sins did my mother 
conceive me,’ seems from the context to refer rather 
to concupiscence, 7. e., the inclination which draws all 
men to evil, and which the Psalmist mentions in ex- 
tenuation of his own unrighteousness. Some of the 
Fathers of the Church, it is true, quote this passage 
against the Pelagians,!* but in doing so their main ob- 
ject is to demonstrate that Adam’s sin injuriously affected 
his descendants. That the injury which it inflicted is 
identical with original sin can hardly be proved from this 
text, unless it be interpreted in the light of the New 
Testament. 

A somewhat more conclusive text is Job XIV, 1 sqq., 
which was cited already by the Fathers as an argument 
for the existence of original sin. The passage runs as 
follows: ‘Man born of a woman, living for a short 
time, is filled with many miseries. . . . Who can make 
him clean that is unclean? Not one.” This is a literal 
translation of the Hebrew text. The Vulgate brings 
out the sense of the passage more clearly thus: “ Quis 
potest facere mundum de immundo conceptum semine? 
Nonne tu qui solus es? — Who can make him clean that 
is conceived of unclean seed? Is it not thou who only 


13 Cfr. e. g., St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 50, n. 10. 


ORIGINAL SIN 247 


art?” The meaning plainly is: No one but God can 
sanctify a man conceived in ethical uncleanness, i. é\)) i 
sin. There is no question here of Levitical unclean- 
ness. The Sacred Writer plainly means that every man 
is conceived in original sin, though he does not ex- 
plicitly mention the relation of man’s guilt to the sin 
of Adam,—a relation which not even St. Paul himself 
emphasized on all occasions. Cfr. Eph. II, Be ey 

-- eramus natura (dvoea) filtti irae, sicut et ceteri— 
We... were by nature children of wrath, even as the 
rest, ” 


b) The locus classicus for our dogma is Rom. 
V, 12-21. St. Paul in this passage draws a 
sublime parallel between “all” (adres, also Toot ) 
and the “one’’ («s) who, under one aspect, is the 
first Adam as the author of sin and death, and 
under another, the second Adam (i. e., Christ) as 
the Father of grace and salvation. The passage 
may be divided into three sections, all of which 
clearly bring out the doctrine of original sin. 

«) Consider in the first place Rom. V, 12: 
“Sicut per unum hominem peccatum (4 dpapia. ) 
in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors, 
et ita in omnes homines mors pertransiit, in quo 
(<# @) omnes peccaverunt — As by one man sin 
entered into this world, and by sin death: and 
so death passed upon all men, in whom all have 
sinned.” 

According to the context cis cvOpwros here can only 
mean Adam, who is the author of sin and death. By 


248 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


peccatum (i dpaptia) St. Paul evidently means a real 
sin, in the strict sense of the term, not mere concu- 
piscence, or death as the penalty of sin. If peccatum 
spelled death, the text would contain a tautology: “ By 
one man death entered into this world, and by death, 
death.” If it meant concupiscence (which, it is true, 
St. Paul in Rom. VII, 17, also calls peccatum, but only 
by metonymy), the sense would be: “ By one man con- 
cupiscence entered into this world, and by concupiscence, 
death.” But concupiscence is not per se sinful, much less 
a sin by which “all men sinned.” We must also take 
into consideration that Adam was not punished with 
death on account of his concupiscence, but for his dis- 
obedience, which was a grievous sin. The Apostle ex- 
pressly says: “‘ Per inobedientiam unius hominis pecca- 
tores constituti sunt multi — By the disobedience of one 
man, many were made sinners.” ** It is quite obvious 
that the “ sin’ which, together with death, was by “one 
man” transmitted to all others, cannot be identical with 
the personal transgression of Adam. Like the death of 
Adam, this sin was not communicable to others, and more- 
over the Apostle never calls it éuapria, but sometimes zapd- 
Baows (praevaricatio), occasionally rapérrwpa (delictum), 
or mapaxoy (inobedientia). Consequently it can only be 
the habitual sin of Adam (habitus peccati) which “ en- 
tered into this world” through him, 7. e., was by him 
transmitted to all his progeny.— The anacoluthic clause, 
cb’ & rdvres japrov — in whom all have sinned — is taken 
by the older Latin Fathers and by a number of councils 
as a relative sentence, and interpreted thus: “Jn quo 
[scil. uno homine, 1. e., Adam] omnes peccaverunt — 
And in him [i. e., in this one man, Adam], all have 


14 Rom. V, 19. 


ORIGINAL SIN 249 


sinned.” This may be said to embody the traditional 
view, since it has been the constant belief of Christians 
that all men sinned in Adam. Nor is there anything in 
the Greek text of Rom. V, 12 to disprove this construc- 
tion. In New Testament Greek émi is sometimes used 
interchangeably with év, e. g., éx’ évouare for év dvopate. 
Since Erasmus, however, many Catholic exegetes prefer 
to take é¢’ 6 causally for dm (émi rovrw 6m, eo quod, quia, 
which may be a Hebraism from Wed). It must be ad- 
mitted that this interpretation is more in conformity with 
the Greek idiom than the phrase duaprévew éxi (for év) 
miu. Nor does it in any way impair the dogmatic bearing 
of the text. If é¢’ é be construed relatively, the sense 
of the passage is: ‘All men have sinned in Adam;” 
if causally, it means: “ All men (and consequently chil- 
dren too) must die, because all have sinned.” 


The trend of the Pauline argument therefore 
is: The sin of this one man Adam is exactly 
co-extensive with the death of the body, which 
entered this world in consequence of it. Now, 
infants too must die. This can assuredly not be 
a punishment for personal sins, as they are in- 
capable of sinning. Hence they suffer the pen- 
_alty of death because the habitual sin of Adam 
has been transmitted to them. It is this habitual 
sin we call original sin. Consequently all men 
are born in the state of original sin. 

8) Proceeding with his demonstration the 
Apostle continues:** “Usque ad legem enim 


15 Rom. V, 13 sq. 
17 


250 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


peccatum erat in mundo; peccatum autem non 
wunputabatur, quum lex non esset. Sed regnavit 
mors ab Adam usque ad Moysen etiam in eos, 
quit non peccaverunt in similitudinem praevari- 
cations Adae, qui est forma futuri — For until 
the law sin was in the world; but sin was not 
imputed, when the law was not. But death 
reigned from Adam unto Moses, even over them 
also who have not sinned after the similitude of 
the transgression of Adam, who is a figure of 
him who was to come.” 


Though St. Paul in this passage refers to the personal 
transgressions of men “ from Adam unto Moses” rather 
than to the habitual sin of our progenitor, the context 
shows that peccatum here again is used in the sense of 
moral transgression. The Apostle notes that “ until the 
law,” that is, up to the time when the Mosaic code took 
effect, personal crimes were “not imputed,” 7. e., not 
punished by death, and that nevertheless death reigned 
“even over them who have not (p#) sinned after the 
similitude of the transgression of Adam,” 7. e., in the 
manner in which Adam sinned. The negative particle py 
(not) is absent from some codices and Patristic citations 
of the passage; but modern textual criticism has fully es- 
tablished its authenticity. It occurs in the majority of 
extant MSS. as well as in the Itala, the Vulgate, and 
the Peshitta, and the rhetorical figure which the Apostle 
employs in this passage (auxesis) clearly demands it. 


St. Paul evidently wishes to meet an objection 
which might arise from his expression “mdvres 


ORIGINAL SIN. . 251 


jmaprov—all have sinned.” ‘All men have sinned 
personally,” it might be argued, “and therefore 
all men must die.” True, replies the Apostle, 
the men who lived “from Adam unto Moses’ 
did commit many personal sins. But it was not 
on this account they had to die. For there was 
not then any positive law which punished per- 
sonal sins by death, as was the case later under 
the Mosaic code. Yet “death reigned from 
Adam unto Moses,” even over those who (such as 
infants) were not guilty of personal sin. Con- 
sequently, death was not a punishment for per- 
sonal sin, but for that particular épaptia which 
“entered into this world” through the fault of 
Adam, 1. é., original sin. ! 

y) An additional argument for the existence 
of original sin is contained in Rom. V, 18 sq: 
“Tgitur sicut per unius delictum in omnes homines 
m condemnationem, sic et per unius [scil. Christi] 
wustitiam in omnes homines in iustificationem 
vitae. Sicut enim per inobedientiam unius homi- 
mis [scil. Adae] peccatores constituti sunt multi 
(dpaprwdot Kateotébyoay oi TONAL ) | ata et per unius 
obeditionem tusti constituentur multi: (Sixaor Karo- 
oralnoovrar ot rohdoi)—Therefore, as by the offence 
of one, unto all men to condemnation; so also 
by the justice of one, unto all men to justifica- 
tion of life. For as by the disobedience of one 
man, many were made sinners; so also by the 


252 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


obedience of one, many shall be made just.” The 
Apostle’s reasoning is quite transparent. He 
develops the parallel between Adam and Christ, 
which he had begun in verse 12. The reader will 
note the sharp antithesis between constituti pec- 
catores by the disobedience of Adam, and con- 
stitutt tustos by the obedience of Christ. The 
human race ( wavTes avOpwro., ot modhot ) has by the 
sin of Adam become a race of sinners, precisely 
as, by the “justification of life” through Christ, 
it has recovered justice. Now, justification is 
effected by the grace of being “born again of 
water and the Holy Ghost; ** consequently, the 
sin of Adam inheres in man from birth,—it is 
really and truly inherited. 


It may be objected that, since “many” but not all 
were justified by and in Christ, so a pari “many,” but 
not all men were tainted by the sin of Adam, namely 
those who imitated Adam’s sinful conduct. But St. 
Paul expressly rejects this construction. Moreover, 
there is a perfect parity between “being born” and 
“being born again;” for as no man contracts original 
sin except by descent from Adam, so no man is justified 
except he be born again of the Holy Ghost. That the 
number of individuals in the two contrasted groups is 
unequal, is due to the fact that descent from Adam is 
inevitable, while spiritual regeneration depends upon a 
voluntary act, 7. e., the reception of the Sacrament of 
Baptism.** 


16 John III, s. Schafer, Erklarung des Briefes 
17 On the whole subject cfr. Al. Pauli an die Romer, Minster 1891, 


ORIGINAL SIN 283 


3. THE ARGUMENT FROM TRADITION.—Belief 
in the existence of original sin dates back to 
Apostolic times. This can be shown: (a) from 
the constant practice of infant Baptism, and (b) 
from the verbal teaching of the Fathers. 

a) The necessity of infant Baptism (paedo- 
baptismus) has always been regarded as a con- 
clusive argument for the existence of original 
sin. Baptism of its very nature is a sacrament 
instituted “for the forgiveness of: -sins. 777) ili, 
therefore, new-born infants must be baptized 
“for the forgiveness of sins,’”’ and their sin, un- 
like that of adults, cannot be personal sin, then 
it must be original sin. This argument, which 
St. Augustine effectively employed against Bishop 
Julian of Eclanum,” was extremely repugnant to 
the Pelagians.”° 

Origen testifies to the early practice of bap- 
tizing infants in order that they might obtain 
forgiveness of their sins.** St. Cyprian says: 
“St a baptismo atque gratia nemo prohibetur, 


18“ In remissionem peccatorum.” 
(Symb. Nicaen.-Constantinop.) 

19“ Non est,’ he says on one 
occasion, ‘‘ cur provoces ad Orientis 
antistites. . 


tus, aut ipsum [solum] tibi remis- 
sum aut et ipsum [t. e., siinul cum 
actualibus]. Sed sit verum est, quod 
audivimus, te infantulum baptiza- 
tum, etiam tu, quamvis a tuis pro- 
pris peccatis innocens, tamen quia 


- . Nam peccatum ori- 
ginale, quacumque aetate sis baptiza- 


ex Adam carnaliter natus contagium 
mortis antiquae prima  nativitate 
traxistt, et in iniquitate conceptus 
es, profecto exorcizatus et exsuffla- 
tus es, ut a potestate erutus tene- 


brarum transferreris in regnum 
Christi.” (De Pecc. Mer. et Rem., 
Tye.) 


20 Cfr. St. Jerome, Dial., 3, n. 


17s 
21 Hom. in Lue., 14. 


254 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


quanto magis proliberi non debet infans, qui 
recens natus nihil peccavit, nisi quod secundum 


Adam carnaliter natus contagium mortis antiquae 


prima nativitate contraxit — Since nobody is de- 
nied baptism and grace, how much more ought 
an infant not to be denied [these benefits], who 
being but just born has done no sin, except that, 
by being descended from Adam in the flesh, he 
has contracted by birth the contagion of the an- 
clent death 335 

b) In examining the positive teaching of the 
Fathers, it will be well to consider («) the West- 
ern Fathers apart from (f) the Eastern. Pela- 
gianism was an occidental growth and was al- 
most entirely extirpated by the Latins, notably 
St. Augustine. The Eastern Fathers, in view 
of the errors of the Gnostics and Origenists, 
which flourished mainly in the Orient, and for 
fear of encouraging such false beliefs as that in 
the existence of an absolutely evil principle, were 
accustomed to speak of original sin with caution 
and reserve. 


a) As for the pre-Augustinian period, St. Augustine 
himself calls upon antiquity as bearing witness against 


the Pelagians. 


22 Epist. ad Fidum, 64, n. 5. For 
a more detailed treatment we must 
refer the student to the dogmatic 
treatise on the Sacrament of Bap- 
tism. 

23 De Nupt. et Concup., II, 12, 25. 


“Non ego finxt originale peccatum, quod 


—In his work Contra Iulianum 
Pelagianum he marshals a veritable 
phalanx of Patristic texts and con- 
cludes as follows: ‘‘ Non est hoc 
malum nuptiarum, sed primorum 
hominum peccatum, in  posteros 


=e a ee 


ae On at ee 


if 
i“ 
at 


ORIGINAL SIN ass 


catholica fides credit antiquitus; sed tu [Iuliane], qui 
negas, sine dubio es novus haereticus —It was not I 
who devised the original sin, which the Catholic faith 
holds from ancient times; but you [he is addressing 
Julian], who deny it, are undoubtedly an innovating 
leretic.;; 2+ | 

Vincent of Lerins wonderingly enquires who before the 
time of Ccelestius ever dreamt of denying the doctrine of 
original sin.2* Among the most ancient testimonies is 
that of Tertullian, who in his favorite legal phraseology 
writes: “Omnis anima eo usque in Adam censetur, 
donec in Christo recenseatur; peccatrix autem immunda 
recipiens ignominiam ex carnis societate.’ 2° 

8) The belief of the Oriental Christians could not be 
substantially different from that of their western 
brethren, because the churches of the East and West at 
that time conjointly constituted the one true Church of 
Christ. In matter of fact, Irenaeus, who belonged to 
the East both with regard to birth and training, gives 
expression to the primitive faith when he writes: 
“Deum in primo quidem Adam offendimus (pocexdpa- 
pev), non facientes eius praeceptum; in secundo autem 
Adam reconciliati sumus. . . . Neque enim alteri cuidam 
eramus debitores, cuius praeceptum transgressi fueramus 
ab initio (vmepéBnpev ax’ apyns)—In the first Adam we 


propagatione traiectum. Etenim runt, adversus vos proferunt de om- 
huius mali reatus baptismatis sanc- nium hominum peccato originali ob- 
tificatione remittitur. ... Propter no-zia successione sententiam.”” 


quam catholicam veritatem sancti ac (Contra Iulianum Pelag., II, 10, 
beatt et in divinorum eloquiorum 33). 


pertractatione clarissimt sacerdotes 24De Nupt. et Concup., II, 12, 
Ireneus, Cyprianus, Reticius, Olym- 25. 

pius, Hilarius, Ambrosius, Gregorius 25 Commonit., 38: “Quis ante 
[Naz.], Innocentius, Ioannes [Chry- Coelestium reatu praevaricationis 
sost.], Basilius, quibus adde presby- Adae omne genus humanum dene- 


terum, nolis velis, Hieronymum, ut  gavit adstrictum? ” 
_omittam eos, qui nondum dormie- 26 De Testim. Anim., qo. 


256 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 
offended God by disobeying His command; but in the 
second Adam. we were reconciled. ... For to no one 
else were we indebted for having transgressed His pre- 
cept in the beginning.” ?* St. Athanasius tersely de- 
clares: ‘In that Adam sinned, death entered the 
world.” 28 And St. Basil?®: “ Because we did not ab- 
stain, we were expelled from Paradise.” *° 

The Pelagians made desperate efforts to claim at least 
one of the Greek Fathers in favor of their view. 
Bishop Julian of Eclanum repeatedly appeals to the 
authority of the “ great John of Constantinople.” ** Did 
St. Chrysostom ignore, nay even oppose, the doctrine of 
original sin? *? St. Augustine triumphantly defended him 
against this charge. In descanting on the effects of 
Baptism St. Chrysostom says: “In the laver of regen- 
eration grace touches the soul and eradicates the sin 
which has taken root in it.” ** But what does he mean 
when he writes in another of his works: “Ideo etiam 
infantes (Ta madia) baptizgamus, licet peccata** non 
habeant (xatro. duaprhara odx éyovtra)”— Therefore do 
we also baptize little children, although they have no 
sins.” Augustine rightly explains that Chrysostom meant 
actual sins: “Intellige propria [scil. peccata] et nulla 
contentio est. At inquies: Cur non ipse addidit propria? 
Cur, putamus, nist quia disputans in catholica ecclesia 
non se aliter intelligt arbitrabatur? Tali quaestione nul- 
Fall and Original Sin, pp. 273 saq., 
Cambridge 1903. 


31 Cfr. Jos. Schwane, Dogmenge- 
schichte, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 457 


27 Adv. Haeres., V, 16, 3. 

28 Contr. Arian., Or. 1, 51. 

29 Or. de Ieiunio, 1. 

30 A large number of other 


equally pertinent Patristic texts is 
cited by Heinrich, Dogmatische The- 
ologie, Vol. VI, pp. 736 sqq., Mainz 
1887. For the development of the 
dogma up to the time of St. Augus- 
tine, cfr. F,.. R. Tennant, The 
Sources of the Doctrines of the 


sqq. 

32 This thesis is defended by two 
Protestant writers on the history of 
dogmas, Wigger and Miinscher. 

33 Hom. in rt Cor., 40. 

34 Not peccatum. 


ORIGINAL SIN 257 


lus pulsabatur, vobis nondum litigantibus securius lo- 
quebatur.” *° Elsewhere Chrysostom positively asserts 
the existence of original sin. Thus he says in his 
homilies on the Book of Genesis: “ Christ appeared 
only once; he found our paternal note of indebtedness, 
which Adam had written (eipev ipdv yeypdypadov TATPOOV, 
ort e€ypawev 6 ’ASdu); for it was he [Adam] who laid 
the foundation of the debt (roo xpetous) which we have 
increased by subsequent [i. e., personal] sins.” °* Julian 
further insisted that, according to St. Chrysostom, St. 
Paul in employing the word “sin” merely meant the 
penalty of bodily death. In his commentary on Rom. 
V, 19 the Saint says: “What does the term ‘sinner’ 
mean here? . It seems to me that it means one who has 
incurred a penalty and is condemned to death.” 37 But 
the context shows that Chrysostom merely wishes to deny 
that all men became personal sinners through the sin of 
Adam. For in the same homily from which we have 
quoted he clearly admits the existence of habitual sin- 
“We have received out of that grace not only so much 
as was needed to take away the sin, but much more. 
For we were freed from the penalty, cast off all injus- 
tice, and re-arose as men newly-born, after the old man 
meds Deen buried, (0. All this Pant terms |/4 super- 
abundance of grace, intimating that we have not only 
received a medicine adapted to the hurt, but health and 
beauty. ... For Christ hath paid so much more than 
we owed. ... Therefore, O man, doubt not if thou 
seest the richness of so many graces, and ask not in 
what manner that spark of death and sin was quenched, 
since a whole ocean of graces was poured out upon 
—it.’%8 St. Augustine was therefore perfectly justified 


35 Contr. Iulian. Pelag., I, 6, 22. 37 Hom. in Ep. ad Rom., TOw Tints 
36 Hom. in Gen., 9. . 38 Ibid, 


258 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY. 


in addressing Julian in such harsh words as these: 
“Ttane ista verba S. Ioannis Episcopi audes tamquam 
e contrario tot taliumque sententiis collegarum eis op- 
ponere, eumque ab illorum concordissima societate seiun- 
gere et eis adversarium constituere? Absit, absit hoc 
malum de tanto viro credere aut dicere. Absit, inquam, 
ut Constantinopolitanus Ioannes de baptismate parvulo- 
rum eorumque a paterno chirographo liberatione per 
Christum tot ac tantis coepiscopis suis, maximeque 
Romano Innocentio, Carthaginiensi Cypriano, Cappadoct 
Basilio, Nazianzeno Gregorio, Gallo Hilario, Mediola- 
nensi resistat Ambrosio. ... Hoc [dogma] sensit, hoc 
credidit, hoc docuit et Ioannes.” *° 

It must be admitted, however, that St. Chrysostom’s 
interpretation “does not coincide exactly with the ideas 
of Augustine on the nature of original sin. He fre- 
quently repeats that the consequences or penalties of the 
first sin affected not only our first parents, but also their 
descendants, but he does not say that the sin itself was 
inherited by their posterity and is inherent in their na- 
ture. In general, to appreciate the homiletic teaching of 
Chrysostom apropos of sin it is well to remember that 
he had in mind Manichzean adversaries with their denial 
of free-will and their doctrine of physically irresistible 
concupiscence, an error that cut away the foundations 
of all morality, and one which he opposed with all his 
mighti)*? 


Reapincs: — Greg. de Valentia, Controv. de Peccato Originals. 
— *Bellarmine, De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati, 1. 3 sqq.— 
Mariano a Novana, O. Cap., De Originaria Lapsi Hominis Con- 


89 Contr. Iulian. Pelag., I, 6, 22. + of the dogma of original sin cfr. St. 

40 Bardenhewer-Shahan, Patrol- Thomas, Contr. Gent., IV, 52 (Rick- 
ogy, Pp. 340, Freiburg and St. Louis aby, Of God and His Creatures, pp. 
1908. On the philosophical aspects 380 sqq.). i, 


a giiee 


NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 259 


ditione, Parisi 1882.—Simar, Die Theologie des hil. Paulus, 
and ed., pp. 30 sqq., Freiburg 1883— A. Scher, De Universali 
Propagatione Originalis Culpae, Romae 1895.— Bossuet, Défense 
de la Tradition et des Saints Péres, VIII, 2 sqq.— Baur, Das 
manichiische Religionssystem, Titbingen 1831— Mandernach, 
Geschichte des Priscillianismus, Trier 1851.— Klasen, Innere Ent- 
wicklung des Pelagianismus, Freiburg 1882— The Anti-Pelagian 
Works of Saint Augustine, Translated by Peter Holmes et al., 
Vol. I, Preface, Edinburgh 1872. (The documents which relate 
to the Pelagian controversy will be found in an appendix to St. 
Augustine’s works edited by the congregation of St. Maur. For 
a full bibliography of Pelagianism consult Bardenhewer-Shahan, 
Patrology, pp. 504 sq., Freiburg and St. Louis 1908.) —*Mohler, 
Symbolism, ch. 2 sqq., 5th English ed., London 1906.— Hefele, 
Conciliengeschichte, and ed., Vol. Il, Freiburg 1875.— Schwane, 
Dogmengeschichte, and ed., Vol. II, § 56 sqq., Freiburg 1895.— 
F. R. Tennant, The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and 
Original Sin, Cambridge 1903.— S. Harent, art. “ Original Sin,” in 
the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XI— MacEvilly, An Exposition 
of the Epistles of St. Paul, Vol, 1, 4th ed., New York 1801. 


ARTICLE 3 


THE NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 


We might fitly preface this Article with the well-known 
dictum of St. Augustine: “Antiguo peccato nihil est 
ad praedicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secre- 
huss? + 
_ That the sin of Adam indwells as a real and true guilt 
(reatus culpae) in all his descendants, is most assuredly 
an impenetrable mystery. While the Church has never 
dogmatically defined the nature of original sin, she 
teaches: (1) that it exists as a real and proper sin in 
every human being in consequence of his descent from 


® 1 DesMor. Eccl. I, 22. 


260 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


Adam;2 (2) that Baptism removes whatever is of the 
nature of sin;* and (3) that the concupiscence which 
remains after Baptism does not partake of the nature 
of guilt.* 

It is within these clearly defined limits, therefore, that 
we must seek for the constitutive elements of original 
sin. The Church tells us in what the essence of orig- 
inal sin does not consist ; it remains for scientific theology 
to ascertain its true nature. In the following series of 
systematic theses we shall endeavor as far as possible 
to go to the root of the problem. 


Thesis I: Original sin does not descend as a sub- 
stantial form from Adam to his progeny, constituting 
man an incarnate image of the Devil. 


This is de fide. 

Proof. The heretical view opposed to this 
thesis was held by the Lutheran theologian 
Mathias Flacius Illyricus (+ 1575), head of 
the so-called “Substantiarians,’” who contended 
that the sin of Adam intrinsically transformed 
the soul into a sinful substance and an image of 
Satan, comparing it to “wine which turns into 
vinegar.” Illyricus was opposed in his own 
camp by a school called ‘“‘Accidentarians.” Be- 
ing little more than a revamped Manicheism, 
his theory stands and falls with the ancient heresy 
asserting the absolute nature of evil. “Malum 
illud,’ says St. Augustine, “quod quaerebam, 


2“ Propagatione inest unicuique 38“ Tollit totum id, quod veram 
proprium.” et propriam peccati rationem habet,” 
4 Supra, pp. 243 sqq. 


NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 261 


unde esset, non est substantia; quia si substantia 
esset, bonum esset. Aut enim esset incorrupti- 
bilis substantia, magnum utique bonum; aut sub- 
stantia corruptibilis, quae nisi bona esset, cor- 
rumpi non posset — That evil, the origin of which 
I have been so long seeking for, is no substance; 
for if it were a substance, it would be good. For 
it would either be an incorruptible substance, a 
great good indeed; or it would be a corruptible 
substance, which if it were not good could not be 
corrupted.” ° The theory of the Substantiarians 
has not even the recommendation of novelty, for 
it substantially agrees with the teaching of the 
Euchites or Messalians, which was condemned 
by the Third General Council of Ephesus, A. D. 
431.° It is unnecessary to point out the absurd 
consequences to which this error leads, not only 
with regard to the doctrine of the Creation, but 
likewise in Anthropology and Christology.’ 


Thesis II: Concupiscence as such does not con- 
stitute the essence of original sin. 


Proot. Uhis- thesis isiialso' de) Ade.) liwis 
5 Confess., VII, 12. olic Encyclopedia, Vol. enn Ctr. 
6 The Messalians, or Euchites St. John Damascene, De Haer., n, 

(i. e., Praying folk), believed that 80. 

‘evil was a physical substance and 7 The student will find this mat- 

that the Devil indwelled personally ter exhaustively treated by_ Bellar- 

(évuroordtrws) in every man. mine, De <Amiss.) .Grat.):V, 3-3: 


(Funk, Manual of Church History, 
Eng. trans. by L. Cappadelta, Vol. 
I, p. 147, London 1910; J. P. Arend- 
zen, art. ‘‘ Messalians ” in the Cath- 


Suarez, De Peccato Orig., disp. 9, 
sect. 2; and De Rubeis, De Pecc. 
Orig., C. 54. 

8 Conc. Trident., Sess. V, can. 5- 


262 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


aimed at the so-called Reformers of the sixteenth 
century (Luther, Calvin, Melanchthon), and 
against the Jansenists (particularly Baius, Jan- 
senius, and Quesnel), who depicted concupis- 
cence in lurid colors and asserted that it is a 
formal sin and original sin.® This theory was 
condemned as heretical by the Council of Trent.*° 

The orthodox doctrine on the subject of con- 
cupiscence is based upon the Epistles of St. Paul 
and the teaching of the Fathers, notably St. Au- 
gustine. 

a) St. Paul expressly declares that Baptism 
obliterates whatever is sinful and deserving of 
reprobation in man. Rom. VI, 4: “Consepulti 
sumus cum illo [scil. Christo] per baptismum in 
mortem — Weare buried together with him [7. e., 
Christ] by baptism into death.” Rom. VIII, 1: 
“Nihil ergo nunc damnationis est its, qui sunt 
im Christo Iesu — There is now therefore no con- 
demnation to them that are in Christ Jesus.” 
We know from experience that concupiscence re- 
mains in man even after baptism; hence con- 
culpiscence cannot be a sin, and least of all orig- 
inal sin. 

Jansenism can be triumphantly refuted from 
the writings of St. Augustine, whom it professes 


9 Supra, pp. 239 sq. 11 ovdéy dpa viv KardKpuua. 
10 Conc. Trident., Sess. V, can. 5, 


ty 
iS 


NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 263 


to follow. It is quite true St. Augustine, like 
St. Paul,’ calls concupiscence sin; but he mani- 
festly does not mean that it is a sin in the strict 
sense of the term, except by the free consent of 
the will. “Peccati nomen accepit concupiscentia,” 
he says quite unmistakably, “quod ei consentire 
peccatum est —Concupiscence has received the 
name of sin, because it is a sin to consent to it.” 12 
In fact, St. Augustine anticipated the authentic 
declaration given by the Tridentine Council, that 
the reason why St. Paul calls concupiscence sin 
is because it “is of sin and inclines to sin,’? 14 
“Sic autem,” he writes, “vocatur peccatum, quia 
peccato facta est, quum iam in regeneratis non stt 
ipsa peccatum; sic vocatur lingua locutio, quam 
facit lingua, et manus vocatur scriptura, quam 
facit manus — As arising from sin, it is called 
sin, although in the regenerate it is not actually 
sin; and it has this designation applied to it, 
just as speech which the tongue produces is 
itself called tongue, and just as the word hand 


is used in the sense of writing, which the hand 


produces.” * And again: “Restat ergo [in 


it baptizatis] cum carne conflictus, quia deleta est 


miquitas, sed manet infirmitas — There remains, 
therefore, a conflict with the flesh [in those who 


12Rom. VII, 17: “It is no 13 De Perfect. Iust., n. 44. 


Ho, more I that ‘do it, but sin that 14 Supra, p. 245. 
_ dwelleth in me,” ; 15 De Nupt. et Concub., Wo 23336, 


264, DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY. 


are baptized], because, while unrighteousness is 
wiped out, infirmity remains.” * 

We may add the following theological argu- 
ment. It is possible to conceive a state of pure 
nature in which concupiscence would be neither a 
sin nor original sin; consequently, original sin is 
not identical with concupiscence.** 


b) If original sin is not concupiscence, neither is it 
identical with the hereditary evils brought upon the 
human race by the misconduct of Adam.** There can 
be no original sin without moral guilt. Mere penalties 
are not sins, they presuppose sin. 

Some of the earlier Schoolmen?® believed that orig- 
inal sin is a positive quality (morbida qualitas) which is 
transmitted from the infected body to the soul and as- 
serts itself in the form of concupiscence. A few Scho- 
lastic theologians derived this contagious disease from the 
poisonous juices of the forbidden apple which Adam ate 
in Paradise, or from the pestilential breath of the serpent 
which seduced Eve. This untenable theory bears a 
striking resemblance to that of the Lutheran theologians 
of the sixteenth century. There is, however, an essen- 
tial difference between the two. Henry of Ghent, 
Gregory of Rimini, and the other representatives of 
this school expressly teach that concupiscence (which 
they identify with original sin) loses its sinful character 
in those who are regenerated by Baptism. But this very 
consideration should have convinced them that con- 
cupiscence cannot be identical with original sin even 

16 Serm., 6. 19 Henry of Ghent, Gregory of 

17 Supra, pp. 228 sqq. Rimini, Driedo, and others. Cfr. 


18 This heresy was taught by Vasquez, Comment. in S. Theol., 
Abélard and Zwingli. 1a 2ae, disp, 132, c 4. 


NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 265 


before justification, because the morbida qualitas re- 
mains after Baptism without losing its intrinsic nature.?° 

Hermes * gathered up as into a sheaf the various 
heresies of Luther, Zwingli, and Baius. He held that 
“ original sin is a disposition common to all natural de- 
scendants of Adam and Eve in consequence of their de- 
scent from these sinful progenitors, and which, in course 
of time, produces an inevitable dissonance between rea- 
son and the senses.’ 2? 


Thesis III: It is highly improbable that, as cer- 
tain eminent theologians hold, original sin consists 
exclusively in the extrinsic imputability of the actual 
sin of Adam conceived as morally enduring. 


Proof. The theory ?? rejected in this thesis is 
based upon a peculiar conception of habitual sin. 


a) Theologians and moral philosophers rightly distin- 
guish between actual sin (peccatum actuale) and habitual 
sin (peccatum habituale). Actual sin (sin as an act) 
is the cause of habitual sin (sin as a state), because a 
sinful action produces a state of enmity with God. Now, 
while the majority of Catholic divines define habitual 
sin as a privation of sanctifying grace,?4 the writers 
whose particular theory we are here considering re- 
gard the loss of sanctifying grace merely as a punish- 
ment for sin, not as a sinful state.2°> In this hypothesis 


20Cfr. Bellarmine, De Pighius (Contr. I de Pece. Orig.), 
Grat., V; 15. Alphonsus Salmeron (In Ep. ad 
21 See his Dogmatik, Part 3, Dp. Rom., disp. 46), Toletus (In Ep. 
172. ad Rom., cap. 5), and De Lugo 


Amiss. 


22 Refuted by Kleutgen, Theologie 
der Vorzeit, Vol. II, pp. 616 sqq., 
Miinster 1872. 

23 Among its adherents may be 
mentioned: Ambrosius.  Catharinus 


(Opusc. de Lapsu Hom.), Albertus 


18 


(De Poenit., disp. 7, sect. 2 and 
7 

24° Peccatum habituale est ipsa 
privatio gratiae.”’ 

25 “ Privatio gratiae non est pec- 
catum, sed poena peccati habitualis.”’ 


206 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


the nature of habitual sin cannot consist in the loss of 
grace. In what, then, does it consist? De Lugo an- 
swers: “ Peccatum habituale est ipsum peccatum actuale 
moraliter perseverans, physice autem praeteritum, in or- 
dine ad reddendum hominem rationabiliter exosum 
Deo.” *® Since original sin is plainly not an actual sin 
committed by him in whom it indwells, but merely a sin- 
ful state traceable to Adam, the same theologian con- 
sistently defines it as “ipsum peccatum actuale Adae 
moraliter perseverans, quamdiu parvulis non condonatur, 
in ordine ad reddendos eos rationabiliter exosos Deo.” ?* 
This morally enduring fault and its imputability is the 
reason why God withholds the jewel of sanctifying grace 
from every child at the moment of its conception. In 
other words, privation of grace is not the constitutive 
element of habitual sin, but merely a penalty due to it. 
This theory has been defended by a number of subtle 
arguments, which may be summed up as follows: (1) 
In the state of pure nature there would be habitual 
sins which would not entail the loss of sanctifying 
grace; consequently the privatio gratiae cannot consti- 
tute the essence of sin. (2) Habitual sins may be ve- 
nial sins, and in that case they do not entail the loss 
of supernatural grace; consequently, and a pari, habitual 
mortal sin (and therefore also original sin) does not 
essentially consist in the loss of supernatural grace. 
(3) It is far more consistent and more satisfactory to 
consider the loss of grace as a cessation of divine 
friendship, and therefore as a punishment for sin, rather 
than as a sin in itself. (4) If the privation of grace 
constituted the essence of habitual sin, repeated mortal 
sins would produce but one habitual sin, because sanc- 


26 De Poenit., disp. 7, sect. 2. 27 Op. cit., sect. 7. 


es 


NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 267 


tifying grace can be lost only once. In other words, 
all habitual mortal sins would be specifically equal to, or 
would constitute, but one sin,— which is absurd. For 
the solution of these subtle difficulties we refer the 
student to Palmieri.?8 


b) The theory which ‘we have just expounded, 
especially the exaggerated form in which it was 
championed by Ambrosius Catharinus and Al- 
bertus Pighius, is inadmissible: (1) On account 
of the dogmatic consequences which it involves, 
and (2) because it does not fully square with 
the Tridentine teaching. 


In its more moderate form, as propounded by Sal- 
meron, Toletus, and especially De Lugo,”® this theory 
is less objectionable, because these writers make two 
admissions which insure the orthodoxy of their system 
even if the Church should one day define it as an article 
of faith that the privation of grace enters into the formal 
essence of original sin.*° These admissions are: (1) 
That the sin of Adam is morally at least a real sin also 
in his descendants, and (2) that original sin cannot be 
conceived without a privatio gratiae. Ambrosius Catha- 
tinus maintains that original sin consists exclusively in 
the extrinsic imputability of the sin of Adam, and that 
his descendants, therefore, are not really sinners (ab 
imtrinseco) but are merely so called by a sort of di- 
vine imputation, somewhat after the manner in which, 

28 De Deo Creante, pp. 566 sqq., 30“ Ad rationem peccati originalis 
Romé 1878. bertinere privationem gratiae sancti- 

29In this form the theory was  ficantis.” Cfr, Schema Propos. 
also espoused by a number of minor Conc. Vatican. in the Collectio La- 


writers, e. g., Arriaga, Platel, Kil- censis, t. VII, pp. 517, 549. 
ber, Frassen, and Henno. 


268 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


in the Lutheran view of justification, man does not be- 
come internally justified by Baptism, but merely seizes 
the extrinsic justice of Christ and with it, as with a 
cloak of grace, covers the sinful nakedness of his soul. 
It is true that Catharinus refers to the privation of grace 
as a penalty of original sin; but he fails to establish any 
organic and necessary connexion between the two. Un- 
like De Lugo, he omits to accentuate the fact that the 
loss of sanctifying grace is er vi notionis an essential 
consequence of original sin. 


However, De Lugo’s theory, too, is open to 
objection: It fails to account for the individual 
guilt of original sin as an intrinsic (privative) 
quality, and does not get beyond the extrinsic 
imputation of the sin of Adam. If original 
sin in its formal essence were but the actual sin 
of Adam in so far as it morally continues in his 
descendants until forgiven by Baptism, it could 
not strike root in the souls of infants and exist 
in them as individual, physically inhering sin. 
The only quality of original sin that inheres in 
the individual, according to this theory, is the 
privation of grace, and this De Lugo and his 
school do not conceive. as the substance, but 
merely as a penalty of original sin. This view 
can hardly be harmonized with the fundamental 
conception underlying the Tridentine definition, 
to wit, that original sin is “transfusum ommi- 
bus et mest umicuque proprium,’*' and that 


81 Conc. Trident., Sess. V, can. 3. 


NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 269 


those affected with it “propriam iniustitiam 
contrahunt.” °° The Council goes even further 
than that; it adds that unrighteousness follows 
natural birth in precisely the same manner in 
which righteousness follows regeneration. This 
gives rise to the antithesis between nasci and 
contrahere propriam iniustitiam on the one 
hand, and renasci and iustum fieri gratia Christi 
on the other. Now the essence of justification 
consists in the infusion of sanctifying grace; and 
if this be true, then original sin (like habitual 
sin in general) essentially consists in the priva- 
tion of sanctifying grace. Thus the theory of 
De Lugo, and a fortiori that of Catharinus, falls 
to pieces. 

Thesis IV: Original sin essentially consists in pri- 
vation of grace, so far as this is voluntary in all men 
through the will of their progenitor. 

This proposition embodies a common teaching 
of Catholic theologians. 

Proof. We have to show: (1) that priva- 
tion of grace (privatio gratiae) constitutes the 
essence of original sin, and (2) that, through its 
causal relation to the sin of Adam, it involves guilt 
on the part of all who are affected by it. These 


two. elements, viz., privation of grace and the 


origin of this privation in voluntary guilt, to- 
gether constitute original sin. 
32 Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, cap. 3. 


270 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY, 


1. As regards the first of these elements, it 
follows from the preceding thesis that the pri- 
vatio gratiae is not merely a punishment, but 
original sin itself. Because of the importance 
of this proposition we shall restate the argument 
in a somewhat different form. 


a) It is an article of faith that infant Baptism so com- 
pletely obliterates original sin, qua guilt, that nothing 
odious or damnable remains in the regenerate infant.** 
This effect is produced solely by sanctifying grace, 
which Baptism infuses into the soul of the child. 
“ Nam sicut revera homines, nisi ex semine Adae pro- 
pagati nascerentur, non nascerentur iniusti, quum ed 
propagatione ... propriam imiustitiam contrahunt: ita 
nisi in Christo renascerentur, nunquam tustificarentur, 
quum ea renascentiad per meritum passionis eius gratia, 
gua iustt fiunt, illis tribuatur.8* Consequently original 
sin, considered as habitual sin, consists essentially in 
privation of grace, whereby the child becomes an enemy 
of God, just as he is constituted a friend of God by 
the sanctifying grace conferred in Baptism. 

b) Following in the footsteps of the Second Council 
of Orange (A.D. 528) the Tridentine Fathers teach * 
that original sin is “the death of the soul”? (mors ani- 
mae). Now, in the present economy of grace, the only 
way in which the soul can die is by being deprived of 
its supernatural life-principle, which is sanctifying grace. 
Let us put the argument into the form of an equation: 
privatio gratiae== mors animae= peccatum originale ; 
consequently, peccatum originale est privatio gratiae. 


38 Cfr. Conc. Trid., Sess. V, can. 34 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. 3. 
5; supra, pp. 243 Sq. 35 Sess. V, can. 2; supra. p. 243. 


NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 271 


c) According to the teaching of St. Paul * original 
sin and justification are opposed to each other as con- 
traries; to deny the one is to affirm the other, and vice 
versa. Now, if sanctifying grace constitutes divine son- 
ship or justice, then the absence of this grace (due to the 
guilt of Adam) must constitute the state of enmity with 
God, usually called original sin. 

d) We arrive at the same result by the method of 
elimination. The state of original justice in Paradise 
comprised the following factors: (1) Sanctifying grace 
as the primary element of original justice, (2) integrity 
of nature (immunitas a concupiscentia) as its secondary 
element, and (3) bodily immortality and impassibility 
as its tertiary element.*’ By original sin Adam for- 
feited all these prerogatives for himself and the whole 
human race, and they were superseded by their contraries, 
vig.: privation of grace, concupiscence, mortality, and 
passibility. Among these evils death and suffering are 
assuredly not sins, but merely inherited evils, or, to speak 
more accurately, penalties of sin. Concupiscence cannot 
constitute the substance of original sin, because the 
Church teaches that it remains in the soul after Bap- 
tism.** Consequently privation of grace must be the 
formal essence of original sin. 

These convincing arguments have led the majority of 
theologians to adopt the view formulated in our thesis.®9 


2. To render privation of grace.a sin, another 
factor must co-operate, namely the ratio volun- 


36 Rom. V, 15 sq. 145; Duns Scotus, Comment. in 
87 Cfr. supra, pp. 196 sqq. Quatuor Libros Sent., II, dist. 20; 
38 Cfr. supra, pp. 261 saqq. qu. 2; Dominicus Soto, De Nat. 


39 Cfr. St. Anselm, De Concept. 
Virg., c. 26; St. Thomas Aquinas, 
S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 82; De Malo, 
qu. 4, art. 1; Compend. Theol., c. 


et Grat., I, 9; Bellarmine, De Amiss. 
Grat., V, 9; Suarez, De Vitiis et 
Peccatis, disp. 9, sect. 2; and most 
other theologians, 


272 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


‘aru, 1. e., freely incurred guilt. Although sanc- 
tifying grace, even in baptized infants, is doubt- 
less more than a mere physical ornament of the 
soul (viz.: moral righteousness and_ sanctity, 
gratia sanctificans, iustificans), its loss involves 
real guilt only when it is due to a sinful act of 
voluntary renunciation. For every habitual sin 
postulates an actual sin, every guilt a moral 
crime, the death of the soul a sinful act of mur- 
der. To deny this fundamental principle of 
moral philosophy would be equivalent to Mani- 
chzism.*° Consequently, original sin, too, be- 
ing real guilt, must have for its efficient cause 
a sinful act. Where are we to look for this 
sinful act? In the case of infants it surely can- 
not be a personal sin, since an infant is guilty 
of original sin before he is able to commit a 
sinful personal act. The sin which causes pri- 
vation of grace in an infant, therefore, can be 
none other than the sin of Adam in Paradise, 
constituting in some way or other a real guilt in 
the infant as well. This is precisely the teaching 
of St. Paul. Rom. V,12: “Per unum hominem 
peccatum in hunc mundum intravit — By one 
man sin entered into this world.” Rom. V, 10: 


debeat esse voluntarium.”’ Likewise 
Prop. 47: “‘ Unde peccatum originis 


40 The Church has condemned 
the proposition (No. 46) of Baius: 


“Ad rationem et definitionem pec- 
cati non pertinet voluntarium, nec 
definitionis quaestio est, sed causae 
et originis, utrum omne peccatum 


vere habet rationem peccati sine ulla 
ratione ac respectu ad voluntatem, 
@ qua originem habutt.’’ 


NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 4 


“Per inobedientiam unius hominis peccatores 
constitutt sunt multi — By the disobedience of 
one man many were made sinners.” This is also 
the unanimous and firm belief of the Fathers of 
the Church. In the words of St. Augustine: 
“Omnes enim fuimus in illo uno, quando fuimus 
ule unus, qui per feminam lapsus est in peccatum 
— For we were all in that one man, when we 
were all [identical with] that one man who 
through a woman fell into sin.” 4 


3. To the question, why the sin of Adam inheres 
as a true sin, 7. ¢. as real guilt (reatus culpae) in all 
his decendants, we can only reply that this is a mystery 
which theological speculation is unable to explain. The 
following considerations are commonly adduced to refute 
certain philosophical objections. 

It was the will of God that Adam should be phys- 
ically and juridically the head of the human race, and, 
as such, should act as its representative. God had 
given him original justice and its concomitant pre- 
ternatural prerogatives not only as a personal privilege, 
but as a heritage which he was to transmit to all his de- 
scendants. In other words, original justice was essen- 
tially hereditary justice, original sanctity was essentially 
hereditary grace, and a privilege given to human nature 
as such. Consequently, hereditary grace and human 
nature were from the first causally related. The nexus 
existing between them was based neither on metaphysical 
_ hecessity nor on any legal claim, but was instituted 
by the free will of God. When Adam voluntarily re- 


- 41 De Civ. Dei, XIII, ia. A 42 Supra, pp. 216 sqq. 


274 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


nounced original justice, he acted not for himself alone, 
but as the representative of his race, as the moral and 
juridical head of the whole human family. Thus the 
loss of original justice was essentially a privation of 
hereditary justice, and as such tantamount to a volun- 
tary renunciation on the part of human nature of its. 
supernatural heritage. This voluntary renunciation in- 
volves an hereditary guilt, which is voluntary on the part 
of each and every individual human being, because Adam, 
acting as head and progenitor of the race, rejected sanc- 
tifying grace in the name.of his entire progeny. Con- 
sequently original sin is not a personal sin, but a sin of 
nature, conditioned upon our generic relation to Adam, 
who, contrary to the will of God, despoiled human 
nature of grace and thereby rendered it hostile to its 
Creator. 

It will be worth while to support this explanation by 
theological authorities. St. Anselm of Canterbury, who 
is called the Father of Scholasticism, writes luminously 
as follows: “In Adamo omnes peccavimus, quando ille 
peccavit, non quia tunc peccavimus ipsi qui nondum 
eramus, sed quia de illo futuri eramus, et tunc facta est 
necessitas, ut cum essemus peccaremus: quoniam per — 
unius inobedientiam peccatores constituti sunt multi.” 
St. Thomas Aquinas says with his usual clearness: 
“ Sicut autem est quoddam bonum, quod respicit naturam, © 
et quoddam quod respicit personam, ita etiam est quae- 
dam culpa naturae et quaedam personae. Unde ad cul- 
pam personae requiritur voluntas personae, sicut patet — 
in culpa actualt, quae per actum personae committitur. — 


Ad culpam vero naturae non requiritur nisi voluntas in | 


natura illa. Sic ergo dicendum est, quod defectus illius 


43 De Conc. Virg., c. 7. 


ahr 


NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 275 


originalis wustitiae, quae homini in sua creatione collata 
est, ex voluntate hominis accidit. Et sicut illud naturae 


donum fuit et fuisset in totam naturam propagatum 


homine m wstitia permanente, ita etiam privatio illius 
boni in totam naturam perducitur quasi privatio et vitium 
naturae; ad idem genus privatio et habitus referuntur. 
Et in quolibet homine rationem culpae habet ex hoc, 
quod per voluntatem principii naturae, 1. e. primi hominis, 
inductus est talis defectus.” ** Blessed Odo of Cambrai 
(+ 1113) graphically describes the difference between 


personal sin and sin of nature as follows: “ Peccatum, 


quo peccavimus in Adam, mihi quidem naturale est, in 
Adam vero personale. In Adam gravius, levius in me; 
nam peccavi in eo non qui sum, sed quod sum. Peccavi 
in €0 non ego, sed hoc quod sum ego; peccavi homo, non 
Odo; peccavt substantia, non persona. Et quia substan- 
tia non est nisi in persona, peccatum substantiae est 
etiam personae, sed non personale. Peccatum vero per- 
sonale est, quod facio ego, qui sum, non hoc quod sum; 
quo pecco Odo, non homo; quo pecco persona, non 
natura, Sed quia persona non est sine natura, peccatum 
personae est etiam naturae, sed non naturale.’ * 

The logical and theological possibility of original sin 
therefore depends upon three separate and distinct con- 
ditions: (1) The existence of a supernatural grace 
which was not due to human nature, and the absence of 


which entails enmity with God, 7. e., a state of sin; (2) 


_ The existence of an ontological nexus by which Adam 


and his descendants constitute a moral unity or monad; 
(3) The existence of a positive divine law conditioning 
the preservation or loss of hereditary grace upon the 


44 Comment. in Quatuor Libros  Cfr. also S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 81, 


 Sent., II, dist. 30, qu. 1, art. 2— art. 1; De Malo, qu. 4, art. 1. 


45 De Peccato Originali, 1. 2. 


276 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


personal free-will of our progenitor as the head and 
representative of the whole human family. 

God cannot be charged with cruelty or injustice on 
account of original sin, for He denies fallen man nothing 
to which his nature has a just claim. Adam’s headship 
was divinely intended for the purpose of transmitting 
original justice (not original sin) to all his descendants. 
God did not cause but merely permitted the Fall of 
man, perhaps with a view of making it the source 
of still greater blessings, such as the Incarnation, Re- 
demption, grace, etc. O felix culpa, o certe necessarium 
Adae peccatum! 

4. THE CONTRACTUAL AND THE ALLIGATION THEORIES. 
— To facilitate a deeper understanding of the com- 
munity of nature and will that unites Adam with the 
members of his family, there have been excogitated two 
separate and distinct theories, one of which is ‘called 
the theory of Contract, the other, the theory of Alliga- 
tion. The contractual theory (sometimes also called 
“ Federalism”), holds that God made a formal contract 
with Adam to this effect: If you preserve hereditary 
justice, it will be transmitted to all your descendants; 
but if you forfeit it, you will involve yourself and your 
posterity in misery and sin.** According to the other 
theory, God by a decretum alligativum so bound up the 
will of all of Adam’s descendants with that of their 
progenitor that the will of Adam became the will of his 
family, just as under the civil law a free-will act of a 
guardian is considered equivalent to that of his ward. 

It seems to us, however, that neither of these theories 
contributes anything to a profounder appreciation of 
the nature of original sin. If the causal nexus existing 


46 Thus Ambrosius Catharinus and others; cfr. De Rubeis, De Pecc. 
Orig., c. 61. 


ae 


at, Ecler 
se ene 


mre 


NATURE OF ORIGINAL SIN 277 


between Adam and his descendants was a positive ordi- 
nance of God, there was no need of a contract or decretum 
alligativum. If, on the other hand, we deny the existence 


of such a causal nexus, the transmission of Adam’s sin 


by inheritance becomes absolutely unintelligible. A breach 
of contract might result in an evil of nature, but it 
could never produce a sin of nature, while the inclusion 
of the will of Adam’s descendants in that of their pro- 
genitor per se can constitute only a nexus conditionis, 
but never a nexus unitatis. Revelation furnishes no 
basis whatever for such hypotheses, and Dominicus Soto 
is right in treating them as “ fictions.” 47 

One more important observation and we shall close. 
We have explained that original sin formally consists 
in privation of grace and that concupiscence is merely 
a resulting penalty. St. Thomas and several other emi- 
nent theologians regard concupiscence as an integral 
though secondary constituent of original sin, in fact as 
its materia (its forma being absence of grace).*® The 
Angelic Doctor explains this as follows: Every ha- 
bitual sin embraces two essential elements: (tr) A 


‘ turning away from God (aversio a Deo) and (2) a 


turning to the creature (conversio ad creaturam). The 
first is the formal, the second the material element. In 
the case of original sin, this turning to the creature 
manifests itself most drastically in concupiscence, and 
therefore concupiscence enters as an integral constituent 


into the essence of original sin and is thereby sharply 


differentiated from other evils such as mortality, suffer- 
ing, diabolical or external temptation, etc. In matter of 


47 For a more detailed treatment ter quidem est concupiscentia, for- 
of these theories cfr. Palmieri, De maliter vero est defectus gratiae 


oh Deo Creante et Elevante, pp. 584  originalis.’ S. Theol., 1a z2ae, qu. 
1. sqd. Solaray: 


- 48° Peccatum originale materiali- 


278 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


fact concupiscence, though not in itself sinful, lies very 
near the line that divides the physical from the moral 
order; so much so that even its unconscious movements 
(motus primoprimi) are, materialiter, opposed to the 
moral law, and escape being sins only by the circumstance 
that the will withholds its formal consent. It is in this 
sense we must understand St. Augustine, when he speaks 
of a reatus concupiscentiae, as for instance in the follow- 
ing passage: “Cuius concupiscentiae reatus in baptis- 
mate solvitur, sed infirmitas manet, cur donec sanetur, 
omnis fidelis, quit bene proficit, studiosissime relucta- 
tur.’ 4° This view, which was adopted by some of the 
Schoolmen, must not be confounded with the heretical 
teaching of the Protestant Reformers, or with that of 
the Jansenists.°° The Tridentine Council originally 
intended to defend this Scholastic view against its op- 
ponents by adding to its first draft of the Decretum 
de Peccato Originali the words: “ Non improbare Syno- 
dum eorum theologorum assertionem, qui aiunt, manere 
post baptismum partem materialem peccati originalis 
[scil. concupiscentiam], non formalem.” This clause 
was, however, omitted from the final draft of the de- 
Cree. 


REapDINGS : — Berlage, Dogmatik, Vol. V, pp. 249 sqq., Miinster 
1860.— *Schliinkes, Wesen der Erbsiinde, Ratisbon 1863.— Hur- 
ter, Compend. Theol. Dogmat.,-t. II, n. 407 sqq., Oeniponte 1806. 


_(S. J. Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 3908 © 
sqq.).— G. Pell, Das Dogma von der Sitinde und Erlésung im — 


Lichte der Vernunft, Ratisbon 1886—*Scheeben, Mysterien des 


Christentums, §§ 40 sqq., 3rd ed., Freiburg 1912——J. H. Busch, 


Das Wesen der Erbsiinde nach Bellarmin und Suarez, Paderborn if 


49. Retract., I, 315,\2.—Cfr. St. 50 Cfr. Second Thesis, supra, pp. 
Thomas, S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 82, 261 sqq. 


art. 3. 51Cfr. Pallavicini, Hist. Conc. 


Trident., VII, 9. 


TRANSMISSION OF ORIGINAL SIN 279 


1909.— S. Harent, art. “Original Sin” in the Catholic Ency- 
clopedia, Vol. XI—C. Cutberlet, Gott und die Schopfung, pp. 360 
sqq., Ratisbon 1910. 


ARTICLE 4 


HOW ORIGINAL SIN IS TRANSMITTED 


1. THe Specrric Unity or Oricinat Sin— 
Our guiding principle in this Article must be that 
original sin is specifically one in all men, and that 
it comes down to us from the first sin of our proto- 
parents in Paradise. By its peculiar mode of 
transmission original sin is numerically multiplied 
as many times as there are children of Adam born 
into the world. Yet in each and every one of 
these there inheres one and the same specific 
sin, 1. e., the sin of Adam, with no difference 
either of essence or degree so far as gravity is 
concerned. Such is the express teaching of the 
Church. “Hoc Adae peccatum,’ says the Tri- 
dentine Council, “quod origine unum est, propa- 
gatione transfusum, omnibus inest unicuique 
proprium — This sin of Adam, one in its origin, 
being transfused aay all by eae SAAT is in 
each one as his own.’ 

It is a controverted question among theologians 


whether original sin derives solely from Adam or from 
both Adam and Eve as its efficient cause; or, rather, 


whether there would be an original sin if Eve alone 


1 Cone. Trident., Sess. V, can. 3. 


280 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


had fallen. Holy Scripture seems to answer this ques- 
tion in the negative; for whenever it refers to original 
sin, it speaks of it as the “sin of Adam” (peccatum 
Adami) or the “sin of one man” (peccatum unius 
hominis).2 In point of fact Adam alone was qualified 
to act as the head and representative of the human 
race. The apparently dissentient text Ecclus. XXV, 33: 
“A muliere initium factum est peccati et per tlam 
omnes morimur — From the woman came the beginning 
of sin, and by her we all die,” is merely a statement of 
the historic fact that Eve seduced her husband. Hence, 
in the words of St. Thomas, “ Original sin-is not con- 
tracted from the mother, but from the father. Accord- 
ingly, if Adam had not sinned, even though Eve had, 
their children would not have contracted original sin; 
the case would be different if Adam had sinned and Eve 
had not.”*® It remains to be explained how original sin 
is transmitted from Adam to his descendants. 


2. THE TRANSMISSION OF ORIGINAL SIN BY 
NaTURAL GENERATION.—To solve this problem 
we must first examine in what way the nature 
of Adam is transmitted to his descendants. 


The answer obviously is—by sexual generation. © 
By this same act the child also contracts natural 
or original sin. The Catholic formula for this _ 


truth reads: “Generatione contrahitur pecca- 
tum,’* or: “Adae peccatum propagatione 
transfusum,’ © which is diametrically opposed to 


2B. ‘go; Rom: Vy) 12 Vsqq. 5 Cfr. the Council of Trent, Sess. 
3\S. Theol: ra 2ae; qu, (81, art. 5. V, canon 3. 
4 Cfr. the Second Council of Mil- 

eve, canon 2. 


TRANSMISSION OF ORIGINAL SIN 281 


the Pelagian heresy that “sin is transmitted by 
imitation, not by propagation.” ° 


Original sin can be transmitted only by the natural 
mode of sexual generation, 7. e., the commingling of 
male with female, because this is the way in which all 
children of Adam come into being. Hence the frequent 
occurrence of the phrase “ex semine Adae”’ in the 
various definitions of our dogma.’ If any man, therefore, 
though a descendant of Adam, were not born ex semine 
Adae, he would not be subject to original sin. This is 
the case of our Lord Jesus Christ, who was “ conceived by 
the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin Mary.” ® Not so 
His mother, who was miraculously conceived without 
original sin in view of the merits of her Divine Son? 
When, as in the case of St. John the Baptist, the lack of 
generative power (regardless of whether it is due to fe- 
male sterility or male impotency) is miraculously sup- 
plied by God, there is sexual generation, and consequently 
also original sin. 


3. ORIGINAL SIN AND CREATIONISM.—The 
Catholic teaching that original sin is transmitted 
by sexual generation contains the solution of a 
great difficulty, which caused St. Augustine to 


6 Cir. supra, p. 243. Spiritu Sancto.... Et propter hoc 


“Cir. Conca Trid.,) Sess. V1, cap. 
4; Supra, p. 270. 

8 Circ. St. Thomas, S. Theol., 3a, 
Gi. fs, dart. t;/4ad). 20. “Unde 
Christus non fuit in Adam secun- 
dum seminalem rationem, sed solum 
secundum corpulentam substantiam. 
Et ideo Christus non accepit active 
ab Adam humanam naturam, sed 
solum materialiter, active vero a 


19 


Christus non peccavit in Adam, in 
quo fuit solum secundum materiam.”? 
For a more detailed treatment of 
this subject we must refer the 
reader to the dogmatic treatise on 
the Incarnation. - 

9The dogme of the Immaculate 
Conception belongs to Mariology, 
to which we shall devote volume VI 
of this series of dogmatic text-books. 


282 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


waver between Creationism and Generationism.* 
The Pelagian argument was substantially this: 
A spiritual soul cannot originate otherwise than 
by a creative act of God. But since nothing im- 
pure can come from the hands of God, it is absurd 
to say that the human soul is contaminated by 
original sin. The solution of the difficulty is as 
follows: The parents engender the whole child, 
not merely its body. This is not, of course, to 
be understood in the sense that they create the 
spiritual soul. What they do is to produce a 
material substratum which is determined and dis- 
posed by the laws of nature to receive a spiritual 
soul. This soul, forming a constitutive element 
of that human nature for which the parents lay 
the foundation, incurs original sin, not on account 
of its creation by God, but in consequence of the 
genesial connexion of the human nature, of which 
it forms a part, with Adam. “Sic ergo originale 
peccatum est in anima,’ says St. Thomas, “in 
quantum pertinet ad humanam naturam. Hu- 
mana autem natura traducitur a parente in hlium 


per traductionem carnis, cut postmodum anima in- — 


funditur, et ex hoc infectionem incurrit.” * Bel- 
larmine gives an equally clear explanation in his 


treatise De Amissione Gratiae: “Siquidem ani- — 


ma ut prius intelligitur creart a Deo, mhil habet 
cum Adamo ac per hoc non commumicat eius pec- 


10 Supra, pp. 169 sqq. 11 De Potent., qu. 3, art. 9, ad 6. 


CONCUPISCENCE 283 


cato, sed quum in corpore generato ex Adamo in- 
cipit habitare et cum ipso corpore unum SUp posi- 
tum facere, tunc peccatum originis trahit.’ ” 


It follows that original sin in the soul of a new-born 
babe is produced neither by Almighty God nor by the 
child’s parents. It is not produced by God, for He merely 
creates the soul, just as He would do were man in a state 
of pure nature, and refrains from endowing it with sancti- 
fying grace for the sole reason that it is destined to be the 
substantial form of a body which is derived by genera- 
tion from Adam. Nor is original sin produced by the 
child’s parents, because the parents merely beget a human 
nature, regardless of whether it is to be constituted in 
righteousness or sin. The efficient cause of original sin 
is purely and solely Adam. “ Infectio originalis peccatt 
nullo modo causatur a Deo, sed ex solo peccato primi 
parentis per carnalem generationem,” says Aquinas.1° 
This is the reason why even pious and saintly parents 
beget their children in the state of original sin. For, 
as St. Augustine observes, “ parents, though themselves 
regenerated, beget not children inasmuch as they are 
born of God, but inasmuch as they are still children of 
the world.” 14 


4. THE Part PLAYED BY CONCUPISCENCE IN 
THE TRANSMISSION OF ORIGINAL S1n.—To pre- 
vent misunderstanding and to acquire a clearer 
notion of original sin and the manner of its prop- 
agation, we must carefully distinguish (1) be- 


12 De Amiss. Grat., V, 15. “It qui generant, sit iam regenerati 
13S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 83, art. sunt, non ex hoc generant, quod 
¥, adi. filu Det sunt, sed ex hoc, quod 


14 De Nupt. et Concup., 1, 18, 20: adhuc filii saeculi.” 


284 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


tween actual and habitual concupiscence, (2) be- 
tween concupiscence in the begetting parents and 
in the begotten child, and (3) between material 
and formal concupiscence. 


a) Whether concupiscence be conceived actually as an 
evil commotion, or habitually as an evil disposition, the 
fact that it exists both in the begetting parents and the 
begotten child furnishes an inductive proof of the actual 
transmission of original sin by sexual generation. It is an 
article of faith that the loss of integrity is a penalty of 
original sin. Had not human nature, through Adam, vol- 
untarily renounced sanctifying grace, and with it all the 
preternatural prerogatives with which it was originally 
endowed (including the perfect dominion of reason over 
the lower passions), neither parents nor children would 
now be subject to concupiscence. The existence of 
concupiscence, which is the result of sin, may, therefore, 
from the standpoint of Catholic dogma, be taken as a 
certain proof for the existence of original sin, which is 
its underlying cause. We say, from the standpoint of 
Catholic dogma, for human reason would be unable to 
draw this conclusion without the aid of Revelation, be- 
cause in the state of pure nature, which we know to 


be possible, concupiscence might exist without being © 


caused by sin. 

b) Taken in the more limited sense of formal con- 
cupiscence of the flesh as manifested in the act of sexual 
generation, concupiscence is not the proper cause of the 
transmission of original sin, nay it is not even a necessary 
condition of such transmission. We know from Divine 
Revelation that the principal cause of original sin is the 


transgression of Adam. Sexual generation, whether ac- — 


a rn. 


CONCUPISCENCE 285 


companied by concupiscence or not, is merely instru- 
mental. 

St. Augustine, instead of regarding concupiscence as a 
mere mode, or an inevitable concomitant, of sexual gen- 
eration (in the state of fallen nature), held it to be 
the instrumental cause of original sin. Such at least 
seems to be the tenor of a number of passages in his 
writings; e. g.: “The very embrace which is honorable 
and permitted, cannot be effected without the ardor of 
concupiscence. . . . Now from this concupiscence what- 
ever comes into being by natural birth is tied and bound 
by original sin.”*® It was due to the influence of this 
great Doctor (who, as we have pointed out before, found 
himself unable to form a definite opinion with regard to 
the comparative merits of Generationism and Creation- 
ism),*° that Peter Lombard and others of the Schoolmen 
unduly exaggerated the part played by concupiscence in 
the transmission of original sin.7 Even if a child were 
miraculously begotten without concupiscence on the part 
of its parents, it would yet be tainted by original sin, 
because born of the seed of Adam. Such a child would 
come into the world precisely like other children,— not 
in a state of pure nature, nor yet in the state of sanc- 
tifying grace, but defiled by original sin: and it would 
consequently need Baptism just as much as any other 
child. Consequently the “ ardor of concupiscence ” is not 
a necessary condition, much less the instrumental cause, 
of original sin. 

c) In its material sense, however, 7. e., as sexual com- 
merce, or the conjugal embrace, concupiscence is the 


15 De Nupt. et Concup., I, 24, 27: broles, originali est obligata pec- 


““Ipse ille licitus honestusque con- cato.” 
cubitus non potest esse sine ardore 16 Supra, pp. 169 sqq. 
libidinis. ... Ex hac carnis con- 17 Cfr. Peter Lombard, Lib, Sent., 


cupiscentia quaecumque  nascitur . II, dist. 30, 31. 


286 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


instrumental cause of original sin, because original sin is 
transmitted by sexual generation. It is in this sense that 
the Fathers of the Church, and especially St. Augustine, 
say that where there is no concupiscence of the flesh, 
there is no original sin. They take absentia concupis- 
centiae as meaning sine opere viri, or sine amplexu mari- 
tali.* Jesus Christ is the only man who was thus con- 
ceived,*? 


Reapincs: —*Kilber (Theol. Wirceburg.), De Peccato Ori- 
ginali, cap. 3— Katschthaler, Theol. Dogmat. Specialis, Vol. I, 
Ratisbon 1878.— Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual of Catholic Theology, 
Vol. II, pp. 30 sqq., 2nd ed., London igor. 


’ 


ARTICLE 5 


THE PENALTIES OF ORIGINAL SIN 


Although the penalties of original sin are practically 
the same for Adam’s descendants as they were for Adam 
himself, there is a difference in degree. Our first 
parents deserved a severer punishment for their actual 
transgression than their unfortunate descendants, who 
have committed no personal fault but are merely tainted 
by inherited guilt. The sin of our first parents was a 
mortal sin, while that with which their descendants are 
born is merely a sin of nature, and consequently, in 
point of co-operation, there is less guilt in original sin 
than even in the smallest venial sin. This is the express 
teaching of St. Thomas.? 


18 Cfr. St. Augustine, De Gen. 1 Comment. in Quatuor Libros 
ad Lit., X, 20; Leo the Great, Sent; Wb, dist.’ 33; give 0a, nae 
Serm. de Nativitate Domini, 2. 1, ad 2: “Inter omnia peccata 


19 St. Anselm has left us a special minimum est originale, eo quod 
treatise on this subject under the minimum habet de voluntario. Non 
title of De Conceptu Virginali et enim est voluntarium voluntate is- 
Peccaito Oritginali. tins personae, sed voluntate princi- 


a & - > f i 
A ey ee i i nD Mee 


EFFECTS OF ORIGINAL SIN 287 


But why does God, who punishes venial sin only with 
purgatory, visit original sin -with eternal damnation? 
For the reason that, in the words of Francis Sylvius, 
original sin by its very nature imports privation of jus- 
tice, and he who is infected with it lacks that grace by 
which alone the punishment can be lifted. 


I. THE PENALTIES OF ORIGINAL SIN IN THE 
WAYFARING STATE.—In order to gain a clear 
notion of the effects of original sin, let us consider 
an unbaptized infant. He is free from personal 
guilt, mortal or venial, and tainted solely by the 
stain of original sin. A consideration of his 
condition here below and his fate in the next 
world, should he die before receiving Baptism, 
will give us a good idea of the nature of original 
sin and the penalties which it entails. 

Divine Revelation enables us to reduce the ef- 
fects of original sin in the status viae to four dis- 
tinct groups, all of which are penalties until Bap- 
tism removes their guilt and together with it their 
characteristic as a punishment; some of them, 


et subiectum eius, nimirum homo, 
invenitur sine gratia, per quam 


pi naturae tantum [scil. Adae]. 
Peccatum enim actuale, etiam ve- 


niale, est voluntarium voluntate eius 
in quo est, et ideo minor poena 
debetur originali quam veniali.”’ 
2Fr. Sylvius, Comment. in S. 
Hie Ole he TAZA LGU Orel arion: Se 
“Quod originali peccato debeatur 
poena aeterna, non est simpliciter 
ratione suae gravitatis, sed est ex 
conditione peccati et subjecti, quia 
peccatum illud importat [natura 


Sua] privationem iustitiae et gratiae, 


solum remissio poenae fieri potest.” 
(Sylvius was an eminent Scholastic 
theologian of the seventeenth cen- 
tury, whose commentary on the 
Summa of St. Thomas is distin- 
guished by great clarity and com- 
pleteness. See P. von Loe in the 
Kirchenlexikon, Vol. XI, 2nd ed., 
col. 1042 sq.) Cfr. also St. Thomas, 
De} Malo) (quien. arti) nad 4.0% Sy 
Theol 3a) "aa. a vagts 4: 


288 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


however, continue as mere consequences of orig- 
inal sin even after Baptism. 

a) By far the worst effect of original sin in 
the theological order is the privation of sanctify- 
ing grace,* which involves the loss of all its super- 
natural concomitants, such as adoptive sonship, 
the theological virtues, the seven gifts of the 
Holy Ghost, ete.* The privation of these strictly 
supernatural gifts, entailing as it does the loss 
of all claim to Heaven and of the right to actual 
graces (these can, however, be regained by Bap- 
tism), plainly bears the stamp of a just punish- 
ment. But even in the privatio gratiae there is 
besides the element of guilt also an element of 
punishment. 

Privation of grace implies (1) the turning away of 
man from God (aversio hominis a Deo), which con- 
stitutes the nature of original sin as such; (2) a turning 
away of God from man (aversio Dei ab homine), i. e., 
the anger and indignation of God against the sinner, 
which constitutes the punishment for sin,—a _ punish- 
ment that manifests itself in the privation of sanctify- 
ing grace. It is in this latter sense that St. Thomas 
teaches: ‘“ Conveniens poena peccati originalis est sub- 
tractio gratiae et per consequens visioms divinae.’*® And 
again: ‘“Subtractio originalis iustitiae habet rationem 
poenae.” ® : 


, 8&8 Supra, pp. 269 saqq. published as Volume VII of this 
4For a detailed treatment of _ series. 
these prerogatives consult the dog- 5 De Malo, qu. 5, art. 1. 


matic treatise on Grace, to be 6S. Theol., 1a 2ae, que 8s, arte Ss. 


EFFECTS OF ORIGINAL. SIN 289 


b) The most disastrous effect of original sin 
in the moral order is concupiscence, so touch- 
ingly described by St. Paul? as “the law of sin 
that is in my members.” *® Second among the 
evil effects of original sin, because most. inti- 
mately related to concupiscence, is the rebellion 
of the flesh against the spirit. Not only does 
man’s tendency to evil furnish evident proof of 
the existence of original sin,® but concupiscence 
even in its unpremeditated stirrings—including 
the irascible passions—not only furnishes the 
occasion for a large number of actual sins, but 
leads directly to material sins.!° It is for this 
reason that St. Paul in his Epistle to the Romans 
calls concupiscence sin, and St. Thomas Aqui- 
nas treats it as an integral constituent—more 
specifically as the material component—of orig- 
inal sin. 

c) In the physical order, death, passibility, the 
suffering caused by disease, unhappiness, etc., 
are not mere consequences but also penalties of 
original sin; and this is as true of every man born 
in the state of original sin as it was of Adam 
himself. Chief among these evils is the death 
of the body, which in most of the Scriptural 
texts dealing with the subject is emphasized as 
the typical penalty of sin in the physical order.1! 

7 Rom. VII, 14 sqq. 10 Supra, pp. 277 sqq. 


8 Lex peccati, lex in membris. ~ 11 Cfr. Rom. V, r2 sqq. 
9 Supra, pp. 283 sqq. ; 


290 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


The Council of Trent describes this whole cate- 
gory of evils by the phrase, “mors et poenae cor- 
poris.® 77 


Special mention must be made of the disturbed rela- — 


tion of fallen man to nature, especially to the animal 
kingdom. In enumerating the prerogatives enjoyed by 
Adam in Paradise, the Roman Catechism expressly says 
that he ruled over the brute creation. This teaching is 
well supported by Gen. I, 26 sqq. Adam forfeited this 
prerogative both for himself and his descendants, but 
through the merits of Jesus Christ it was restored in a 
limited degree and by way of exception to certain of the 
Saints (St. Francis of Assisi, among others). 


d) Another, extrinsic, penalty of original sin 
is the dominion of Satan, under which humanity 
has groaned ever since the Fall. In casting off 
the divine law man voluntarily shouldered the 


galling yoke of the Devil and became his slave. _ 


2 Pet. II, 19: “A quo enim quis superatus est, 
huius et servus est-— For by whom a man 1s 
overcome, of the same also he is the slave.” The 
Fall of our first parents inaugurated the diabol- 
ical regimen which caused Christ to describe 
Satan as “the prince of this world,” ** while St. 
Paul went so far as to refer to him as “the god 


of this world.” +4 With the Fall also began the — 


temptation of man by the Devil, the worship of 


12 Conc. Trid., Sess. V, can. 2. 14iSCOL nL Vy od. 
18 John. XII, 31; XIV, 30. 


' 
/ * 
7 i ‘ 
i ee ee Se ee ee 


THE DOGMA OF FREE-WILL 291 


demons, idolatry, the deception practiced by 
pagan oracles, diabolical possession, etc.*® 


It is interesting to note that the Tridentine Council 
refers to the captivitas diaboli as the cause of death, and 
speaks of the Devil as exercising a “reign of death.” 16 
What are we to understand by this “reign of death”? 
Surely something more than bodily decay. It means the 
power of evil, which is quite as truly a reign of death 
as the dominion of Jesus Christ is a power unto life. 
“The opposition of life and death,’ remarks Glossner, 
“is personified in Christ on the one hand, and in the 
Devil on the other. Christ is the author and ruler of 
life, because He is life itself. The Devil is irretrievably 
doomed to eternal death by his personal conduct, and 
is consequently ‘the prince of death,’ the ruler of the 
-empire of death.’ ’’ 17 


2. THE DocMa oF FREE-WILL.—It is an ar- 
ticle of faith that even in the state of original 
sin man retains full liberty of choice between 
good and evil. 


Liberty in general is immunity either (1) from exter- 
nal compulsion (libertas a coactione), or (2) from 
inward necessitation (libertas a necessitate). Free- 
will embraces both and may therefore be explained as 
active indifference of doing or not doing a thing (libertas 


15 On the Devil’s dominion over 
the human race as manifested in 
our own day, cfr. J. Godfrey Rau- 
pert, The Supreme Problem, Buf- 
falo 1910, pp. 80 sqq.;- on diabolical 
possession, infra, pp. 346 sqq. 

16 Conc. Trid., Sess. V, cani-t: 

- et cum morte [incurrit Adam] 


oe 
. 


captivitatem sub eius potestate, qui 
mortis deinde habuit imperium, i. e. 
diabolit.” Cfr. Heb. II, 14. See 
also Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, cap. t. 
17 Dogmatik, p. 348 sq. Fora fur- 
ther treatment of this point see 
Theoph. Raynaud, De _  Attribut. 


. Christi, sect. 5, c. 15, Lugduni 166s. 


292 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


contradictions sive exercitti), of doing it thus or other- 
wise (libertas spectficationis), of doing what is good or 
what is evil (libertas contrarietatis). The last-men- 
tioned kind of liberty is not a prerogative, but a defect 
of free-will. The libertas contradictionis constitutes the 
complete essence of free-will; for he who is able freely 
to will or not to will, is eo ipso also able to will this 
particular thing or that. Hence the term free-will 
(liberum arbitrium, libertas indifferentiae). The ne- 
cessity consequent upon a free act does not destroy, 
but rather includes free-will, and is therefore called 
necessitas consequens s. consequentiae, in contradistinc- 
tion to necessitas antecedens s. consequentis, which de- 
termines the will.** As soon as the will, by determining 
itself, has performed a free act, this act becomes a his- 
torical fact and cannot be undone. This is what is 
called historical necessity. There is another kind of 
necessity, termed hypothetical, which does not destroy 
the liberty of the will; for to will an end one must needs 
will those means without which the end cannot be at- 
tained. A traveller who insists on visiting a city which 
can be reached in no other way than by water, must 
necessarily choose the water route, though he may en- 
joy untrammeled liberty of choice with regard to his 
starting point and different lines of steamers. The dis- 
tinction between physical and ethical freedom of choice 
does not affect substance but merely extension. Physical 
liberty extends to morally indifferent actions, such as 
walking, reading, writing, and so forth, whereas ethical 
liberty refers solely to such actions as are morally good 
or bad. The theologian is concerned with ethical liberty 


18 Cfr, Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 


365 sqq. 


THE DOGMA OF FREE-WILL 203 


only, and our thesis is that man enjoys freedom of choice 
between good and bad even in the state of original sin. 


a) Luther asserted that ethical liberty was 
so completely destroyed by original sin that fallen 
man is compelled to do good or evil according as 
Mood’ or the Devil ridés him.” “Uhis) teaching 
has been expressly condemned as heretical. “S1 
quis liberum homims arbitrium post Adae pec- 
catum amissum et extinctum esse dixerit, .. . 
anathema sit—AIf{ any one assert that the free 
will of man was lost and became extinct after 
the sin of Adam, let him be anathema.” It 
was on the denial of free-will that Calvin based 
his terrible doctrine of Predestination. | 

a) The dogmatic teaching of the Church is 
supported by all those numerous texts of Scrip- 
ture which describe the human will, even in the 
condition in which it finds itself after the Fall, 
as exercising a free choice between good and 
evil, life and death, the worship of the true God 
and idolatry, and which expressly ascribe to 
man the power of governing his passions. To 
quote only a few passages: Deut. XXX, Io: 
“Testes invoco hodie coelum et terram, quod 
proposuerim vobis vitam et mortem, benedic- 
tionem et maledictionem; elige ergo vitam —I 


19 Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, can. 5 (in Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, 
Mm.) S15). 


294 ‘DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


call heaven and earth to witness this day, that 
I have set before you life and death, blessing 
and cursing. Choose therefore life.” Josue 
XXIV, 15: “Optio vobis datur; eligite hodie, 
quod placet, cui servire potissimum debeatis, 
utrum dus, quibus servierunt patres vestri in 
Mesopotamia, an diis Amorrhaeorum, in quorum 
terra habitatis: ego autem et domus mea servie- 
mus Domino — You have your choice: choose this 
day that which pleaseth you, whom you would 
rather serve, whether the gods which your 
fathers served in Mesopotamia, or the gods of 
the Amorrhites, in whose land you dwell: but 
as for me and my house we will serve the Lord.” 
Gen. IV, 7: “Sub te erit appetitus ews, et tu 
dominaberis illius — The lust thereof shall be un- 
der thee, and thou shalt have dominion over iti 
There are many other passages in which Holy 
Scripture postulates liberty of choice by com- 
manding or suggesting something conditioned 
upon man’s free will. Cfr., e. g., Matth. XIX, 
17: “ Si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata — 
If thou wilt enter into life, keep the command- 
ments.” St. Paul freely admits the existence of 
a moral and religious aptitude even in pagan na- 


tions, thereby indirectly teaching the doctrine of 
free-will.”° 


20 The references to prove this Theologie des hl. Paulus, 2nd ed., ae 


proposition will be found in Simar, Pp. 37 sqq., 81 sqq., Freiburg 1883. 


THE DOGMA OF FREE-WILL 295 

B) As regards the Fathers, Calvin himself admits 
that they unanimously defend free-will. The Greek 
Fathers *1 speak of the aire€odauov Tis Tov avVOporav dicews 
quite as often as their Latin colleagues of the liberum 
arbitrium.”? St. Augustine, on whom the Jansenists 
pretend to base their heterodox teaching, occasionally 
alludes to “a decline of free-will in consequence of 
original sin”;?? but the liberty he has in view is not 
the natural ethical liberty of the will; it is the freedom 
from concupiscence which our first parents enjoyed in 
Paradise and which they forfeited by original sin. Thus 
he says in his treatise Against Two Letters of the Pe- 
lagians: “For which of us can say that by the sin of 
the first man free-will perished from the human race? 
Through sin liberty indeed perished, but it was that — 
liberty which was in Paradise. .. . For free-will is so 
far from having perished in the sinner, that by it all 
Sins 4s 


b) In addition to its denial of free-will, Jan- 
senism upheld another grievous heresy, viz.: that 
in the state of fallen nature mere freedom from. 
external compulsion (libertas a coactione) is 
sufficient to produce merit or demerit. The 
third of the series of condemned propositions ex- 


21. g., Basil (In Is., I, 19) and 
John of Damascus (De Fide Ortho- 
doxa, II, 12). 

22 A large number of Patristic 
texts bearing on this doctrine has 
been collected by Bellarmine, De 
Grat. et Lib. Arbit., V, 25 sqq. 

23 Thus, e. g., in the oft-quoted 
passage: “Libero arbitrio male 
utens homo et se perdidit et ipsum.” 


(Enchir, 30; Migne, P. L., XL, 
246.) i 

24 Contra Duas Epist. Pelag., I, 
2, 5: “Quis nostrum dicat, quod 
primi hominis peccato perierit li- 
berum arbitrium de humano genere? 
Libertas quidem periit per peccatum, 
sed illa, quae in Paradiso fuit. . . 
Nam liberum arbitrium usque adeo 
in peccatore non periit, ut per illud 
peccent.” 


. 


296 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


tracted from the writings of Jansenius reads: 
“Ad merendum et demerendum in statu naturae 
lapsae non requiritur in homine libertas a neces- 
sitate, sed sufficit libertas a coactione.” => This 
proposition was condemned as heretical; hence 
it is an article of faith that the will, to be en- 
tirely free in its actions, must not only be exempt 
from external compulsion, but must intrinsically 
determine itself; in other words, it must be abso- 
lutely free also from intrinsic necessity.?° 

a) Sacred Scripture accentuates the sover- 
eignty of the will over its interior actions quite 
as strongly as the essential dependence of the 
ethical merit or demerit of our free-will actions 
on the absence of all manner of intrinsic necessi- 
tation. St. Paul says of him who has the choice 
between the married state and virginity: ‘Hav- 
ing no necessity, but having power of his own 
will (Hy €xov avayxyy, ovoiay Sé exer wept rod idiov OeAua- 
ms). #7 And in Eeclus. XXKI, 8 sqq., the 
moral value of human actions is described as 
necessarily conditioned by free determination: 
“Beatus dives, qui inventus est sine macula, et 


qui post aurum non abut nec speravit im pecunia — 


et thesauris. Quis est lic? et laudabimus eum; 
fecit enim mirabiliain vita sua. Quit probatus 
est in illo et perfectus est, erit ili gloria aeterna; 


25 Denzinger-Bannwart,  Enchiri- 26 Cfr. St. Thomas, De Malo, qu. — 


dion, 0. 1094. ; 
Pagid \Ofoy SIRNA WISE Y, B 


THE DOGMA OF FREE-WILL 297 


gui potuit transgredi et non est transgressus, 
facere mala et non fecit — Blessed is the rich man 
that is found without blemish: and that hath not 
gone after gold, nor put his trust in money nor 
in treasures. Who is he, and we will praise 
him, for he hath done wonderful things in his 
life. Who hath been tried thereby, and made 
perfect, he shall have glory everlasting. He 
that could have transgressed, and hath not. 
transgressed, and could do evil things, and hath 
not done them.” 

8) This conception, which is based upon the 
most elementary moral sentiment, dominates 
the writings of the Fathers to such an extent 
that it was only by the most violent sophistry 
that Jansenius was able to base his heretical 
teaching on the utterly misunderstood dictum 
of St. Augustine: “Quod amplius nos delec- 
tat, secundum id operemur necesse est — We 
must of necessity act according to that which 
pleases us most.” ** By delectatio St. Augustine 
does not mean the unfree impulse which in the 
impulses called motus primo-primi overpowers the 
will; but that deliberate delectation which mo- 
tivates the determination of the will. That a 
man may repel the attraction of grace as freely 
as he may resist the incitements of the senses, 


28 In Galat., 49. (Migne, P. L., the student is advised to consult the 
XXXV, 2141). For a more detailed dogmatic treatise on Grace. 
discussion of this and kindred topics | 

20 


298 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


Augustine knew from his own experience, for 
he says in his Confessions: “Non faciebam, 
quod et incomparabili affectu amplius mihi place- 
bat — I did not do that which pleased me incom- 
parably more.” * At no time in his life did 
this great and holy Doctor ever deny. free-will 
or teach that freedom from external compulsion 
is sufficient to render a moral action meritorious. 
“God gave free-will to the rational soul which 
is in man,” he says in his treatise against For- 
tunatus. “Thus man was enabled to have 
merits: if we are good by our own will, not of 
necessity. Since, therefore, it behooved man to 
be good not of necessity, but by his own will, 
God had to give to the soul free-will.”’ ®° 

3. How Nature ts “WouNDED” By ORIGINAL 
Stn.—The Scholastic theory of the vulneratio 
naturae is based on the ancient teaching of the 
Church that original sin entailed a serious de- 
terioration of both body and soul,?* and on the 
doctrine of various councils that it weakened and 
warped free-will.*? 


29 Confess., VIII, 8, 20. 
senius taught that we necessarily 
follow the greater indeliberate at- 
traction, whether good or bad.) 

30 Contr. Fortunat., disp. 1, 15 
(Migne, P. L., XLII, 118): ‘ Ani- 
mae rationalit, quae est in homine, 
dedit Deus liberum arbitrium. Sic 
enim posset habere meritum, si 
voluntate, non necessitate boni es- 
semus. Cum ergo oporteat non ne- 


(Jan- 


cessitate, sed voluntate bonum esse, 
oportebat ut Deus animae daret 
liberum arbitrium.’ For a_ de- 
tailed refutation of the heretical 
teaching of Jansenius see Palmieri, 


De Deo Creante et Elevante, pp. © 


615 sqq., Romae 1878; cfr. also 
Pope Leo XIII’s Encyclical letter 
“ Libertas’ of June 20, 1888. 

31 Cfr. supra, pp. 218 sqq. 

82 Cfr. <Arausic. II, can. 252 


~ x = nae KS 
_—— 7 
nt Na ll ce asl a dies 5 —=—_S 


THE “WOUNDS OF NATURE” 299 

a) In attempting to estimate the extent of the injury 
which human nature suffered through original sin, and to 
determine the measure of its influence upon the attenuatio 
et inclinatio liberi arbitrii, St. Thomas Aquinas proceeds 
from the principle that fallen man — aside from original 
sin proper, as guilt— could experience a deterioration 
of his nature only with regard to those psychic faculties 
which are apt to be the seat of virtues, to wit: reason, 
will, pars irascibilis, and pars concupiscibilis. By op- 
posing to the four cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, 
fortitude and temperance) the four contrary vices of 
ignorance, malice, weakness, and cupidity, the Scholas- 
tics arrived at what they called the four ‘ wounds of 
nature” inflicted by original sin. It is quite obvious 
that free-will, too, was affected by these four vices, es- 
pecially by evil concupiscence.** Man suffers grievously 
from these wounds ** even after justification. 

b) Theologians are not agreed as to whether these 
“wounds of nature ”’ consist in an actual deterioration of 


“Liberum arbitrium atienuatum et 
inclinatum;’? Conc. Trid., Sess. VI, 
cap. tT: “ Tametsi in eis [scil. ho- 
minibus lapsis] liberum arbitrium 
minime extinctum esset, viribus licet 
attenuatum et inclinatum.” 

S3iCirn St.) Dhomass9.) Dneol, 1a 
2ae, qu. 85, art. 3: “ Per iustitiam 
originalem perfecte ratio continebat 
inferiores animae vires, et ipsa ratio 
a Deo perficiebatur ei subiecta. 
Haec autem originalis iustitia sub- 
tracia est per peccatum primi paren- 
tis. Et ideo omnes vires animae 
remanent quodammodo  destituiae 
proprio ordine, quo naturaliter or- 
dinantur ad virtutem, et ipsa desti- 
tutio vulneratio naturae  dicitur. 
Sunt autem quatuor potentiae 
animae, quae possunt esse subiecta 
virtutum, scil. ratio, 


in qua est 


prudenta; voluntas, in qua est ius- 
titia; trascibilis, in qua est fortt- 
tudo; concupiscibilis, in qua est 
temperantia. Inquantum ergo ratio 
destituitur suo ordine ad verum, 
est vulnus ignorantiae; inquantum 
vero voluntas destituitur ordine ad 
bonum, est vulnus malitiae; inquan- 
tum vero irascibilis destituitur suo 
ordine ad arduum, est vulnus in- 
firmitatis; inquantum vero concu- 
piscibilis destituitur ordine ad de- 
lectabile moderatum ratione, est 
vulnus concupiscentiae.” 

34 On the philosophical aspect of 
the Fall and the wounds- inflicted 
thereby on both the intellectual and 
the moral nature of man, see J. 
Godfrey Raupert, The Supreme 
Problem, 2nd ed., London and New 
York i911. 


300 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


the natural faculties of the soul, or merely in the priva- 
tion of supernatural justice. Of course, neither of the 
two contending schools dreams of asserting that original 
sin formally annihilated any natural faculty of the soul. 
The more moderate school contents itself with saying that 
fallen nature is merely the state of pure nature into 
which man was thrown back, while the extreme school 
insists that original sin seriously impaired the natural 
faculties of the soul. This difference of opinion ac- 
counts for the various interpretations put upon the 
well-known axiom: “Natura est spoliata gratuitis et 
vulnerata in naturalibus.” > The rigorists describe the 
relation of fallen man to man in a state of pure nature 
as that of a patient to one in the enjoyment of good 
health (aegroti ad sanum), while their opponents compare 
it to the relation of a man who has been stripped of 
his garments to one who has never had any (nudati 
ad nudum). A reconciliation of the two opinions is 
impossible except on the basis of a previous understand- 
ing with regard to the true conception of the so-called 
state of pure nature.*° 


4. THE EFFECTS OF ORIGINAL SIN IN THE 
STATUS TERMINI, OR THE Lot oF UNBAPTIZED 
CHILDREN.—Since original sin is not actual sin, 
but merely a sin of nature, the punishment in- 
flicted on those who die while involved in it can- 


35 Cfr. Bellarmine, De Gratia 
Primi Hominis, c. 6. 

36 Cfr. supra, pp. 228 sqq. The 
arguments for the rigorist view can 
be found in Alb. a Bulsano, Theol. 
Dogmat., ed. Gottefrid. a Graun, t. 
I, pp. 468 sqq., Oeniponte 1893, and 
France. Schmid, Quaest. Select. ex 
Theol. Dogmat., pp. 297 saqq., 


Paderbornae 1891. The case for 
the milder view, which seems to 
us to be the more probable one, is 
well stated by Palmieri, De Deo 
Creante et Elevante, th. 78 and 
Chr. Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. 
III, 3rd ed., pp. 152 sqq., Friburgi 
1908. 


THE LOT OF UNBAPTIZED CHILDREN 301 


not consist in physical suffering (poena sensus), 
but simply and solely in their exclusion from the 
beatific vision of God (poena damni). The 
hypothesis that they will be punished by fire 
(poena ignis) must be rejected as cruel and un- 
tenable. 


a) The rigoristic view alluded to in the last sentence 
had its defenders among the Fathers and early ecclesias- 
tical writers. We mention only Fulgentius,?? Avitus of 
Vienne,** and Pope Gregory the Great.2® It was advo- 
cated also by a few of the Schoolmen, e. G StiiAne 
selm,*° Gregory of Rimini‘! (who was called by the 
opprobrious name of “torturer of little children) ,” # 
and by Driedo,** Petavius,*4 Fr. Sylvius, and the so- 
called Augustinians, to whom may be added Bossuet 
and Natalis Alexander. St. Augustine,*® while admitting 
that the punishment of unbaptized children is “ the 
mildest punishment of all,” ® yet speaks of it as 1gms 
aeternus, so that Faure ** and others have charged him 
with advocating the more rigorous view.*® In matter of 
fact his attitude was one of uncertain hesitation. To- 
wards the end of his life he seems to have held that the 
penalty pronounced in Math. XXV, 41: “ Depart from 
me, you cursed, into everlasting fire,” would not fall upon 

37 De Fide ad Petr., c. 27. 46 “ Mitissima. omnium poena.” 

38 Carm. ad Fuscin. Soror. 47In S.- Augustini Enchirid., c. 

39 Moral., IX, 21. 93. 

40 De Concept. Virg., c. 23. 48 P. J. Toner goes so far as to 


41 Comment. in Quatuor Libros say that “St. Augustine was an 
Sent., II, dist. 31, qu. 2. innovator, and... sacrificed tra- 


42“ Tortor infantiwm.’ 

43 De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., tr. 3, 
Geis 2s 

44 De Deo, IX, to. 

45 Enchirid.,: c. 93; 
Mer. et Remiss., I, 16. 


De Peccat. 


dition to the logic of an indefensi- 
ble private system.” Crish The- 
ological Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 
rs). 


' 


302 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY; 


unbaptized children, but that, “as between reward and 
punishment there may be a neutral sentence of the 
qudge;y it" 


b) The teaching of the Church is more clearly 
apparent from her dogmatic definitions than from 
either Scripture or Tradition. It is an article 
of faith that children who die unbaptized must 
suffer the poena damni, 1. e., are deprived of the 
beatific vision of God. “Amen, amen, I say 
to thee, unless a man be born again of water 
and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the 
kingdom of God.” The arbitrary assumption, 
said to have been made by the Pelagians, that 
unbaptized infants, though deprived of the king- 
dom of heaven (i. e., communion with Jesus 
Christ and the Saints), nevertheless enjoy “eter- 
nal life” (7. e@., the visio beatifica), was never 
admitted by the Fathers nor by the magis- 
terium of the Church! “Si quis parvulos re- 
centes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat,” says 
the Tridentine Council, “. . . aut dicit in remis- 
stonem quidem peccatorum eos baptizari, sed 
nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati, quod 


49 De Lib. Arbit., III, 23. Fora gree of glory» (companionship with 


succinct account of the controversy 
cfr. P.J. Toneriie 

50 John III, s. 

51 Dr. Toner holds (1. c., p. 316) 
that “‘the teaching attributed to 
the Pelagians — viz., that they ad- 
mitted unbaptized infants to the 
beatific vision and only excluded 
them from a certain accidental de- 


Christ and the Saints)—is an his- 


torical fiction. ... Nearly all the 
great theologians who have made 
a serious study of the history of 
the question admit that it was only 
natural happiness for wunbaptized 
children that the Pelagians meant 
to defend.”’ 


THE LOT OF UNBAPTIZED. CHILDREN 303 


regenerationis lavacro necesse sit expiari ad 
vitam aeternam consequendam, anathema sit.” °° 

But do wunbaptized infants also suffer the 
poena sensus? More specifically, are they con- 
demned to the punishment of fire? The milder 
and more probable opinion is that they are not. 
This milder teaching is traceable to the writings 
of some of the earlier Fathers; °* but the Church 
did not emphasize it until a much later period. 
An important, though not ex-cathedra, decision 
is the dictum of Innocent III, embodied in the 
Corpus Iuris Canonici, that “Poena originalts 
peccati est carentia visions Det, actualis vero 
poena peccati est gehennae perpetuae crucia- 
tus.’ °* The opposition in this passage between 
original and actual sin on the one hand, and 
carentia visionis and cruciatus (1. @., poena ignis ) 
on the other, justifies the conclusion that pri- 
vation of the beatific vision (== poena damnt) 
is the only punishment inflicted on him who has 
no other guilt than that involved in original sin, 
while he who is guilty of actual sin has to suffer 
the eternal torments of hell (= poena sensus). 
When the Jansenist pseudo-council of Pistoia 
ventured to ridicule the so-called limbus puerorum 
as a “Pelagian fiction,” Pope Pius VI solemnly 


52 Conc. ‘Trid., \Sess. V3, cans 4. 54 Cap. “ Maiores” de Bapt. in 


53 Cfr., e. g., Gregory of Nazian- Deore Vapi tite Cass 
zus, Serm., 40, cap. 30. 


304 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


declared in his dogmatic Bull “Auctorem fidei” 
(A.D. 1794): “Perinde ac si hoc ipso, quod qui 
poenam ignis removent, inducerent locum illum 
et statum medium expertem culpae et poenae inter 
resnum Dei et damnationem aeternam, qualem 
fabulabantur Pelagiani: falsa, temeraria, in 
scholas catholicas iniuriosa.” 

But how is this teaching to be reconciled with 
the definition of the Council of Florence that 
“the souls of those who die in actual mortal sin, 
or merely in original sin, at once go down to 
hell, to be punished unequally?” ®> What is the 
meaning of the phrase in infernum? Does it im- 
ply that the unbaptized children are condemned 
to the tortures of hellfire? Impossible. To 
understand the definition aright we must attend 
to the expressly defined disparity of punishment 
quite as carefully as to the descensus in in- 
fernum. As there is an essential difference be- 
tween original and actual sin, the disparitas poe- 
narum held by the Church must be more than a 
mere difference of degree; it must be specific, 
which can only mean that unbaptized infants 
suffer the poena dammni, but not the poena sensus. 


As a matter of fact the pain of hellfire can be in- 
flicted only in punishment of personal sin, because it 


55 This definition reads as fol- mox in infernum descendere, poenis 
lows: “ Definimus, illorum animas, tamen disparibus puniendas.” (De- 
qui in actuali mortali peccato mo- cret. Unionis Conc. Flor., quoted in 


riuntur vel solo originali decedunt, Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 693.) 


THE LOT OF UNBAPTIZED CHILDREN 305 


directly affects human nature in its innate faculties and 
powers, and subjects not merely the supernatural and 
preternatural gifts a man may have, but his very nature 
to the punitive justice of God. “ Peccato original non 
debetur poena sensus,’ says St. Thomas, “sed solum 
poena dammni, scil. carentia visionis divinae. Et hoc vide- 
tur rationabile propter tria. Primo quidem quia... 
peccatum originale est vitium naturae, peccatum autem 
actuale est vitium personae. Gratia autem et visio di- 
vina sunt supra naturam humanam, et ideo privatio 
gratiae et carentia visionis divinae debentur alicui per- 
sonae non solum propter actuale peccatum, sed etiam 
propter originale. Poena autem sensus oppomtur in- 
tegritati naturae et bonae eius habitudini, et ideo poena 
sensus non debetur alicui nisi propter peccatum ac- 
tuale.”” 56 

c) In connection with the subject just discussed the- 
Ologians are wont to treat the question (of considerable 
importance in pastoral theology) whether, in view of 
the dogma that unbaptized children suffer the poena 
damni, it is possible to entertain the hypothesis that 
these infants may enjoy a species of natural beatitude 
in the world beyond. Cardinal Bellarmine somewhat 
harshly calls the affirmative view heretical and lays it 
down as an article of faith that those children who die 
without the grace of Baptism are absolutely damned 
and will be forever deprived of supernatural as well 
as natural beatitude.*’ The eminent Cardinal’s thesis 

56 De Malo, qu. s, art. 2. Cfr. logical, Quarterly, Vol. IV, No. 
Bolgeni’s monograph, Stato dei He - 
Bambini Morti senza Battesimo, 57 De Amiss. Grat., Minin: 
Rome 1787; J. Didiot, Ungetauft “ Fide catholica tenendum est, par- 
verstorbene Kinder.’ Dogmatische vulos sine baptismo decedentes ab- 
Trostbriefe, Kempen 1898; P. ye solute esse damnatos et non solum 


Toner, ‘‘ Lot of Those Dying “in coelesti, sed etiam naturali beati- 
Original Sin,’ in the Irish Theo- - tudine perpetuo carituros.” 


306 DOGMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY 


is true in so far as man in the present economy can- 
not miss his supernatural without at the same time 
missing his natural destiny. Now, according to the dog- 
matic teaching of the Church he who dies in the state 
of original sin cannot attain to the beatific vision of 
God, which is his supernatural end, and consequently 
incurs eternal damnation (poena damni); hence it 
would be heretical to assume that he could escape dam- 
nation and attain to his natural end in the form of 
a purely natural beatitude corresponding to the status 
naturae purae. But Cardinal Bellarmine overlooked the 
fact that between these two extremes (damnation in 
the strict sense and natural beatitude) there is con- 
ceivable a third state, viz.: a condition of relative 
beatitude materially though not formally identical with 
natural beatitude properly so called. He who dies in 
the state of original sin can never formally attain to 
natural beatitude, because original sin remains in him and 
will perpetually exclude him from the kingdom of heaven ; 
in other words, as there is no status purae naturae, so 
there can be for him no beatitudo purae naturae. But 
materially he may enjoy all those prerogatives which in 
some other economy would have constituted man’s nat- 
ural end and happiness, viz.: a clear abstractive knowledge 
of God combined with a natural love of Him above all 
things,— such a love is in itself a source of natural beati- 
tude. It may almost be laid down as a theological axiom 
that original sin, as such, cannot deprive man of those nat- 
ural prerogatives which in the state of pure nature would 
constitute his natural end and object; but that it affects 
only supernatural prerogatives. For this reason St. 
Thomas does not hesitate to assert that the conscious- 
ness of being eternally deprived of the beatific vision 
of God is not even a source of tormenting pain or ex- 


d Z ‘ % 
i 


THE LOT OF UNBAPTIZED CHILDREN 307 


ceptional sadness to unbaptized children. “ Omnis homo 
usum liberi arbitri habens proportionatus est ad vitam 
aeternam consequendam, quia potest se ad gratiam 
praeparare, per quam vitam aeternam merebitur; et ideo 
st ab hoc deficiant, maximus erit dolor eis, quia amittunt 
ulud, quod suum esse possibile fuit. Pueri autem nun- 
quam fuerunt proportionati ad hoc, quod vitam aeternam 
haberent: quia nec eis debebatur ex principiis naturae, 
cum omnem facultatem naturae excedat, nec actus pro- 
prios habere potuerunt, quibus tantum bonum conse- 
querentur. Et ideo nihil omnino dolebunt de carentia 
visionis divinae, imo magis gaudebunt de hoc, quod par- 
ticipabunt multum de divina bonitate in perfectionibus 
naturalibus.’ °* This opinion of the Angelic Doctor. is 
now shared by so many eminent theologians that it may 
justly be called sententia communior,®® and so far from 
being un-Catholic or heretical, may be entertained as 
ktghly probable.®° 


READINGS : — St. Thomas, De Malo, qu. 5.— *Fr. Schmid, Quaes- 
tiones Selectae ex Theologia Dogmatica, pp. 289 sqq., Pader- 
born 1891—J, R. Espenberger, Die Elemente der Erbsiinde 
nach Augustin und der Friihscholastik, Mainz 1905.— Jos. Rick- 
aby, S. J., Free Will and Four English Philosophers (Hobbes, 
Locke, Hume and Mill), London 1906. 


58 Comment. in Quatuor Libros and latterly Franz Schmid, Quaest. 


Sent., II, dist: 33, qu. 2, art. 2. 

59 Among those who share it we 
may mention: Suarez (De Pecce. 
et Vitus, disp. 9, sect. 6), and Les- 
sius (De Perfect. Div., XII,- 22). 
Prominent among the comparatively 
few who oppose it is Cardinal Bel- 
larmine (De Amiss. Grat., VI, 6), 


Selectae ex Theol. Dogmat., pp. 278 
sqq. 

60 Cir. A. Seitz, Die Heilsnot- 
wendigkett der Kirche nach der 
alichristlichen Literatur bis zur 
Zeit des hl. Augustinus, pp. 301 
sqq., Freiburg 1903. 


CHAPTER Lit 


CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 


Human reason may conjecture the existence of 
pure spirits but is unable to demonstrate it by 


cogent arguments.’ 


What knowledge we pos- 


sess of the Angels is based entirely on Divine 
Revelation,? and for this reason we will treat of 


1Cfr. Palmieri, 
Romae 1876. 

2 This fact did not prevent Scho- 
lastic philosophy from assigning to 
the Angels an important réle in its 
speculations. “Modern thought,” 
says Fr. Joseph Rickaby, S. J., in 
an exquisite passage of his classic 
essay on Scholasticism (New York 
1908, pp. 70 sq.), “attends curi- 
ously to the brute creation, and to 
the physiology of the human body; 
it believes in experimental psy- 
chology; it never attempts to con- 
template intellect apart from brain 
and nerves. On grounds of pure 


Pneumatologia, 


reason, it asks, what have we that — 


can be called knowledge even of 
the very existence of angels? The 
angels have taken flight from Cath- 
olic schools of philosophy; the rus- 
tle of their wings is caught by the 
theologian’s ear alone. Whether 
philosophy has lost by their de- 
parture, it is not for these pages 
to say. St. Thomas would have 
counted it a loss, The angels en- 
tered essentially into his scheme 


of the cosmos, and were indispen- 
sable transmitters of thought to 
human kind. ‘Our _ intellectual 
knowledge,’ he says, ‘must be reg- 
ulated by the knowledge of the 
angels.” (Contra Gentiles, III, 9). 
Modern psychology is serenely ob- 
livious of the fact. Catholics, no 
doubt, still believe in angels, dread 
the evil ones (devils), and pray to 
the good ones who now see the 
face of God. Catholics also be- 
lieve that good angels are often 
the vehicles through which ‘ actual 
grace,’ that is, warnings and im- 


pulses in order to salvation, de- | 


scends from God to men. But 
that man owes his ordinary knowl- 
edge of mathematics, chemistry, 
sanitation, railway management, to 
any action whatever of angelic in- 
telligence upon his mind —is there 
any man living who thinks so? 
If all that St. Thomas meant was 
that we should try to penetrate be- 
yond the surface evidence of the 
senses, that is what every scientific 
man endeavors to do in his view 


308 


THE ANGELS 309 


them under the title of Christian Angelology, in 
contradistinction to the pagan fictions of gen and 
demigods. 

As the history of the Angels runs parallel to, 
and displays many analogies with, that of the 
human race, we are justified in dealing with it 
aiter much the same method. Hence we shall 
divide this Chapter into three Sections. In the 
first we shall treat of the nature of the Angels; 
in the second, of the supernatural aspects of the 
angelic creation; and in the third, of the apos- 
tasy of the Angels from the supernatural order. 
Leaving to Scholastic speculation the deeper 
problems involved in the existence and activity 
of pure spirits, we shall confine ourselves to a rea- 
soned exposition of the positive dogmatic teach- 
ing of the Church. 


GENERAL READINGS: — *St. Thomas, S, Theol., Ia, qu. 50 sqq., 
106 sqq.— Ipem, Contr. Gent., II, 46 sqq. (Rickaby, Of God and 
His Creatures, pp. 108 sqq.).—IpEM, Opusc. 15, De Substantiis 
Separatis— Cfr, also St. Thomas’ commentators, notably Fer- 
rariensis and the treatises De Angelis composed ‘in his spirit by 
Billuart, Philippus a SS, Trinitate, Gonet, Gotti, and the Salman- 
ticenses, 

*Suarez, De Angelis, is the opus classicum on the subject. 

The doctrine of the Fathers is admirably summarized by Peta- 
vius, De Angelis (Dogm. Theol., t. IIT). 

A complete and profound monograph is Tourneley, De An- 
gelis. 


of nature—to see e. g. in a bar more than that (cf. Of God and 
of iron what a pure intelligence His Creatures, p. 252), and some 
would see there, that is the effort are beginning to suspect that he is 
of science. But St. Thomas meant - right.” 


310 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 


Among modern theologians the student will find it profitable 
to consult Scheeben, Dogmatik, Vol. II, §§ 135 saq. and §§ 181 
sqq., Freiburg 1878 (Wilhelm-Scannell’s Manual, Vol. I, 2nd ed., 
pp. 376 sqq., London 1899); Palmieri, De Deo Creante et Ele- 
vante, thes. 17 sqq. 58 sqq. Romae 1878; Heinrich, Dog- 
matische Theologie, Vol. V, §§ 281-290, Mainz 1884; Oswald, 
Angelologie, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1889; Simar, Dogmatik, 4th ed., 
Vol. I, pp. 313 sqq., Freiburg 1899; L. Janssens, De Deo Creatore 
et de Angelis, Friburgi 1905; D. Coghlan, De Deo Uno et Trino 
et De Deo Creatore, pp. 493-511, Dublinii 1909; S. J. Hunter, 
Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, 2nd ed., pp. 265-311. 
See also R. O’Kennedy, The Holy Angels, London 1887, and 
Hugh Pope, art. “ Angelus ” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I. 

On the cultus of the Angels, see Bareille, “ Le Culte des Anges 
a ’Epoque des Péres de lEglise” in the Revue Thomiste, March 
1900; J. H. Newman, An Essay on the Development of Christian 
Doctrine, 12th impression, pp. 411 sqq., London 1903; Tixeront, 
Histoire des Dogmes, Vol. II, pp. 133 sqq., 219, 274 sqq., 372 sqq. 


SECTION 1 


EXISTENCE, NATURE, NUMBER, AND HIERARCHY 
OF THE ANGELS 


A DICE At 


EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF THE ANGELS 


_ I. THE DocmMa.—The existence of Angels is 
a truth so obviously founded in Scripture, Tra- 
dition, and the teaching of the Church that it 
seems superfluous to undertake a formal demon- 
stration of it. We therefore merely indicate 
some of the many Scriptural texts in which it 
fe, expressly taught: ’ Ps.) XC Ti) GEE e Zor 
Px 2) Matth, TV; 11x Ville: XXII, 
Bos OV) 30; John I, 61s Heb, £4: 

St. Augustine voices the belief of the Fathers 
when he says: “Quamvis non videamus appari- 
tionem angelorum, tamen esse angelos novimus 
ex fide ... Spiritus autem angeli sunt; et cum 
spiritus sunt, non sunt angeli; cum mittuntur, 
tunt angel. ‘Angelus enim officii nomen est, non 
naturae. Quaeris nomen huius naturae, spiritus 
est; quaerts oficium, angelus est: ex eo quod est, 
_ Spiritus est; ex eo quod agit, angelus est — Al- 

though we may not see them, we know by faith 
311 


are CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 


that wAngels: €xist.)\.) Phe Aneels are spirits; 
but it is not as such that they are Angels; they be- 
come Angels by being sent. For Angel denotes an 
office, not a nature. You ask the name of this 
nature? tis; "spirit." You, ask titsomices tis 
that of an angel [7. e. messenger].’ In as far as 
he exists, an Angel is a spirit; in’as far as he 
acts, Nels anvaneel« > 

We know three Archangels by name, viz.: 
Michael, Raphael, and Gabriel. 

Though it is uncertain whether the Mosaic 
account of the Creation,* in employing the term 
coelum, means to include the Angels,’ the cre- 
ation of the Angels out of nothing is undoubt- 


edly Wan \articlé vot) faith. (St Paul) expressly 


teaches: “Jn ipso [scil. Christo] condita sunt ® 
umiversa in coelis et in terra, visibiha et invisi- 
bilia,” sive throni sive dominationes, sive prin- 
cipatus, sive potestates — In him |1. e., Christ] 
were all things created in heaven and on earth, 
visible and invisible, whether thrones, or domt- 
nations, or principalities, or powers.” * The 
Church through her infallible teaching office has 
raised this truth to the rank of a formally de- 
fined dogma at the Fourth Council of the Lat- 
eran: “Creator omnium visibilium et imvisi- 


8 Serm. in Ps. 103, I, 15. 6 éxricOn, 
4 Gen. I, 1 sqq. Tra adpara, 
5 Theologians have been split into 8 Col. I, 16; cfr. also Rom. VIII, 


two opposing factions on this ques- 38 sq. 
tion ever since the Patristic era. 


EXISTENCE OF THE ANGELS 313 


bilium, spiritualium et corporalium, qui sua. 
omnipotenti virtute simul ab initio temporis 
utramque de mihilo condidit naturam, spiritualem 
et corporalem, angelicam videlicet et mundanam, 
ac deinde humanam.”® This definition was sub- 
stantially reaffirmed by the Vatican Council: 
“God . . . created out of nothing, from the very 
first beginning of time, both the spiritual and 
the corporeal creature, to wit, the angelical and 
the mundane, and afterwards the human crea- 
BEC ie /.4) t | 


When the Angels were created is not so clearly defined. 
The phrase “Simul ab initio temporis,” strictly inter- 
preted, says no more than that they were created in and 
with time. Whether the creation of the Angels was si- 
multaneous with that of the material universe is uncertain. 
Simul may be interpreted in the sense of aequaliter 
(xowy), and in the phrase “ac deinde humanam,” deinde 
is not necessarily temporal, but may be illative in mean- 
ing. As St. Thomas has pointed out,!! the definition of 
the Fourth Lateran Council was aimed at a Manichzean 
heresy which did not bear directly on the time of the 
creation of the Angels. Nevertheless many theologians 
tegard the interpretation just suggested as artificial and 
hold the simultaneous creation of the Angels and the ma- 
terial universe to be a theologically certain doctrine, 
which may not be rejected without temerity. We prefer 


9 Cap. “ Firmiter,’”’ quoted by Den- 1783), Manning’s translation (The 


zinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. Vatican Council and its Definitions, 
428. 4th American ed., p. 209, New York 
_ 10Conc. Vatican., Sess. III, cap. 1902). 

I (apud Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 11 Opusc, XXIII. 


21 


314 CHRISTIAN: ANGELOLOGY 


not to read into the Lateran definition something which 
its authors evidently did not intend to put there, and 
adopt the affrmative view merely for the reason that 
it is the common teaching of theologians.’* It would at 
any rate be unreasonable to assume an immoderately 
long interval of time to have elapsed between the creation 
of the angels and that of the physical universe. The only 
thing we know positively is that the Angels existed at the 
time of Adam,** whence it follows that they were created 
no later than the sixth “ day.” 


2. THE NATURE OF THE ANGELS.—It is Cath- 
olic doctrine, though not yet an article of faith, 
that the Angels are incorporeal substances, 7. é., 
pure spirits. 

a) This doctrine can be more effectively dem- 
onstrated from Holy Scripture than from ancient 
ecclesiastical Tradition, the latter being far less 
clear and definite. The Bible constantly refers 
to the Angels as spirits (spiritus, mvedpara), in 
express contradistinction to souls.** St. Paul, — 
moreover, draws a direct contrast between a 
pure spirit’? and man, who is a compound of 
spirit and body. Eph. VI, 12: “Non est nobis” 
colluctatio adversus carnem et sanguinem, sed 
adversus principes et potestates, adversus mundt 
rectores tenebrarum harum— Our wrestling is 
not against flesh and blood; but against prin- 


12.Gir, Sie Dhoom. oe liaeol., . tas 14 Cfr. Luke XI, 24; Heb. I, 14, 
du. OF, cart. 3. et passim. 
ue Cir. Gen.” LIU913 T1,) 24. 15 The Devil, whose nature was — 


not destroyed by sin. 


NATURE OF THE ANGELS 315 


cipalities and powers, against the rulers of the 
world of this darkness.” : 

That the Angels have often visibly appeared to 
men is no argument against their incorporeity. 
When they assume a body, that body is merely 
an outer garment, assumed for a transitory pur- 
pose, not something which the bearer informs 
aiter the manner of a substantial form.’® There- 
fore Raphael said to Tobias: “Videbar quidem 
vobiscum manducare et bibere, sed ego cibo in- 
visibili et potu, qui ab hominibus videri non po- 
test, utor — I seemed indeed to eat and to drink 
with you: but I use an invisible meat and drink, 
which cannot be seen by men.” ?7 The much- 
discussed text,’ Gen, VI.)'2: "Phe sonstotitod 
seeing the daughters of men, that they were fair, 
took to themselves wives,” #®—which misled even 
some of the Fathers,°’—does not refer to the 
Angels at all, but to the pious Sethites, who mar- 
ried the evil daughters of Cain.”° 

b) As we have already noted, the Fathers do 
not teach this doctrine as clearly as the Bible. 
Several of their number ascribe to the Angels 


a body of ether or fire. 


16 Wilhelm-Scannell, Manual of 
Catholic Theology, Vol. DN Ds03 7.0 

1G Tob. XII;\ 70. 

18“ Videntes filii Det (the Sep- 
tuagint has of dyyedor Tov Oeov) 
fitas hominum, quod essent pul- 
chrae, acceperunt sibi uxores.? — 


This they were led to 


19 E. g., SS. Justin, Ireneus, and 
Ambrose. i 

20 Cfr. P. Scholz, Die Ehen der 
Sohne Gottes mit den Téchtern der 
Menschen, Ratisbon 1865; Robert, 
Les Fils de Dieu et les Filles de 
VHomme in La Revue Biblique, 
1895, PP. 340-373 and 525-552. 


316 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 


do “by a literal interpretation of Ps. CIII, 4: 
“Out facis angelos tuos spiritus et ministros tuos 
ignem urentem — Who makest thy angels spirits, 
and thy ministers a burning fire.” ?* Some con- 
ceived Satan as clothed in an aérial body.?? It is 
evident from all this that belief in the incorporeity 
of the Angels was the result of a gradual de- 
velopment. To-day it is held as theologically cer- 
tain.” 


c) Are the Angels composed of matter and form? 
This is quite a different question from the one discussed 
above. Granted that the Angels are pure spirits, it 
may be asked whether their purely spiritual nature 
admits of a composition of matter (determinabile) re- 
quiring for its actuation a form (determinans), or 
whether, like the Divine Essence, they are metaphysically 
simple.*4 

Being purely spiritual substances, the Angels are phys- 
ically simple, and therefore essentially immortal. “ Not, 
indeed, that their destruction is in itself an impossibility, 
but because their substance and nature are such that, 
when once created, perpetual conservation is to them 
natural.” *° They are indestructible also for this reason 


210On the Angelology of the 23 Cfr. Palmieri, De Deo Creante 
Jews cfr. Hackspill, “ L’Angelologie et Elevante, pp. 153 sqq. 
Juive & VEpoque Néotestamentaire ” 24 Alexander of Hales and St. 
in La Revue Biblique, 1902, pp. Bonaventure held that the nature 
527-550. of Angels admits of potentiality 


22 Cfr. St. Fulgentius, De Trinit., and actuality. Cfr. on this contro- 
c. 9. Even St. Bernard (cfr. his versy St. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 
De Considerat., V, 4) entertained 50, art. 2. 
rather hazy notions on this point, 25 Cfr. Wilhelm-Scannell, 4 Man- 
as also Abbot Rupert of Deutz (De ual of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. I, 
Trinit., I, 11), Cardinal Cajetan, pp. 379. 
and Bafiez. 


NATURE OF THE ANGELS 317 


that the Creator is bound by His own wisdom, goodness, 
sanctity, and justice to conserve these pure Spirits, in 
whom He has implanted an immanent craving for beati- 
tude.*° 

3. INTELLECT, WILL, AND PoWER OF THE 
ANGELS.—Being pure spirits, the Angels must 
possess intellect and free-will; for no spirit is con- 
ceivable without these attributes. Hence they 
are called simply ves or vois by the Fathers, and 
intelligentiae by the Scholastics. 

a) The comprehension of the angelic intellect 
and its mode of operation is a subject of specu- 
lation, concerning which our limited mind is at 
a decided disadvantage. The Schoolmen have 
practically exhausted the capacity of the human 
intellect along these lines. As of faith we need 
only hold that the Angels are not endowed with 
cardiognosis nor with a certain knowledge of the 
free-will acts of the future; these being exclu- 
sively divine prerogatives.2? It follows that their 
knowledge of the thoughts and future free ac- 
tions of men is purely conjectural and can at 
most engender moral certitude. 


Can the Angels communicate their thoughts to one 
another? It would be unreasonable to assume that such 


26 Cfr. Matth. XVIII, 10; XXV, 
‘41; Luke XX, 36. As regards the 
relation of the Angels to space, 
that is a philosophical rather than 
a theological problem, on which 
the student may, if he wishes, have 
recourse to Suarez, De Angelis, 1.: 


IV, and F. Schmid, Quaest. Select. 
ex Theol. Dogmat., pp. 28 sqq., 
Paderborn 1801. 

27 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His 
Knowability, Essence, and Atiri- 
butes, pp. 359 sqq., 361 sqq. 


318 » CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 


a vast number of pure spirits, endowed with intellect 
and free-will, should lack the means of intercommunica- 
tion. Besides, we know on the authority of Holy 
Scripture that the Angels do converse with one an- 
other.2® But Revelation tells us nothing about the nature 
of their intercourse. The only thing we know for certain 
is that they do not converse by word of mouth. Among 
the six theories that have been excogitated on the subject 
the most plausible is that of St. Thomas. He holds that 
the Angels converse by a mere act of the will, which 
manifests the thought of the speaker to him whom he 
wishes to address.”° 


b) That the Angels are endowed with free- 
will follows from the fact, (which is demonstrable 
on purely philosophic grounds), that free-will 
belongs to every spiritual nature as such. I[n- 
deed, if God operates freely ad extra because He 
is the supreme and infinite Spirit,°° and 1f man, 
who occupies the lowest rank in the scale of 
intellectual beings, enjoys freedom of choice be- 
cause the light of reason burns within him,” 
surely the Angels, who form the connecting link 
between God and man, and most certainly far 


festare.”’— On the different theories 
in question cfr. Becanus, De An- 


28 Cfr, Zach. I, 9 saq.; 1 Cor. 
DG GLEE 13 


29 Cfr. Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 107, 
art. 1: ““Ex hoc quod conceptus 
mentis angelicae ordinatur ad mani- 
festandum alteri per voluntatem ip- 
sius angeli, conceptus mentis unius 
angeli innotescit alteri; et sic lo- 
quitur unus angelus alteri. Nihil 
est enim aliud loqui ad alterum, 
quam conceptum mentis altert mani- 


gelis, c. 1, qu. 14; Gregory of Va- 
lentia, De Deo Creatore, disp. 8, qu. 
4, p. 2. On the mode of operation 
peculiar to the angelic intellect, and 
on its medium, see St. Thomas, S. 
Theol., 1a, qu. 54 sqq., and Suarez, 
De Angelis, 1. II. 

80 Supra, pp. 40 sqq. 

81 Supra, pp. 291 sqq. 


NATURE OF THE ANGELS 319 


outrank the latter, must also be endowed with 
free-will. The logical force of this argument is 
irresistible. Free-will is either included or it is 
not included in the concept of spirit. If it were 
not included therein, then God Himself would not 
be free; if it is, then the Angels, too, are free, 
freer in fact than man, who is hampered by his 
senses. Sacred Scripture, moreover, tells us that 
the Angels rejoice, that they have desires,?? 
that some of them sinned and were transformed 
into demons. The story of the Fall is the most 
convincing proof that the Angels enjoy freedom 
Or choice: Ctr 2 Pets TL) Aci ene angelis 
peccantibus non pepercit —God spared not the 
Angels that sinned.” | 

In the light of these and similar texts St. John 
Damascene defines an Angel as “a rational, in- 
telligent, free nature, with a mutable will,’ and 
he adds: “Every being that is endowed with 
reason, is likewise equipped with free-will, Con- 
sequently an Angel, being a nature endowed with 
reason and intelligence, is also equipped with 
freedom of choice. Being a creature, he is mu- 
table, because free either to persevere and pro- 
gress in what is good, or to turn to the bad.” *4 

c) The Angels are by nature superior to, and 

32 Luke XV, 7. Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu) 59, art. 


331 Pet. I, 12. 1, and Suarez, De Angelis, 1. III. 
34 De Fide Orth., II, 3. Cfr. St. 


320 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 


more excellent than man. Cir. 2 Pet: II, 11: 
‘gAneels’).) |. sare “)oTeater Vinee strensih .; and 
power) Gal (Via) 6 Youle received. me 
asan. angel, of ‘God, ‘as. Jesus ‘Christ.".* The 
names by which the Angels are called in the Bible 
(Dominations, Virtues, Powers) also indicate 
that they enjoy superior prerogatives, though, of 
course, being themselves mere creatures, they can 
neither create nor perform miracles.*® 

It is to be remarked, however, that Angels 
(and demons) by virtue of their natural faculties 
are able to perform actions which impress man 
as exceeding the powers of nature (muiracula 
quoad nos). But such actions are not miracles in 
the strict and proper sense of the term unless the 
nature of the case or its attending circumstances 
make it plainly evident that the effect 1s one which 
could not be produced by any agency short of the 
divine omnipotence. We need not add that, with 
regard to the extent of their power, good and evil 
spirits alike depend at all times on the Divine 
Will, without whose command or permission they 
cannot interfere with the laws of nature. 


35 Cfr. Matth. XXII, 30; Gal. I, 55 sqq.; that every supernatural 
8. effect (and a miracle in the strict 

36 That the power of creating sense is a supernatural effect) pos- 
something out of nothing belongs to tulates an infinite causality, 7 @., 
God alone, and is incommunicable, omnipotence, was shown supra, pp. 
we have demonstrated supra, pp. 187 sqq. 


NUMBER OF THE ANGELS 321 


ARTICLE 2 


NUMBER AND HIERARCHY OF THE ANGELS 


I. NUMBER OF THE ANGELS.—Sacred Scrip- 
ture and Tradition furnish us no clue by which 
we could determine the number of the Angels. 
It is certain that they are very numerous. Cfr. 
Dan. VII, 10: “Millia millium ministrabant et 
et decies millies centena millia assistebant ei — 
Thousands of thousands ministered to him, 
and ten thousand times a hundred thou- 
sand stood before him.” Apoc. V, 11: “I 
heard the voice of many angels . . . and the 
number of them was thousands of thousands.” 
Basing their calculations on the parable of the 
Good Shepherd, some of the Fathers have esti- 
mated the numerical proportion of Angels to 
men as 99:1. ‘Thus St. Cyril of Jerusalem says: 
“Consider all the human beings that have lived 
from Adam to the present day; their number is 
very large, and yet it is small, for of Angels 
there are still more. They are the ninety-nine 
sheep, we are the one hundredth, since there is 
but one human race.” 37 


Theologians differ as to whether or not the Angels are 
all of one species. St. Thomas holds that each consti- 
37 Catech., 15. For a more com- Suarez, De Angelis, EY re Cfr: 


plete treatment of this topic see also O’Kennedy, The Holy Angels, 
Petavius, De Angelis, Era, cand PDs 78a. 


322 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 


tutes a distinct species.** Suarez teaches that the mem- 
bers of each choir bear a specific relation to all the other 
members of the same choir.*® Cardinal Toletus assumes 
that, like men, all the Angels belong to one and the same 
species.*° The problem really defies the limited powers 
of human reason. Cardinal Toletus and those who hold 
with him must not, however, be understood as asserting ~ 
that the specific unity of the Angels results from pro- 
creation, because the Church has formally condemned the 
proposition that “the human soul is propagated from 
parent to child just as body from body or one Angel 
from another.” *# 


2. THE NINE CHOIRS AND THE THREE HIER- 
ARCHIES OF THE ANGELS.—The Angels are dis- 
tributed into various Orders, some _ superior, 
others inferior. This is not an article of faith, 
but it may be set down as a certain truth. Sacred 
Scripture enumerates nine such Orders. Isaias 
saw the Seraphim,* Moses mentions the Cheru- 
bim, as ouardians ot Paradise.3 and ot), Pauly, 
enumerates the Thrones, Dominations, Principal- 
ities, and Powers, to which, in another place,*® 
he adds the Virtues. Besides these the Bible 
frequently mentions Angels and Archangels. 
The fact that Holy Scripture carefully discrimi- 


S8)Seud Heol.) 1a; .aus 80; att. 4e 

39 De Angelis, I, 14. 

40 Comment. in S. Thom., l. c 

41“ Anima humana fil propaga- 
tur ab anima patris sui sicut corpus 
a corpore et angelus etiam unus ab 
alio.” Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchi- 
ridion, n. 533. For a fuller discus- 


sion of this subject cfr. Palmieri, 
De Deo Creante et Elevante, pp. 
204 sqd. 

42 Ts. VI, 2. 

43 Gen. III, 24. 

44 Col. I, 16. 

45 Eph: I, 213 cfr. 
38. 


Rom. VIII, 


PIERARCHY Of) THEM ANGELS 323 


nates between these different Orders is sufficient 
watrant that the names employed by the Bible 
are not merely synonymous terms.*® The precise 
number of the angelic choirs is not known to us. 
In how far they differ, and what are their mutual 
relations, is a matter of speculation rather than 
of faith.*” 

Since the time of the Pseudo-Dionysius.** it 
has been customary in the Schools to group 
the nine angelic choirs into three divisions, in 
imitation of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, each di- 
vision comprising three choirs (ordines, 74&«s), as 
follows: (1) The supreme hierarchy, compris- 
ing the Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones; (2) 
The intermediate hierarchy, comprising the 
Dominations, Virtues, and Powers; (3) The 
lowest hierarchy, comprising the Principalities, 
Archangels, and Angels. 

This difference in rank is believed to be due to 
the fact that the members of the supreme hier- 
archy, who are, so to speak, assistants at the di- 
vine throne, receive their orders directly from 
God Himself, while those of the intermediate 
hierarchy hand the divine commands down to the 
lower Angels, who in turn communicate them to 
46 Cir. S. Greg. M., Hom. in Ev., Pesch, Praelect. Dogmat., t. III, 3rd 
r ed., pp. 214 sq., Friburgi 1908. 

47 “ Dicant qui possunt,” says St. 48 De Coelesti Hierarchia, c. 3. 
Augustine (Enchir., c. 58), “‘ ego Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Know- 


me ista ignorare confiteor.” Cfr. ability, Essence, and Attributes, p. 
270. 


34 


324 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 


men. Revelation is silent on this point. Ac- 
cording to Pseudo-Dionysius,*® whom the Scho- 
lastics, thinking him a pupil of the Apostles, 
blindly followed,” the division of the Angels into 
hierarchies has still another signification. The 
higher Angels, he says, are charged with the 
mission of “illuminating” and “purifying” those 
of the lower Orders. By illumination (illumi- 
natio) the Schoolmen mean the communication 
of knowledge by an Angel of a higher to an 
Angel of a lower Order. In so far as the in- 
ferior Angel is thereby cleansed of defects inci- 
dent to his imperfect mode of cognition, the 
process is also called “purgation” (purgatio). 
We need scarcely remind our readers that this 
teaching does not exceed the value of a more or 
less well-founded opinion.°* 


49 De Coelestti Hierarchia, c. 4 108; Stiglmayr, S. J., “ Die En- 


and 8. gellehre des sogen. Dionysius Areo- 

50 Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His pagita’’ in the Comite Rendu du 
Knowability, Essence, and Aitri- Congrés Intern. & Fribourg, Vol. I, 
butes, p. 270. Pp. 403 sqq., 1897; Hugo Koch, 


51 On the interesting problems Pseudo-Dionysius  Areopagita im 
involved in these speculations the seinen Beziehungen zum Neupla- 
student may profitably consult St. tonismus und Mysterienwesen, 
Thomas, S. Theol., 1a, qu. 106, Mainz 1goo. 


SECON 2 
THE ANGELS AND THE SUPERNATURAL ORDER 


AN DOTY 


THE SUPERNATURAL ENDOWMENT OF THE ANGELS 


I. THEIR ELEVATION TO THE STATE OF GRACE. 
—After having created the Angels, God did not 
leave them in puris naturalibus, but endowed 
them with sanctifying grace. Thus they became 
His adopted children and received a claim to the 
beatific vision. This is the unanimous teaching: 
of Catholic theologians, and it is based upon Di- 
vine Revelation. Being “saints,” “angels of 
Holt cnpelectiancels. \* sons of God, “\andiso 
forth, the Angels must necessarily be conceived as 
endowed with sanctifying grace. There is no 
ground for the assumption’ that the demons 
never enjoyed such a supernatural endowment. 
On the contrary, it is quite certain that all the 
Angels without exception were elevated to the 
supernatural order.” We read in the Epistle 


1 Dan. VIII, 13. of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales, 
Bis Corse XN Paeaen and St. Bonaventure. 

Siz lim. Vecer. Y 6 ““ Neque tamen haec assertio ex 
4Job XXXVIII, 7. fide certa est. Nam Magister Sen- 


5 Made by Peter Lombard, Hugh tentiarum in 2 dist. 5 absque nota 


325 


326 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 


of St. Jude: “Non servaverunt suum principa- 
tum,’ sed dereliquerunt suum domicilium — And 
the angels . . . kept not their principality, but 
forsook their own habitation;” 7. e., they did not 
preserve their supernatural prerogatives, but re- 
linquished their place of honor. Consequently 
the demons too, before the Fall, were endowed 
with grace.® 


According to the more common opinion of Catholic di- 
vines, the Angels are endowed with grace each according 
to the measure of his natural perfection, 7. e., the natural 
prerogatives with which he was created. This doctrine 
has nothing in common with Pelagianism; for it is not 
merit (meritum naturae), but the disposition of each An- 
gel’s nature which guides God in distributing His graces. 
In the words of St. Basil, ‘The Powers of Heaven are 
not holy by nature, but they possess the measure of their 
sanctification from the Holy Ghost, according to the 
rank by which one excels the other.” ® Or, as St. John 
Damascene puts it, “ They partake of light and grace, 
each according to his dignity and order.” 1° According 
to this theory the Seraphim *! rank first in the order of 
grace, because their nature is the most perfect; while 
the “ Angels,” simply so called, occupy the lowest rung 
of the ladder. But since this teaching cannot be demon- 
erroris existimavit, daemones nun- tiam.” Other Patristic texts in 


quam habuisse gratiam. Ceterum Tepe, Instit. Theol., t. II, pp. 628 
est tta certa nostra assertio, ut iam sqq., Paris 1895. 


eam negare censeatur esse plane 9 De Spiritu Sancto, c. 16, n. 38. 
temerartum.” (Gregory of Valen- 10:De) Fide Orth. II, 32) 7 Pre 
cia, disp. 4, qu. 13, p. 1.) sua quisque dignitate et ordine 
T dpxny. splendoris gratiaeque participes.” 
8 Cfr. St, Ambrose, Serm. in Ps., 11 From ay to burn, to glow; 
i Y 


118, 7, n. 8: “TIpse dtabolus per 


superbiam naturae suae amisit gra- hence, literally: Angels of love, 


THEIR SUPERNATURAL ENDOWMENT = 327 


strated from Revelation, its value does not exceed that 
of a probable opinion.” 


2. WHEN WERE THE ANGELS SANCTIFIED ?— 
A number of medieval theologians * held that 
all the Angels remained for some time after 
their creation in the pure state of nature and 
were elevated to the state of supernatural grace 
at a later date. St. Thomas demonstrated by 
weighty arguments that the sanctification of the 
Angels must have been contemporaneous with 
their creation.‘* Among the Fathers this view 
had been championed by St. Augustine: “Deus 
angelos cum amore casto, quo illi adhaererent, 
creavit, simul in eis condens naturam et largiens 
gratiam — God created the Angels with a chaste 
love, by which they adhered to Him, endowing 
them with grace at the same time that He created 
their nature.” * Though not an article of faith, 
this opinion has become the prevailing one in 
consequence chiefly of its having been adopted 
into the Roman Catechism. St. Thomas himself 
had previously championed the contrary view as 
the more common and probable one." 


12S. Theol., 1a, qu. 62, art. 6: 
** Rationabile est, quod secundum 
gradum naturalium angelis data sint 
dona gratiarum, et perfectio beatitu- 
dinis.”’ 

13 Hugh of St. Victor, Alexander 
of Hales, St. Bonaventure, Duns 
Scotus, and others. 4 

14 St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 
wa, qu. 62, art. 3: “... quamvis 


super hoc sint diversae opiniones, 
hoc tamen [scil. quod angeli in gra- 
tia creati fuerint] probabilius vide- 
tur et magis dictis Sanctorum con- 
sonum est.’ 

15 De Civ. Dei, XII, 9.. For some 
other Patristic texts of similar tenor 
see Suarez, De Angelis, V, 4. 

16 Comment. in Quatuor Libros 
Sentent., II, dist. 4, qu. 4, art. 2. 


328 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY. 


3. THE PROBATION OF THE ANGELS.—It is the 
teaching of the Fathers, unanimously defended by 
Catholic theologians, that, like men, the Angels 
had to undergo a probation, during which they 
found themselves in the status viae and had to 
merit the beatific vision of the Blessed Trinity. 
The fact that they were able to merit the beatific 
vision presupposes that while in the wayfaring 
state they received an external revelation of the 
truths necessary for salvation, and, like man, were 
bound to prepare themselves by a free act of in- 
ternal faith for the attainment of eternal happi- 
ness." Gennadius * taught that the Angels 
were simultaneously raised to the state of grace 
and glory in the instant of their creation. But 
this opinion is incompatible with the revealed 
truth that some of them apostatized. If the 
fallen Angels had been constituted in the state of 
glory, it would have been impossible for them to 
sin, because the beatific vision of God completely 
abrogates the creature’s freedom of. chosing 
evil.’® 


Cfr. Catech. Rom., P. 1, c. 2, qu. 
17: “Cum illud sit in divinis lt- 
teris, diabolum ‘in veritate non 
stetisse,’ perspicuum est, eum re- 
liquosque desertores angelos ab or- 
tus sui initio gratia praeditos fuisse 
— Since Holy Scripture says that 
the Devil ‘stood not in the truth,’ 
(John VIII, 44), it is clear that 
he and the rest of the rebel angels 


were gifted with grace from the 
very moment of their creation.” 
This sentence does not, of course, 
decide the question at issue. 

17 Cfr. Suarez, De Angelis, V, 5 
sq. 

18 De Eccl. Dogm., c. 59. 

19 For a more elaborate treatment 
of this point we must refer the 
student to Eschatology. 


PROBATION OF THE ANGELS 329 


How long the period of probation lasted, whether but 
a single instant, or two morulae, or three,”° is a matter 
of pure conjecture. The only thing that we must hold 
as an article of faith is that a portion of the Angels 
came forth unsullied, while the remainder fell and were 
cast into hell. The good Angels “stand before the 
ord,” 2+" before bis) throne,’ they, dwelliiino, the 
heavenly Jerusalem,” 2? 7. e.,'“ in heaven.” ** Christ ex- 
pressly teaches: “Their [little children’s] angels in 
heaven always see the face of my Father who is in 
heaven.” ?° 

That the grace and glory enjoyed by the Angels is a 
supernatural state follows from what we have said in a 
previous Chapter of this volume on the essence of the 
Supernatural,* and also from the rejection by the Church 
of Baius’s propositions: ‘‘ Nec angeli nec primi hominis 
adhue integri merita recte vocantur gratia;” “ Et bons 
angelis et primo homini, si in statu ilo perseverasset 
usque ad ultimum vitae, felicitas esset merces, et non 
gratia; ” “ Vita aeterna homini integro et angelo promissa 
fuit mtuitu bonorum operum, et bona opera ex lege 
naturae ad illam consequendam per se suticiunt.”*" The 
condemnation of these propositions proves that the spe- 
cial endowment of the Angels, like that of man, was 
essentially supernatural. 


20 This is the opinion of Suarez with this problem in his Dogmatik, 
and Scheeben. Suarez writes (De Vol. II, n. 1139. 


Angelis, VI, 3, 5): “Prima [mo- 21 Tob. tochbsy ise 

rula| fuit creationis et sanctifica- 22 Apoc, I, 4. 

tionis cum dispositione ad illam et 23 Heb, XII, 22. 

consequenter cum merito de con- 24 Mark XII, 2s. 

digno gloriae; secunda fuit perse- 25 Matth. XVIII, 10. 

verantiae in gratia cum merito de 26 Supra, pp. 190 sqq. 

condigno gratiae et gloriae; tertia 27 Propos. 1, 3, 4 Batt Damn., in 


receptionis gloriae.”’ Scheeben deals Denzinger-Bannwart’s Enchiridion, 
mn. I00I, 1003, 1004. 


22 


330 _ CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 


ARTICLE es 


THE ANGELS IN THEIR RELATION TO MEN, OR THE GUARD- 
IAN ANGELS 


The Catholic Church teaches that every man has a 
Guardian Angel, whom he should venerate and invoke. 
This teaching is founded on Sacred Scripture.? 

The mission of the Guardian Angels may be Pile 
described as follows: They ward off dangers from body 
and soul, they inspire good and salutary thoughts, they 
convey our prayers to the throne of grace, they assist 
us in the hour of death and bear the souls of the elect 
to Heaven.* The Catholic teaching on the subject may 
be formulated in four theses. 


Thesis I: The Angels exercise a kind of general 
guardianship over the human race. 


Proof. Though we can adduce no express 
dogmatic definition in support of this thesis, it 
must be accepted as an article of faith, because 
it is taught by the magistertwm ordinarium of 
the Church, which, in its turn, voices the mani- 
fest teaching of Scripture and Tradition. St. 
Paul lays it down as an indisputable axiom 
that the Angels minister to those who “shall re- 
ceive the inheritance of salvation.” Heb. I, 14: 
“Nonne omnes sunt administratorii spiritus* in 
ministerium missi propter eos, qui haereditatem 


1\Cfr; Gal. I, 8; x. Tim. III, 76: 2 Cfr. Suarez, De Angelis, VI, 19. 
erbets it, 12. 3 NetTOUpyiKa mvevuaTa, 


THE GUARDIAN ANGELS 331 


capient salutis?—Are they not all ministering 
spirits, sent to minister for them, who shall re- 
ceive the inheritance of salvation?’ The Psalm- 
ist touchingly describes the tender care which 
the Angels bestow upon man. Ps. XC, 11 sq.: 
“Angelis suis mandavit de te, ut custodiant te in 
omnibus viis tuis; in manibus portabunt te, ne 
forte offendas ad lapidem pedem tuum — He 
hath given his angels charge over thee, to keep 
thee in all thy ways; in their hands they shall 
bear thee up, lest thou dash thy foot against a 
stone.”” The lives of Tobias and of our Lord 
Jesus Christ Himself prove how faithfully the 
Guardian Angels perform their duty. 

This doctrine was part of the Apostolic Tra- 
dition, as is clearly evidenced by the following 
passage from Origen: “This too is contained in 
the ecclesiastical teaching, that there are Angels 
of God and good powers who serve Him for the 
purpose of consummating the salvation of men.” 4 


Since this angelic guardianship is based upon a di- 
vine mission,® the question has been broached whether 
such missions are limited to the lower choirs, or whether 
members of the higher choirs too are sometimes sent down 
from Heaven. There are two theological opinions on 
_this subject. One, based on the writings of the Pseudo- 
Areopagite, and espoused by SS. Gregory the Great, 
Bonaventure, and Thomas Aquinas, holds that only the 


4 De Princip., praef. n._10. Other 5 The term ‘ Angel” is derived 
Patristic passages infra. from ayyenos ; ayyenrewy, to send. 


332 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 


lowest three, or at the most five of the lower choirs dis- 
charge the office of messengers, while the Seraphim, the 
Cherubim, the Thrones, and the Dominations are con- 
stantly assembled around the throne of the Most High. 
Since, however, theologians have begun to emancipate 
themselves from the authority, once all too highly re- 
garded, of the Pseudo-Areopagite, the opinion of Scotus 
and his school has become the more common one, to wit, 
that all Angels without exception are employed as divine 
messengers. ‘There are two very good reasons for adopt- 
ing this view. The first is the authority of St. Paul, who 
emphatically teaches that all spirits are “sent.’® The 
second is the fact that Angels of the highest rank have 
been commissioned to execute divine commands, as, e. g., 
the Seraph in Isaias VI, 6 sqq., and the two Cherubim 
“ placed before the paradise of pleasure,’ Gen. III, 24.7 


Thesis II: Every Christian from the moment of 
Baptism has-his particular Guardian Angel. 


Proof. Suarez says of this thesis: “Though 
not expressly contained in Holy Writ, nor yet 
formally defined, it is received by universal con- 
sent in the Church and has such a solid founda- 
tion in Scripture, as interpreted by the Fathers, 
that it cannot be denied without very great 
temerity and even error.” * The Biblical basis 


6 Heb. I, 14. transmitting God’s commands to 

7 Gerson declared the Thomistic the lower Angels. How violently 
view to be heretical; but this is the simplest Scriptural passages 
manifestly unjust, because the Tho- were sometimes strained in order 
mists willingly concede that the to square them with the teaching of 
higher (or. so-called assisting) Pseudo-Dionysius, can be seen in 
choirs may act at least mediately Suarez, De Angelis, VI, to. 
as divine messengers, 7. e., by 8 De Angelis, VI, 17. 


THE GUARDIAN ANGELS 333 


of this doctrine is our Saviour’s own declaration: 
“Videte, ne contemnatis unum ex Ins pusillis; 
dico enim vobis, quia angeli eorum® in coelis 
semper vident faciem Patris met — See that you 
despise not one of these little ones: for I say to 
you, that their angels in heaven always see the 
face .of tiy Hather whois tm heaven.’ The 
expression “their angels” (7. e., the angels of 
these little children), plainly points to the exist- 
ence of Guardian Angels (angelt custodes seu 
tutelares, dyyeho. pidaxes), That each man has a 
Guardian Angel is also proved by a passage in 
the Acts of the Apostles. The friends of St. 
Peter, when he knocks at the door after his de- 
liverance from prison, joyfully exclaim: “It is 
his angel.” ‘4 The objection that the Saviour’s 
words apply exclusively to the children of the 
Jews, is invalid. For, in the first place, all the 
supernatural prerogatives of the Synagogue de- 
scended in an enhanced degree upon the Christian 
Church; and, secondly, the Fathers in their in- 
terpretation of this and similar passages no- 
where make a distinction between Jews and 
Christians, or between the Old and the New 
Testament. St. Basil declares: “That each one 
among the faithful? has an angel, who directs 
his life as a guide ** and shepherd,** nobody can 


90i ayyedou aUTaOY, =~ 12 €xdoT@ TOY TLOTHY, 
10 Matth. XVIII, 10. ; 13 madaywyés, 
11 Acts XII, 15. 14 youeus, 


334 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 


deny who remembers the words of our Lord: 
“See that you despise not one of these little 
ones.” *° Commenting on this same dictum of 
our Divine Saviour, St. Chrysostom writes: 
“Each faithful Christian has an Angel; for 
every righteous man had an Angel from the very 
beginning, as Jacob says:*® The Angel that 
nourisheth and delivereth me from youth.” 7 
Origen undoubtedly voices the belief of the Prim- 
ittve Church when he says: “Each of us, even 
the lowliest, has an Angel by his side.” 18 

The faith of the early Christians manifested 
itself unmistakably in the devotion they paid to 
the Guardian Angels. As early as the fourth 
century it was customary to erect altars and sanc- 
tuaries in their honor. The Feast of the Guard- 
ian Angels originated in the eleventh century. 
“Though of comparatively recent introduction, 
[it] gives the sanction of the Church’s authority 
to an ancient and cherished belief.” ™ 


Some of the early Fathers and ecclesiastical writers 
held that besides his Guardian Angel every Christian 
has also a demon to tempt him.” Bellarmine rightly 


general see K. A. H. Kellner, Heor-« 
tology, pp. 328 sqq., London 1908. 
20Thus Origen (Hom. 12 in 
Luc.), Gregory of Nyssa (De Vita 
Moysis), Tertullian (De Anim., ec. 


15 Contr. Eunom., 1. 3, n. 1. 

16 Gen. XLVIII, 16. 

17 Hom. in Col., 3 n. 4. 

18 Hom. in Num., 20. 

19 On the history of this feast 


cfr. the article ‘‘ Guardian Angels, 
Feast of,” by T. P. Gilmartin, in 
the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VII. 
On the festivals of the Angels in 


30), and Cassian (Collat., VIII, 17). 
They seem to have followed the 
Shepherd of Hermas (1. II, mand. 
6): Ato elaly adyyedor, els Tis 
dixaoovvns, els THS Tovnpias, 


THE GUARDIAN ANGELS 335 


reckoned this belief, which has absolutely no Scriptural 
foundation whatever, among the errors of Hermas. That 
every man should be afflicted with an imp to plague him, 
is a notion which can hardly be reconciled with belief 
in a benevolent Providence. Perhaps Hermas was led to 
adopt it in a well-meant endeavor to Christianize the 
pagan idea of a genius niger as a counterpart to the 
genius albus. 

Some modern writers on the philosophy of religion 
maintain that Jewish and Christian angelology was bor- 
rowed from the pagan religions of the East, and that 
in the last analysis the Angels are merely personifica- 
tions of Divine Providence. Not to speak of the ex- 
treme antiquity of the Jewish belief in Angels,?1 this 
theory is disproved by the teaching and conduct of 
Christ Himself, and also by the sharp contrast existing 
between the Angels of the Bible and the figments of. 
pagan mythology. 


Thesis III: Not only Christians and those justi- 
fied, but heathens and sinners also have each a Guard- 
ian Angel. 


Proof. Suarez refers to this proposition as em- 
bodying “the common teaching of theologians and 
Fathers.” 7. Its meaning is that every man has 
a Guardian Angel in as far as he is a man, not 
in consequence of Baptism or justification. This 
angelic guardianship begins at birth. “Magna 


21 See Gen. III, 24; XVI, 7 saq. 


Cofrs Hackspill, ** L’ Angelologie 
Juive”’? in La Revue Biblique, 1902, 
PP. 527 sq. 

22° Non solum iustos, sed etiam 
peccatores, neque solos fideles, sed 


etiam infideles, neque solos bapti- 
gatos, sed etiam inbaptizatos habere 
angelos custodes, est communis sen- 
tentia theologorum et patrum, quos 
in priore assertione principali alle- 
gavimus.’ (De Angelis, VI, 17.) 


336 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 


dignitas animarum,” says St. Jerome, “ut una- 
quaeque habeat ab ortu nativitatis in custodiam sut 
angelum delegatum.” ?* Theodoret and Isidore 
of Sevilla base this belief on Christ’s dictum con- 
cerning little children, which we have quoted 
above.** Quite a number of the Fathers, it is 
true, speak of Guardian Angels only in connec- 
tion with pious Christians; but their utterances 
must not be interpreted in an exclusive sense; 
these Fathers merely wish to emphasize that 
every good Christian enjoys the special protection 
of a Guardian Angel, which does not exclude that 
God bestows the same paternal providence also 
upon the heathen and the sinner. 

The attitude of the Schoolmen on this ques- 
tion was Soy nen by the declaration of St. An- 
selm, that “every soul is committed to an An- 
gel at the moment when it is united with the 
body.” *° St. Thomas, proceeding from the prin- 
ciple that “the guardianship of the Angels over 
men is as it were the carrying into effect of divine 
Providence,” ** argues as follows: “Beneficia, 
quae dantur divinitus, ex eo quod est C hristianus, 
incipiunt a tempore baptismi, sicut perceptio 
Eucharistiae, et alia huiusmodi. Sed ea quae 


23 In Matth., 18, 10. 26 “ Angelorum custodia est quae- 

24 Supra, p. 333. dam executio divinae providentiae 

25 Elucid., II, 31: ‘‘ Unaquaeque circa homines,’ (S. Theol., 1a, qu. 
anima, dum in corpus mittitur, an- LVS mavtare) 


gelo committitur,” 


THE GUARDIAN ANGELS 337, 


providentur homini a Deo, in quantum habet 
naturam rationalem, ex tunc et exhibentur, ex 
quo nascendo talem naturam accipit; et tale 
beneficium est custodia angelorum. ... Unde 
statim a nativitate habet homo angelum ad sui 
custodiam deputatum.” *" Socrates’s assertion 
that he enjoyed the guidance of a tutelary spirit 
(Saonov) expresses a profound truth.2® 


Thesis IV: Every State and every ecclesiastical 
province has its own divinely appointed tutelary spirit. 


Proof. This thesis, which embodies merely a 
probable opinion, finds some slight support in the 
famous vision of Daniel,*® where the Archangel 
Michael battles side by side with Raphael as prin- 
ceps Iudaeorum, for the Israelites against two 
other Angels, who are called princes (5%) of the 
Persians and the Greeks. Of the four Angels en- 
gaged in this conflict three are expressly desig- 
nated as “princes” of certain nations or States. 
We must refer the reader to St. Thomas for an ex- 
planation as to how Angels can battle with one 
another on behalf of their clients.2° St. Basil 
commenting on the vision of Daniel says: ‘That 
there are certain Angels who are placed at the 


27h ec. 
28 Cfr. Manning, The Daemon of 
Socrates, London 1872. For a 


a proper translation) cfr. M. Louis, 
Doctrines Religieux des Philosophes 
Grecs, Paris 1910. 


lehgthy and attractive discussion of 
the ‘‘ Daimonion of Socrates” (for 
which he admits his inability to find 


29 Dan. X, 12 sqq. 
30 Summa Theologica, 1a, qu. 113, 
art. 8. 


338 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 


head of entire nations, is a fact which the 
wise Daniel heard from the Angel [Raphael], 
who spoke to him thus: The prince of the king- 
dom of the Persians resisted me, and behold 
Michael came to help me.” *! Some of the 
Fathers think that the “man of Macedonia’? who 
appeared to St. Paul in a vision and besought him 
to “pass over into Macedonia, and help us,” ®? 
was the tutelary Angel of the Macedonians.*? 
St. Michael, who is called “the Prince of Guard- 
ian Angels,’ was regarded as the tutelary spirit 
of the Jewish Synagogue; in the New Testament 
he is venerated as the special protector of the 
Catholic Church.** 

Certain Scriptural expressions * permit us to 
infer that churches, cities, and ecclesiastical prov- 
inces likewise have special tutelary spirits.** 

That we owe a duty of reverence to our 
Guardian Angel is taught by St. Bernard in 
these words: “Jn quovis diversorio, in quovis 
angulo, angelo tuo reverentiam habe.” *" 

READINGS: — Trombelli, Tratiato degli Angeli Custodi, Bo- 
logna 1747.— Berlage, Dogmatik, Vol. IV, §§ 26 sqq—De la 


31 Contr. Eunom., 1. III, n. 1. 
82 Acts XVI, 9. 
83 Cfr. Origen, Hom in Luc., 123 


St. Michael, his personality and his 
cult see F. G. Holweck in the Pas- 
toral-Blatt, St. Louis, Mo., 1910, 


St.. Ambrose, In Luc., 1. 12. 

84 Cfr. St. Thomas, Comment. in 
Quatuor Libros Sent., IV, dist. 43, 
art. 3, qu. 3: “* Ministertum iWud 
erit principaliter unius archangelt, 
scil. Michaelis, qui est princeps Ec- 
clesiae, sicut fuit Synagogae.” On 


No. 7, pp. 97 sqq. 

ShiCir ne. .5 Lach Lana. 

386 For a more detailed explana- 
tion see Suarez, De Angelis, VI, 
17. 

87 Serm. in Ps., 12, 90. 


THE GUARDIAN ANGELS 330 


Gerda, De Angelo Custode.— Albert. a Bulsano, Theol. Dogmat., 
t. I, pp. 321 sqq., Oeniponte 1893.— Chardon, L’Ange et le Prétre, 
Paris 1899.— S. J. Hunter, Outlines of Dogmatic Theology, Vol. 
II, 2nd ed., pp. 298 sqq—R. O’Kennedy, The Holy Angels, 
pp. 99-119, London 1887.— C. Gutberlet, Gott und die Schopfung, 
PP. 441 sqq., Ratisbon 1910—H. Pope, art, “ Guardian Angels ” 
in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VII. 


SECTION 3 


THE APOSTASY OF A NUMBER OF THE ANGELS 


AR DICTA sr 


THE FALLEN ANGELS OR DEMONS 


1. THE EXISTENCE oF Evit Spirits.—The 
Fall of the Angels was unlike that of man. The 
human race apostatized as a whole, because all 
men were virtually contained in Adam and con- 
sequently all contracted original sin through him. 
The fallen Angels sinned as individuals, each of 
his own accord, and thereby rendered themselves 
guilty of actual sin. 

The existence of evil spirits is an obvious in- 
ference from the revealed truth that a portion 
of the angelic host, who were all originally 
created in the state of sanctifying grace, rebelled 
against God and were cast into hell. “Diabolus 
et alu daemones a Deo quidem natura creatt sunt 
boni, sed ipst per se factt sunt mali,’ says the 
Fourth Council of the Lateran.’.. Our : Lord 
Himself says: “I saw Satan like lightning fall- 


1Caput “ Firmiter,’ quoted by Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n, 
428. 


340 


APOSTASY OF THE ANGELS 341 


ing from heaven.’ St. John in the Apocalypse 
gives a graphic description of his fall: “Cauda 
ews [scil. draconis| trahebat tertiam partem 
stellarum coeli et misit eas in terram. . . . Draco 
... prowectus est in terram et angeli eius cum 
illo missi sunt — And his tail drew the third part 
oft the stars of heaven, and cast them to the earth. 
vated they dragon) was cast’ mntetne 
earth, and his angels were thrown down with 
him.” * On the strength of this text certain 
mystically inclined theologians estimated the pro- 
portion of the fallen angels to those that remained 
faithful as 1:3. Whether this estimate be cor- 
rect or no, we may safely assume that the number 
of the faithful Angels exceeded those who fell 
away. 

The Bible consistently distinguishes between the 
“ Devil,’ or “Satan,” in the singular, and ‘“ demons,” 
in the plural number. Satan is described as the seducer, 
the demons as his victims. While the latter are desig- 
nated by the indefinite terms “demons” (daemones, 
Saipoves, Saipdua), or “unclean spirits” (spiritus impuri 
Ss. nequam, rvedpata axabapta % movnptas), their leader, 
“the prince of demons,” * is called by the proper name 
of “Satan” (cardy or catavas, [OW, i. e., an adversary) 
or “ Devil” (diabolus, 8:aBodos, i. e., slanderer or ac- 
cuser, from daBdddev, to traduce), and by such quasi- 


2 Luke X, 28.\ .\Cfr.) John -VII1; 4 Matth. IX, 34: “ princeps dae- 
44. ; moniorum.”’ 
3 Apoc. XII, 4. 


342 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 


proper names as Asmodeus,® Azazel, Beelzebub” and 
Belial. The name Lucifer does not occur in the Bible. 
Nor is there any Scriptural warrant for speaking of 
“ devils” in the plural number. There is but one Devil, 
though there are many demons or evil spirits. It is the 
teaching of Holy Scripture that the kingdom of Christ 
is opposed by a kingdom of evil ruled by the prince of 
this world, who is the father of lies, Leviathan or the 
“great dragon ... that old serpent, who is called the 
Devil and Satan, who seduceth the whole world.” 

From the psychological point of view it is a reasonable 
assumption that the apostasy of the Angels was instigated 
by one of their own number, most likely by the one who 
ranked highest both in natural and supernatural endow- 
ment,'* and that consequently the kingdom of evil orig- 
inated at the very summit of creation and thence spread 
over heaven and earth. 

What was the nature of the sin committed by the 
fallen angels? Fathers and theologians quite generally 
hold that it was pride; but they are not agreed as to its 
underlying motive. Some think the pride of the fallen 
angels was inspired by envy because of the great things 
which God had in store for the human race (elevation 
to the state of grace, the Hypostatic Union, Mary the 
Queen of Angels, and so forth). Others believe the in- 
ordinate desire of these angels to be like God prompted 
them to rise in mutiny against their Sovereign.” 


5/ Lob. TLEY 8, 

6 Lev. XVI, to. 

7 Luke XI, 15 ef passim. 

St2sCor. Vile sass 

9 Cfr. Petavius, De Angelis, III, 


Be 
10 Apoc. XII, 9. 
11 Among Christians he is pop- 
ularly known as “ Lucifer.”’ 


12 Hence the name of Michael 


(ON2" Quis est ut Deus?) On 
the cult and feast of St. Michael, 
cfr. F. G. Holweck in the Pastoral- 
blatt, St. Louis, July 1910. For a 
more detailed account of the doc- 
trine of the Fall of the Angels the 
student is referred to Suarez, De 
Angelis, VII, 10 sqq. 


APOSTASY OF THE ANGELS 343 


2. THE PUNISHMENT OF THE FALLEN AN- 
GELS.—It is an article of faith that the fallen 
angels in punishment for their crime were forth- 
with shorn of grace and cast into hell, where 
they have no hope of redemption. Sacred Scrip- 
ite, teaches; this expressly Ciny Qebeuiin a 
“Deus angelis peccantibus non pepercit, sed 
rudentibus inferni detractos in tartarum tradidit 
cruciandos — God spared not the angels that 
sinned, but delivered them, drawn down by in- 
fernal ropes, to the lower hell, unto torments.” 
Epistle of St. Jude 6: “Angelos vero, qui non 
servaverunt suum principatum, sed dereliquerunt 
suum domicilium, in iudicium magni diei vinculis 
aeternis sub caligine reservavit — And the angels 
who kept not their principality, but forsook their 
own habitation, he hath reserved under dark- 
ness in everlasting chains, unto the judgment of 
the great day.” The phrase “reserved unto the 
judgment of the great day” does not mean that 
the evil spirits have any chance of redemption, 
but merely indicates that their punishment will 
not be complete till after the Last Judgment, 
when they shall cease to harass men. 

The much-discussed theory that a time will 
come when all free creatures, demons and lost 
souls included, shall share in the grace of salva- 
tion ( dmoxataoracts mavroy) 18 was rejected as he- 


13 Latin, restitutio in integrum. and was taught among others by 
This doctrine originated with Origen St. Gregory of Nyssa. See the 


344 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 


retical in the first of the famous anathemas pro- 
nounced at the Council of Constantinople, A. D. 
543. Christ Himself implicitly condemned it 
when He spoke of the final judgment: “Dis- 
cedite a me, maledicti, in 1gnem aeternum, qui 
paratus est diabolo et angelis ems — Depart 
from me, you cursed, into everlasting fire which 
was prepared for the devil and his angels.” 
It is the almost unanimous opinion of theolo- 
gians * that, unlike man, the fallen angels were 
granted no time for repentance. 


ARTICLE, 2 


THE DEMONS IN THEIR RELATION TO THE HUMAN RACE 


While the good Angels are placed as guardians 
over men in order to help them to attain their tem- 
poral and eternal salvation, the Devil, who “was 
a murderer from the beginning,’ ’ by way of 
punishment for original sin, exercises a “reign 
of death” (imperium mortis) over the human 
race. This “reign of death’ manifests itself in 
three ways. | 

1. TEMPTATION TO Sin.—There are two 
species of temptation, known by the Scholastic 
names of tentatio probatioms and tentatio seduc- 


article ‘‘ Apocatastasis ’’ by P. Batif- 15 Salmeron is one of the very 
fol in the Catholic Encyclopedia, few exceptions. 
Vol. I. 1John VIII, 44. 


14 Matth. XXV, 41. 


THE FALLEN ANGELS 345 


tionis. The tentatio probationis aims at prov- 
ing the will, while the tentatio seductionts has 
for its ultimate object the ruin of the soul. It 
is quite plain that God cannot seduce men.’ 
When)He.:\“tempts’’\a’/many) Hey simply)) tries 
his faith,” as in the case of Adam and Abraham; 
which is quite compatible with His infinite holi- 
ness. Satan and his demons, on the contrary, 
continually strive by lies and false pretences to se- 
duce men to commit sin and thereby to incur eter- 
nal damnation. John VIII, 44: “Tile homicida 
erat ab initio et in veritate non stetit, quia non est 
veritas m eo; quum loqutur mendacium, ex 
proprus loqutur, quia mendax est et pater ems 
— He was a murderer from the beginning, and 
he stood not in the truth; because truth is not in 
him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of 
his own: for he is a liar, and the father thereof.” 
Gaxsiewoaniie lion, ) says; >t Peter, 7[ the Devil 
goeth about, seeking whom he may devour.” * 


Whether the demons have a hand in all the tempta- 
tions to which men are subject, is a problem regarding 
which the Fathers and theologians do not agree. What 
renders its solution difficult is the circumstance that, 
as Suarez has rightly pointed out, the underlying ques- 
tion is not one of power, but of fact. St. Thomas takes 
middle ground. He attributes all temptations to the in- 

2Cfr. the Epistle of St. James,. I, ter diabolus tamquam leo rugiens 
circuit, quaerens quem devoret.” 


« 81 Pet. V, 8: ‘“* Adversarius ves- 


23 


346 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 


direct influence of the Devil. “ Diabolus,” he says, “ est 
causa omnium peccatorum nostrorum, quia instigavit 
primum hominem ad peccandum, ex cuius peccato con- 
secuta est in toto genere humano quaedam pronitas ad 
omnia peccata. Et per hunc modum intelligenda sunt 
verba Damascent et Dionysu. Directe autem dicitur esse 
aliquid causa alicuius, quod operatur directe ad illud; 
et hoc modo diabolus non est causa omnis peccati. Non 
enim omnia peccata committuntur diabolo instigante; sed 
quaedam ex libertate arbitru et carnis corruptione.” * 


2. DEMONIACAL PossEssion.—God in His in- 
finite wisdom occasionally permits demons to take 
possession of the human body. Ascetic theology 
distinguishes three species of demoniacal posses- 
sion: (1) Circumsession, (2) obsession, and 
(3) possession in the strict sense of the term. 
Demoniacal possession, even in its highest stage, 
must not be conceived as analogous to the Hy- 
postatic Union, or the indwelling of the Holy 
Ghost in the souls of the just. It is no more 
than the relation of one who moves to him 
who is moved. We know that demoniacal pos- 
session is possible from Sacred Scripture and 
Tradition. Both in the Gospels and the Acts 
Christ and His Apostles are frequently described 
as expelling evil spirits from persons possessed by 
them (daemomiact, évepyovpevor), It is a blasphe- 
mous reflection upon the truthfulness and sanctity 


ANOLE HCOL Tas Cu wihiAartans: und thre Gegenmittel, 3rd ed., Frei- 
Cfr. Fr. Hense, Die Versuchungen burg 1902. 


DEMONIACAL POSSESSION 347 


of the Godman to assume, as some modern Ra- 
tionalists do,’ that Christ simply played the réle 
of a physician or magnetic healer to accommo- 
date Himself to the superstitions of the Jews. 
The Church placed herself squarely upon the 
ground taken by her Founder when she adopted 
various exorcisms into her liturgy and even es- 
tablished a special ordo of exorcists.? Cases 
of diabolical possession were frequent in the 
Apostolic age and for a long time thereafter.’ 
The Church still recognizes the possibility of 
demoniacal possession in her Pontifical. The 
indications of demoniacal possession are: “Ig- 
nota lingua loqui pluribus verbis vel loquentem 
intellgere; distantia et occulta patefacere; vires 
supra aetatis seu conditionis naturam ostendere, 
et id genus alia.’ Under the present discipline 
no exorcism may be performed without the ex- 
press mandate of the Bishop. This rule is in- 
tended to prevent mistakes and abuses, such as 
have occurred in the past and are likely to occur 
again. We know that in the Middle Ages epi- 
lepsy, impotence, and other diseases were fre- 
quently ascribed to demoniacal influence, and no 


5 Cfr. Barker Stevens, The The- 
ology of the New Testament, pp. 
76 sqq., Edinburgh 1gor1. 

6 Ordination to the office of exor- 
cist is the second of the four minor 
orders of the Western Church, 
Cfr. our dogmatic treatise -on the 
Sacrament of Holy Orders and the 


article *‘ Exorcist’? by P. J. Toner 
in Vol. V of the Catholic Ency- 
clopedia. 

7Ireneus, Adv. Haer., Il, 32, 4; 
Tertullian, Apol. c. 23. Cfr. Alex- 
ander, Demonic Possession in the 
New Testament, London 1902. 


348 CHRISTIAN ANGELOLOGY 


attention was paid to the fact that people who 
believe they are possessed by an evil spirit are 
often merely insane.® 

3. Brack Macic.—By black magic® theolo- 
gians understand the power of producing super- 
human effects without the codperation of God or 
the blessed Angels. If any such power really ex- 
ists, it must certainly be attributed to the in- 
fluence of evil spirits..° The possibility of hu- 
man intercourse with Satan cannot be denied 
in view of the many instances recorded, or 
assumed as true, in the New Testament. The 
medieval witch-baiters sinned grievously by ex- 
aggerating the power of the Devil, by neglecting 
the most elementary principles of sound psy- 
chology, and by proceeding with unpardonable 
carelessness and inhuman cruelty in the trial of 
persons accused of witchcraft. No period of 
the world’s history is characterized by so many 
insane superstitions and such a radical want of 
common sense as the terrible time during which 
thousands of supposed witches were tried, tor- 
tured, and executed for practicing sorcery.1! Of 
course, the theological principle that there are 


8 Cfr. Heyne, Uber Besessenheits- 
wahn bei geistigen Erkrankungs- 
zustanden, Paderborn 1904; W. H. 
Kent, art. ‘‘Demoniacs” in the 
Catholic Encyclepedia, Vol. IV. 

9“ White magic” is a natural 
art, based on an extraordinary fa- 
cility of doing things, 


10 On the pagan oracles and the 
false prophets of whom the Fathers 
so frequently speak, cfr. Palmieri, 
De Deo Creante, pp. 483 sqq. 

11 Cfr. J. Janssen, Geschichte des 
deutschen Volkes, Vol. VIII, Frei- 
burg 1895 (English ed. by A. M. 
Christie, Vol. XVI.) 


“‘DEMONIACAL POSSESSION 349 


demons and that they have the power. of injuring 
man in body and soul, is no more disproved by 
these medieval excesses than by the all too ready 
credence which in our own time thousands of 
well-meaning Catholics gave to the bogus rev- 
elations of Leo Taxil and his fictitious Diana 
Vaughan.” 


READINGS: — St. Anselm, “De Casu Diaboli—*St. Thomas, 
Quaest. Disp., De Daemonibus.— M. Psellus, De Daemonum Ope- 
yatione (reprinted in Migne, P. G., CXXII, 819 sqq.).—J. M. 
Platina, De Angelis et Daemonibus, Bononiae 1740.— M. Ger- 
bert, Daemonurgia Theologice Expensa, Friburgi 1776.— W. 
Schneider, Der neuere Geisterglaube, 2nd ed., Paderborn 1885.— 
Leistle, Die Besessenheit mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung der 
Lehre der Viéter, Dillingen 1887—-*M. Hagen, Der Teufel im 
Lichte der Glaubensquellen, Freiburg 1899.—Duhm, Die bdsen 
Geister im Alten Testament, 1904—S. J. Hunter, Outlines of 
Dogmatic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 302 sqq—R. O’Kennedy, The 
Holy Angels, pp. 39 sqq., 120 sqq., London 1887.— Spirago-Clarke, 
The Catechism Explained, 8th ed., pp. 147 sqq.— Delaporte-Sad- 
lier, The Devil: Does He Exist? And What Does He Do? New 
York 1904—N. Paulus, Hexenwahn und Hexenprogess, vor- 
nehmlich im 16. Jahrhundert, Freiburg 1910.— W. H. Kent, arti- 
cles “ Devil” and “ Demon” in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 
IV.— M: Ji O'Donnell, ‘art.’ Possession, > bid... Vol XIEs\ J.-P. 
Arendzen, art. “ Occult Arts,” ibid., Vol. XI— Habert, La Magie, 
Paris 1908.— R. Polz, Das Verhiltnis Christi zu den Damonen, 
Innsbruck 1907.—J. G. Raupert, Modern Spiritism, London 1904. 
—Ipem, The Supreme Problem, London 1911.—A. V. Miller, 
The Dangers of Modern Spiritualism, London 1908. 


12 Cfr. H. Gruber, S. J., Leo Tavil’s Palladismus-Roman, 3 vols., 
; Berlin 1897-8. zs 


, iN SoMa 


4 Haye 
Hi) nb Le | 


INDEX 


A 


ABELARD, 2064. 

Abraham, 345. 

Accident, 7. 

Accidentarians, The Lutheran, 
260. 

Acosmism, 23. 

Adam, Visions of, 115 sq.; Su- 
pernatural endowment of, 
124; The body of, not de- 
veloped from the animal 
kingdom, 127; Was not a 
hermaphrodite, 128; Was per- 
sonally created by God, 128; 
The first man, 134; Mani- 
chaean error concerning, 138; 
His supernatural state in 
Paradise, 183; Was endowed 
with sanctifying grace before 
the Fall, 196 sqq.; When was 
he raised to the state of su- 
pernatural grace? 199 sq.; 
Exempt by a special grace 
from concupiscence, 200 sqq.; 
Was he gifted with infalli- 
bility? 210 sq.; Was created 
in holiness, 222 sq.; Original 
sin contracted from Adam, 
not Eve, 279 sq. 

Adductio ex non esse ad esse, 
6 


Adiutoria Dei naturalia, 230. 
Albertus Magnus, 53, 170, 205. 
Albertus Pighius, 265, 267. 
Albigenses, 26, 50. 

Alexander of Hales, 236, 316. 
Alexander *V II); Popex 132, 177. 
Allegorism, 115. 


Alligation, The theory of, 276 


sqq. 

Amalric of Béne, 27. 

‘Auapria, 247 sq. 

Ambrosius Catharinus, 265, 267, 
269, 276. 
Ambrose, St., 
255,250. 
Anastasius II, Pope, 175 sqq. 
Angelology, Christian, 308 sqq.; 
Not borrowed from pagan- 

ism, 335. 

Angels, The, Created out of 
nothing, 12; God’s creative 
power not communicable to, 
54 saqq.; Were they instru- 
mental in the creation of 
man? 129; Role of in Scho- 
lastic philosophy, 308; His- 
tory of the, 309; Nature of 
the, 311 sqq.; Three Arch- 
angels known by name, 312; 
Created out of nothing, 312 
sq.; When created, 313 sq.; 
They are ptire spirits, 314 
sq.; Have often visibly ap- 
peared to men, 
“sons of God” 
‘ daughters: of) ten,” . 315° 
Teaching of the Fathers on, 
315 sq.; They are physically 
simple, essentially immortal 
and indestructible, 316; They 
possess intellect, 317 sq.; Are 
not endowed with cardio- 
gnosis, 317; They can com- 
municate their thoughts to 
one another, 317 sq.; Possess 
freewill, 318 sq. ; Damascene’s 


42, 52, 134, 160, 


351 


352 


definition of, 319; The An- 


gels by nature superior to- 


man, 320 sq.: Are able. to 
perform muiracula quoad nos, 
320; Number of, 321 sq.; Are 
they all of one species? 321 
sq.; Nine choirs of, 322 sqq.; 
Difference in rank, 323 sq.; 
The supernatural endowment 
of, 325 sqq.; Their santifica- 


tion contemporaneous with 
thetr “creation; 3275) Their 
probation, 328 sq.; The 


Guardian Angels, 330 sqq.; 
Apostasy of a number of the 
Angels, 340 sqq. 

Animals, Man’s disturbed rela- 
tion towards, in consequence 
of original sin, 290. 

Animal worship, 106. 

Anselm of Canterbury, St., 274, 
286, 301, 336. 

Anteperiodism, 113. 

Ante-solar days, 1109. 

Anthropology, Dogmatic, 124 
sqq. : 

Anticreationist heresies, 20. 

Anti-God, Theory of an evil, 


22. 

Antipodes, 136. 

Apocatastasis, 164, 343. 

Apollinaris, 138, 145, 166. 

Apostles’ Creed, The, 18, 38. 

Appetite, Twofold in man, 
203. 

Archangels, 312, 322, 323. 

Arguments for the existence of 
God also show that He is the 
absolute creator of the uni- 
verse, 8. 

Arianism, 146. 

Aristotle, 8, 17, 80, 177. 

Armenians, 168, 176. 

Arriaga, 267. 

Asmodeus, 342. 

Astronomy, 104, 105. 

Athanasian Creed, 146. 

Athanasius, St., 18, 19, 57, 141, 
202,250. 

Atheism, 23, 29, 93. 

Atomism, 149. 


INDEX 


“Auctorem fidei,” Bull, 224, 
304. 

Aufklirung, 94. 

Augustine, St.— On Gen. i, 1, 
14; For some time under the 
sway of dualistic error, 22; 
On’) John ing, 135. - On) the 
freedom of God’s creative 
will, 43, 46; On the creation 
of sinful creatures, 47; On 
the creation of the world not 
in time but with time, 52; 
Denies that an angel can 
create, 57; On divine Preser- 
vation, 65; On the divine 
Concursus, 71; On the finis 
operantis of creation, 83, 88; 
On creatio secunda, 101, 102; 
Teaches that the six days of 
creation were but a_ sin- 
gle moment, 107; Protests 
against a foolish way of 
reconciling faith and science, 
109; As an advocate of Con- 
cordism and Idealism, 118; 
On the ante-solar days, 119; 
On the Hexaémeron, 122; 
On the unity of the human 
race, 136; His dichotomic 
standpoint, 142; Drastic dic- 
tum against the Apollinarists, 
145; On the Hypnopsychites, 
151; On the immortality of 
the soul, 160; Against the er- 
rors of the Priscillianists, 
164; Inclines to Generation- 
ism, 169 sq.; Admits there is 
no eccles. tradition in favor 
of Generationism, 173 sq.; On 
the supernatural state of our 
first parents, 183; On the 
spiraculum vitae, 198; On the 
propagation of the human 
race, 202; On freedom from 
concupiscence, 202; On the 
bodily immortality of our 
first parents, 205; On the in- 
fused knowledge of Adam, 
207 sq.; On the origin of 
speech, 213; On the life of 
our first parents in Paradise, 


INDEX 


215 sq.; On the gravity of 
the first sin, 234 sq., 237; On 
infant baptism, 253; Against 
Pelagianism, 254; Defends 
St. Chrysostom, 256; Against 
Julian of Eclanum, 257 sq.; 
His teaching on original sin 
does not coincide exactly 
with that of St, Chrysostom, 
258; On original sin, 259; 
Teaches that it is not a sub- 
stance, 260 sq.; Jansenism 
can be refuted from his 
writings, 262 sqq.; All men 
sinned in one man, 273; On 
concupiscence as a secondary 
element of original sin, 278; 
On concupiscence as the in- 
strumental cause of original 
sin, 285. sq.; On “ free-will ” 
gitenm theuohalle 2057 Fis 
teaching misinterpreted by 
Jansenius, 297 sq.; On the lot 
of unbaptized children, 301; 
On the Angels, 311 sq.; On 
the sanctification of the An- 
gels, 327. 

Augustinians, The so-called, 
230, 301. 

Aureolus, 62, 

Averroés, 138, 152. 

Avitus of Vienne, 301. 

Azazel, 342. 


B 


BAIUS}, 593,223," 224, 225, '290, 
231, 243, 262, 265, 272, 320. 
Baptism, 135, 243, 244, 245, 252, 
253, 260, 264, 270, 335. 

Basil St.,) 51, (108; 213, 255, 250, 
258, 326, 333, 337. 

Bayle, 63. 

Beatitude merely a secondary 

‘end of Creation, 86. 

Beatific Vision, The, a super- 
natural prerogative, 190 sq. 

Beelzebub, 342. 

Being, Creation the production 
of being as being, 7. 

Belial, 342. 


353 


Bellarmine, Cardinal, 173, 265, 
282 Sq., 305, 306, 307, 334. 

Benedict XII, Pope, 168, 176, 

Bereschith, 14. 

Berlage, 63. 

Bernard, )St,,))316,, 338. 

Bible, Nature and the, both tell 
the history of Creation, 103 
sqq.; Not a text-book of sci- 
ence, 105; Speaks the lan- 
guage of the common people, 


105. 

Biel, Gabriel, 56, 205. 

Body, The human, An essential 
constituent of man, 137 sqq. 

Boker, 120 sq. 

Bonaventure, St., 53, 190, 205, 
209, 316, 331. 

“Book of Nature,” The, 104. 

Bossuet, 301. 

Bourdais, 114. 

Braga,. Council of, 26, 92, 164. 

Brahmans, 24. 

Brucker, +J.; 114 

Buckland, 112. 


C 


CABALISTS, 24. 

Cajetan, Cardinal, 129, 204, 235. 

Calvin, 262, 295. 

Caput “ Firmiter,’ 27, 20, 50. 

Carthage, Plenary Council of 
(AL DoS'418), 210," 240. 

Catechism, Roman, 64, 60, 71, 
327. 

Causae secundae, 67. 

Causality, God’s absolute, 3. 

Causa prima, 68. 

Causa universalissima, 58. 

Celestine I, Pope, 220. 

Chartres, School of, 27. 

Chemistry, 148. 

Cherubim, 322, 323, 332. 

Children, The lot -of unbap- 
tized, 300 sqq. 

Choirs of the Angels, 322 sqq. 

Christ, The “Second Adam,” 
130, 210, 247, 252; The Apol- 
linarists deny Him a rational 
soul, 145; Alone has a claim 


354 


to Divine Sonship, 193; Re- 
stored the lost state of jus- 
tice, 196 sq.; Not tainted by 
original sin, 281; The only 
man conceived sine opere 
virt, 286; Drove out demons, 


347. 

Chrysostom, St. John, 19, 65, 
93, IOI, 130, 255, 256, 257, 258, 
334- 

Circumsession, Diabolical, 346. 

Clement of Alexandria, 33 sq. 

Clement of Rome, St., 85. 

Clement XI, Pope, 224, 245. 

Co-Adamites, 131 sq. 

Coelestius, 239 sq., 255. 

Coelum et terra, 14, 15. 

Cohortatio ad Gentes, 18. 

Collins, 93. 

Cologne, Provincial Council of, 
43. 

Comparative Philology and the 
origin of speech, 212 sq. 

Concordance theories, 113. 

Concordism, 114 sq., 117, 118. 

Concupiscence, Freedom from, 
@ .gtace,; 188) 194) squs Our 
first parents: originally ex- 
empt from, 200 sqq.; Not a 
vigor naturae, 202; An in- 
ordinate inclination towards 
evil, 203; Became rebellious 
after the Fall, 217; Is not sin 
but of sin and inclines to sin, 
245; Not the essence of orig- 
inal sin, 261 sqq.; The part it 
plays in the transmission of 
original sin, 283 sqq.; Formal 
concupiscence of the flesh 
not the proper cause of the 
transmission of original sin, 
84 sq. 

Concurrence, Divine, 67 sqq.; 
Definition of, 67; Demon- 
strated from Revelation, 609; 
The controversy between 
Molinism and Thomism, 72. 

Concursus collatus, 74. 

Concursus divinus generalis, 67. 

Concursus oblatus, 73. 

Concursus praevius, 74, 77. 


INDEX 


Constantinople, Council of, 138, 
103 Sq., 344, 543. 

“Continued creation,” 62, 

Contract, The theory of, 276 
sq. 

Conversion of 
something, 6. 

Copernican world-view, The, 
105, 106, 210. 

Cornely, 150. 

Cosmogonies, The Mosaic and 
pagan, 13; The Mosaic and 
science, 104. 

Cosmology, Dogmatic, 98 sqq. 

Cosmos, Pantheism deifies the, 
23; The divine idea of the, 
32 Sqq. 

Creare, Meaning of the term in 
Gens 4,78: 25%) G0: 

Creation, The, God’s first work, 
1; A true conception of, in- 
dispensable, 1; Subjective 
and objective, 2; Considered 
as a divine act, 3 sqq.; The 
concept of explained, 4; Def- 
inition of, 4 sq.; Not a con- 
version, 6; Periphrastic def- 
inition of by St. Thomas, 7; 
Invariably results in  sub- 
stance, 7; Reason could have 
arrived at the concept of 
Creation without supernat- 
ural aid, 8; But de facto is 
indebted for it to Revelation, 
8; Futile objections raised 
against the dogma by infidel 
philosophers, 8; Creation a 
necessary conception, 9; 
‘Proof of the dogma, 9 sqq.; 
From Scripture, 10; The 
dogma enunciated in certain 
divine names, 10; In Gen. 1, 
1, 13; Proved from Tradi- 
tion, 17; Anti-creationist 
heresies, 220; Dualism, 21% 
Pantheism, 23; The dogma 
defined by the Vatican 
Council, 30; Explanation of 
the dogma, 32; The divine 
idea of, 32; In relation to 
the Trinity, 35 sqq.; Crea- 


nothing into 


INDEX 


tion properly appropriated 
to the Father, 38; Creation 
as a free divine act, 40 sqq.; 
libertate contradictionis, 41 
sqq.; libertate specifications, 
43 saqq.; But not Ilbertate 
contrarietatis, 46 sqq.; Crea- 
tion in time, 49 sqq.; Cre- 
ation from all eternity, 52 
saq.; Can’ creatures) create? 
54 sqq.; Final cause or end 
of, 79 sqq.; Finis operantis, 
SI sq.; Finis operis, 83 sqq.;3 
Creation passively consid- 
ered, 97 sqq. 

Creationism, 169 sqq.; Not a 
dogma in the strict sense, 173 
sqq.; But a theologically | cer- 
tain “truth, 177; And original 
sin, 281 sq. 

Creatio prima, 16, 98, 100 sq. 


Creatio secunda, 6, 16, 98, 100 
sq. 
Creative power, The, incom- 


municable, 54. 

Creator, The, 8. 

Creatura creatrix, 57. 

Creatures, All bear vestiges 
of the Trinity, 395. Spiritual 
creatures are real images of 
the Trinity, 40; Can they 
create? 55; Can be employed 
as instrumental causes in 
creating, 58; The happiness 
of, merely a secondary end 
of Creation, 86. 

Cross of Christ, The, 49. 

Curse, The divine, 235. 

Cyprian, St., 253 sq., 255, 258. 

Cyril of: Alexandria, St., 53, 


198. 
Cyril’ of Jerusalem, St.,. 32T. 
D 


Aaiuoviov, The, of Socrates, 337. 

Damascene, St, John, 56, 130, 
152, 198, 202, 319, a 

Daniel, 337. 

Darwin, 214. 


355 


Darwinism, 34, 127. 

David of Dinant, 27. 

(i Days; Ol ane shexacmeron, 
II3 sqq., 117 sqq. 

Death, 195, 237, 240, 245, 247, 
289 


Debitum naturae, 185. 

Decretum pro Iacobitis, 36. 

Deification, entailed by the pos- 
session of supernatural pre- 
rogatives, 188, 198. 

Deism, 92, 93. 

Deluge, The, 105, 113. 

Deluge theory, The, 112, 113. 

De Lugo, 266, 267, 268, 269. 

Demiurge, II, 17, 18, 127. 

Anuovpyia, 21. 

Demons, 340 sqq.; In their re- 
lation to men, 344 sqq. 

D’Envieu, Fabre, 135. 

Descartes, 83, 86, 142. 

Devil, The, Good by nature, 27; 
Envy of, the cause of death, 
206; Seduced our first par- 
ents, 233 sqq.; Original sin 
does not constitute man an 
incarnate image of the, 260 
sqq.; Humanity under the 
dominion of the, 290 sq.; 
There is but one, 341 sq.; 
Human intercourse with the, 
348. | 

Diabolical possession, 346 sqq. 

Dichotomy, 137, 138 sq. 

Diognetus, Epistle to, 160. 

Disposition, Divine, 91. 

Dodwell, 94. 

Dominations, 320, 322, 323, 332. 

Dominicus Soto, 277. 

Dominus coeli et terrae, It. 

Donum integritatis, 200, 204, 


215. 

Draper’s History of the Con- 
flict between Religion and 
Science, I05. 

Driedo, 301. 

Dualism, 20 sqq., 26, 100. 

Duns Scotus, 54, 204, 205. 

Durandus, 56, 67, 69, 204. 


356 
E 


EccLes. ili, 19, Not incompati- 
ble with the doctrine of im- 
mortality, 158 sq. 

Egyptians, 16. 

Eiwapuéevn, 92. 

Eleatians, The, 17, 23. 

Elements, Essential, of human 
nature, 137 sqq. 

Emanation, Theory of, 20, 24. 

Embryo, The human, 177 sq. 

Encyclopedists, French, 94. 

End, Definition of, 80; Final, 
of creation, 80 sqq. 

Endowment, Man’s_ supernat- 
ural in Paradise, 196 sqq. 

Energumenes, 346 sq. 

"Ep kal wav, 23. 

Ens ab alio, 3, 10, 62. 

EUS: G\SE.' 3.00: 

Ephesus, Council of, 242, 261. 

Ephrem, St., 101. 

"Eroupia, 138. 

Erasmus, 249. 

Esquimos, 135. 

Estius, 16, 172. . 

Eternity, Was the world cre- 
ated from? 52 sqq. 

Eucharist, The Blessed, 190. 

Euchites, 261. 

Eunomius, 213. 

Eusebius, I5I. 

Eve, Creation of, 129; Dignity 
of, 131; The first woman, 
133; Original sin not con- 
tracted from, 279 sq. 

Evil, 47, 181. 

Evil Spirits, Existence of, 340 
sqq.; Nature of their sin; 
342; Their punishment, 343; 
In their relation to the hu- 
man race, 344 sqq. 

Evolutionism, 24, 25. 

Exegesis and the Hexaémeron, 
117 sqq. 

Ex nihilo, True sense of the 
phrase, 6. 

Ex nihilo nihil fit, 8. 

Ex nthilo sui et subiecti, 5. 


INDEX 


"EE obK bpTwr, 6, 
Ezechiel’s vision, 144 sq. 


F 


Fatt, The, Of our first parents, 
233 sqq.; Of the Angels, 340 
sqq. 

Fate, 92. 

Faure, 301. 

Federalism, 276 sqq. 

Fichte, 25. 

Finis, 80. 

Finis operantis of Creation, 81 
sqq. 

Fims operis of Creation, 83 


Sqq. 
First and Second Creation, 100 


sq. 
Flesh, “ Rationality ” of, 146. 
Florence, Council of, 28, 36, 41, 
473) 304 
Fomes peccati, 244 sq. 
Forma cadaverica, 148. 
Forma corporeitatis, 147 sq. 
Formation of the universe, 6, 
98, 90. 
Fossils, 100. 
Francis of Assisi, St., 290. 
Franzelin, Cardinal, 229. 
Frassen, 267. 
Fredegis of Tours, 6. 
Freemasonry, Deism in, 94. 
Freethinkers, 93. 
Freewill, 137, 222, 242; 
dogma of, 291 sqq. 
Frohschammer, 171. 
Fulgentius, 301. 


G 


GALILEI controversy, The, 104. 

Gen, i, I, analysis of, 14 sq., 17, 
50; Sense of, never defined 
by the Church, 107. 

Generation, Defined, 5; Sexual, 
161 sqq.; Asexual, 202; Orig- 
inal sin transmitted by nat- 
ural, 280 sq.; Sexual, not the 
proper cause of the trans- 
mission of original sin, 284 


sq. 


The 


INDEX 


Generationism, 166 
sqq. 

Genius albus, 335. 

Genius niger, 335. 

Gennadius, 328. 

Geocentric world-view, 101. 

Geology, 104, 105. 

Geometry, 107. 

Gerson, 332. 

Gietmann, 158. 

ae obiectiva and formalis, 

= 

Glorification of God, the ulti- 
mate object of Creation, 85. 

Glory, 192. 

Glossner, 291. 

Gnostics, The, 17, 18, 21, 24, 20, 
48, 127, 138. 

Gnosticus intuitus, 24. 

God, Self-existing, 3; The 
cause of the universe, 8; As 
Yahweh, 10; As Dominus 
coeli et terrae, 11; As De- 
miurge, 11; The Creator of 
the invisible world, 12; The 
God of the Old Testament vs. 
the God of the New, 21, 29; 
His creative wisdom, 33; 
Creation properly appropri- 
ated to the Father, 38; His 
freedom in creating the 
world, 45; Incommunicabil- 
ity of His creative power, 54; 
Creation never attributed to 
any one but God, 55; He will 
never withdraw His preserv- 
ing influence from the uni- 
verse, 66; Alpha and Omega, 
82; His object in creating the 
universe, 81; His Providence, 
gl; He is the “highest na- 
ture,” 181. 

‘Goethe, 25. 

Golden Age, The, 216. 

Gonet, 75. 

Grace, The state of, as distin- 
guished from beatific vision, 
191 sq.; Its concomitants in 
Paradise, 216 sq.; Voluntary 


sqqd., 173 


357 


privation of, the essence of 
original sin, 269 sqq. 

Grammar as a scientific aid in 
exegesis, 108. 

“Grand Architect of the Uni- 
verse,” 94. 

Gregory Nazianzen, 35, 255, 
258. 

Gregory of Nyssa, 130, 160, 108, 
2025213, 

Gregory of Rimini, 264, 301. 

Gregory the Great, 65, 72, 301, 


eu 
Guardian Angels, 330 sqq. 
Gubernatio mundi, 91. 
Gunther, 86, 138, 144. 
Gutberlet, 112. 


H 


HATRED, 134. 

Hebrew language, 
Adam receive it 
from God? 212. 

Hegel, 25, 214. 

Hell, 80, 304 sq., 343. 

Hengstenberg, 112. 

Henno, 267. 

Henry of Ghent, 62, 264. 

Heraclitus of Ephesus, 25. 

Heresies, Anticreationist, 20. 

Hermas, Pastor of, 18, 335. 

Hermes, 86, 171, 265. 

Hermogenes, 18. 

Hexaémeron, Distinctio and 
ornatus, 99; In its relation to 
science, 103 sqq.; Its purpose 
strictly religious, not scien- 
tific, 105 sqq.; Susceptible of 
many different interpreta- 
tions, 106; None adopted by 
the Church,. 106; The Hex- 
aémeron is a negative guid- 
ing principle for scientists, 
107; Scientists free to inter- 
pret it in any reasonable and 
moderate way, 111 sqq.; Dif- 
ferent theories of, I12 sqq.; 
And exegesis, 117 sqq.; Cre- 
ation of man towards the end 
of the, 128. 


The, Did 
directly 


358 


Heyse, 214. 

Hilary,.,St., 258. 

Hippolytus, St., 42. 

Hoberg, 115. 

Holy Ghost, 346. 

Hugh of St. Victor, 190. 

Hume, David, 94. 

Hummelauer, J. 7:(S) (J... 114, 
TIS, 116: 

Hyle, An eternal, uncreated, 6, 
10, 18, 20, 21, 53; An abso- 
lutely evil principle, 239. 

Hylomorphism, 147, 148. 

Hylozoism, 20, 24, 25. 

Hypnopsychites, 151 sq. 

Hypostatic Union, The, 
190, 342, 340. 


I 


146, 


IpEA of the Cosmos, The di- 
vine, 32 sqq. 

Idealism, 114 sq., 118. 

Idealist theories, 114 sq. 

Illyricus, M. Flacius, 260. 

Immaculate Conception, 177. 

Immortality, Of spiritual sub- 
stances, 66; Of the human 
soul, 151 sqq.; Proved from 
Revelation, 155 sqq.; From 
Tradition, 160 sqq.; Bodily, 
a supernatural prerogative, 
194 sq.; Our first parents be- 
fore the Fall were endowed 
with bodily, 205 sqq.; The 
Church’s teaching on the 
bodily immortality of our 
first parents, 225; Of the An- 
gels, 316, 

Impassibility, a supernatural 
prerogative, 194 sq.; Enjoyed 
by our first parents in Para- 
dise, 214 sqq. 

Incarnation, Probable belief of 
our first parents in the, 200. 

Incommunicability of the cre- 
ative power, 54. 

Indebitum naturae, 186, 194. 

Indestructibility of the human 
soul, 154; Of the Angels, 316 
sq. 


INDEX 


Indians, North American, 135. 

Infallibility, Was Adam gifted 
with? 210 sq. 

Infant Baptism, 243 sq., 253; 
270. 

Infusion of the soul into the 
body, 176 sq. 

Innocent III, Pope, 303. 

Innocent X, Pope, 224. 

Integrity, The gift of, 200; 
Possessed by our first par- 
ents, 202, 215; The loss of, 
a penalty of original sin, 284. 

Intelligentiae, 317. 

Ionian philosophers, 25. 

Interperiodism, 113. 

Ireneus, St, 18, 42, 88, 160, 
108)/, 201, 1255: 

Isaias, 322. 

Isidore of Sevilla, 336. 


Af 
JANSENISM, 223 sq., 242 sqq., 
262, 278, 205. 
Jansenius, 183, 223, 224, 243, 
262, 206, 297. 
Jerome, Sti 71) O8n g0s kya 


339. 
Jews, The, Their belief in 
Creation, 13; In immortality, 


155 sqq. : 

Job, His belief in personal im- 
mortality, 156 sq. 

Jona Tt, kage: 

John, St., Logos-doctrine of, 34. 

John, St., of Damascus. (See 
Damascene. ) 

John the Baptist, St., 281. 

John Scotus Eriugena, 24. 

Julian of Eclanum, 253, 256, 
257, 258. 

Justification, 252, 268, 271, 335. 

Justin Martyr, St., 11, 17, 35, 
142, 160 


K 


KAnrT, 86, 94, 165. 
Kaulen, Fr., 212. 
Kilber, 267. 

King, 86. 


INDEX 


Klaatsch, 132. 

Klee, 63, 171. 

Kleutgen, Jos. (S.J.), 173, 176. 

Knowledge, Infused, of our 
first parents, 207 sqq. 

Knoodt, 182. 

Kéoyos, 97. 

Kécopos vontés — kécpos acOnrés, 


34 
Kunstle, K., 26. 
Kupwos, 6, 11. 
Koartz,; (115: 


L 


LACTANTIUS, 134, 136, 167. 

Languages, 212. 

Lateran, Fourth Council of the, 
27, 47, 50, 55, 312, 313, 3403 
Fifth Council of the, 143, 153, 
176. 

Leibniz, 45, 142. 

Leo the Great, 26, 165, 174, 184. 

Leo X, Pope, 143, 153, 176 sq. 

Lessing, 94. 

Lessius, 89. 

Liberatore, 77. 

Liberty, 2091. 
will.) 

Liturgism, I15. 

Adyot ovovdrrool, 34, 

Logos, The Divine, 5, 26, 35, 37, 
40, 51, 138, 193, 200. 

Lucifer, 342. 

Lumen gloriae, 192. 

Lusus naturae, 109. 

Luther, 262, 265, 293. 


(See also Free- 


M 


MAASSEN, Fr., 175. 

Macedonia, 338. 

Machabees, The Mother of the, 
12 sq. 

Magic, 348 sq. 

Maher, M. (S.J.), 214. 

Man, The nature of, 126 sqq.; 
The origin of, 126 sqq.; The 
first man immediately created 


359 


by God, 127 sqq.; The Crea- 
tion: of, 1277) 'saq:;, Called 
pukpdeos, 130; All men de- 
scended from Adam and 
Eve, 131 sqq.; Essential con- 
stituents of, 136 sqq.; Dichot- 
omy proved from Scripture, 
139 sqq.; Has an immortal 
soul, 151 sqq.; Things due to 
him as man, 228 sq.; His de- 
fection from the supernatural 
order, 232 saqq. 

Mani, 21. 

Manichaeism, 109, 21, 22, 26, 28, 
20,48, 127, 138,238 Sau, 200, 


313: 
Mankind, Descended from 
Adam and Eve, 131. 
“Man of Sorrows,’ The, 49. 
Marcion, 19, 21. 
Marriage not derived from 
original sin, 202. 
Mary, Blessed Virgin, 281, 342. 
Mass, The, 59. 
Materia informis, tot. 
Materialism, 20, 29, 93, 154. 
Materia praeiacens, 5, 6 
Materiarii, The, Io. 
Melanchthon, 262. 
My dy, 6 
Messalians, 261. - 
Metamorphoses, Ovid’s, 13. 
Metempsychosis, 165 sq. 
Michael, Archangel, 337, 338, 


342. 
Mileve, Council of, 219, 240, 


243. 

Mill, John Stuart, 22. 

Miracles, 59, I11, 182, 190, 320. 

Mivart,St..G,, 127;)130,\131. 

Molecules, 101. 

Molinism, On the divine Con- 
cursus, 72 sqq. 

Moneta, Ven., 170. 

Monism,*20;':22.)1 5). 

Monogenism, Christian, 132. 

Morgan, Thomas, 93. 

Mosaic account of the Creation, 
The, 13; Historic character 
of, 116 sq. (See also Hex- 
aémeron. ) 


360 


Moses, 10, 52, 116, 130, 250, 251, 
Rao 
Muller, Max, 214. 
N 


NAMES, Deeper meanings of 
God’s, 10 sqq. 

Naturalism, 94. 

Nature, and the Supernatural, 
180 sqq.; Explanation of the 
term: Natures t8rusqa,- 
Definition of, 185; The state 
of pure, 228 sqq.; The state 
of fallen, 227; The state of 
repaired, 227; How “wound- 
ed” by original sin, 298 sqq. 

Neanderthal race, 132. 

Necessity, Historical, 292. 

Negroes, 132. 

Nemesius, 164. 

Neo-Platonists, 24, 26. 

Neptunists, 105. 

Nicephorus Callistus, 152. 

Norisius, Cardinal, 173. 

Noes, 317, 

Novs, 138, 317. 


O 


OBSESSION, 346. 

Occasionalism, 67. 

Ockam, 138. 

Odo of Cambrai, 275. 

Oischinger, 171. 

Olivi, Petrus Ioannis, 142, 

Olympius, 255. 

Omnipotence, God’s, 57. 

Onomatopoeia, 212. 

Optimism, Absolute, 45; Rela- 
tive, 46. 

Orange, Second Council of, 220, 
242. 

Ordines angelorum, 323. 

Ordo naturalis, 185. 

Original justice, State of, 216 
80d), 227, 

Origen, 51, 65, 82, 152, 164, 215, 
230,'253,'331, 334.’ 

Original Sin, Marriage not a 
result of, 202; Heresy of the 


INDEX | 


Pelagians concerning, 218 
sqq.; State of, not identical 
with the state of pure nature, 
229 sq.; The doctrine of, ex- 
pounded, 232 sqq.; The sin 
of Adam as the first sin, 233 
sqq.; Heretical Theories con- 
cerning, 238 sqq.; Tridentine 
decree on, 243 sqq.; Scrip- 
tural proof for, 245 sqq.; 
Traditional proof for, 253 
sqq.; The nature of, 259 sqq.; 
Does not descend as a sub- 
stantial form from Adam to 
his progeny, 260 sqq.; Is not 
a substance, 260 sq.; Con- 
cupiscence not the essence of, 
261 sqq.; Not identical with 
concupiscence, 264 sq.; No 
morbida qualitas, 264; Does 
not consist exclusively in the 
extrinsic imputability of the 
actual sin of Adam, 265 sqq.; 
Consists essentially in priva- 
tion of grace, 269 sqq.; Why 
does the sin of Adam in- 
here as a true sin in all his 
descendants? 273 sqq.; The 
contractual and _ alligation 
theories, 276 sqq.; How it is 
transmitted, 279 sqq.; Its 
specific unity, 279; Derives 
from Adam, 279 sq.; Trans- 
mitted by natural generation, 
280 sq.; And Creationism, 
281 sq.; The part played by 
concupiscence in the trans- 
mission of, 283 sqq.; The 
penalties of, 286 sqq.; Ef- 
fects of, in the status termimi, 
300 sqq. 

Oswald, so. 

Ovcia mpwrn, 181. 

Over-soul, The universal, 152. 

Ovid, 13. 


P. 


PAEDO-BAPTISMUS. 
Baptism. ) 
Paleontology, 104. 


(See Infant 


INDEX 


Palmieri, 46, 267. 

Pancosmism, 23. 

Panlogism, 26. 

Panpsychism, 146. 

Pantheism, Its teaching, 8, 20, 
23; Cosmological and_onto- 
logical, 23 sqq.; Its influence 
on modern thought, 25; Sup- 
plants Manichaeism, 29; Con- 
demned by the Vatican Coun- 
cil, 30; Differs from Deism, 
93, 94; Incompatible with 
the dogma of Creation, 106; 
Denies the immortality of 
the soul, 154 sq.; The, of 
later Protestant divines, 222. 

Tlav Oeds, 23. 

Paradise a garden of pleasure, 


216; 

Parents, Our first, Exempt by 
a special grace from_con- 
cupiscence, 200 sqq.; Were 
they blind? 201; Were they 
infants? 201; Their natural 
integrity, 202; Were they 
able (in Paradise) to com- 
mit venial sin? 204; Fall of, 
233 sqq.; Were they ulti- 
mately saved? 238. (See 
also Adam and Eve.) 

Passibility, A penalty of orig- 
inal sin, 289. 

Pastor of Hermas, The, 18. 

Pattern, 33. 

Paul, St., 16, 42, 70, 88, 163, 172, 
192, 197, 201, 206, 209, 247, 
249, 252, 257, 262, 263, 271, 
289, 290, 204, 206, 312, 314, 
322, 330, 332, 338. 

Pelagianism, 218 sqq., 239 Sdq., 
254, 281, 326. 

Pelagians, 71, 169, 202, 218 sqqd., 
239, 246, 253, 256, 302. 

Periodism, 113 sq. 

Peripatetic theory of the ele- 
ments, I0f. 

Pessimism, 48. 

Petavius, 301. 

Peter Lombard, 58, 170, 199, 
285. 

Peter, St..)'333, 345." 

24 


361 


Petrifactions, 100. 

Peyrére, Isaac, 132, 134. 

Pdpuakov THs dPavacias, 207. 

Philo, 6, 215. 

Physical premotion. (See prae- 
motio physica.) 

Physics, 105, 148. 

Pistoia, Pseudo-council of, 224, 
303. 

Pius V, Pope, 224, 245. 

Pius. ‘Vi, (Pope, 245,' 303: 

Pitts LX Pope; 440) 177: 

Platel, 267. 

PISO Geni Nyd Sad 73 2Eu SaaS, 
137,202. 

Plutonists, 105. 

Poetism, I15. 

Pomponazzi, 152. 

Positivism, 20. 

Possession, Demoniacal, 
sqq. 

Postperiodism, I13. 

Potentia obedientialis, 188 sqq. 

Powers, 320, 322, 323. 

Praemotio physica, 75. 

Pre-Adamites, 131 sq., 134, 135 
sq. 

Pre-existence, Theory of, 162 
sqq., 238. 

Preservation, Divine, 61 sqq.; 
‘The nature of, 62; Not mere- 
ly negative, 63; Proved from 


346 


Scripture, 64; Active and 
passive, 64. 
Preternatural, The, 187 sq.; 


Prerogatives, 194. 
Principalities, 322, 323. 
Principium sine principio, 38, 


51. 
Priscillian and Priscillianism, 
22, 26, 164, 238. 
Privatio gratiae, 269 sqq., 288. 
Probation, Precept of, 233 sqq: 
Processes, Formative, 5, 7. 
Production, Modes of, 5. 


-Prophecies, 190. 


Protestantism, Heretical teach- 
ing of, on original sin, 221 
sqq., 242 sqq. 

Protoevangelium, The, 155. 

Protyle, 6. 


362 


Providence, Divine, 91 sqq.; 
Definition of, 91; How re- 
lated to the divine govern- 
ment of the world, 91; The 
dogma, 92. 

“Providentissimus Deus,” En- 
cyclical,: 111, 

Pseudo-Clement, 160. 

Pseudo-Dionysius, 323, 324, 331, 
332. 

Ptolemy, 106, 


Pure Nature, The state of, 
(See Nature.) 
Q 

QUESNEL, 223, 224, 225, 243, 262. 
R 


RAPHAEL, Archangel, 337, 338. 

Rationalism, 94. 

Rationes rerum, 34. 

Reason might have arrived at 
the concept of Creation, but 
in matter of fact did not, 8. 

Redeemer, The, 4o. 

Redemption, The, 135, 217, 


227. 
Reign of death, The, 291, 344. 
Restitution theory, 112. 
Reticius, 255. 

Revelation, Reason indebted to, 
for the true concept of Cre- 
ation, 8, 

Richard of St. Victor, 53. 

Rickaby, Jos. (S.J.), 308. 

“Riddle of the painful earth,” 
The, 48. 

Ripalda, 193. 

Rosmini, 171, 

Rufinus, 173. 

Ruiz, 46, 93. 

Rupert of Deutz, 316. 


S 


SABBATH, The, 106, 116, 121. 
Sacraments, The, 190. 
‘Salmeron, 267, 344. 
Samuel, 157. 


INDEX 


Satan, also 


Wevsdoui sq: 
Devil.) 

Saul, 157. 

Sayce, 214. 

Schell, 148, 205. 

Schelling, 25, 165. 

Schepss, G., 22. 

Schiffini, 148. 

Schleicher, 214. 

Schleiermacher, 222, 

Schmid, Fr., 307. 

Schopenhauer, 48. 

Schwalbe, 132. 

Science, Habitual infused, A 
supernatural prerogative, 194 
sq.; Possessed by our first 
parents, 207 sqq. 

Scientia media, 74. 

Scientists as exegetes, 104. 

Scotists, The, Their doctrine of 
the forma corporeitatis, 147 
sq.; On the immortality of 
the soul, 151; On the eleva- 
tion of Adam to the state of 


grace, 199 sq. 
Scotus, Duns. (See Duns Sco- 
(See John 


tus.) 

Scotus Eriugena. 

Scotus Eriugena.) 
Seisenberger, M., 114. 
Self-existence, God’s, 10, ine 
Semen spirituale, 168. 
Semi-Pelagians, 220. 
Seraphim, 322, 323, 326, 332. 
Serpent, The, in Paradise, 234. 
Severian of Gabala, 100. 
Shame, 200. 

Sheol, 156. 

Sin, 28, 45, 47, 68, 181, 200, 236, 
245, 344. (See also Original 
Sin.) 

Socrates, 337. 

Sola fide, Protestant theory of 
justification, 222, 

Solomon, 210. 

Sonship, Divine, 192, 193. 

Sorcery, 348. 

Soul, The human, Is not merely 
a more highly developed 
form of the brute soul, 127; 
The spiritual soul an essen- 


(See 


INDEX 


tial constituent of man, 137 
sqq.; Man has but one, 140 
sq.; The principle of thought, 
141 sq.; The spiritual soul 
the immediate substantial 
form of the body, 142 sqq.; 
Immortality of the, 151 sqq.; 
Does it sleep after death till 
the Resurrection? 151 sq.; 
The soul an image of God, 
157; Origin of the, 161 sqq.; 
Generationism unacceptable, 
166 sqq.; Creationism the 
only true theory, 169 sqq.; 
Infused into the body, 176 
sq.; When infused, 177 sq. 

Soul-sleep, Theory of, 152. 

South Sea Islands, Aborigines 
OF, (132: 

Space in its relation to Crea- 
tion, 9. 

Speech, Origin of, 211 sqq. 

Spencer, Herbert, 9, 25. 

Spinoza, Baruch, 24, 146. 

Spiraculum vitae, 140, 198. 

Spiration, 5. 

Stagirius, 93. 

Star worship, 106. 

States of man, The different, 
226 sqq.; Historic, 226 sq.; 
Possible, 227 sq. 

Stattler, 86. 

Status termini, IQI. 

Status viae, 191. 

Steinthal, 214. 

Stenzel, A., 112. 

Stoa, The, 17. 

Suarez, 58, 76, 112, 307, 332, 335, 


345. 

Substance, Creation results in 
7; Creatures are not emana- 
tions of the divine, 24; When 
A ahh with Nature, 
181. 

Substantia intrinsece superna- 
turalis, Possibility of a, 193. 

Substantiarians, The Lutheran, 
260, 261. 

Succession, 6 sq. ‘ 

Suffering, A penalty of original 
sin, 289. 


363 


Supernatural Order, Preroga- 
tives of the, 190 sqq. 

Supernatural, The, in man, 179 
sqq.; Definition of, 180 sqq.; 
Not synonymous with spirit- 
ual, 182; Definition of the 
term, 186 sqq.; Two species 
of, 187 sq.; The Preternat- 
ural, 187; The strictly super- 
natural, 188; Prerogatives, 
190 sqq. 

Sylvius, Francis, 287, 301. 


i 


TATIAN, 51. 

Taxil, Leo) 340. 

Temptation to sin, 344 sqq. 

Tertullian, 10 sq., 12, 18, 19, 35, 
85, 130, 152, 160, 166 sq., 173, 
175, 255- 

Gelwots, 188, 108. 

Theodore Abucara, 168. 

Theodoret, 93, 336. 

Theophilus of Antioch, 18. 

Theosophy, 20. 

Thomas, St., Definition of Cre- 
ation; 73 On Elebs! 11134 17: 
On the divine idea of the 
cosmos, 33; On the divine 
Processions, 37; On the eter- 
nity of the world, 54; Teach- 
es that pure being can be 
created only by the causa 
universalissima, 58; And that 
a creature cannot even be an 
instrumental cause in creat- 
ing, 59; And that being is the 
essence of God alone, 65; On 
co-operation between God 
and the creature, 68, 73; St. 
Thomas and Thomism, 74; 
On the formation of the uni- 
verse, 99; On St. Augustine’s 
interpretation of the Hexae- 
meron, 102; Explains why 
the Bible is written in un- 
scientific language, 106; Pro- 
tests against a foolish way of 
reconciling faith and science, 


304 


IIO sq.; On the Hexaémeron, 
118 sq.; On the creation of 
man, 129; On the forma cor- 
boris, 147; Paves the way for 
Creationism, 169 squei On 
the potentia obedientialis, 
189; On concupiscence, 194 
sq-; On impassibility, 195; 
On Adam’s -elevation to the 
State of grace, 199; Holds 
that our first parents (in 
Paradise) could not commit 
venial sin, 205; On _ the 
knowledge of our first par- 
ents before the Fall, 200 
sq.; On the infallibility of 
Adam, 211; On the mys- 
tery of original sin, 274 
sq.; On concupiscence as 
a secondary constituent of 
original sin, 277; On the 
transmission of original sin, 
280, 282; On Christ’s im- 
munity from original sin, 
281 ; On the penalties of orig- 
inal sin, 286; On concupis- 
cence as the material com- 
ponent of original sin, 289; 
On the influence of original 
sin on human nature, 209; 
On the punishment due to 
original sin, 305; On the lot 
of unbaptized children, 306 
sq.; On the Angels, 308; 
Holds that they converse by 
a_mere act of the will, 318; 
Holds that each Angel con- 
stitutes a distinct species, 
321 sq.; On the sanctification 
of the Angels, 327; On the 
orders of the Angels, 331 sq.; 
On the Guardian Angels, 336 
sq.; On temptation, 345 sq. 
Thomism, On the divine Con- 
cursus, 74 sqq.; On the ques- 
tion: When was Adam 
raised to the state of super- 
natural grace? 199 sq.; On 
the state of pure nature, 230 


sq. 
Ovpos, 138, 


INDEX 


Thrones, 322, 822; 332. 

Timeus, Plies is 

Time in its relation to Crea- 
tion, 49 sqq. 

Tindal, 93. sip 

Tobias, 331. 

Tohu-vabohu, ris, 

Toland, 93. 

Toletus, Cardinal, 267, 22) 

Traducianism, 166 sqq. 

Poner tipi. 301, 302, 

Transmigration of souls, 165 
sq. 

Transmission of original sin, 
Mode of, 279 sqq. 

Transubstantiation, 66. 

Tree of knowledge, 206 Sq., 
234, 235. 

Tree of life, 235. 

Trent, Council of, 47, 109, 222 
Sq., 243 Sqq., 262, 263, 268 sq., 
270, 278, 279, 290, 201, 293, 
302. 

Trichotomy, 138, 139, 142. 

Trinity, The dogma of Crea- 
tion in its relation to the, 35 
sqq.; The Trinity as Creator, 
38; Vestiges of the, in all 
creatures, 38 sqq.; Rational 
creatures bear the image of 
the, 40; Nature vs. hyposta- 
sis in the, 182; Our first 
parents probably had a be- 
lief in the, 200. 

Turribius, 165. 


U 


“ UNIGENITUS,” Bull, 224. 

Unity of the human race, 126 
sqq.; Is a Catholic doctrine, 
131 sq.; How safeguarded, 
130. 

Universe, The, Essentially an 
ens ab alio, 3; Beginning of 
the, 4; Formation, 6: God 
the cause of the, 8; The di- 
vine idea of the, 32: The 
best in a relative sense, 46; 
Was it created from all eter- 
nity? 52, 


INDEX 


V 


VALENTIUS, 19. 

Vatican, Council of the, 29, 50, 
82,/93,792,- 131,155, 313. 

Vaughan, Diana, 340. 

Verbal theory, 112. 

Vestiges of the Trinity in all 
creatures, 38. 

Vienne, Council of (A.D. 
7211), 142. 140. Ssqa. 

Vigilius of Salzburg, 136. 

Vigouroux, F., 114. 

Vincent of Lerins, 255. 

Virtues, 320, 322, 323. 

Vision theory, I15 sqq. 

Vock, 183. 

Vosen, I12, 

Vulneratio naturae, 208 saq. 


W 


Wacner, A., I12\ 
Westermayer, A., 113. 
Whitney, Prof., 214. 

Will, The human, 203, 204. 


365 
Winchell, 132. 
Wiseman, Cardinal, 112. 
Witchcraft, 348. 
Woman, Creation of, 129; 
Promise of redemption 


through the seed of the, 156. 

World, The beginning of the, 
4; Not “metamorphosed 
nothingness,” 9; God _ the 
Creator of the visible as well 
as the invisible, 12; The 
theory of an absolutely per- 
fect, 45; Was it created from 
all eternity? 52. 


iy 
YAHWEH, I0. 
Z 


ZACHARIAS, Pope, 136. 
ZigiiaraiGard.i77: 
Zosimus,- Pope, 219, 241. 
Zwingli, 243, 264, 265. 


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